Valdez v Unknown
Filing
58
ORDER signed by District Judge David A. Ezra on 5/9/2012 GRANTING 46 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter Judgment and Close this case. CASE CLOSED. (Reader, L)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RICARDO VALDEZ,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS
)
WALKER, GUFFEE, and VORON, )
et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )
Case No. 2:08-cv-1978 DAE
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is Defendants Walker, Guffee, and Voron’s
(collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 46.)
Pursuant to Local Rule 230(l), the Motion was submitted without oral argument.
After reviewing the supporting and opposing memoranda, the Court GRANTS
Defendants’ Motion.
BACKGROUND
This matter involves a series of alleged incidents in which requests for
medical attention made by Plaintiff Ricardo Valdez (“Plaintiff”) were ignored over
the course of approximately one year’s time. (“FAC,” Doc. # 12 at 3.) Plaintiff is
currently an inmate at the Mule Creek State Prison (“Mule Creek”) in Ione,
California. (Id. at 1; Valdez Depo. at 63.) He was housed in an administrative
segregation unit at California State Prison, Sacramento (“CSP-Sacramento”)
during the alleged incidents that form the basis of this action. (FAC at 2.)
Defendants Walker, Voron, and Guffee were Correctional Officers at CSPSacramento during this time. (“Walker Decl.,” Doc. # 46-4 ¶ 1; “Guffee Decl.,”
Doc. # 46-5 ¶ 2; “Voron Decl.,” Doc. # 46-6 ¶ 1.)
Plaintiff Valdez has a long history of heart problems and suffered a
heart attack at approximately age 38, which caused major heart damages. (Valdez
Depo. at 15:5–16:18.) As a result of his heart problems, Valdez was prescribed
numerous medications for his heart, blood, and veins. (Id. at 17:13–18:20.)
Valdez’ health record reflects a history of poor compliance with his blood pressure
medication, which raises the risk of heart complications, as well as a history of
diverting pain medications for personal gain. (“Heatley Decl.,” Doc. # 46-3 ¶¶
17–18.)
According to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), on the
morning of April 17, 2006, Plaintiff informed Defendant Walker that he was
experiencing severe chest pains and needed to see medical clinicians. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff alleges that Walker indicated that he would call for help, but that he never
returned. (Id.) At about 12:30 p.m. that day, Plaintiff allegedly notified two other
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officers not party to this case that he was experiencing numbness in his arm and
hand. (Id.) Plaintiff was eventually placed in handcuffs and escorted down the
hall, where he collapsed. (Id. at 4–5.) Plaintiff was taken to the infirmary on a
gurney, given pain medication, and released. (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff also alleges that sometime prior to the April 17, 2006 event,
Plaintiff notified Defendants Guffee and Voron that he was experiencing severe
chest pains and needed medical attention. (Id. at 3–4.) According to Plaintiff,
Guffee told Plaintiff to wait for the routine medical walkthrough, which would
have been in approximately three hours, and when Plaintiff protested the threehour wait, Voron replied, “You’re not dead, so you can wait.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff
also alleges that Defendants neglected his medical needs from April 11, 2006
through February 15, 2007. (Id. at 5.) According to the FAC, Defendants’ neglect
resulted in Plaintiff suffering a massive heart attack that required surgery in
February 2007. (Id., Ex. A.)
On August 22, 2008, Plaintiff filed the original Complaint, alleging
that a “Jane Doe” was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when
she transported him to receive medical attention using a gurney instead of vehicle
transportation. (Doc. # 1.) In an Order filed on August 26, 2009, the Court found
that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference under the Eighth
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Amendment as to Jane Doe and dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend.
(Doc. # 11.) Plaintiff was granted 30 days within which to file an amended
complaint.
On September 11, 2009, Plaintiff filed the present FAC. (FAC, Doc.
# 12.) The FAC alleges that Plaintiff’s Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated and seeks compensation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On
October 5, 2009, the Court filed an Order dismissing Plaintiff’s Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims. (Doc. # 13.) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim
remains. (Id.)
On August 12, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies.
(Doc. # 25.) On March 30, 2011, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
with respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim in the FAC. (Doc. # 35.) In
reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that Plaintiff’s prison grievance “clearly
complain[ed] about the pattern of alleged indifference to his medical conditions
leading up to and resulting from the April 17, 2006 incident.” (Id. at 12.)
On October 26, 2011, Defendants filed the instant Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Motion”). (Doc. # 46.) On February 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed
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an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.1 (Doc. # 53.) On
February 24, 2012, Defendants filed a Reply. (Doc. # 56.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 56 requires summary
judgment to be granted when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials
on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); see also Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 2005);
Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). A main purpose
of summary judgment is to dispose of factually unsupported claims and defenses.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986).
Summary judgment must be granted against a party that fails to
demonstrate facts to establish what will be an essential element at trial. See id. at
323. A moving party without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial—usually,
1
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s 7-page Memorandum in Opposition largely
reiterates the allegations and prayer for relief in his FAC. Further, Plaintiff’s
Opposition fails to comply with Local Rule 260(b), which requires that any party
opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “reproduce the
itemized facts in the Statement of Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that are
undisputed and deny those that are disputed, including with each denial a citation
to the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory
answer, admission, or other document relied upon in support of that denial.” E.D.
Cal. R. 260(b).
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but not always, the defendant—has both the initial burden of production and the
ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for summary judgment. Nissan Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). The burden
initially falls upon the moving party to identify for the court those “portions of the
materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of
material fact.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d
626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323).
Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56, the
nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial” and may not rely on the mere allegations in the pleadings. Porter,
419 F.3d at 891 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256
(1986)). In setting forth “specific facts,” the nonmoving party may not meet its
burden on a summary judgment motion by making general references to evidence
without page or line numbers. S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885,
889 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A]t least some ‘significant probative evidence’ ” must be
produced. T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v.
Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)). “A scintilla of evidence or evidence
that is merely colorable or not significantly probative does not present a genuine
issue of material fact.” Addisu, 198 F.3d at 1134. The Ninth Circuit has “refused
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to find a ‘genuine issue’ where the only evidence presented is ‘uncorroborated and
self-serving’ testimony.” Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061
(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir.
1996)). “Conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data cannot defeat
summary judgment.” Rivera v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 331 F.3d 1074, 1078
(9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, a pro se litigant is held to the same standard in
responding to a motion for summary judgment as a represented party. Jacobsen v.
Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1364-66 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bell, 27 F. Supp.
2d 1191, 1197 n. 4 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
When “direct evidence” produced by the moving party conflicts with
“direct evidence” produced by the party opposing summary judgment, “the judge
must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with
respect to that fact.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. In other words, evidence
and inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Porter, 419 F.3d at 891. The court does not make credibility determinations
or weigh conflicting evidence at the summary judgment stage. Id.; see also Nelson
v. City of Davis, 571 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[C]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge.”) (citations omitted). However, inferences
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may be drawn from underlying facts not in dispute, as well as from disputed facts
that the judge is required to resolve in favor of the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec.
Serv., 809 F.2d at 631.
DISCUSSION
A.
Deliberate Indifference Claim
“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical
treatment, an inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’”
Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The two-part test for deliberate indifference requires the
plaintiff to show (1) “‘a serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to
treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) “the defendant’s response to
the need was deliberately indifferent.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quoting McGuckin
v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.1992)).
Deliberate indifference is shown by: (1) “a purposeful act or failure to
respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need,” and (2) “harm caused by
the indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060); see Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837–42 (1994). Deliberate indifference may be manifested “when
prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it
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may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id.
(citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). A delay in medical treatment, without more,
is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference. Shapely v.
Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The
delay in medical treatment must be harmful, although there is no requirement that
the delay cause “substantial” harm. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059–60. A finding
that an inmate was seriously harmed by the defendant’s action or inaction tends to
provide additional support for a claim of deliberate indifference; however, it does
not end the inquiry. Id. at 1060. Generally, “the more serious the medical needs of
the prisoner, and the more unwarranted the defendant’s action in light of those
needs, the more likely it is that a plaintiff has established deliberate indifference on
the part of the defendant.” Id. at 1061.
Here, Plaintiff claims that while detained, he made numerous requests
for medical attention for his chest pains and that Defendants displayed deliberate
indifference to this serious medical condition. (FAC at 5.) He alleges that
Defendants ignored his complaints and delayed in getting him appropriate medical
care leading up to an alleged incident on April 17, 2006. (Id. at 3–5.) Plaintiff
further alleges more generally that between April 11, 2006 and February 15, 2007,
he requested medical attention and Defendants neglected him and failed to take his
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medical concerns seriously.2 (Id. at 5.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ neglect
resulted in Plaintiff suffering a massive heart attack that required surgery in
February 2007. (Id., Ex. A.)
According to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony,3 on the morning of
April 17, 2006, Plaintiff informed Defendant Walker that he was experiencing
severe chest pains and needed to see a nurse. (Valdez Depo at 43:3–25.) Walker
indicated that he would call for help but he never returned. (Id. at 44:1–9;
46:14–17.) Plaintiff testified that approximately five minutes after his exchange
with Walker, he saw Defendant Guffee opening cell doors to permit inmates to
return from the outside yard. (Id. at 46:17–23.) Plaintiff claims he told Guffee that
2
In his FAC, Plaintiff does not provide any factual allegations identifying
when and to whom these alleged requests were made or how any defendants
neglected his concerns. Plaintiff’s unsupported and conclusory assertion regarding
Defendants’ allegedly neglectful behavior during this 10-month time span is not
sufficient to state a plausible ground for relief. Moreover, Defendants submitted
evidence showing that Valdez was seen by medical officials on multiple occasions
between August 2006 and February 14, 2007. (See Heatley Decl. ¶¶ 13–15.)
Valdez’s Exhibit C in his Opposition also shows that he was seen by medical staff
on at least sixteen separate occasions for complaints of chest pain. (Opp’n, Ex. C.)
3
At Plaintiff’s request, a Spanish-speaking interpreter was provided for
Valdez’s deposition because he does not speak or write English well. Valdez
admitted at his deposition that he did not personally write or type out his pleadings
in his case, and instead relied on inmates to translate his verbal Spanish into
written English. (Valdez Depo. at 5:1–9; 33:6–35:15.)
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he had pain in his heart and Guffee screamed, “Hey, there’s a man down here.”
(Id. at 50:24–51:11.) Sergeant Voron immediately arrived and asked Valdez what
was going on. (Id. at 48:16–24.) Valdez claims that at this point he was lying on
the ground in his cell. (Id. at 49:18–50:1.) According to Plaintiff, Voron placed
Valdez in handcuffs and escorted him down the hall, where he collapsed. (Id. at
50:2–6; FAC at 4–5.) Plaintiff was taken to the infirmary on a gurney, given pain
medication, and released to his cell that same day. (Valdez Depo at 50:2–54:1;
Heatley Decl. ¶ 20.)
As to the alleged incident on April 17, 2006, the record before the
Court does not show any triable issue as to whether Defendants acted with
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. Plaintiff’s own deposition
testimony demonstrates that both Guffee and Voron acted promptly in response to
Plaintiff’s complaints of chest pain. With respect to Guffee, Plaintiff admits that
she responded to his complaint by yelling out to the sergeant for assistance. (Id. at
51:11.) Similarly, with respect to Voron, Plaintiff’s testimony confirms that he
immediately escorted Plaintiff out of his cell and to the infirmary for medical care.
(Id. at 48:16–50:4.) Additionally, in their respective declarations in support of the
instant Motion, each of the three Defendants state that they did not deny, delay, or
interfere with Plaintiff’s medical care. (Guffee Decl. ¶ 16; Voron Decl. ¶ 14;
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Walker Decl. ¶ 15.) Meanwhile, Plaintiff has not proffered any evidence, opinion,
or otherwise to demonstrate that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference.
Moreover, Defendants have submitted evidence establishing that any
deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants leading up to and including the
April 17, 2006 incident did not cause Plaintiff any harm. First, insofar as Plaintiff
is alleging harm stemming from the medical treatment he received, none of the
Defendants would be liable for such treatment because, as custody staff members,
Walker, Guffee, and Voron did not have the authority to diagnose an inmate’s
medical issues, dictate how quickly medical staff provides treatment, perform
medical procedures, or dispense medication. (Walker Decl. at ¶ 11; Guffee Decl.
at ¶ 12; Voron Decl. at ¶ 10.) Further, according to Dr. S. Heatley (“Dr. Heatley”),
a licensed medical doctor employed at Mule Creek State Prison, Valdez suffered
no damage from any alleged delay in medical care on April 17, 2006, and Valdez
received “timely and appropriate medical care” at CSP-Sacramento in 2006.
(Heatley Decl. ¶¶ 1, 36–37.) Additionally, Dr. Heatley stated that Valdez’s UHR
confirms that while housed at CSP-Sacramento, Valdez underwent numerous
electrocardiograms (“EKG”), a test that checks for problems with the electrical
activity of the heart and can often indicate active or past damage to the heart. (Id.
¶ 21.) Dr. Heatley observed that an August 2006 EKG showed results similar to
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other EKGs Valdez had previously undergone and showed prior damage from his
1999 heart attack4; no new damage was seen. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence raising a triable
issue as to whether any delay by the Defendants caused him any harm or injury.
The only evidence cited by Valdez in his Opposition consists of three exhibits of
medical records demonstrating that was treated for heart problems and/or chest
pains in 2006 and 2007. (Opp’n, Exs. A–C.) However, the mere fact that Plaintiff
was treated for these medical problems does not demonstrate that such problems
resulted from any delay in treatment caused by the Defendants. There is no
medical evidence in the record to suggest that Defendants’ alleged conduct caused
Plaintiff any injury. See Cooper v. McAlpine, 2010 WL 760703, at *7 (E.D. Cal.
March 4, 2010) (citing Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th
Cir. 2008)) (in addition to demonstrating deliberate indifference, in a § 1983
action, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the
actionable cause of the claimed injury); see also Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth
Detention Center, 40 F.3d 1176, 1188–1189 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding “[a]n inmate
who complains that delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation
4
While Dr. Heatley’s declaration references a 1999 heart attack, Valdez
testified that the heart attack was in 1998. (Valdez Depo at 15:2–6.)
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must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental
effect of delay in medical treatment to succeed”); cf. Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur.
Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1506, n.4 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Although causation is a question of
fact, it may be decided as a matter of law if, under undisputed facts, reasonable
minds could not differ.”).
Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff testified at his deposition
that Defendant Walker ignored his request for medical attention on February 14,
2007. (Valdez Depo at 55:24–57:8.) Plaintiff’s FAC makes no reference to this
purported incident. Plaintiff cannot expand the scope of his pleadings through his
deposition testimony. See Szemple v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., Civ.
No. 07-4809, 2012 WL 161798 at *5 n.8 (D.N.J. Jan. 19, 2012) (noting that a
claim cannot be recognized when the allegation is not set forth in the amended
complaint or alleged as of the time of plaintiff’s deposition). Nonetheless, even if
Plaintiff had properly pled facts regarding the February 14, 2007 incident, the
Court would find that the record does not show any triable issue as to whether
Defendant Walker acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs.
Defendants submitted evidence showing that any alleged acts by
Defendant Walker in February 2007 did not cause Plaintiff any harm. According
to Dr. Heatley, Valdez suffered no damage from any alleged delay in medical care
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on February 14, 2007, and Valdez received “timely and appropriate medical care”
at CSP-Sacramento in 2007. (Heatley Decl. ¶¶ 36–37.) Moreover, Dr. Heatley
stated that tests administered on Valdez upon his arrival at the hospital on February
14, 2007 showed no evidence of a heart attack or permanent heart muscle damage,
although there were “warning symptoms.” (Heatley Decl. ¶¶ 27–28.) Dr. Heatley
also observed that on February 16, 2007, Valdez underwent a “Nuclear Cardiac
Spec Study,” an exercise stress test with nuclear imaging of the heart, which
showed no change from 2006. (Id. ¶ 30.) Dr. Heatley further stated that a
February 17, 2007 heart catheterization test, which is performed only after less
invasive testing is done, revealed “significant blockages to the left main and 3
other blood vessels to the heart,” showing a high risk pattern for a future heart
attack. (Id. ¶ 31.) According to Dr. Heatley, Valdez underwent triple artery
bypass surgery on February 19, 2007 as a precautionary measure because it was
“medically probable” that a patient with a history of heart ailments like Valdez
would eventually suffer a major heart attack. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 35.)
As with respect to the alleged April 2006 incident, Plaintiff has not
proffered any evidence raising a triable issue as to whether any delay by Defendant
Walker on February 14, 2007 caused him harm or injury. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s
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Eighth Amendment claim.
B.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue, in the alternative, that the doctrine of qualified
immunity shields them from liability as to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim.
The defense of qualified immunity protects “government
officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A
defendant may have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about
what the law requires in any given situation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205
(2001). The threshold question in qualified immunity analysis is: “Taken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. at 201. A court considering a
claim of qualified immunity must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the
deprivation of an actual constitutional right and whether such right was “clearly
established.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Where there is no
clearly established law that certain conduct constitutes a constitutional violation,
the defendant cannot be on notice that such conduct is unlawful. Rodis v. City &
County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 964, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2009). The relevant,
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dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether
it would be clear to a reasonable defendant that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
concludes that Defendants prevail as a matter of law on their qualified immunity
defense because the Court has determined that there was no Eighth Amendment
violation. However, even if an Eighth Amendment violation had occurred, in light
of clearly established principles at the time of the incident, Defendants could have
reasonably believed that their behavior was lawful.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter
Judgment and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, May 9, 2012.
_____________________________
David Alan Ezra
United States District Judge
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