Echeverria v. Dickenson
Filing
18
FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds on 04/19/11 recommending that petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied; and the district court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. Referred to Judge John A. Mendez. Objections due within 14 days. (Plummer, M)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
JUAN ECHEVARRIA,
11
Petitioner,
12
13
No. 2:09-cv-1822 JAM JFM (HC)
vs.
KATHLEEN DICKENSON,
Warden,
14
Respondent.
15
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
/
16
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of
17
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner claims that his federal constitutional
18
right to due process was violated by a 2006 decision of the California Board of Parole Hearings
19
to deny him a parole date.
20
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
21
In 1988, petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to
22
fifteen years to life in prison. See Ex. 1 to Answer, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in
23
Sacramento County Superior Court, at 2. On January 11, 2006, petitioner appeared before the
24
Board for a subsequent parole consideration hearing. See Ex. A to Ex. 1 to Answer, at 1.
25
Petitioner appeared at and participated in the hearing. See id. Following deliberations held at the
26
/////
1
1
conclusion of the hearing, the Board announced their decision to deny petitioner parole and the
2
reasons for that decision. See id. at 100-104.
3
4
ANALYSIS
I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
5
6
Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in
state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:
7
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
8
9
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
10
11
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
12
Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly
13
established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the
14
governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially
15
indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different
16
result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406
17
(2000)).
18
Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal
19
habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
20
from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
21
prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ
22
simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court
23
decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that
24
application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75
25
(2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal
26
/////
2
1
question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) (internal citations
2
omitted).
3
The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state
4
court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court
5
reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal
6
habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is
7
available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).
8
II. Petitioner’s Claim
9
As noted above, petitioner claims that the denial of parole violated his federal
10
constitutional right to due process of law. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
11
Amendment prohibits state action that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due
12
process of law. A litigant alleging a due process violation must first demonstrate that he was
13
deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that
14
the procedures attendant upon the deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky
15
Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989).
16
A protected liberty interest may arise from either the Due Process Clause of the
17
United States Constitution “by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’” or from “an
18
expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,
19
221 (2005) (citations omitted). See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987).
20
The United States Constitution does not, of its own force, create a protected liberty interest in a
21
parole date, even one that has been set. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981);
22
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (There is “no constitutional or
23
inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
24
sentence.”). However, “a state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory language, ‘creates a
25
presumption that parole release will be granted’ when or unless certain designated findings are
26
/////
3
1
made, and thereby gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. See
2
also Allen, 482 U.S. at 376-78.
3
California’s parole statutes give rise to a liberty interest in parole protected by the
4
federal due process clause. Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861 (2011). In California, a
5
prisoner is entitled to release on parole unless there is “some evidence” of his or her current
6
dangerousness. In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1205-06, 1210 (2008); In re Rosenkrantz, 29
7
Cal.4th 616, 651-53 (2002). However, in Swarthout the United States Supreme Court held that
8
“[n]o opinion of [theirs] supports converting California’s ‘some evidence’ rule into a substantive
9
federal requirement.” Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862. Rather, the protection afforded by the
10
federal due process clause to California parole decisions consists solely of the “minimal”
11
procedural requirements set forth in Greenholtz, specifically “an opportunity to be heard and . . .
12
a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” Id.
13
Here, the record reflects that petitioner was present at the 2006 parole hearing,
14
that he participated in the hearing, and that he was provided with the reasons for the Board’s
15
decision to deny parole. According to the United States Supreme Court, the federal due process
16
clause requires no more. Accordingly, petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus should
17
be denied.
18
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
19
States District Courts, “[t]he district court must issue or a deny a certificate of appealability when
20
it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. A certificate of
21
appealability may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the applicant has made a substantial
22
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The court must either
23
issue a certificate of appealability indicating which issues satisfy the required showing or must
24
state the reasons why such a certificate should not issue. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). For the reasons
25
set forth in these findings and recommendations, petitioner has not made a substantial showing of
26
the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, no certificate of appealability should issue.
4
1
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
2
1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied; and
3
2. The district court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.
4
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
5
Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen
6
days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
7
objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
8
“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the
9
objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The
10
parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
11
appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
12
DATED: April 19, 2011.
13
14
15
16
17
12
eche1822.157
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?