Rupe v. Cate et al

Filing 173

ORDER signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea on 12/23/13 GRANTING with prejudice Defendants' 164 Motion for Summary Judgment and Nunc Pro Tunc leave to exceed page limit; DENYING Plaintiff's 166 Motion to Strike. CASE CLOSED. (Manzer, C)

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SACRAMENTO DIVISION 5 6 7 No. PAUL ANTHONY RUPE, CV-08-2454-EFS (PC) 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 v. 10 11 12 JEFFREY BEARD, in his official capacity as Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 I. 15 16 INTRODUCTION Before the Court, without oral argument, is Defendants’ Motion 17 for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 164. Defendants seek summary judgment 18 on Plaintiff’s claims against them. Also pending before the Court is 19 the related matters of Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, ECF No. 166, and 20 Defendants’ Nunc Pro Tunc Leave to Exceed Page Limit, ECF No. 167. 21 Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and the record in this 22 matter, and having consulted the applicable authority, the Court is 23 fully informed. 24 Defendants’ 25 Defendants’ Nunc Pro Tunc Leave to Exceed Page Limit, ECF No. 167, and 26 denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, ECF No. 166. ORDER - 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 164, grants II. 1 2 BACKGROUND Factual History1 A. Plaintiff, 3 an incarcerated inmate in the custody of the 4 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), is a 5 practicing Druid. 6 beliefs and practices of the druids — the religious and educational 7 leaders in ancient Gaul. 8 Bards, Ovates, and Druids (“OBOD”), a Druid organization based in 9 England, from which he obtained correspondence courses to aid his Druidry is a neo-pagan religion that revives the Plaintiff has communicated with the Order of 10 spiritual development. 11 courses related to Druidry, and he has written articles and attained 12 various 13 Druidry is Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious belief. titles Plaintiff 14 and He has completed several OBOD educational honorifics voluntarily within associated his chosen with religious members of other order. Pagan 15 denominations while incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison (“MCSP”). 16 On March 17, 2007, he wrote to California State Senator Gloria Romero, 17 requesting various items necessary for Pagan religious worship. A 18 copy of the letter was given to Defendant Subia, the MCSP warden. On 19 the same day, Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance with MCSP 20 officials in which he requested accommodations for Pagan worship, 21 including a request for a sweathouse, fire pit, religious land, and 22 23 24 1 In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Court has considered the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom as contained in the submitted affidavits, declarations, exhibits, and depositions, in the 25 light 26 Plaintiff. 1999). ORDER - 2 most favorable to the party opposing the motion – here, the See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1 religious 2 Plaintiff’s grievance on April 2, 2007. 3 Long — an associate MCSP warden — informed Plaintiff that MCSP would 4 approve the Pagan group's practices and would grant them a worship 5 area, 6 accommodate the large number of Pagan inmates at once. however On 7 herbs 8 9 believed the June Committee and 1, (RRC) were oils. grounds 2007, request being and officials provided Plaintiff regarding placed Takehara MCSP on held were the on not a large Religious limitations religion. On to Review that Plaintiff June 6, 11 connection with their investigation of a note threatening an assault 12 on Mule Creek staff by members of Kekau Ya Aset (HYA), to which 13 Plaintiff belonged. On June 10, 2007, Plaintiff filed an inmate 14 grievance the 15 stones, and crystals, and requesting a fence, fire pit, and sweathouse 16 for the Pagan religious grounds. 17 these requests for unauthorized religious items need to go through the 18 RRC. June 14, purchase oils, cell herbs, in prayer In response Plaintiff was informed 19 On 20 segregation. 21 completed, Plaintiff was found guilty of a Rule Violation Report (RVR) 22 in connection with the note threatening Mule Creek staff members by 23 HYA. On 2007, to Plaintiff’s 2007, Defendants ability searched enough 10 requesting Lockhart hearing At the hearing, Defendant submitted his a Plaintiff September 18, was 2007, placed after an in administrative investigation was On November 15, 2007, Defendant Bueno and Green did not allow 24 25 non-Wiccans to use the Pagan religious grounds. 26 Druids were required to hold group worship on the general population ORDER - 3 Plaintiff and the 1 yard. Between November 2007 and September 2008, Plaintiff sent 2 multiple request to the RRC requesting food for religious feasts, 3 religious grounds to accommodate more inmates, a sweathouse, fire pit, 4 and approval of some religious items. 5 reviewed Plaintiff’s requests and decided that only Native Americans 6 could use the sweathouse. 7 that MCSP personnel had been served with his complaint. 8 Allen told building staff on April 7, 2009, that the Druids were no 9 longer a recognized religious group. On February 25, 2009, the RRC On March 17, 2009, Plaintiff was informed Defendant On April 15, 2009, Defendant 10 Martel issued a memorandum stating that MCSP would no longer provide 11 food 12 Plaintiff was advised that he was being considered for a transfer to 13 the California State Prison in Lancaster (“LAC”). 14 to the transfer on numerous procedural and substantive grounds. The 15 UCC the 16 conversion of Mule Creek yards that made them incompatible with Level 17 three and four inmates. 18 to LAC. 19 and was placed on the waiting list to work as support staff. 20 2013, Plaintiff was transferred back to Mule Creek from LAC. 21 B. for any hearing prisoner stated the religious transfer celebrations. was On May 6, 2009, Plaintiff objected recommended because of On June 17, 2009, Plaintiff was transferred On July 22, 2009, Plaintiff attended his initial ICC hearing In March Procedural History Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on October 16, 2008, ECF 22 23 No. 1, and the Amended Complaint on July 24, 2009, ECF No. 31. 24 February 25 Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 26 Plaintiff filed another amended complaint, captioned as the First ORDER 1, - 4 2010, the Court granted in part ECF No. 48. and denied in On part On February 24, 2010, 1 Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 51. 2 June 15, 2010. 3 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, motion for leave to conduct 4 third-party discovery, and motion to compel discovery. On 5 ECF No. 68. December 14, Defendants answered the FAC on On October 13, 2011, the Court denied 2011, Plaintiff filed the ECF No. 96. now-operative 6 complaint, captioned as the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ECF No. 7 101. 8 The 9 Defendants. Defendants answered the SAC on February 16, 2012. SAC asserts nine claims and names ECF No. 105. thirty-eight individual On January 26, 2012, the Court screened the SAC pursuant 10 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 11 several of Plaintiff’s claims for mootness, the Court directed service 12 of the remaining claims. 13 Defendants moved to dismiss various claims. 14 June 3, 2013, the Court granted dismissal of the Fourth Claim against 15 Defendants Omeira and Bowen and granted dismissal of the Eighth Claim 16 against 157. On 17 September 12, 2013, the Defendants filed for summary judgment. ECF 18 No. 164. Defendants ECF No. 103. After partially dismissing On August 15, 2012, and March 25, 2013, Cash, Fortson, and ECF Nos. 128 & 151. Sebok. ECF No. On III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE 19 Plaintiff 20 seeks to strike Defendants’ Motion for Summary 21 Judgment, ECF No. 164, as Defendants’ brief exceeded the page limits 22 set in Local Rule 56.1 and 7.1. 23 brief was twenty-three pages long, when the limit was twenty pages. 24 Plaintiff notes that before filing the over-length brief Defendants’ 25 did 26 Defendants filed a nunc pro tunc request for leave to exceed the page not ORDER seek - 5 leave of the Under Local Rule 7.1, Defendants’ Court. However, on October 9, 2013, 1 limit, stating they had inadvertently filed the brief compliant with 2 the Eastern District of California Local Rules, but not complaint with 3 the Eastern District of Washington Local Rules, and requested leave be 4 granted. 5 over-length brief, as the brief, which was three pages over length, 6 addressed nine 7 necessary to 8 Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is denied and Defendants’ request to 9 exceed the page limit is granted. Ultimately, the Court finds good cause for permitting an claims adequately IV. 10 against thirty-one address all the Defendants, issues. which was Accordingly, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11 Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s nine claims for 12 relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 13 (RLUIPA) and the Civil Rights Act (§ 1983). 14 A. Legal Standards 15 Summary judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there 16 is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 17 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 18 Once a party has moved for summary judgment, the opposing party must 19 point to specific facts establishing that there is a genuine dispute 20 for trial. 21 the nonmoving party fails to make such a showing for any of the 22 elements essential to its case for which it bears the burden of proof, 23 the trial court should grant the summary judgment motion. 24 “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule [56(a)], its 25 opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 26 doubt as to the material facts. ORDER - 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If Id. at 322. . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come 1 forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 2 trial.’” 3 574, 586-87 (1986) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 4 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court does 5 not weigh the evidence or assess credibility; instead, “the evidence 6 of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 7 are to be drawn in his favor.” 8 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 9 B. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 Discussion 10 1. RLUIPA 11 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Beard and Jackson, in their 12 official capacity, violated his right to practice his religion under 13 RLUIPA. 14 Be Adjudicated, ECF No. 161, Plaintiff is no longer housed at LAC 15 making the injunctive relief sought against Jackson moot. However, as Plaintiff acknowledges in his Notice of Claims to 16 As to Defendant Beard, Plaintiff bears the initial burden of 17 persuasion on whether the “government practice that is challenged by 18 the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff's exercise of religion.” 19 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-2. 20 impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person 21 residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden 22 results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the government 23 shows that the burden is “in furtherance of a compelling government 24 interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering . . . that 25 interest.” 26 ‘compelling governmental interest’ standard, ‘[c]ontext matters' in ORDER - 7 RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2012). “While [RLUIPA] adopts a 1 the application of that standard.” 2 722-23 (2005). 3 “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail 4 administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to 5 maintain 6 consideration of costs and limited resources.” 7 defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, 8 whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious 9 belief.” good § Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, Courts are expected to apply RLUIPA's standard with order, security 2000cc–5(7)(A). and RLUIPA discipline, does consistent Id. at 723. not define with RLUIPA “substantial 10 burden,” but the Ninth Circuit has held that in the context of a 11 prisoner’s 12 substantial burden occurs “where the state . . . denies [an important 13 benefit] because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby 14 putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and 15 to violate his beliefs.” 16 (9th Cir.2005) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). constitutional challenge to institutional policies a Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 17 Here, Plaintiff fails to make any showing that his religious 18 exercise was so burdened as to pressure him to abandon his beliefs. 19 Plaintiff continues to have the opportunity to pray, use his Tarot 20 cards, purchase some religious oils and herbs, and have group worship. 21 Rather than being pressured to abandon his religious belief, Plaintiff 22 seeks 23 provided by the prison, namely sweathouse ceremonies and six yearly 24 feasts. 25 burden under RLUIPA. 26 // ORDER additional religious accommodations beyond those already Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a substantial - 8 1 2. § 1983 Claims 2 Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a 3 claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed 4 the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant 5 of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or 6 laws of the United States. 7 (1981). 8 the 9 participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 10 which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 11 which [the plaintiff complains].” 12 (9th Cir. 1978). 13 and 14 defendant 15 constitutional deprivation. 16 (1976). 17 superior liability. 18 690-92 (1978). 19 position and the claimed constitutional violation must be shown; vague 20 and conclusory allegations are insufficient. 21 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 22 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within meaning focus on of section if he does an affirmative act, Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 The inquiry into causation must be individualized the whose 1983, duties acts or and responsibilities omissions are alleged of to each have individual caused a See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 Liability for a violation will not arise from respondeat Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, A causal link between a person holding a supervisorial See Fayle v. Stapley, The Court takes up each of the alleged violations in turn. 23 a. 24 First Amendment, Free Exercise 25 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Jackson, Beard, Barnham, Baptista, 26 Muhammed, Kuric, Long, Lackner, R. Bueno, Green, Lockhart, Takehara, ORDER - 9 1 Martel, Subia, and Knipp violated his First Amendment right to freedom 2 of religion. 3 retain the protections of the First Amendment. 4 of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1974). 5 exercise his religion, however, is limited by institutional objectives 6 and by the loss of freedom concomitant with incarceration. 7 348. 8 government denied him “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing [his] 9 faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that prisoners See O'Lone v. Estate A prisoner's right to freely Id. at To prevail on his Free Exercise Claim, Plaintiff must show the 10 adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 11 319, 322 (1972). 12 require prison administration to provide inmates with the religious 13 provisions of their choice. 14 place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of 15 size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without 16 regard to the extent of the demand.”). It is well-settled that the First Amendment does not Id. at 322 n. 2 (“A special chapel or 17 Here, as to Defendants Beard and Jackson, Plaintiff alleges they 18 violated his First Amendment rights by failing to enforce or implement 19 a number of new policies. 20 Jackson are supervisory officials and Plaintiff has not demonstrated 21 any facts showing they, either through policies enacted or actions not 22 taken, deprived Plaintiff of his First Amendment rights. 23 record shows that at all times Plaintiff could, and did, avail himself 24 of the RRC to voice his concerns and seek accommodations for his 25 practices. 26 // ORDER - 10 See ECF No. 101 at 27. However, Beard and In fact, the Defendants Barnham, Baptista, Muhammed, Kuric, Long and Lackner, 1 2 members 3 religious practice. 4 actions 5 comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners. 6 Mule Creek, Plaintiff did have access to some oils and herbs, could 7 read his tarot cards, pray, could attend group worship, and was even 8 let out of the yard with other Druids prior to the general population. 9 Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the RRCs actions or 10 of the denied RRC, him allegedly failed to recognize Druidry as a However, Plaintiff does not show how the RRCs a reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith While at inactions deprived him of any First Amendment right. 11 Next, as to Defendants Martinez, Texeira, Machado, Knipp, Long, 12 Vanni, and Martel, Plaintiff concedes that Texeira, Knipp, and Vanni 13 were not present at the transfer meeting. 14 are dismissed. 15 the 16 Plaintiff was up for transfer by the ICC, and then was not actually 17 transferred, in any way impacted his ability to practice his religion. 18 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Long, Bueno, and Baptista 19 violated his First Amendment rights by ordering him to reduce the 20 number of Pagan practitioners. 21 the provided space was not large enough to accommodate all the Pagan 22 inmates at one time, did not tell Plaintiff he could not attend or 23 that he could not practice his religion. 24 no violation that could arise from this request as to Plaintiff’s 25 First Amendment rights. 26 // Plaintiff ORDER - 11 Accordingly, those claims As to Defendants Martinez, Machado, Long, and Martel, fails to show how the UCC’s acknowledgement that However, the request to Plaintiff that Accordingly, the Court finds 1 Defendants Bueno and Green allegedly violated Plaintiff First 2 Amendment rights by ordering Plaintiff off of the Pagan grounds due to 3 limited space and security concerns. 4 provided with the opportunity to worship with a group on the general 5 population yard. In Cruz, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] special 6 chapel or place of worship need not be provided for 7 regardless of size.” 8 Court finds that Defendants, in providing Plaintiff an area for group 9 worship, just not the specific area Plaintiff desired, did not violate 10 However, Plaintiff was still Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n. 2. every faith Accordingly, the his First Amendment rights. On 11 June 6, 2007, Defendants Lockhart and Takehara searched 12 Plaintiff’s cell taking a number of items. 13 not 14 investigation of threats against the prison staff, in any way affected 15 his ability to practice his religion. demonstrate how, the search of his However, Plaintiff does cell due to an ongoing Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Martel, Subia, Long, and 16 17 Knipp violated 18 actions 19 actions. 20 between these supervisors and the claimed constitutional violations. 21 See Fayle, 607 F.2d at 862. of his their However, First Amendment direct rights subordinates Plaintiff has not but by being actively demonstrated aware of ignored a the their causal link Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim fails. 22 Ultimately, the Court finds nothing in the record before it to 23 support the contention that Defendants denied Plaintiff a reasonable 24 opportunity 25 afforded fellow prisoners. 26 // ORDER - 12 of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed. b. 1 Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection 2 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Beard, Jackson, Barnham, Baptista, 3 Muhammed, Kuric, Long, Lackner, Martinez, Teixera, Machado, Knipp, 4 Long, Vanni, Martel, R. Bueno, Green, Lockhart, and Takehara violated 5 his Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection by treating other 6 religions differently from Druidry. The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all 7 8 similarly situated people equally. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 9 Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). This does not mean, however, 10 that all prisoners must receive identical treatment and resources. 11 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 12 873, 880 (9th Cir. 1993); Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568–69 (9th 13 Cir. 14 prisoners' Equal Protection claim because “the prison administration 15 is not under an affirmative duty to provide each inmate with the 16 spiritual 17 Protection claim brought under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that “the 18 defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against 19 [him] based upon membership in a protected class.” 20 City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005). 1987) counselor First, 21 (affirming like summary of his his Free judgment choice”). Exercise against To claim, Native prevail on American an Equal See Thornton v. Plaintiff argues the 22 request to reduce the number of Pagan practitioners, his removal from 23 Pagan grounds, and the 24 protection violation. 25 being treated differently from any other prisoner when space within 26 the prison is limited or when a prisoner is suspected of involvement ORDER - 13 searching of his cell amount to an equal However, Plaintiff does not evidence how he is 1 in threats to staff members. Additionally, he has presented 2 no evidence to indicate a discriminatory purpose for these actions. Second, as the members of the ICC and UCC, Plaintiff concedes 3 4 that “Defendants 5 claim” and that “[t]his is not an equal protection claim.” 6 166 at 11. 7 claim against the ICC and UCC Defendants. Knipp, and Vanni are dropped from this ECF No. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Equal Protection Finally, 8 Texeira, Plaintiff maintains that the prison supervisors and 9 members of the RRC failed to provide Pagan Chaplains, lands for Druid 10 practices, or sweathouses, amounting to an Equal Protection violation. 11 However, like in Toombs, here, the fact that Druids do not have a paid 12 Chaplain 13 Plaintiff is allowed to receive help with religious issues from other 14 paid Chaplains working at CDCR. 15 the 16 access to a volunteer Druid Chaplain if one was available. 17 Plaintiff acknowledges that the RRC did review and ultimately rejected 18 his request for land and a sweathouse. 19 Native 20 entitled to receive “identical treatment and resources.” 21 v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). 22 Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the denial by the RCC of his 23 request is not Plaintiff violation indicates Americans to a have are a of that Equal Protection clause, as Additionally, nothing presented by Defendants provided separate the a have, or would, deny Lastly, ECF No. 166 at 28. sweathouse, sweathouse2 was all inmates based him While are not See Hartmann solely on his 24 25 26 2 Plaintiff acknowledges there is no alternative to the construction of a separate sweathouse considered sacred. ORDER - 14 noting the Native Americans’ sweathouse is 1 religious beliefs and not upon 2 the RCC’s concern for the use of limited prison resources. 3 In the end, Plaintiff while providing evidence that Defendants 4 knew he was a Druid, has not demonstrated that the purpose of any 5 disparate treatment he allegedly received was due to his being a 6 Druid. Accordingly, his claim is dismissed. c. 7 Plaintiff 8 9 First Amendment, Freedom of Speech/Retaliation Knipp, Long, claims Vanni, Burkard, that Defendants Martel, Green, V. R. Martinez, Bueno, Bueno, Texeira, Rutherford, Kudlata, Allen, Machado, Takehara, 10 Chamberlain, Rathjen, 11 Reaves, Nakanoto, Bradford, Beuchter, and Rushing violated the First 12 Amendment by retaliating against him to chill his speech. 13 Prisoners may not be retaliated against for exercising their 14 right of access to the courts, which extends to access to established 15 prison grievance procedures. 16 Cir. 1995). 17 evaluated in light of concerns over “excessive judicial involvement in 18 day-to-day 19 resources 20 Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 21 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). 22 appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the 23 evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct 24 alleged to be retaliatory.” 25 To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege five basic 26 elements: “1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action ORDER However, retaliation claims brought by prisoners must be prison with - 15 Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th management, little which offsetting ‘often benefit to squander[s] anyone.’” judicial Pratt v. In particular, courts should “‘afford Id. (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482). 1 against an inmate 2) because of 3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, 2 and that such action 4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 3 Amendment Rights, and 5) the action did not reasonably advance a 4 legitimate correctional goal.” 5 68 (9th Cir. 2005). 6 institutional order, discipline, and security. 7 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994). 8 by showing adverse activity after the occurrence of protected speech, 9 but rather a plaintiff must show a nexus between the two events. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567- Legitimate penological goals include preserving Barnett v. Centoni, 31 Retaliation is not established simply 10 Husky v. City of San Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000). 11 inmate claiming retaliation must allege that the actions caused some 12 injury, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000), and has 13 the 14 correctional goals for the alleged conduct. 15 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d Here, the Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. 16 Plaintiff 18 retaliated against him by placing him up for transfer. 19 fact that he was not transferred after these 2007 hearings, Plaintiff 20 fails to establish that being put up for transfer was because of his 21 religious 22 maintaining security in the facility. 23 Defendants placed him into administrative segregation in retaliation 24 for his religious beliefs and filing of grievances. However, aside 25 from the beliefs fact 26 ORDER - 16 the and that members not the for of the segregation the UCC legitimate and ICC First, 17 the maintains An committees Aside from the penological goal of Next, Plaintiff maintains that occurred after filing of 1 grievances, Plaintiff fails to show any nexus 2 between the administrative segregation and his religious beliefs. 3 Additionally, Plaintiff further alleges retaliation by Defendant 4 Rutherford and Defendant Allen by having to undergo strip searches and 5 having 6 conclusory allegations are not support by evidence demonstrating a 7 connection between these events and his religious beliefs, other than 8 that they occurred after complaining about religious services, which 9 is insufficient to maintain a retaliation claim. his cousin placed into a holding cell. However, these 10 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants further retaliated 11 against him by removing him from the Pagan grounds, transferring him 12 to LAC, and failing to place him on the assignment list. 13 evidence 14 transferred due to yard conversion at Mule Creek, and was placed on 15 the waiting list for assignment to the support staff. 16 provided nothing but conclusory allegations that these events had any 17 nexus to his religious beliefs or grievances. shows he Ultimately, 18 was removed Plaintiff because fails to of space However, the limitations, demonstrate was Plaintiff has how any of 19 Defendants’ actions were actually retaliatory because of his religious 20 beliefs or grievances, and not for a legitimate penological goal. 21 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are dismissed. d. 22 Plaintiff 23 Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process alleges due process Rutherford, rights under V. the Bueno, and Kudlata, 25 Amendment. 26 a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a - 17 his Defendants 24 ORDER violated that Fourteenth Procedural due process claims require (1) a deprivation of 1 denial of adequate procedural protections. 2 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). 3 proceeding where a liberty interest is at stake, due process requires 4 that 5 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 6 also receive: “(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; 7 (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and 8 correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence 9 in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the fact-finder of the “some evidence” Hufford v. McEnaney, 249 In the context of a disciplinary support the disciplinary decision. The inmate must 10 evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Id. 11 at 454. 12 criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant 13 in such proceedings does not apply.” 14 539, 556 (1974). However, “prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 15 Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are 1) that Rutherford threatened 16 to charge him with misconduct if he did not accuse another, 2) V. 17 Bueno falsely charged him with misconduct, and 3) Kudlata failed to 18 provide him with an impartial hearing officer. 19 fails 20 protection before being placed in administrative segregation. 21 Plaintiff maintains that he was charged with false reports, the Due 22 Process Clause does not make one free from false accusations, but 23 merely 24 accusations. 25 rights were violated is dismissed. 26 // ORDER to establish provides - 18 the he procedural was not provided protections to However, Plaintiff adequate defend procedural against While false Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that his due process e. 1 Fourth Amendment, Unlawful Search and Seizure Plaintiff 2 argues violated Defendants Fourth Lockhart, Amendment right Takehara, to be free and 3 Rutherford 4 unreasonable searches and seizures by searching his cell in connection 5 with an ongoing investigation into threats against prison staff. 6 U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, that “the Fourth Amendment has 7 no applicability to a prison cell.” 8 536 (1984). 9 his prison his that from The Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, An inmate has no “reasonable expectation of privacy in cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth 10 Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 11 The Supreme Court noted, “[p]rison officials must be free to seize 12 from cells any articles which, in their view, disserve legitimate 13 institutional interests.” 14 Plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 15 prison 16 dismissed. cell. f. 17 Id. at 528 n.8. Accordingly, Eighth Plaintiff Amendment, Id. at 519. Here, the Court finds that Fourth Amendment Cruel claim is and Unusual Rathjen, Bennett, Punishment/Deliberate Indifference 18 Finally, 19 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants 20 Reaves, Nakanoto, Bradford, Beuchter, and Rushing violated his Eighth 21 Amendment rights. 22 take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners. 23 v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 24 to protect inmates from dangerous conditions at the prison violates 25 the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the 26 deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and (2) the ORDER - 19 The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials Farmer The failure of prison officials 1 prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate 2 safety. 3 she knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and 4 disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. 5 Id. at 837. 6 deliberate indifference. Id. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute Id. at 835-36 & n.4. 7 Here, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants either transferred him 8 to LAC knowing he would be subject to cruel or unusual punishment at 9 LAC or did not place Plaintiff on the assignment list so that he could 10 be given a work 11 demonstrate 12 subjectively aware of a risk to Plaintiff’s safety. 13 Plaintiff has not demonstrated any violations of his Eight Amendment 14 rights. 15 C. any assignment. evidence that However, could show Plaintiff that any has failed Defendant to was Accordingly, Conclusion 16 For the foregoing reasons, taking the evidence in the light most 17 favorable to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that a 18 violation 19 Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. of his constitutional V. 20 rights or the RLUIPA occurred. CONCLUSION 21 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 22 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 164, is GRANTED. 23 2. 24 Defendants’ Nunc Pro Tunc Leave to Exceed Page Limit, ECF No. 167, is GRANTED. 25 3. 26 ORDER Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, ECF No. 166, is DENIED. - 20 4. 1 The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter JUDGMENT in Defendants’ favor with prejudice. 2 3 5. All pending deadlines and hearings are STRICKEN. 4 6. The Clerk’s Office shall CLOSE this file. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 Order and provide copies to Mr. Rupe and to defense counsel. 7 DATED this 23rd The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this day of December 2013. 8 s/ Edward F. Shea EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 C:\Windows\Temp\notes87944B\08.2454.grant.msj.lc2.docx ORDER - 21

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