Williams v. Martel

Filing 46

ORDER signed by Senior Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr. on 9/28/2012 ORDERING that the Petition be and hereby is DENIED. CASE CLOSED (Reader, L)

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United States District Court
Eastern District of California

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ABE WILLIAMS, JR.,
Petitioner,

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v.

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M. MARTEL,

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CV 08-02315 TJH

Order
[JS-6]

Respondent.

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In 1987, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to fifteen

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years to life with an additional three one-year consecutive sentences. The Superior Court,

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the California Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

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habeas petitions. When the California Board of Prison Terms (“BPT”) denied Petitioner

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parole in 1999, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus from federal court. In 2006, the

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BPT denied him parole again.

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He now petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus based on the 2006 BPT
decision, asserting that:

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1. Denial of the credits mandated by his sentencing statute’s provisions violated

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his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as his federal liberty

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and vested interests;

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2. Denial of his parole was arbitrary and capricious and the BPT acted in a biased
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and unfair manner, violating Petitioner’s due process and equal protection rights;

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3. The state court habeas decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme

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Court authority, was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority, was

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objectively unreasonable, and was an unreasonable determination of the facts in

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light of state court proceedings; and

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4. A state evidentiary hearing is required as a matter of law because it is

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impossible to adjudicate a habeas petition with unsettled facts.

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The Petitioner asserts a fifth, new claim in his Traverse that his First Amendment

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rights were violated by forced participation in a therapy group.

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Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2254, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s

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adjudication was either: 1) Contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-cation of,

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clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;

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or 2) Based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

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presented at the State Court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1-2). Petitioner has not

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demonstrated that he is entitled to relief under this standard.

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Petitioner’s first claim fails. Under the AEDPA, if a prisoner asserts a claim that

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he already has presented in a previous federal habeas petition, the claim must be

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dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Here, Petitioner presented his claim concerning the

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denial of credits to a federal court in 2005, and that claim was denied on the merits.

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Thus, the credit claim must be dismissed as successive under the AEDPA.

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Petitioner’s second claim fails. The Supreme Court specifically rejected the

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argument that parole decisions are to be reviewed for evidentiary sufficiency in

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Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex. 442 U.S. 1, 15, 99 S. Ct.

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2100, 2107, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668, 680 (1979). An opportunity to be heard and a statement

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of reasons why the inmate did not qualify for parole are sufficient to protect against an

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arbitrary state parole decision. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. A parole authority is not

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required to cite evidence to support its decision. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16.
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The “some-evidence” test that Petitioner argues controls was developed in the

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context of a prison disciplinary hearing, Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst.,

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Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 2775, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356, 366 (1985),

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which, as the Supreme Court has recognized, is a fundamentally different context than

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a parole proceeding. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15-16. Because the tests and standards

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developed by the Supreme Court in one context cannot be transferred to a distinguishable

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context for AEDPA purposes, it is not appropriate to apply the some-evidence standard

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of judicial review to parole decisions.

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As to Petitioner’s claim that the BPT acted unfairly, the only case in which the

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Supreme Court has specifically addressed the process due in state parole proceedings is

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Greenholtz. There, the Supreme Court held that due process is satisfied when the state

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provides an inmate an opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons for the

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parole decision. Greenholtz. 442 U.S. at 16. “The Constitution does not require more.”

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Greenholtz. 442 U.S. at 16. No other Supreme Court holdings require more at a parole

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hearing. Thus, the state court decisions upholding the BPT’s decision were not contrary

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to clearly established federal law.

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Petitioner argues that the BPT’s decision was biased because the hearing panel said

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that the commitment offense was cruel and callous. While it is true that the Due Process

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Clause prevents the state from depriving a plaintiff of a protected interest without “a fair

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trial in a fair tribunal,” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625, 99 L. Ed.

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942, 946 (1955), to prevail Petitioner must “overcome a presump-tion of honesty and

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integrity” on the part of decision-makers. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct.

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1456, 1464, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712, 723 (1975). Here, the evidentiary record does not

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demonstrate bias. Instead, it indicates that Petitioner did not object to the panel

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considering his parole suitability, that the hearing was conducted in an orderly fashion,

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and that the panel considered facts demonstrating Petitioner’s suitability for parole. Thus,

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the state courts reasonably applied clearly established federal law when denying the bias

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claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Morever, even a summary denial of a claim is entitled
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to AEDPA deference. Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Petitioner’s third claim incorporating his credit, fairness, and bias claims, but

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adding that the state courts’ decisions were based on an unreasonable determination of

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the facts, similarly fails. Under Section 2254(d)(2), a writ of habeas corpus cannot be

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granted unless the state courts’ decisions were based on an unreasonable determination

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of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. The state courts’s factual

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determinations are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting

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that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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Although Petitioner argues that the evidence cannot support the BPT’s decisions, he does

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not show that the state court made factual errors. The trial court found that Petitioner beat

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a three year old girl to death, and that during the course of the beating he hanged the child

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by her hands and feet. The court, also, found that Petitioner had a lengthy criminal

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history that included prior prison terms, an extensive history of substance abuse, that the

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2005 psychological evaluation was not supportive of release, that his substance abuse

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treatment is inadequate, that he engaged in misconduct while in prison, and that he

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admitted to not having realistic plans for his release on parole. Petitioner has not

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established by clear and convincing evidence that the courts’s factual determinations were

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incorrect. Rather, he disagrees with the weight the BPT and the state courts assigned to

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the evidence. This disagreement does not entitle Petitioner to federal habeas relief.

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Fourth, Petitioner argues that, as a matter of law, he is entitled to a state court

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evidentiary hearing to resolve alleged inaccuracies in his commitment offense transcripts.

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Section 2254(e)(1) of the AEDPA requires federal courts to presume the correctness of

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the state court’s factual findings unless applicants rebut this presumption with clear and

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convincing evidence. Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74, 127 S. Ct. 1933,

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1939-40, 167 L. Ed. 2d 836, 843-44 (2007). Petitioner fails to do so when he disputes

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the accuracy of the transcripts based on his memory of the trial. Moreover, the state

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courts already determined that he failed to show the transcripts to be inaccurate. Thus,

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Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
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Fifth and finally, Petitioner’s First Amendment claim first asserted in the Traverse

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is dismissed because it was not asserted in the Petition. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37

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F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994).

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It is Ordered that the Petition be, and hereby is, Denied.

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Date: September 28, 2012

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____________________________________

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Terry J. Hatter, Jr.
Senior United States District Judge

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Order – Page 5 of 5