Blanton v. County of Sacramento et al

Filing 62

ORDER signed by Judge Morrison C. England, Jr on 7/6/12 GRANTING 45 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk is directed to close this case. CASE CLOSED. (Matson, R)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DAVID BLANTON,
No. 2:09-cv-01832-MCE-CKD

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Plaintiff,

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v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO;
SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT; CHRIS BITTLE;
DONALD BRICKER; and CRYSTAL
FISHER BRADNAX,

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Defendants.

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----oo0oo----

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Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

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and Summary Adjudication (ECF No. 45). For the reasons that

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follow, the Motion will be granted in full.

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BACKGROUND1

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Plaintiff David Blanton (“Blanton”) was a licensed Adult

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Residential Administrator, who operated an adult residential care

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facility.

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Paragraph 12).

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employed by Blanton at his facility.

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at night on July 3rd or early in the morning of July 4th, 2007,2

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Blanton caught Fischer stealing cleaning products from the care

(First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 9,
Defendant Crystal Fischer Bradnax (“Fischer”) was
(Id. at ¶ 13.)

Either late

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facility and spoke with her about the thefts.

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sent home and placed on administrative leave without pay.

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(Id.) Fischer was
(Id.)

Within hours, Fischer reported to the Sacramento County

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Sheriff’s Department (“SCSD”) that Blanton had brandished and

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accidentally discharged a firearm inside the residential home.

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Specifically, she informed Officer Kenneth King (“Officer King”)3

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of the incident.

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supervisor, Defendant Officer Donald Bricker (“Officer Bricker”)

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and requested a welfare check on the residents of the facility.

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(Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed

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Facts (“PR-SUF”), ECF No. 51, Attachment 1, ¶ 9).

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(Id. at ¶ 15.)

Officer King then contacted his

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The following facts are the Court’s determination of what
is undisputed based on its review of both Plaintiff’s and
Defendants’ Statements of Facts and the Records cited therein.
For the purposes of this motion, all reasonable inferences are
drawn in favor of the Plaintiff.
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All forthcoming dates are from the year 2007 unless
otherwise stated.
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Kenneth King was dismissed with prejudice from all causes
of action. (ECF No. 57., Stipulation and Order.)
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On July 4th, Officer Bricker and his Deputy Officer,

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Defendant Chris Bittle (“Officer Bittle”), went to the facility,

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interviewed Blanton and investigated his care facility. (Id. at

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¶ 11.)

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his investigation and his interview with Blanton.

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¶ 18.)

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During the investigation, Officer Bricker took notes of
(PR-SUF at

According to Blanton, he did not admit to the police

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officers to have fired a gun in the facility.

(Id. at ¶ 12.)

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However, the police officers investigating the incident’s reports

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indicate that Blanton did, in fact, admit to having accidentally

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discharged the firearm.4

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In Officer King’s July 4, 2007,report of his investigation

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of the incident, he reported that Fischer stated that, “[w]hile

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we were talking, Blanton picked up the gun and was putting the

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magazine in the handle when all of a sudden the gun went off.

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Blanton objects to the contents of the police reports on
hearsay grounds, but does not dispute that the police arrived,
investigated, and interviewed witnesses. The Court overrules
Blanton’s hearsay objection to the police reports contained in
ECF No. 49, Ex.2. The police officers’ statements and
observations recorded in a police report are admissible, as is
the summary of Blanton’s statement made to Officer Bricker under
the public-records hearsay exception contained in Fed. R. Evid.
803(8) and Cal. Evid. Code § 1280. See, e.g., Colvin v. United
States, 479 F.2d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 1973) (Personal observations
of police officers contained in the police reports are generally
admissible); Rupf v. Yan, 85 Cal. App. 4th 411, 430 n.6 (Cal.
App. 2000) (noting that “a police officer’s report is admissible
under Evidence Code section 1280 if it is based upon the
observations of a public employee who had a duty to observe facts
and report and record them correctly. [] Statements
independently admissible, such as a party admission, contained in
a police report are similarly admissible, despite their hearsay
character.” (citations omitted)).
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The bullet went through the entertainment center in the front

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room...” (Request for Judicial Notice5 (“RJN”), ECF No. 49, Ex. 2

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at 5.)

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according to Bricker’s report,

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Consistent with Fischer’s description of the event,

Blanton admitted that he was in the home earlier
checking up on one of his employees and when he was
leaving the house he picked up his gun from a cabinet
shelf and the gun fired one round into the wooden
entertainment center. Blanton showed us where the
bullet struck the wood entertainment center and showed
us the wood debris on the floor. It appeared a single
bullet struck the wood cabinet system and did not exit
the house or travel into any other area of the home.

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(Id. at 8-9.)

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Blanton’s statement to him, in which Blanton allegedly said,

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among other information about the incident, that:

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Officer Bittle also included a summary of

After I arrived tonight I placed the gun on the shelf
of the entertainment center and removed the magazine to
make it safe, I had the magazine in my pocket and the
gun was just laying on the shelf by itself without a
holster.

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Pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 201(b) (authorizing
judicial notice of adjudicative facts ‘capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be
reasonably questioned’), Defendants request the Court take
judicial notice of several documents. (Request for Judicial
Notice (“RJN”) (ECF No. 49, Att. 1-4.) Specifically, Defendants
ask the Court to take judicial notice of the: (1) Demand for Jury
Trial, dated October 25, 2011, and signed by Attorney for
Plaintiff (RJN, Att. 1); (2) Incident/Information Report, dated
July 4, 2007, signed by Defendant Bricker and recorded in the
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, Report Number
07-0036423SD (Id., Att. 2); (3) Order from the Department of
Social Services Hearing, signed by Administrative Law Judge
Marilyn A. Woollard and dated March 31, 2008 (Id., Att. 3);
(4) Transcript for the Order from the Department of Social
Services Hearing, dated February 7, 2008, and transcribed and
signed by Heather R. Coiner (Id. at Att. 4). Defendants’ requests
are unopposed and are the proper subject of judicial notice.
See, e.g., Champlaie v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP,
706 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1040 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Lee v. County of
Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (court may take
judicial notice of matters of public record). Accordingly,
Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, (ECF No. 49, Att. 1-4.),
is granted.
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I picked the gun up and I must have had my finger on
the trigger because the gun fired one round. The
bullet hit the wood entertainment center and caused
wood to splinter onto the floor.
I was really surprised the gun fired because I had
removed the Magazine and I didn’t think it would fire
without it, but I guess I was wrong. After the gun
fired my worker Crystal became pretty shaken up and I
could tell she was concerned. I told her to take the
rest of the night off and I would stay at the home in
her place. She left and didn’t say anything.
None of the residents were awake when the gun fired and
none woke up after the incident. The bullet hit the
wood and stayed in the frame of the cabinet.
After Crystal left I cleaned up a little, put my gun
away and went to bed.
I did not point the gun towards Crystal and I never
picked it up to show it to her I’m sure she knows I
have the gun because I bring it with me every time I
come to the house.

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According to Defendants Officers Bittle and Bricker as well

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as the summary of Blanton’s statement, Blanton informed them that

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the gun was in his bedroom.

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retrieved the gun after asking for Blanton’s permission, they

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found it unsecured.

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(Bricker Decl. at ¶ 21.)

When they

(Id. at ¶ 22.)

Officer Bricker and Officer Bittle concluded that Blanton’s

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gun had discharged, but that no crime had been committed.

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(Bricker Decl. at ¶ 23.)

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he created the incident report.6

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Officer Bricker completed his report within 24 hours after the

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interview with Blanton and the investigation of Blanton’s care

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facility.

After Officer King spoke with Fischer,
(Id. at ¶ 23-24.)

Likewise,

(Id. at ¶ 25.)

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Incident reports written by police officers are designed
for record keeping and not for prosecution proceedings. (PR-SUF
at ¶ 24.)
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On July 5th, Fischer reported the incident to Alta Regional

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Services (“ALTA”), which coordinates services for developmentally

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disabled individuals and administers placement of residents in

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various care homes on behalf of the State of California

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Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”).

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¶ 33-34.) John Redman (“Redman”), a representative of ALTA, spoke

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with Fischer.

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Blanton had brandished a gun on the night of July 3rd and had

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discharged the gun in the care facility.

(Id. at ¶ 35.)

(PR-SUF at

Fischer indicated to Redman that

(Id. at ¶ 36.)

ALTA

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then initiated an investigation into Fischer’s claims.

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¶ 37.)

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interviewed Blanton.

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representatives, Blanton denied that he discharged the gun.

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at ¶ 39.)

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(Id. at

That same day, Mr. Redman made a site visit and
(Id. at ¶ 38.)

When asked by the ALTA
(Id.

Redman called the SCSD as part of his investigation of

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Fischer’s complaints.

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informing him that an accidental discharge did occur and a report

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on the matter was being prepared.7

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Officer Bricker returned Redman’s call,

(Id. at ¶ 41.)

After learning of the police report and the SCSD conclusion

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that the gun had been discharged, ALTA removed residents from

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Blanton’s care facility.

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(Id. at ¶ 44.)

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Blanton contends that the Officers initiated the
communications between the Officers and ALTA that led to the ALTA
hearing and subsequent revocation of his license. (PR-SUF at
¶ 42.) Review of the Record and Declarations does not provide a
reasonable factual basis for the Court to accept that conclusory
allegation. The Court is persuaded that Redman, on behalf of
ALTA, initiated communications after receiving a complaint from
Fischer and that the Officers were cooperative rather than
instigative.
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Blanton appealed the removal, contending that no firearm was

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discharged.

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(Id. at ¶ 45.)

In October, ALTA held a hearing regarding the removal of

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residents from the care home.

(Id. at ¶ 46.)

Blanton was

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represented by counsel and presented evidence to support his

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contention that the police reports were inaccurate and that he

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did not discharge a gun in the care facility.

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Officer Bricker and Officer King both testified at the hearing

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and were subject to examination by ALTA and Blanton’s counsel.

(Id. at ¶ 47.)

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(Id. at ¶ 48.)

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had in fact been discharged, that Blanton was in violation of

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applicable law and that the removal of residents was proper.8

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(Id. at ¶ 51.) Blanton appealed the decision.

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ALTA determined based on the hearing that the gun

(Id. at ¶ 52.)

On February 7th, 2008, the California Department of Social

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Services (“CDSS”) held a subsequent administrative hearing to

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consider Blanton’s appeal from the ALTA decision.

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ECF No. 49, Ex. 3.(Department of Social Services Order

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(“DSSO”))).

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Defendants Fischer, Officer Bittle and Officer Bricker all

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testified and were subject to cross-examination.

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PR-SUF at ¶ 54-56.)

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(See generally

Blanton was again represented by counsel and

(DSSO at p. 2;

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Blanton objects that the alleged outcome of the ALTA
hearing is based on hearsay. (PR-SUF at ¶ 51.) The Court is
persuaded that the ALTA hearing concluded that Blanton discharged
his gun in the care facility. However, this finding is not
necessary to the outcome of this case, because the issue was
relitigated in the CDSS proceeding and again the gun was found to
have been fired in the care facility by Blanton. (See DSSO Order,
ECF No. 49, Ex. 3.)
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The Department of Social Services affirmed the ALTA findings in a

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written decision concluding that Blanton was in violation of

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applicable state codes and that his license to operate an adult

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care facility must be revoked.

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the court held that, “As set forth in the Factual Findings and

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Legal Conclusions as a whole... the Department proved by a

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preponderance of the evidence that, on July 4, 2007, respondent

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[Blanton] discharged his gun in the licensed facility...” (Id.)

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Blanton did not seek judicial review of that decision.

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(DSSO at p. 14.)

Specifically,

(Id. at

¶ 60.)

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On July 9th, 2009, Blanton filed his complaint in this

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Court, with jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§1343, which confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear suits

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brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

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is also conferred by 28 U.S.C. §1331.

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§1367(a), this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over claims

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arising under state law.

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(ECF No. 2.)

Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

In his complaint, Blanton argues the following: 1) that

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Defendants conspired to present false testimony to the Regional

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Center and Department of Social Services regarding Plaintiff,

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that 2) the SCSD failed to supervise, train or discipline the

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allegedly lying defendants, Officer Bricker, Officer Bittle, and

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Officer King, and that 3) the County of Sacramento was

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deliberately indifferent to SCSD’s failure to train, supervise

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and discipline their employees.

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Blanton raises the following causes of action: 1) that Defendants

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deprived him of his liberty interest under the Fourteenth

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Amendment Due Process Clause and under the California

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Constitution by unlawfully taking his license and thus his

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livelihood from him; 2) Defendants unlawfully deprived him of his

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property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

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Clause and the California Constitution by taking his license and

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thus his property under false pretenses; 3) that Defendants

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violated his Second Amendment right to carry a gun; 4) that

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Defendants’ actions, which led to revocation of his license,

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constituted a Taking without Just Compensation under the United

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State Constitution and the California Constitution; and 5) that

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Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him.

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Each and every one of Blanton’s claims hinges on the

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contention that the police officers involved in this case

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conspired against him in an effort to conceal their original

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finding, which allegedly was that Blanton did not fire his gun on

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the night of July 3rd, 2007.

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On October 25, 2011, Defendants filed the instant Motion for

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Summary Judgment.

Defendants seek first to dismiss Plaintiff’s

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case on the basis of issue preclusion, arguing that the same

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issues were litigated in the state administrative hearings and

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that this Court is precluded from relitigating them.

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Furthermore, Defendants claim that Plaintiff has failed to state

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a cause of action against the moving County and Officer

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Defendants because said Defendants are immune from civil

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prosecution for their investigation and their testimony contained

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in the police reports, as well as for their administrative

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hearing testimonies.

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STANDARD

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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

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judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

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interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

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as a matter of law.”

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principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

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unsupported claims or defenses.

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477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

One of the

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

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adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

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summary judgment.

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ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party
always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).
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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

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burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

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genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist.

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

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585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

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253, 288-89 (1968).

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In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

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dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

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facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

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material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

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the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

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affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

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the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

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(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

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Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987).

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“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

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question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

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evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

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properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

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upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.”

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251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448,

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20 L. Ed. 867 (1872)).

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the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

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opponent must do more than simply show that there is some

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metaphysical doubt as to the material facts....

The opposing party must demonstrate that

Stated another way,

Anderson, 477 U.S. at

As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen

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Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

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of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine

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issue for trial.’”

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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

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opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

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that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

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drawn in favor of the opposing party.

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Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

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the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

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from which the inference may be drawn.

Richards v. Nielsen

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Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

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aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

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ANALYSIS

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A.

Issue Preclusion

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Defendants argue that because the administrative hearing

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already determined that Officer Bricker’s and Officer Bittle’s

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testimonies were truthful, the issue underlying this case

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(whether Officer Bricker and Officer Bittle lied in their report)

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has already been litigated and is thus precluded from further

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adjudication.

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Page 6.)

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issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may

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preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause

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of action involving a party to the first case.”

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McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).

(See Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 45,

Under issue preclusion, “once a court has decided an

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Allen v.

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Under 28 U.S.C. §1738, federal courts must preclude claims

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which have already received state court judgments.

Marrese v.

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American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380

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(1985).

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decisions of administrative tribunals, acting in a judicial or

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quasi-judicial fashion.

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478 U.S. 788, 798-799 (1986) (preclusive effect extends to

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administrative decisions in § 1983 actions); See also Murray v.

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Alaska Airlines, 50 Cal. 4th 860, 867 (Cal. 2010) (discussing

Furthermore, that preclusive effect can extend to final

University of Tennessee v. Elliott,

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collateral estoppel’s application to administrative proceedings).

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The Ninth Circuit has noted that, “Elliott requires us to give

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preclusive effect, at a minimum, to the fact-finding of state

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administrative tribunals.” Miller v. County of Santa Cruz,

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39 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 1994).

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reflects the Court’s particular emphasis on protecting the fact-

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finding process of state administrative tribunals.

The “at a minimum” clause

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However, the Court must first determine whether this

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particular issue has already been properly adjudicated by the

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state agencies.

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lied in their report was adjudicated in an administrative

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hearing, the Court must first find that the California courts

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would afford preclusive effect to the administrative agency’s

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proceeding.

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This is because the courts want to ensure that the administrative

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hearing provided sufficient safeguards to be equated with a state

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court judgment.

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that determination and likewise determine that the issue has been

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precluded.

Because the issue regarding whether the police

Plaine v. McCabe, 797 F.2d 713, 719 (9th Cir. 1994).

Id.

If so, the Court will grant deference to

Id.
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As stated by the Ninth Circuit,

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The federal court must carefully review the state
administrative proceeding to ensure that, at a minimum,
it meets the state’s own criteria necessary to require
a court of that state to give preclusive effect to the
state agency’s decisions. To do otherwise would run
the risk of precluding relitigation of issues by
parties who have had no fair opportunity to be heard.

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Id.

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California state courts utilize a two-part test to determine

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whether conclusions of a state administrative hearing are

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precluded from further judgment.

See People v. Sims, 32 Cal.3d

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468, 479 (1982).

First, the hearing must meet the fairness

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standards set forth in United States v. Utah Construction &

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Mining, 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).9

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hearing must meet the traditional requirements for applying

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collateral estoppel in California.

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both parts of this test are satisfied with regard to the police

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report, the issue is precluded and the Motion for Summary

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Judgment will be granted as a matter of law in favor of the

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Defendants.

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Second, the administrative

Sims, 32 Cal.3d at 479.

If

Id.

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This case was superseded by statute on other grounds and
thus still applies to this case.
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1.

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Utah Construction Standards

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The Utah Construction Standards, which were subsequently

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approved in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co., 456 U.S. 461,

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484-485 (1982), require that an administrative agency 1) act in a

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judicial capacity, 2) resolve disputed issues of fact properly

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before it, and 3) provide parties with an adequate opportunity to

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litigate.

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State Water Resources Control Board, 37 Cal. 4th, 921, 944 (2006)

Utah, 384 U.S. at 422; See also Pacific Lumber Co. v.

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(“Indicia of proceedings undertaken in a judicial capacity

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include a hearing before an impartial decision maker; testimony

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given under oath or affirmation; a party’s ability to subpoena,

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call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce

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documentary evidence, and to make oral and written argument; the

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taking of a record of the proceeding; and a written statement of

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reasons for the decision.”)

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Defendants argue (and Plaintiff does not refute) that all

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three of these factors were satisfied by the administrative

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hearings held by the ALTA and the CDSS.

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proceedings before a neutral decision-maker with each party

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represented by counsel.

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(Written Order for the CDSS hearing); PR-SUF at ¶ 46-56.)

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parties were allowed to present evidence and call, examine,

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cross-examine and subpoena witnesses.

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submitted under oath, and a verbatim transcript of the CDSS

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hearing was produced.

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Both were adversarial

(See RJN, Attachment #3, Exhibit C

(Id.)

(Id. at Exhibit D.)

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The

Testimonies were

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The Court therefore concludes both hearings satisfied the Utah

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Construction standards.10

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2.

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California Traditional Elements of Issue Preclusion

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The California Supreme Court held that in order to apply
issue preclusion to a fact-finding or judgment,

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First, the issue sought to be precluded from
relitigation must be identical to that decided in a
former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been
actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it
must have been necessarily decided in the former
proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former
proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally,
the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the
same as, or in privity with, the party to the former
proceeding. The party asserting collateral estoppel
bears the burden of establishing these requirements.

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Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341(1990); See also

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People v. Garcia, 39 Cal. 4th 1070, 1077 (Cal. 2006) (listing

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elements).

17

turn.

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The Court now addresses each of these elements in

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26
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10
Blanton disputes specifics regarding what was said at the
hearings. However, Blanton does not dispute the fact that the
hearings were judicially fair. Specifically, Blanton does not
contest that each hearing allowed for a neutral arbitrator, an
opportunity for counsel, opportunities to present evidence, to
thoroughly examine witnesses, etc.

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a.

1

The issue is identical to that decided in a former
proceeding

2
3

While the administrative hearings addressed the issue of

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license revocation, whereas this case pertains to violations of

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Constitutional rights, the underlying issue in both cases is

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precisely the same: did Defendants falsify their testimonies, as

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well as the reports, about whether Blanton discharged his

8

firearm?

9

Blanton’s contention in the administrative hearings was that

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his license should not be revoked because the Defendants had

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conspired together and falsified their reports and testimony to

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falsely claim that he had discharged his firearm in the

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residential facility on the night of July 3rd, 2007.

14

Here, Blanton alleges that because the Defendants conspired

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together and falsified their testimony to falsely claim that he

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discharged the firearm, they violated his rights under the

17

federal Constitution, as well as various rights under state

18

law.11

19

In this case, the administrative proceeding examined the

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Defendants and allowed cross-examination precisely to ensure that

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their police report was not fabricated.

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all the contentions Plaintiff invokes in this case, is identical

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to that which was already determined.

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342; Sims, 32 Cal.3d at 485.

This issue, central to

See Lucido, 51 Cal.3d at

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26
27
28

11

In both his administrative hearings and in this case,
Blanton has alleged a conspiracy but failed to state the reasons
why Fischer, the Police and the Administrative agencies would all
conspire against him.
17

b.

1

Actually Litigated in the Former Proceeding

2
3

Plaintiff does not contest, and the record supports, that

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the issue pertaining to whether the police officers lied in their

5

reports was already litigated before both ALTA and the California

6

Department of Social Services.

(See PR-SUF at 45-59.)

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c.

8

Necessarily Decided in the Former Proceeding

9
10

While the language of the test uses the term “necessarily

11

decided,” courts have long held that estoppel applies so long as

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the issue subject to estoppel was not “entirely unnecessary” to

13

the judgment in the initial proceeding.

14

342.

15

§ 268, p. 710, and cases cited therein;

16

32 Cal.3d at 484–485 (holding issue “necessarily decided” because

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determination of innocence by preponderance of evidence

18

“necessarily” determines lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.)

19

Lucido, 531 Cal.3d at

See e.g. 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Judgment,
see also Sims, supra,

Here, the administrative proceedings’ determinations that

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the police officers were not lying in their reports were central

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to their ultimate rulings against Blanton.

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administrative proceedings found that the police officers lied,

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they would only have Fischer’s word as evidence of a fired

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weapon.

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was not “entirely unnecessary” in determining whether to revoke

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his license because the reports were strong evidence that the gun

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was in fact fired in the care facility.

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Had the

Certainly, the issue regarding whether the police lied

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d.

1

The Parties Must Be in Privity or the Same Parties
as were in the Administrative Proceedings

2
3

Each of the parties herein were engaged in the first

4

proceedings, with factual findings made in regard to each of

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them.

6

This element is clearly established.

As each of the prongs of the issue preclusion test are

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satisfied, the issue pertaining to whether the police lied in

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their reports is precluded from being relitigated here.

See

9

Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 341; Garcia, 39 Cal. 4th at 1077.

The

10

alleged untruthful reporting of Defendants Officer Bittle,

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Officer Bricker, Officer King and Fischer will not be

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readjudicated. Because this is the underlying basis for all of

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Plaintiff’s claims, and because there are no other material

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issues of fact, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary

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Judgment in full.

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17

B.

Officer Immunity

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19

Even if this Court were to find this action not subject to

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issue preclusion, it would still find the causes of action

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against the officers barred on immunity grounds.

22

Officers are immune from damages liability for actions

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brought on the basis of false testimony. Briscoe v. LaHue,

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460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983).

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that circumventing absolute witness immunity for police officers

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by alleging a conspiracy to present false testimony would

27

undermine the purposes served by granting witnesses absolute

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immunity from damages liability under § 1983.

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held

19

1

Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000).

2

Accordingly, this Court will not allow damages liability against

3

Officers Bittle or Bricker.

4

Plaintiff invokes the Ninth Circuit ruling in Harris v.

5

Roderick et al., 126 F.3d 1189, 1199-2000 (9th Cir. 1997), in

6

which immunity from suit is revoked from law enforcement

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officials under the complaining witness exception.

8

Blanton’s claim is based on his allegation that the police

9

officers initiated the contact with ALTA.

Here,

In Harris, the Ninth

10

Circuit held that officers who lied to the Court were not immune

11

from suit under Section 1983 if they functioned as a complaining

12

witness.

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entitled to absolute immunity for perjury committed in the course

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of official proceedings, complaining witnesses who wrongfully

15

bring about a prosecution are not.)

16

Id. (holding that while police officers are generally

A complaining witness is defined as one who initiates the

17

prosecution rather than being merely a witness.

18

126 F.3d at 1199, 2000.

19

not be immune from damages claims brought under Section 1983.

20

See Harris,

If guilty of perjury, that witness will

However, the Court holds that this exception does not apply

21

here for two reasons:

1) Because, as held above, the question of

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whether the Officers committed perjury is precluded from

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relitigation, and

24

the Court is persuaded that the Officers did not initiate the

25

prosecution and that therefore the “complaining witness”

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exception to witness immunity is not applicable to this case.

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2) as stated above (see supra at p. 4, n.7),

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1

Not only are Officers Bittle and Bricker protected from suit due

2

to the Court’s finding of issue preclusion, but they are

3

protected by absolute immunity from Section 1983 damages claims.

4
5

C.

County Liability

6
7

Because the Court finds that Officers Bittle and Bricker did

8

not violate any laws, their supervisors cannot be held liable

9

under any theory of vicarious liability.

Plaintiff alleges that

10

the County was “deliberately indifferent to the violations at

11

issue.”

12

However, the Court has dismissed the claim that the reports

13

drafted by Officers Bricker and Bittle were falsely written on

14

the grounds of issue preclusion.

15

(Opposition to Summary Judgment, ECF No. 51, 14:18.)

A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C.

16

§ 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be

17

shown to be a moving force behind a violation of constitutional

18

rights.

19

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

20

governmental entities under Monell, a plaintiff must prove

21

“(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of

22

which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy;

23

(3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the

24

plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the

25

moving force behind the constitutional violation.”

26

Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.

27

1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations

28

in original).

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York,
In order to establish liability for

21

Plumeau v.

1

Failure to train may amount to a policy of “deliberate

2

indifference,” if the need to train was obvious and the failure

3

to do so made a violation of constitutional rights likely.

4

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).

5

failure to supervise that is “sufficiently inadequate” may amount

6

to “deliberate indifference.”

7

869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989).

8

or supervision, however, does not give rise to a Monell claim.

9

Id.

10

City

Likewise, a

Davis v. City of Ellensburg,
Mere negligence in training

Here, Blanton’s claims fail both because his claims against

11

the officers fail, as well as because his complaint has failed to

12

sufficiently state supervisory liability to satisfy the pleading

13

requirements of Iqbal and Twombly.

14

Twombly, 556 U.S. at 555.

15

Blanton’s claims that the police officers lied or conspired

16

against him and, in any event, the Court has determined that both

17

issue preclusion and immunity bar Blanton’s claims.

18

even excluding these issues, Blanton’s supervisory liability

19

claims lack factual basis and are conclusory recitations of the

20

elements of a supervisory liability claim.

21

556 U.S. at 555 (“a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

22

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than

23

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

24

elements of a cause of action will not do” (citation omitted,

25

alteration in original)).

26

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-680;

First, the evidence does not support

However,

See, e.g., Twombly,

Therefore, the Court will not hold the County of Sacramento

27

liable for any violations.

28

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22

CONCLUSION

1
2
3

As a matter of law, and for the reasons set forth above, the

4

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 45) is GRANTED

5

in full.

6
7

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 6, 2012

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9
10

_____________________________
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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