Fausett v. Mule Creek State Prison, et al.

Filing 136

ORDER signed by Chief Judge Roger L. Hunt on 4/12/11 ORDERING 101 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; and 109 110 and 111 Motion for Summary Judgment are denied. CASE CLOSED. (Matson, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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***

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MICHAEL FAUSETT,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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LEBLANC, et al.,
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Defendants.
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_______________________________________)

Case No.: 2:08-cv-01724-RLH-VPC
ORDER
(Motion for Summary Judgment–#101;
Motion for Summary Judgment–#109;
Motion for Summary Judgment–#110;
Motion for Summary Judgment–#111)

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Before the Court is Defendants LeBlanc, Nale, Martinez, Galloway, and Naseer’s

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Motion for Summary Judgment (#101, filed Dec. 20, 2010). The Court has also considered

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Plaintiff Michael Fausett’s Opposition (#122, filed Feb. 15, 2011), and Defendants’ Reply (#128,

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filed Feb. 22, 2011).

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Also before the Court is Plaintiff Fausett’s Motion for Summary Judgment

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(#109, filed Dec. 22, 2010) against Defendant LeBlanc. The Court has also considered Defendant

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Leblanc’s Opposition (#120, filed Feb. 14, 2011), and Fausett’s Reply (#133, filed Mar. 17, 2011).

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Also before the Court is Plaintiff Fausett’s Motion for Summary Judgement

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(#110, filed Dec. 22, 2010) against Defendant Nale. The Court has also considered Defendant

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Nale’s Opposition (#118, filed Feb. 10, 2011). Fausett did not reply.

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Finally, before the Court is Fausett’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#111, filed

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Dec. 22, 2010) against Defendant Martinez. The Court has also considered Defendant Martinez’s

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Opposition (#119, filed Feb. 14, 2011), and Fausett’s Reply (#133, filed Mar. 17, 2011).

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BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff Michael Fausett is a prison inmate at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”)

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in Ione, California. Defendants LeBlanc and Martinez are registered nurses at MCSP and

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Defendants Nale, Galloway, and Naseer are doctors at MCSP. In late 2006, an MRI of Fausett’s

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lower back showed severe degenerative disk disease between the fourth and fifth lumbar vertebrae.

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Accordingly, on July 10, 2007, Fausett was transported to the University of California Davis for

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posterior lumbar interbody fusion surgery, a procedure whereby the disc between the vertebrae is

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removed and bone morrow is inserted in its place to cause the two vertebrae to fuse together.

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Following surgery, Fausett began to recuperate at U.C. Davis until he was deemed stable to be

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discharged back to prison. On July 20, therefore, Fausett returned to MCSP. Upon discharge, Dr.

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J. Paul Muizelaar, Fausett’s attending physician at U.C. Davis, ordered certain activity restrictions,

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including no heavy lifting or strenuous activity, as well as certain pain medications. Each of the

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Defendants were, in some way or another, involved with Fausett’s post-surgical treatment after he

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returned to MCSP.

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On July 25, 2008, Fausett filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants

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were deliberately indifferent to his post-surgical medical needs in violation of the Eighth and

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Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Fausett claims that

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Defendants have caused him physical and emotional harm by ignoring Dr. Muizelaar’s orders and

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by continuously failing to attend to his ongoing medical needs. In December 2010, Defendants

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filed a motion for summary judgment, which Fausett followed with three motions for summary

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judgment of his own against Defendants LeBlanc, Nale, and Martinez. For the reasons discussed

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below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion and denies Fausett’s motions.

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///

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DISCUSSION
I.

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Summary Judgment Standard
The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no

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dispute as to the facts before the court. Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d

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1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no

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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

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law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis

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on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmovant, and a dispute is “material” only if

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it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

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477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587

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(1986). The movant has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute, and the court

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must view all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Zoslaw

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v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085 (1983).

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Once the movant satisfies the requirements of Rule 56, the burden shifts to the

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nonmovant to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,

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477 U.S. at 256; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). The non-moving party “may

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not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or

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admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists,” Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d

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1404 (9th Cir. 1991), and “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

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as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. “The mere existence of a scintilla of

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evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

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II.

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Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner has the right to be free from “cruel and

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unusual punishments.” Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs constitutes a

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violation of this constitutional guarantee. “In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference

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consists of two parts.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). First, the prisoner

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must show that he faced a serious medical need. Id. In order to satisfy this first part, the prisoner

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must demonstrate that failure to treat his medical need could result in “further significant injury or

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the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. Second, the prisoner must show that the

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defendant was deliberately indifferent to that medical need. Id. In order to satisfy the second part,

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the prisoner must demonstrate that the defendant knew of his serious medical need and

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purposefully disregarded it. Id. Mere negligence or medical malpractice in treating a medical

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condition does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d

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458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980). Finally, a mere difference of medical opinion between a prisoner and the

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defendant is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

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1058 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Fausett alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by

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ignoring Dr. Muizelaar’s post-surgical orders as demonstrated by the following: removing

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Fausett’s pain patch (a strong prescription pain medication in the form of a patch that is applied to

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the skin) when he returned to MCSP after his surgery; refusing to provide Fausett with certain

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types of pain medication and physical therapy; cancelling Fausett’s follow-up appointments

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(apparently with Dr. Muizelaar); ignoring Fausett’s activity restrictions; and failing to provide

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Fausett with a wheelchair or crutches.

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However, Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Fausett’s medical needs

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even though the evidence provided shows that they did not follow Dr. Muizelaar’s post-surgical

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orders with exactness,. For example, it is true that Defendants did not provide Fausett with the

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type of pain medication that Dr. Muizelaar prescribed. But the evidence also shows that

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Defendants did provide Fausett with other pain medications. Additionally, Defendants have

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provided evidence showing that Fausett’s other allegations fail as a matter of law. To illustrate,

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Dr. Muizelaar’s pain patch prescription indicates that Fausett was only to wear the patch from 2:00

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p.m. to 5:45 p.m. on July 20, 2007, while he was traveling from U.C. Davis to MCSP. Thus, when

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Fausett arrived at MCSP the Defendants simply followed Dr. Muizelaar’s orders and removed the

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patch. Furthermore, Fausett has provided no evidence—aside from his own claims and personal

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opinion—that his condition required a wheelchair or crutches and, to the contrary, the evidence

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produced demonstrates that Fausett was able to ambulate without a walker while still at U.C.

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Davis. Therefore, Defendants have met their burden of establishing that they were not deliberately

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indifferent to Fausett’s medical needs with respect to Fausett’s post-surgical treatment.

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Fausett also alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent by not adequately

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addressing his continued medical needs. Specifically, Fausett argues that he consistently

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complained to Defendants about his back pain, numbness in his legs, and urinary problems.

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However, as discussed above, the evidence provided by Defendants shows that they were

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responsive to his complaints and prescribed medications accordingly, in addition to providing him

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with a lower bunk and extra lunches for two months. Therefore, Defendants have also met their

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burden of establishing that they were not deliberately indifferent to Fausett’s continued medical

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needs.

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Furthermore, Fausett has provided insufficient evidence to show that there is a

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genuine dispute for trial. Fausett’s evidence certainly shows, as mentioned above, that Defendants

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did not follow Dr. Muizelaar’s post-surgical orders with exactness. However, noticeably lacking

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is evidence that the Defendants course of treatment went beyond negligence or even medical

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malpractice and was medically unacceptable. Chung, 391 F.3d at 1058 (holding that physician is

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not deliberately indifferent unless prisoner shows that course of treatment was medically

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unacceptable under the circumstances). For example, Fausett has not provided an affidavit or

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other statement from a physician stating that his treatment was medically unacceptable. The mere

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fact that Fausett disagrees with the course of treatment he received is insufficient to show

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deliberate indifference. Id. Therefore, viewing all facts and drawing all inferences in the light

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most favorable to Fausett, the Court finds that there is an insufficient evidentiary basis on which a

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reasonable fact finder could find for Fausett. As such, there is not a genuine dispute of material

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fact for trial and the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

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III.

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Fausett’s Motions for Summary Judgment
Because the Court has granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, it need

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not analyze Fausett’s motions for summary judgment against Defendants LeBlanc, Nale, and

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Martinez. Accordingly, the Court denies Fausett’s motions.

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IV.

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Supplemental Jurisdiction
In his complaint, Fausett asks the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, Fausett’s only claim is one for deliberate indifference.

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Construing the complaint extremely broadly, it is possible for the Court to surmise that Fausett

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intended to assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the facts

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alleged fail to state such a claim as a matter of law. Therefore, if Fausett did intend to assert a

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claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress it must be dismissed along with his deliberate

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indifference claim.

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CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, and for good cause appearing,

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

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(#101) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Fausett’s Motions for Summary Judgment
(##109, 110, 111) are DENIED.

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The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the case.

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Dated: April 12, 2011

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____________________________________
ROGER L. HUNT
Chief United States District Judge

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