Lovely-Trejo v. Winco Holdings, Inc. et al

Filing 27

ORDER signed by Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 2/3/12 ORDERING this case is REMANDED to Shasta County Superior Court. Copy of remand order sent to other court. CASE CLOSED. (Becknal, R)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JESSE T. LOVELY-TREJO,
Plaintiff,

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vs.

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NO. CIV. S-09-1474 KJM-GGH

WINCO HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

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ORDER
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Under 28 U.S.C. §1367(c), a court may decline to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction in a case where it has dismissed all of the claims over which it has original

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jurisdiction. “A district court's decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing

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every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad

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Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1866 (2009); see also Arbaugh

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v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[W]hen a court grants a motion to dismiss for failure

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to state a federal claim, the court generally retains discretion to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over pendent state-law claims. . .”).

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“When . . . the court dismisses the federal claim leaving only state claims for

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resolution, the court should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without

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prejudice.” Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994); Wren v.

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Sletten Constr. Co., 654 F.2d 529, 536 (9th Cir. 1981) (“When the state issues apparently

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predominate and all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the proper exercise of discretion

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requires dismissal of the state claim[s].”) (per curiam). In Carnegie-Mellon Univeristy v. Cohill,

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the United States Supreme Court stated “a federal court should consider and weigh in each case,

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and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and

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comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court

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involving pendent state-law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a case

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properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit

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in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise

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of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.” 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).

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This case was removed to federal court by defendants based on preemption of

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plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with

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respect to an unidentified oral contract. (See ECF 1 at 14-15.) Removal on this basis is dubious

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in the first instance, given there is nothing within this cause of action as pled that asserts a

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violation of a right provided by a collective bargaining agreement or requires the court to

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consider and interpret a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific

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Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining two-step process for analyzing

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preemption claims based on Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.

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§ 185); Jacobs v. Mandalay Corp., 378 F. Ap'px. 685, 687 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). In any event,

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plaintiff has now conceded that her cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and

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fair dealing should be summarily adjudicated against her. (ECF 22 at 6.) As such, the basis for

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removal jurisdiction is extinguished. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

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over the remaining claims, assuming jurisdiction was ever proper.
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This case is REMANDED to Shasta County Superior Court and this case is
CLOSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 3, 2012.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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