Eichler v. Tilton et al

Filing 16

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 04/14/11 recommending that plaintiff's amended complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and this action be closed. Amended Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint 15 referred to Judge Morrison C. England Jr. Objections due within 14 days. (Plummer, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DWAYNE EICHLER,

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No. CIV S-09-1032-MCE-CMK-P

Plaintiff,

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vs.

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J. TILTON, et al.,

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.
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Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 15).
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

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from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

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that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,
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1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

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complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

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rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because a plaintiff must allege

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with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

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claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

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impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

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and conclusory.

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Plaintiff’s original complaint was dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to
state his claims clearly and concisely, pursuant to Rule 8, as well as for failure to state a

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cognizable claim. Plaintiff was informed, in detail, of Rule 8’s requirements and the need to

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allege an actual connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged

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constitutional deprivations. He was also informed as to what is required to state a claim for, inter

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alia, denial of medical treatment, and violation of his freedom of religion rights.

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I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
In his amended complaint, plaintiff continues to make somewhat vague and

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general allegations about the lack of medical treatment he has received. For instance, he claims

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he sought medical care for severe stomach pains and rectal spasms, for which did not receive any

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treatment for more than 18 months , until he was sent to Manteca Hospital. However, plaintiff

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fails to identify who denied him such treatment. (See Am. Comp., Doc. 15, at 16). He also

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claims he was denied follow up medical treatment, as ordered by Dr. Tran. He again fails to state

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who denied him the treatment. (See id. at 185). Plaintiff’s complaint states he has had on going

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medical deprivation dating back to 1989, covering two separate terms of incarceration. He also

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alleges he had a broken nose and blocked nasal passage which have not been fixed, but again

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fails to state who was responsible for such treatment. (See id. at 21). Those few instances he

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does identify individuals, his claims against those defendants are unclear.
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Plaintiff also continues to allege he has been denied the ability to practice his

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religious beliefs. He states he is an anthroposophist, and has been denied the ability to practice

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his religious beliefs. (See id. at 22). However, he fails to state how he was so denied, such as

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how he was prevented from his religious practices. His statements that he was denied “religious

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supplies, sanctuaries, scheduling for religious duties and rights” is inadequate. Plaintiff was also

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previously fully informed as to what is required to state a claim for violation of his right to

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practice his religious beliefs. He has again failed to do so adequately.

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Finally, plaintiff apparently claims other alleged violations by the defendants,
such as failure to provide for his safety, negligence, and overcrowding. However, he again fails
to identify who violated his rights, and how.

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II. DISCUSSION

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Plaintiff was previously informed, in detail, how his complaint was inadequate

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and what was required to adequately state a claim. As to his medical claims, plaintiff was

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informed:

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The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31
(1993); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth
Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). Conditions of confinement may,
however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide
prisoners with “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care,
and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107
(9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment
only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s
act or omission must be so serious such that it results in the denial
of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)
subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and
wantonly for the purpose of inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison official
must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

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Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or
injury, or risks of serious injury or illness, gives rise to a claim
under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; see
also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as
dental and mental health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d
1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is sufficiently
serious if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in
further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.
1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th
Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a
reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of
comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the
prisoner’s daily activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic
and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent
in medical needs cases than in other Eighth Amendment contexts
because the responsibility to provide inmates with medical care
does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns.
See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be
given to the judgment of prison officials as to decisions concerning
medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th
Cir. 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may
constitute deliberate indifference. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1111.
Delay in providing medical treatment, or interference with medical
treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See Lopez,
203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner
must also demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See
McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.
Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition
does not, however, give rise to a claim under the Eighth
Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a difference
of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning
the appropriate course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth
Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332
(9th Cir. 1996).
To the extent Plaintiff is claiming denial of medical
treatment, Plaintiff’s claims are mostly vague and conclusory.
While he claims he was denied medication and denied treatment as
well as follow up visits, he fails to state who denied him
medication, what medication he was denied, and who denied him
treatment.

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As to plaintiff’s religious claims, he was informed:

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The United States Supreme Court has held that prisoners
retain their First Amendment rights, including the right to free
exercise of religion. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 348 (1987); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974). Thus, for example, prisoners have a right to be provided

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with food sufficient to sustain them in good health and which
satisfies the dietary laws of their religion. See McElyea v. Babbit,
833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, prison officials are
required to provide prisoners facilities where they can worship and
access to clergy or spiritual leaders. See Glittlemacker v. Prasse,
428 F.2d 1, 4 (3rd Cir. 1970). Officials are not, however, required
to supply clergy at state expense. See id. Inmates also must be
given a “reasonable opportunity” to pursue their faith comparable
to that afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional
religious precepts. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
However, the court has also recognized that limitations on a
prisoner’s free exercise rights arise from both the fact of
incarceration and valid penological objectives. See McElyea, 833
F.2d at 197. For instance, under the First Amendment, the
penological interest in a simplified food service has been held
sufficient to allow a prison to provide orthodox Jewish inmates
with a pork-free diet instead of a completely kosher diet. See Ward
v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877-79 (9th Cir. 1993). Similarly, prison
officials have a legitimate penological interest in getting inmates to
their work and educational assignments. See Mayweathers v.
Newland, 258 F.3d 930, 38 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing Muslim
inmates’ First Amendment challenge to prison work rule).
In addition , Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) in 2000. See Guru
Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978,
985 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997)) . Under RLUIPA, prison officials are prohibited from
imposing “substantial burdens” on religious exercise unless there
exists a compelling governmental interest and the burden is the
least restrictive means of satisfying that interest. See id. at 986.
RLUIPA has been upheld by the Supreme Court, which held that
RLUIPA’s “institutionalized-persons provision was compatible
with the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
concluded that RLUIPA ‘alleviates exceptional governmentcreated burdens on private religious exercise.’” Warsoldier v.
Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005)).
It is not clear whether a prisoner must specifically raise
RLUIPA in order to have his claim analyzed under the statute’s
heightened standard. Compare Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152,
1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (“factual allegations establishing a ‘plausible’
entitlement to relief under RLUIPA, . . . satisfied the minimal
notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.”), with Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 715
n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to express any opinion about whether
plaintiff could prevail under RLUIPA because plaintiff brought his
claim under the First Amendment only). Therefore, it is possible
for a prisoner’s complaint to raise both a First Amendment claim
and a RLUIPA claim based on the same factual allegations. In
other words, even if the plaintiff does not specifically invoke the
heightened protections of RLUIPA, he may nonetheless be entitled
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to them. Under Henderson, however, the plaintiff’s claim may be
limited to the less stringent Turner “reasonableness test” if the
plaintiff specifically brings the claim under the First Amendment
only.
Under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA, the
prisoner bears the initial burden of establishing that the defendants
substantially burdened the practice of his religion by preventing
him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith. See Freeman
v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing claim
under First Amendment); see also Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994-95
(analyzing claim under RLUIPA). While RLUIPA does not define
what constitutes a “substantial burden,” pre-RLUIPA cases are
instructive. See id. at 995 (discussing cases defining “substantial
burden” in the First Amendment context). To show a substantial
burden on the practice of religion, the prisoner must demonstrate
that prison officials’ conduct “burdens the adherent’s practice of
his or her religion by pressuring him or her to commit an act
forbidden by the religion or by preventing him or her from
engaging in conduct or having a religious experience which the
faith mandates.” Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51
(9th Cir. 1987). The burden must be more than a mere
inconvenience. See id. at 851.
Plaintiff’s claims that his religious rights are being denied
is unclear. It appears that he is claiming his rights are being
violated by prison officials not allowing him to practice yoga. In
order for Plaintiff to show his rights have been violated, at a
minimum, he will be required to show that his religious beliefs are
sincerely held and that they are religious in nature. See Callahan v.
Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981). If Plaintiff is going to
amend his complaint to attempt to state a claim regarding his
freedom of religion rights, he will be required to clearly state what
rights he believes have been violated and how the defendants are
substantially burdening the practice of his religion.

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Finally, plaintiff was informed of the need to adequately link his claims to the

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individual defendants:
Plaintiff’s complaint is inadequate in that it fails to adequately link
the proper defendants to his claims. To state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or
link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged
deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person
‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,
within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act,
participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act
which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of
which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743
(9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the
involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not
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sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to
each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir.
1988).
Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983
for the actions of their employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d
1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no respondeat
superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the
constitutional violations of subordinates if the supervisor
participated in or directed the violations. See id. The Supreme
Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be
liable based on knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s
unconstitutional conduct because government officials, regardless
of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her
own conduct and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). When a defendant holds a
supervisory position, the causal link between such defendant and
the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged.
See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.
Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory
allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in
civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of
Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
Plaintiff has named several supervisory personnel as
defendants in his complaint, including the Director and Secretary
of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, as
well as the Warden. There is no indication in his complaint that
any of the supervisory personnel were directly involved in any
violation raised in his complaint. An action will only be allowed to
proceed against supervisory defendants who were specifically,
personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations.
(Order, Doc. 12).

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Plaintiff has failed to correct the inadequacies previously identified. His amended

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complaint still fails to adequately set forth a claim for violation of his constitutional rights either

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related to his medical care or his religious freedom, or any other constitutional right. While his

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amended complaint is more understandable, he fails to clearly set forth his claims identifying

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who violated his constitutional rights, and how. Throughout his amended complaint, he

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generally refers to groups of defendants, such as medical providers, mental health staff, wardens

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or CDC staff in general. He then claims these groups of defendants violated his rights by using
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conclusory and vague allegations. He does not clearly identify who violated his rights, and in

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what way each individual defendant has done so. Even where he does state a specific

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defendant’s name, his allegations are too vague and insufficient to support his claims.

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III. CONCLUSION

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Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to file an amended complaint which

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adequately set forth his claims. He was informed as to what was required in order to adequately

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state a claim, and the requirement to set forth his claims related to each defendant. He failed to

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do so in his amended complaint. It appears that plaintiff is either unable or unwilling to cure the

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defects in his complaint. As such, further leave to amend should not be granted prior to the

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dismissal of the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)

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(en banc).

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Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s amended
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and this action be closed.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

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objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal.

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See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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DATED: April 14, 2011
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CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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