Kelly v. Sogge et al

Filing 22

ORDER signed by Circuit Judge Carlos T. Bea on 1/7/2010 ORDERING that Pltf's 2 Motion to Proceed IFP is GRANTED. The second claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. Service is appropriate as to dfts Dr. Sogge, Dr. Bakewell, Edmondson, and Dunn. The Clerk to send Pltf 4 USM-285 forms, one summons, an instruction sheet and a copy of the complaint. Within 30 days Pltf shall submit service documents to the court. (Engbretson, K.)

Jam es Kelly v. Dr. Sogge, et al., CV 08-1823 CTB O rd er re 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Complaint P la in tif f James Kelly ("Kelly"), a California prisoner who suffers from rectal b leed in g , brings suit--pro se and in forma pauperis--under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ag ain st prison doctors, Sogge and Bakewell, and prison nurses, Edmondson and D u n n , for deliberate indifference and negligence as to his serious medical needs. Kelly alleges violations of California Government Code section 845.6 on the same g ro u n d s. Kelly filed a timely complaint and exhausted administrative remedies. Kelly does not state a negligence claim under federal law; therefore, this claim is D IS M IS S E D with prejudice. However, because Kelly states a claim for cruel and u n u su al punishment based on deliberate indifference, and because Kelly pleads the elem en ts of a section 845.6 violation, the defendants shall respond to these claims. The Court thus GRANTS Kelly's in forma pauperis motion, and ORDERS the co m p lain t, and the summons thereon, served on the defendants. I. B ack g ro u n d

K elly filed his complaint on August 6, 2008. The case was assigned to a m ag istrate judge and then a district court judge before being reassigned on D ecem b er 23, 2008 to Judge Carlos T. Bea of the Ninth Circuit, who sits by d esig n atio n . (Docket No. 8.) K elly's pro se complaint is difficult to follow and gives an incomplete ch ro n o lo g y. The complaint appears to allege as follows. K e lly , while an inmate at the California Medical Facility ("CMF"), was rap ed by another inmate in May 2003.1 (Compl. at 4.) Soon thereafter, Kelly ex p erien ced rectal bleeding. (Id. & Ex. C.) This bleeding continued after his tr an s f er to the California State Prison, Sacramento ("SAC"), and, in December 2 0 0 5 , Kelly sought treatment from SAC's medical staff.2 (Id. at 5.) Dr. Bakewell,

Kelly does not state grounds for his detention, or when he was admitted at C M F . Nor does he specify how he was raped, e.g., anally, but the Court assumes th at fact in deference to the rule of favorable interpretation of pro se pleadings.
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Kelly does not specify when he was transferred to SAC.
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a physician at SAC, prescribed Kelly medication. (Id. & Ex. E.) Despite recurrent c o m p la in ts , Kelly was "kept on a series of pills." (Id. at 6 & Ex. F.) A year later, in December 2006, Dr. Bakewell and Edmondson, a SAC registered nurse, were "w e ll aware that prescriptions alone was [sic] not effective" to cure Kelly's rectal b leed in g . (Id. at 5.) In March 2007, Kelly went to see Dr. Sogge, a gastroenterologist, who s ch e d u le d a colonoscopy for July 2007. (Id. at 6.) In April 2007, Kelly filed an in m a te grievance with the California Department of Corrections ("CDC"). (See id ., Ex. A.) The colonoscopy was not performed in July, and Kelly got "sicker."3 (Id . at 7.) In August 2007, Dunn, the Utilization Management Nurse at SAC, told C D C that Kelly had received his colonoscopy, even though intervention by the C alifo rn ia Attorney General's Office later revealed that Kelly had not received a co lo n o sco p y. (Id. at 7, Exs. A & G.) In April 2008, Kelly finally received a colonoscopy, with which Dr. Sogge d iag n o sed Kelly with "colon polyp, tubular adenoma, polypoid fragment of colonic m u s c o s a with hyperplastic changes and severe cautery artifact." (Id. at 8 & Ex. J.) This diagnosis confirmed Kelly's need for surgery. (Id. at 9, 18.) As of the filing o f the complaint in August 2008, Kelly still awaits such surgery. (Id. at 9.) K elly thus alleges, however inartfully, that all the defendants "collectively allo w ed [him] to go untreated for a condition (bleeding rectum / constipation / no b o w e l movement) from 2005­2008 before being tested (colonoscopy test) to [the] d is co v e ry he needs surgery for a variety of ailments." (Id. at 18.) Kelly seeks over a million dollars in actual and punitive damages. (Id.) I I. L e g a l Standard

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a p r is o n e r seeks redress from a governmental entity, or officer or employee of a g o v ern m en tal entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss the p r is o n e r 's complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune fro m such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, Kelly alleges he was in continuous pain, had difficulty with bowel m o v em en t, and was constipated. (Compl. at 6.)
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1 1 2 4 , 1126­27, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Pro se pleadings must, however, b e liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th C ir . 1988). III. D is c u s s io n A. S tatu te of Limitations

A s a preliminary matter, the Court finds Kelly's claims are not time barred b y the statute of limitations. 1. S ta n d a r d

T o determine the proper statute of limitations for a § 1983 action, the Court m u st look to the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the forum state. See Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court must therefore a p p ly California's two-year statute of limitations for such actions.4 Cal. Civ. Proc. C o d e § 335.1.5 Federal law, however, provides that a § 1983 claim accrues when th e plaintiff "knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the a ctio n ." Elliot v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal q u o ta tio n marks omitted). 2. A n a ly s is

T h e issue therefore is whether Kelly brought suit within two years of the tim e when he knew, or had reason to know, of his injury. T o resolve this issue, the Court must first determine the precise injury Kelly

California's former one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actio n s applies to § 1983 actions filed before January 1, 2003. DeGrassi v. City of G len d o ra, 207 F.3d 636, 644 (9th Cir. 2000). Because Kelly filed his complaint in 2 0 0 8 , the two-year statute applies. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 9 5 4 ­ 5 5 (9th Cir. 2004). California Civil Procedure Code section 335.1 provides a two-year statute o f limitations for "assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual cau sed by the wrongful act or neglect of another."
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a lle g e s. Here, Kelly sought treatment for his rape in December 2005. A year later, in December 2006, Kelly was still being treated with medication, but it did not cure h is symptoms; Kelly still had rectal bleeding. In March 2007, Kelly saw Dr. S o g g e, who scheduled a colonoscopy for July 2007. But Dr. Sogge did not p erfo rm a colonoscopy on Kelly until April 2008, at which point Dr. Sogge d isco v ered that a possible cause for Kelly's rectal bleeding was not his 2003 rape b u t a cancerous polyp. C o n stru in g the pro se complaint liberally, as it must, the Court reads Kelly to a lle g e that all the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical n eed s by delaying testing and treatment for his rectal bleeding despite knowledge th at such delay would harm Kelly. (Compl. at 11.) T h e next question is when Kelly knew, or had reason to know, of his injury. If Kelly's claim is that the rape caused his rectal bleeding and he was treated with d e lib e r ate indifference, his claim may have accrued in December 2006, when, after a year of taking his medications, he still had rectal bleeding. (Id. at 5­6.) If his K elly's claim of deliberate indifference is that he has suffered progression in his can cero u s condition, he had no reason to know he was suffering from cancer until A p ril 2008, when he finally received his colonoscopy. (Id. at 8.) In either case, Kelly's claim is not time barred because he filed his complaint in August 2008, within two years of December 2006, when the former injury may h a v e accrued, and April 2008, when the latter injury may have accrued. Moreover, ev en if the injury accrued before August 2006--and, therefore, was outside the tw o -y ea r limitations period--the complaint would still be timely under California's eq u itab le tolling statute. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 352.1 (tolling the statute of limitations tw o years for a prisoner incarcerated for a term less than life); see Fink v. Shedler, 1 9 2 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying section 352.1).6 A cco rd in g ly, Kelly's complaint is not time barred.

Subsection 352.1(c) specifically excludes from tolling § 1983 actions relatin g to conditions of confinement, other than actions for damages. Because K elly seeks damages, however, this subsection does not apply. See Fink, 192 F.3d at 1914 n.6.
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B.

E x h a u s tio n of Remedies 1. S ta n d a r d

U n d er the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), a prisoner "may initiate litig atio n in federal court only after the administrative process ends and leaves his g riev an ces unredressed. It would be inconsistent with the objectives of the statute to let him submit his complaint any earlier than that." Vaden v. Summerhill, 4 4 9 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006). 2. A n a ly s is

H e re , Kelly both alleges exhaustion and provides documentation to support th at allegation. (Compl. at 3 & Ex. A.) Exhibit A to the complaint is the CDC D ir ec to r 's final decision denying Kelly administrative relief for the claims alleged in this action;7 the document expressly states: "This decision exhausts the ad m in istrativ e remedy available to the appellant within [CDC]." (Id., Ex. A.) C. In Forma Pauperis

O n August 6, 2008, Kelly requested in forma pauperis status. Pursuant to 2 8 U.S.C. § 1915(a), Kelly filed an adequate affidavit in support of his in forma p au p eris motion, along with a certified copy of his prison trust account statement. (Docket No. 2.) Accordingly, the Court allows Kelly to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter.

In CDC, a prisoner has the right to appeal administratively "any d e p a r tm e n ta l decision, action, condition or policy which they can demonstrate as h av in g an adverse effect upon their welfare." Cal. Admin. Code tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). To exhaust these administrative remedies, a prisoner must proceed th r o u g h several levels of appeal: (1) informal resolution; (2) formal written appeal o n a CDC 602 inmate appeal form; (3) second-level appeal to the institution head o r designee; and (4) third-level appeal to the Director of the CDC. Id. § 3084.5; B ro d h eim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2009). A final decision from the D irecto r's level of review satisfies the exhaustion requirement. Aidnik v. Cal. M e d . Facility, No. 2:08-cv-02583-HDM-RAM, 2009 WL 3789223, at *2 (E.D. C a l. Nov. 10, 2009) (unpublished disposition).
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D.

F ailu re to State a Claim 1. S ta n d a r d

U n d er Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must allege su fficien t factual matter, accepted as true, to "`state a claim to relief that is p lau sib le on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949­50 (2009) ( q u o tin g Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has "facial plausibility" if the plaintiff pleads facts that "allow[ ] the court to draw the r ea so n a b le inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1 9 4 9 . Even after Twombly, "[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, an d a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent stan d ard s than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 8 9 , 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If the co m p lain t fails to state a claim, the Court has discretion to dismiss the complaint w ith or without leave to amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1124, 1130. 2. A n a ly s is

K e lly alleges two claims: (1) "deliberate indifference to an inmates [sic] s er io u s medical needs," and (2) "negligence based on deliberate indifference to an in m ate's serious medical needs." (Compl. at 4, 12.) Kelly alleges that both claims v io late the Eighth Amendment, as well as California Government Code section 8 4 5 .6 . T h e Court must make sense of Kelly's inartful pleading. At the outset, Kelly can n o t state a claim for "negligence based on deliberate indifference"; this presents a contradiction in terms. The Court discerns three remaining claims: (1) an Eighth A m en d m en t claim based on deliberate indifference, (2) an Eighth Amendment claim based on negligence, and (3) a section 845.6 claim based on any of the alleg ed conduct. The Court considers each claim in turn, as well as the issue of p u n itiv e damages. a. E ig h th Amendment Claim: Deliberate Indifference

T o state a claim under § 1983, Kelly must allege (1) a right secured by the C o n stitu tio n or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged violation w as committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins,
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4 8 7 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To establish unconstitutional treatment of a medical co n d itio n under the Eighth Amendment, Kelly must allege (1) "deliberate in d ifferen ce" to (2) a "serious" medical need. See Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F .3 d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). K e lly clearly alleges an objectively "serious" medical need--i.e., one a reaso n ab le doctor would think worthy of comment, one which significantly affects h is daily activities, or one which is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. Id. at 546 n.3. Indeed, Kelly alleges "a reasonable person would have known [that th e bleeding] requires action," that the bleeding had a significant effect on his daily life, and that the bleeding was chronic from 2005 until the present.8 (Id. at 10.) L ess clear is whether Kelly pleads facts to allege subjectively "deliberate in d ifferen ce"-- i.e., that "a prison official . . . knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To act with deliberate indifference, "the official must both be aware of facts from w h ich the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, an d he must also draw the inference." Id. Under the less stringent pleading stan d ard for pro se complaints, the Court finds Kelly's allegations sufficient with resp ect to each defendant. F irst, Kelly alleges Dr. Bakewell and Nurse Edmondson put Kelly on m e d ic atio n s , that they were "totally aware" of his constant visits to the medical s ta ff for rectal bleeding, constipation, and bowel-movement problems, and that th ey were "well aware" that prescriptions alone were ineffective over a period of o n e year from December 2005 until December 2006. (Compl. at 6.) The Court a ls o reads the complaint to allege they ignored his repeated requests for a co lo n o sco p y and for surgery. (Id. at 7.) N ex t, Kelly alleges Dr. Sogge scheduled a colonoscopy for July 2007, but d id not perform the procedure until April 2008, nearly a year later. (Id. at 6­8.) The Court reads the complaint to allege more than mere delay, but rather that Dr. S o g g e ignored Kelly's repeated requests for a colonoscopy--and Kelly's insistence th at no such colonoscopy was ever performed. (Id. at 7­8.) Kelly alleges he made "constant visits" to the infirmary for "continuous s u f fe rin g ." (Compl. at 6.) Liberally construed, this is sufficient to allege a c h r o n ic , painful condition. It is also enough to allege interference with daily life.
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F in a lly , Kelly alleges Nurse Dunn informed the CDC Director that Kelly had r ec eiv e d a colonoscopy in July 2007, despite Kelly's insistence that no such co lo n o sco p y was ever performed. (Id. at 7.) The Court reads the complaint to a lle g e that Dunn deliberately misled the CDC Director--and Kelly even provides d o cu m en tatio n to show, at a minimum, that Dunn's representation to the CDC D irecto r was in error. (Id., Exs. A & G.) This fact came to light following in terv en tio n by the California Attorney General's Office. (Id.) A lth o u g h "state prison authorities have wide discretion regarding the nature a n d extent of medical treatment," Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1 9 8 6 ) , Kelly pleads facts that go beyond the exercise of discretion; Kelly alleges d e lib e r ate indifference. If, as alleged, the defendants "were aware that [a co lo n o sco p y] had been recommended . . . , [Kelly] would have had no claim for d elib erate medical indifference unless the denial was harmful." See Shapley v. N ev . Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis ad d ed ). Here, Kelly alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his s er io u s medical needs because they delayed testing and treatment for his rectal b leed in g , despite their knowledge that such delay would harm Kelly--i.e., cause h im to get "sicker" (Compl. at 11) and to endure "continuous suffering" (id. at 6). Kelly's complaint may also be construed to allege that the delay in his colonoscopy w as "harmful" because it allowed his alleged cancerous condition--the colon p o lyp , tubular adenoma, and polypoid fragment of colonic muscosa with h y p e r p la stic changes--to progress, lowering the probability of effective surgical treatm en t. (See id. at 8­11.) Indeed, Kelly alleges he is still awaiting surgery for h is cancerous condition. (Id. at 9.) A cco rd in g ly, under the less stringent standard for pro se complaints, Kelly states an Eighth Amendment claim against all the defendants. b. E ig h th Amendment Claim: Negligence

K elly cannot state an Eighth Amendment claim based on negligence alone. The Supreme Court has distinguished "deliberate indifference to serious medical n eed s of prisoners," Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, from "negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treatin g a medical condition," id. at 106, holding that only the former violates the C ru el and Unusual Punishment Clause. The Court has read Estelle for the p ro p o sitio n that Eighth Amendment liability requires "more than ordinary lack of d u e care for the prisoner's interests or safety." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
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3 1 9 (1986); accord Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 ("[D]eliberate indifference describes a s ta te of mind more blameworthy than negligence"). A cco rd in g ly, the Court dismisses with prejudice the Eighth Amendment c la im to the extent it is based on negligence. c. C alifo rn ia Government Code Section 845.6 Claim

K e lly also raises a pendent state-law claim under section 845.6,9 which p r o v id e s : N e ith e r a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury p ro x im ately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain m e d ic al care for a prisoner in his custody; but, . . . a public employee . . . is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the p riso n er is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take r ea so n a b le action to summon such medical care. C a l. Gov. Code § 845.6. To state a claim under this section, Kelly must allege: (1 ) the public employee knew or had reason to know of the need (2) for immediate m ed ical care, and (3) failed to reasonably summon such care. Jett v. Penner, 439 F .3 d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2006). As set out above, Kelly alleges each defendant k n ew of his need for additional testing and treatment, that the need for such testing an d treatment was pressing, and that the defendants did not take reasonable steps to en su re Kelly's receipt of such medical care. To the contrary, Kelly alleges the d efen d an ts took steps to deny Kelly the medical care he needed. A cco rd in g ly, under the less stringent standard for pro se complaints, Kelly states a section 845.6 claim against all the defendants. d. P u n itiv e Damages

A s a final matter, Kelly alleges facts that entitle him to punitive damages u n d e r § 1983, and under state law only to the extent Kelly seeks such damages See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also Bowen v. Treiber, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1 2 0 8 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (construing California prisoner's section 845.6 claim as a p e n d e n t state-law claim).
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ag ain st the defendants as individuals. "P u n itiv e damages are available against individual . . . officers in a § 1983 claim only where the officers' `conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or in ten t, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally p ro tected rights of others.'" Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F .3 d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). "[B]ecause the state of mind required to prove a [§] 1983 violation [i]s as high as th at required to sustain a punitive damage award at common law, a plaintiff who satisfie[s] the former standard necessarily satisfie[s] the latter." Ngo v. Reno H ilto n Resort Corp., 140 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Smith, 461 U.S. a t 55­56). B e ca u s e Kelly alleges facts as to each defendant's "deliberate indifference" in violation of the his Eighth Amendment rights, as set out above, those allegations are sufficient to show the "evil motive or intent" or "reckless or callous in d ifferen ce" required to support an award for punitive damages. See Dubner, 266 F .3 d at 969. Of course, Kelly ultimately cannot recover punitive damages without ev id en ce that each defendant acted with the necessary mental state. See Ward v. C ity of San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming summary judgment w h ere plaintiff provided no evidence that officers acted with evil intent); Leer v. M u r p h y , 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[s]weeping conclusory a lle g a tio n s will not suffice to prevent summary judgment"). H o w ev er, "California Government Code [section] 818 bars any award of p u n itiv e damages against a public entity." Westlands Water Dist. v. Amoco Chem. C o ., 953 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Kizer v. County of San Mateo, 5 3 Cal. 3d 139, 146 (1991). Although suits against public officials in their official c ap a c itie s are "equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity itself," see L arez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991), suits against p u b lic officials in their individual capacity are not. A c co r d in g ly , the Court does not strike Kelly's prayer for punitive damages o n his § 1983 claim. Nor does the Court strike this prayer on Kelly's pendent state-law claim to the extent Kelly seeks punitive damages against the defendants a s individuals, rather than against the state.

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IV .

C o n c lu s io n In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1 . Kelly's in forma pauperis motion is granted.

2 . The second claim (Eighth Amendment negligence), above, is dismissed w ith prejudice. 3 . The Court finds Kelly's pro se complaint alleges facts sufficient for p relim in ary screening purposes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, on the first (Eighth A m en d m en t deliberate indifference) and third (pendent state-law) claims, above. Service of the summons and complaint is proper for defendants Dr. Sogge, Dr. B ak ew ell, Edmondson, and Dunn on these claims. 4 . The Clerk of the Court shall send Kelly four (4) return of service (USM2 8 5 ) forms, one summons, an instruction sheet, and a copy of the complaint filed A u g u st 6, 2008. 5 . Within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, Kelly shall complete th e attached Notice of Submission of Documents and submit the following d o cu m en ts to the Clerk of the Court: (a) (b) T h e completed Notice of Submission of Documents; O n e (1) completed summons for each defendant listed in number 3 above; O n e (1) completed return of service (USM-285) form for each d efen d an t listed in number 3 above; and Five (5) copies of the endorsed complaint filed August 6, 2008.

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(d )

6 . Kelly need not attempt service on defendants and need not request waiver o f service. Upon receipt of the above-described documents, the Clerk of the Court sh all deliver those documents to the United States Marshal, who shall serve the ab o v e-n am ed defendants with those documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil P ro ced u re 4 without payment of costs.
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7 . If Kelly fails to submit to the Clerk of the Court the Notice of Submission o f Documents and the other required documents within thirty (30) days of the date o f this Order, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of d is m is sa l of this action without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Dated: January 7, 2010 /s/CarlosT.Bea CarlosT.Bea United States Circuit CourtJudge

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 DATED: ___________________________________ Plaintiff Plaintiff hereby submits the following documents in compliance with the court's order filed ______________: ______ ______ ______ completed summons form completed USM-285 forms copies of the _______________ Complaint/Amended Complaint KELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) SOGGE, et al., ) ) Defendants. _________________________________ ) 2:08-cv-01823-CTB NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF DOCUMENTS