McCoy v. Department of the Army et al

Filing 90

TENTATIVE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 10/7/11. Motions in Limine are to be heard on 12/5/2011 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Judge Lawrence K. Karlton. A Settlement Conference is SET for 1/12/2012 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 27 (DAD) before Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd. Jury Trial is SET for 3/20/2012 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 4 (LKK) before Judge Lawrence K. Karlton; and is estimated to take approximately five days. (Kastilahn, A)

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FILED OCT ? 2011 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 ROSLYN McCOY, 9 lo 1 Plaintiff, NO. CIV. 5-09-1973 LKK/CMK PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ORDER [TENTATIVE1 12 11 HONORABLE JOHN McHUGH. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, 13 Defendant. l5 16 17 18 Pursuant to court a Pretrial Conference was 1 Chambers on October order,LARRY A. ORGAN and BARBARA E .held in FIGARI 1 I 3, 2011. PICKLES and LYNN I(1 appeared as counsel for plaintiff; TODD A.After hearing, theTRINKA ERNCE appeared as counsel for defendants. court 1I 19 makes the following findings and orders: 20 I. JURISDICTION/W~ 21 Jurisdiction is predicated upon 28 U.S.C. 5 1331, as this is 22 an action 1I1 predicatedarising underC.the federal Rehabilitation Act.anVenue is upon S. , as defendant is officer 23 24 25 26 28 U. I 1 I 1 I 1 1391 (3) (2) of the United States, and a substantial part of the events occurred in Sacramento. The court has heretofore found both jurisdiction and venue proper and confirms those orders. JVRY/NON-JURY 11. The trial will be by jury. 111. UNDISPUTED FACTS The parties have stipulated that the following facts are undisputed: GENERAL FACTS RELEVANT TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 1. Plaintiff began working at the Army Corps of Engineers in May 2005. 2. Plaintiff was hired through the Workforce Recruitment Program, which provided funding for units within the Department of the Defense to hire persons with disabilities for limited 80-day terms of employment. 3. Plaintiff applied for a position through the program, self-designating as having a learning disability, and accepted a position as an administrative support assistant in the Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO")Office in Sacramento. 4. Plaintiff has a severe form of the learning disability dyslexia, which makes it difficult for her to fully comprehend written words. 5. Plaintiff's disability substantially limits her ability to read and comprehend. 6. Plaintiff did well in school, graduating from Humboldt State College in 2005 with a degree in Psychology, but needed to spend significantly more time studying than students without her disability. 7. Prior to beginning her work in the EEO office, 2 Plaintiff spoke to Linda Brown, who was the manager of the EEO office, and discussed with Brown Plaintiff's disabilities and the accommodations she would be provided. 8. Also in the EEO Office was Barbara Dwyer, an EEO Specialist, and there were also other individuals who had collateral duties for the EEO office. 9. Plaintiff, Ms. Brown, and Ms. Dwyer were the only individuals who worked in the EEO Office, and Ms. Dwyer and Plaintiff were the only individuals supervised by Ms. Brown. 10. Ms. Brown was Plaintiff Is supervisor during the entire time period of her employment in the EEO Office. 11. At the end of Plaintiff Is 80-day appointment under the Workforce Recruitment Program, Brown converted Plaintiff to a 2-year "excepted" or special appointment with the Corps. 12. Plaintiff s new position was a Program Support Clerk, in which she primarily provided clerical and administrative support to the EEO Office, focused primarily on special emphasis programs. 13. In her capacity as the Program Support Clerk, she assisted Ms. Brown, Ms. Dwyer, and the Special Emphasis Program Managers, who did not work in the EEO Office but devoted up to 20% of their time as collateral duty to managing special emphasis programs, such as those for individuals with disabilities, or minorities. 14. Plaintiff began her probationary period in this position on October 1, 2005. 3 15. On April 7, 2006, Plaintiff and Ms. D y e r were entering the Army Corps office at the same time as A.R. Smith, another employee of the Corps. 16. Mr. Smith is African-American. 17. In August 2006, Plaintiff was involved in making changes to a flyer for the Diversity Jubilee, an event sponsored by the EEO Office. 18. Some of the contents of the flyer were inaccurate, which was discovered by Ms. Brown while she was meeting with Debora Richert, the Chief of Staff, on or about August 23, 2006. Ms. Richert instructed Ms. Brown to schedule a meeting between Ms. Richert, Ms. Brown, Plaintiff, and Ms. Dwyer to discuss the error in the flyer. 19. On August 23, 2006, Chief of Staff Richert held a meeting in her office, attended by Plaintiff, Ms. Dwyer and Ms. Brown, in which the errors in the Diversity Jubilee flyer were discussed. During the meeting, Chief of Staff Richert asked Plaintiff whether she was expected to proofread her own work and Plaintiff responded, "No." 20. On or about August 23, 2006, Ms. Brown wanted to reward the initiative shown by her staff in setting up meetings with volunteers for the Diversity Jubilee event, and inquired separately of Plaintiff and Ms. Dwyer as to whose idea it was to set up meetings with the volunteers. 21. Both Plaintiff and Ms. Dwyer separately claimed credit for the idea. 4 22. On September 7, Plaintiff that September 15, You her 2006. are employment was terminated effective The notice stated: being unsatisfactory Ms. Brown gave notice to 2006, terminated conduct because including making of your a false statement to the Chief of Staff during a meeting on August 2006 23 wherein you stated "you were not required to proofread your work"; on 24 August 2006, you made a false statement to me when you said that it was your idea to meet with Diversity Jubilee volunteers prior to the event; and your inappropriate comment to a member of the Safety Office on 7 April 23. 2006. Plaintiff was in a two-year special appointment position. UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON DISABILITY CLAIM 1. Initially, Ms. Brown proofread Plaintiff's work product. UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S RETALIATION CLAIM 1. In late spring of 2006, Plaintiff met with Human Resources representative Ted Surratt to discuss her job description. 2. August 9, 3. Plaintiff met with Chief of Staff Debora Richert on 2006. Ms. Brown knew that one of the subjects discussed in the August 9, 2 0 0 6 meeting between Plaintiff and Chief of Staff 5 Richert was Ms. Brown's "management style." IV. DISPUTED FACTUAL ISSUES GENERAL DISPUTED FACTUAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO U L CLAIMS 1. 23, Whether or not Ms. Brown believed that, as of August 2006, Plaintiff was responsible for proofreading Plaintiff's final work product (This is relevant to all claims because Ms. Brown alleged that Plaintiff made an untrue statement regarding this issue and asserts this statement as 3ne of the non-retaliatory and non-discriminatory bases for the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.) 2. Whether or not Ms. Brown believed that Plaintiff attempted to take credit for a co-worker's work related to setting up a meeting with volunteers for Diversity Jubilee. (This is relevant to all claims because Ms. Brown alleged that Plaintiff made untrue statements regarding this issue and asserts this as one of non-discriminatory bases for the the non-retaliatory decision to and terminate Plaintiff.) 3. Whether or not the alleged offensive comment made by Plaintiff to Mr. A.R. Smith contributed to Ms. Brown's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment. (This is relevant to all claims because Defendant alleges that this statement was one 3f the non-retaliatory and non-discriminatory bases for the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.) 4. Whether or not the reasons stated by Ms. Brown in the notice to Plaintiff that she was terminated, are false. (This 6 is relevant to whether or not Plaintiff Is disability and/or protected activity contributed to the decision to terminate Plaintiff.) 5. Whether or not Plaintiff's employment would have continued past September 30, 2007. (This is relevant to whether Plaintiff would be entitled to back and front pay damages after September 30, 2007.) 6. Whether or not Ms. Brown approached Human Resources representative Ted Surratt about making Plaintiff's position permanent and to promote her approximately one month prior to the termination of Plaintiff's employment. (This is relevant to whether Plaintiff would be entitled to back and front pay damages after September 30, 2007.) 7. Whether or not Plaintiff normally used special software that read documents to her aloud in order to help her understand the words. She normally used four types of software to read and write. (This is relevant to Plaintiff's claim for disability discrimination, and relevant to whether Ms. Brown's statements that Plaintiff was to proofread her own work were false.) 8. Whether or not, because of her disability, it takes Plaintiff significantly longer to read and comprehend a document than a person without her condition. (This is relevant to Plaintiff's claim for disability discrimination, and relevant to whether Ms. Brown's statements that Plaintiff was to proofread her own work were false.) 7 9. Whether or not Mr. Smith heard Plaintiff say to him "where are you going, we don't let your kind in here." is relevant to all claims, specifically as (This to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false.) 10. Whether or not, in her deposition in June 2010, Plaintiff could not recall her exact words to Mr. Smith on April 9, 2006. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false.) 11. Whether or not, at the fact-finding conference in May 2007, Plaintiff testified she said to Mr. Smith on April 9, 2006, "they let peoples like you in here." (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false.) 12. Whether or not Mr. Smith prepared a memorandum recording the details of the conversation, which he recalls preparing that same day as the incident on April 9, 2006. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are . false 13. Whether or not Mr. Smith later sent a copy to Ms. Brown because he wanted to let Brown know of the incident as she was Plaintiff's supervisor and because Plaintiff worked in the EEO office. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's 8 :emination are false.) 14. Whether or not, after learning about the incident, 4s. Brown counseled Plaintiff on the inappropriate remark, Einding her explanation not credible and nonsensical. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false.) 15. Whether or not, in June 2006, Plaintiff received a >erformance evaluation from her supervisor, Linda Brown. In :his evaluation, Plaintiff received an overall rating of 'Successful,' with no rating less than successful" in any of : e six subcategories. In the evaluation, Ms. Brown commented, h 'Roslyn does an excellent job of staying on top of several 3rojects at the same time. Roslyn is always looking for a setter, faster, easier way to complete assignments. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's 3tated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false. This is 3lso relevant to Plaintiff's damages, specifically whether she ~ouldhave been promoted and/or retained by Defendant absent x discriminatory or retaliatory termination.) 16. Whether or not Ms. Brown met with both Ms. Dwyer and ?laintiff together, and asked them again who it was that set i the volunteer meeting given that they both claimed credit p it. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether lefendantls stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false.) 17. Whether or not Ms. Dwyer indicated that it was her 9 idea, and Plaintiff remained silent for a long period, and Plaintiff again remain silent when Ms. Brown asked her directly why she claimed credit for work that Ms. Dwyer was claiming credit for. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false.) 18. Whether or not, thereafter, Ms. Brown decided to terminate period. Plaintiff's employment during the probationary (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false.) ,19. Whether or not Plaintiff's position would not automatically convert to a permanent position at the end of that term. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false. This is also relevant to Plaintiff's damages, specifically whether she would have been promoted and/or retained by Defendant absent a discriminatory or retaliatory termination.) 20. Whether or not Ms. Brown stopped proofreading Plaintiff Is work product at some point prior to the termination of Plaintiff's employment unless Plaintiff requested that Brown review Plaintiff's work. Ms. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false.) 21. Whether or not Plaintiff and Ms. Dwyer testified that 10 they were treated similarly by Ms. Brown, as did some of the Special Emphasis Program Managers who had interactions with Ms. Brown. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false, whether Plaintiff was discriminated against, and whether Plaintiff was retaliated against. This is also relevant to Ms. Brown1 alleged animus, and whether she treated s similarly situated employees differently.) 22. Whether or not, a few months after Plaintiff's termination, Ms. Brown proposed that Ms. Dwyer's employment be terminated as well. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false, whether Plaintiff was discriminated against, and whether Plaintiff was retaliated against. This is also relevant to Ms. Brown's alleged animus, and whether she treated similarly situated employees differently.) 23. Whether or not Ms. Dwyer is disabled. (This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false, whether Plaintiff was discriminated against, and whether Plaintiff was retaliated against. This is also relevant to Ms. Brown's alleged animus, and whether she treated similarly situated employees differently.) 24. Whether or not Ms. Brown ever inquired of Plaintiff or Ms. Dwyer as to what was said in the meeting with Ms. Richert on August 9, 2006. This is relevant to all claims, specifically as to whether Defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's termination are false, whether Plaintiff was discriminated against, and whether Plaintiff was retaliated against. This is also relevant to Ms. Brown's alleged animus, and whether retaliated against Plaintiff for making a complaint.) DISPUTED FACTUAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON DISABILITY CLAIM 1. Whether or not Plaintiff's disability was a motivating reason for Ms. Brown's decision to terminate her. (This is relevant to whether Plaintiff's disability contributed to the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.) 2. Whether or not Ms. Brown told a co-worker in July or August 2005, that Plaintiff was not of average intelligence, nor could she read or write, or words to that effect. (This is relevant to whether Plaintiff's disability contributed to the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.) 3. Whether or not Ms. Brown referred to Plaintiff in July or August 2005, as "mentally handicapped." (This is relevant to whether Plaintiff's disability contributed to the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.) 4. Whether or not Ms. Brown stated in July or August 2005, that each of her employees was "handicapped by one form of stupidity or another." (This is relevant to whether Plaintiff's disability contributed to the decision to terminate 12 Plaintiff's employment.) 5. Whether or not Ms. Brown expressed anger and resentment about the time and effort she had to give her own daughter, who Plaintiff claims Ms. Brown referred to as "mentally retarded" or "mentally ill." (This is relevant to whether Plaintiff's disability contributed to the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.), 6. Whether or not Ms. Brown concluded she could not trust Plaintiff's judgment or her candor because of Plaintiff's two allegedly false statements in August 2006, coupled with Plaintiff's earlier allegedly racially offensive statement to Mr. Smith in April 2006. 7. Whether or not Ms. Brown terminated Plaintiff's probationary employment due to Ms. Brown's alleged lack of trust in Plaintiff's judgment and her candor. 8. Whether or not Ms. Brown followed correct government procedure in disciplining Plaintiff and whether government EEO officials followed correct procedure in addressing Plaintiff's complaints. 9. Whether or not Plaintiff and Ms. Dwyer testified that they were treated similarly by Ms. Brown, as did some of the Special Emphasis Program Managers who had interactions withMs. Brown. 10. Whether or not, a few months after Plaintiff's termination, Ms. Brown proposed that Ms. Dwyer's employment be terminated as well. 13 11. Whether or not Ms. Dwyer is disabled. DISPUTED FACTUAL ISSUES RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S RETALIATION CLAIM 1. Whether or not Plaintiff raised concerns about a hostile work environment and/or disability discrimination during Plaintiff's meeting with Ms. Richert in August 2006. (This is relevant to the issue of whether Plaintiff engaged in protected activity.) 2. Whether or not Ms. Brown became upset with Plaintiff for "going over Ms. Brown's headu1 by talking to a member of Human Resources about Plaintiff's position description in May or June 2006. (This is relevant to Plaintiff's retaliation claim because it relates to whether Ms. Brown harbored retaliatory animus.) 3. Whether or not Ms. Brown told Plaintiff that "if she, [Ms. Brown] were any other supervisor1'Plaintiff would have been fired. (This is relevant to Plaintiff's retaliation claim because it relates to whether Ms. Brown harbored retaliatory animus.) 4. Whether or not, prior to Ms. Brown's decision to terminate Plaintiff's probationary employment, Ms. Brown knew that Plaintiff had allegedly complained about a hostile work environment and disability discrimination during the August 9, 2006 meeting with Chief of Staff Richert. (This is relevant to whether Plaintiff's alleged protected activity contributed to the decision to terminate Plaintiff. V. NON-DISCOVERY MOTIONS TO THE COURT AND RESOLUTION Plaintiff moved for IFP status, which was granted and appointment of counsel, which was denied. Plaintiff moved for a default judgment, which was denied, and the Army Corps moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, which was mooted by plaintiff filing an Amended Complaint omitting the Army Corps, and naming only McHugh, Secretary of the Army, as defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss the Declaratory Judgment claim of the Second Amended Complaint, which was granted with prejudice, and to strike and dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, which was granted. Defendant moved for summary judgment, which was granted as to compensatory damages for the retaliation claim, and otherwise denied. The plaintiff now claims that later Ninth Circuit determinations suggest that the court's original ruling was erroneous. Despite the fact that law and motion has been cut off, the court will grant the plaintiff fifteen (15) days to file a motion for reconsideration and the court will hear the matter on December 5, 2011 at 10:OO a.m. VI. DISPUTED EVIDENTIARY ISSUES Plaintiff intends to move in limine, pursuant to Fed. Rule of Evidence 403, to exclude evidence of the details of the comment made by Plaintiff to A.R. Smith on April 7, 2006 and to limit references to such comment to the phrase: "inappropriate comment." The phrase llinappropriate comment" is the phrase used by Linda Brown in Plaintiff's notice of 15 Termination. The details of the comment were not stated in the Notice of termination and the danger of prejudice associated with these comments substantially outweighs their probative value. Plaintiff anticipates that issues regarding production of evidence during discovery, document retention, and compliance with document retention policies will evidentiary issues to be addressed. also constitute Plaintiff anticipates addressing these issues through jury instructions. Plaintiff anticipates that Defendant will move to exclude testimony related specifically, to witnesses Plaintiff's who will emotional testify distress, about their observations of Plaintiff before and after her termination. Plaintiff suggests that this issue be resolved by motion in limine . The Secretary will move to exclude any expert opinion testimony to be offered on behalf of Plaintiff, including testimony by her mother, Lois McCoy, her son, Jonathan McCoy, and her friend, Polly Baumbauer, and by any other individual identified on Plaintiff's Witness List [D.E. 851, as well as exhlbits containing similar evidence. See Pltf's Proposed Exhibits 76 and 80. Plaintiff had at one point identified her mother, son, and friend as potentially providing expert witness testimony but failed to present any reports for them under Rule . 26 (a)(2) After the Secretary objected, Plaintiff withdrew the designations for Lois McCoy and Polly Baumbauer, and also 16 failed to produce a report for Jonathan McCoy. Accordingly, ?laintiff is barred from eliciting expert testimony or opinions from these individuals at trial. R. ; See Fed. Civ.P. 26 (a)(2) ?ed.R.Civ.P. 37 (c)(1). The Secretary will move to exclude or otherwise limit ?laintiff1s testimony regarding emotional distress to her ;tipulation that she suffered "garden variety" emotional fistress. In particular, in response to the Secretary's notice :hat he would be seeking an independent medical (physiological) sxamination, Plaintiff conceded she is only seeking garden rariety emotional distress. judgment on this point. She also did not oppose summary Accordingly, the jury should be instructed that she is seeking only "garden variety" emotional listress, and Plaintiff should be limited to only her own :estimony on this point. The Secretary will move to limit Plaintiff's compensatory lamages to "garden variety" emotion distress, and to exclude my other form of compensatory damages, based on her 3tipulation to that effect and based on the absence of any 2ompetent testimony or evidence with respect to any other 2ompensatory damages. This includes Plaintiff's apparent intention to claim as damages certain dental expenses, as indicated by proposed exhibits identified on Plaintiff's Zxhibit List [DE 841. See, e.g., Pltf's Proposed Exhibits 61, 52. The Secretary previously objected to Plaintiff's lesignation of her dentist as an expert, and Plaintiff 17 subsequently withdrew that designation and has failed to designate any expert or provide an expert report with respect to any alleged dental harm caused by the alleged discriminatory termination. Accordingly, Plaintiff has no admissible evidence showing any causal connection and such evidence must be excluded. The Secretary will move to exclude testimony from Helen Warren and Elaine Woodhall, both of whom are listed as witnesses on Plaintiff's Witness List. and 18. See DE 85, at Nos. 16 The Secretary propounded discovery on Plaintiff to identify individuals with knowledge of facts relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Neither of these individuals was ever identified as a potential witness by Plaintiff in her discovery responses nor in any supplemental responses. Plaintiff's failure to timely disclose the identities of these individuals during discovery forecloses their appearance at trial. . Fed.R. Civ.P.33 ; Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 (c)(1) See Further, Ms. Warren appears to relate to the declaratory relief claim for a different administrative complaint; the subject of which was dismissed from this action by the Court's order. See DE 62. Accordingly, Ms. Warren's proffered testimony is irrelevant. Plaintiff has identified numerous documents that do not reference a Bates number. opportunity to determine Until the Secretary has the whether these documents have previously been produced by Plaintiff in response to the Secretary's discovery requests, or were otherwise made available to the Secretary through discovery or were part of the administrative record, the Secretary reserves the right to object to any documents or.evidence that was not previously produced to the Secretary in discovery. See Fed.R.Civ.P.34; Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c) (1). Plaintiff has identified the entirety of the testimony before the Administrative Law Judge, as well as affidavits or statements from various individuals that Plaintiff has also identified as her witnesses. See Plaintiff's Proposed Exhibit List [DE 841, at Ex. Nos. 58, 59, 78, 79, 81-82. The Secretary reserves the right to object to any particular testimony or affidavit by Plaintiff's witnesses on the basis of hearsay or any other applicable evidentiary basis prior to or at the time of trial. Plaintiff has identified a significant number of witnesses that appear to be character witnesses only and/or related to the issue of Plaintiff's emotional state, and will not testify to any percipient knowledge about the alleged discrimination and retaliation in connection with her termination. See Plaintiff's Witness List [DE 851, Nos. 1, 4, 8, 9, 21, 15, 17. The Secretary reserves the right to challenge all or some of these witnesses on the basis of the relevance of their testimony as well as that their testimony will be cumulative and unduly burdensome. Plaintiff has identified as potential exhibits letters of recommendation unrelated to any issues in the case, including 19 her initial appointment, and letters to employers subsequent to her termination. See Plaintiff's Proposed Exhibit List [DE 841, at Ex. Nos. 34, 35, 37, and 38, 39. The Secretary will nove to exclude these documents as hearsay and irrelevant. The Secretary will move to exclude and have Plaintiff destroy or return all copies of an attorney-client privileged document that was inadvertently produced to Plaintiff in discovery. The Secretary had previously identified the document, and withheld it from discovery, but another copy was inadvertently produced. On September 21, 2011, the Secretary informed Plaintiff of this issue after reviewing Plaintiff's exhibit list, and requested Plaintiff destroy or return the document. Plaintiff has not responded to date. Plaintiff's possession and use of the document is foreclosed. See Fed.R.Evid. 702; Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 (b)(5)(B). The parties shall file cross motions in limine to be heard 3n the same date as the motion to reconsider. VII. SPECIAL FACTUAL INFORMATION None. VIII. RELIEF SOUGHT Plaintiff seeks: 1. Back pay, 2. Compensatory damages, 3. Injunctive relief, including sanitization of plaintiff Is personnel file and a request for a positive referral, 20 4. Attorneys' fees, costs of suit and interest. Defendant seeks judgment in its favor and costs. IX. POINTS OF LAW (a) The elements, standards, and burdens of proof for naking a federal Rehabilitation Act claim. (b) The elements, standards, and burdens of proof for naking a retaliation claim under the federal Rehabilitation kt. (c) The legal standard for awarding compensatory damages (on the discrimination claim), and back pay. ANY CAUSES OF ACTION OR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES NOT ZXPLICITLY ASSERTED IN THE PRETRIAL ORDER UNDER POINTS OF LAW \T THE TIME IT BECOMES FINAL ARE DISMISSED, AND DEEMED WAIVED. ABANDONED ISSUES X. None. XI. WITNESSES Plaintiff anticipates calling the following witnesses: See - attachment "A". Defendant anticipates calling the following witnesses: attachment "B" . Each party may call a witness designated by the other. A. No other witnesses will be permitted to testify ~nless: (1) The party offering the witness demonstrates that : e witness is for the purpose of rebutting evidence which h I/// 21 Could not be reasonably anticipated at the Pretrial Conference, or (2) The witness was discovered after the Pretrial Conference and the proffering party makes the showing required in " B M below. B. Upon the post-Pretrial discovery of witnesses, the attorney shall promptly inform the court and opposing parties of the existence of the unlisted witnesses so that the court may consider at trial whether the witnesses shall be permitted to testify. The evidence will not be permitted unless: (1) The witnesses could not reasonably have been discovered prior to Pretrial; (2) The court and opposing counsel were promptly notified upon discovery of the witnesses; (3) If time permitted, counsel proffered the witnesses for deposition; (4) If time did not permit, a reasonable summary of the witnessest testimony was provided opposing counsel. XII. EXHIBITS. SCHEDULES AND S-RIBS Plaintiff contemplates the following by way of exhibits: . See attachment "C" Defendant contemplates the following by way of exhibits: See - attachment A. unless : . "DT1 No other exhibits will be permitted to be introduced (1) The party proffering the exhibit demonstrates that the exhibit is for the purpose of rebutting evidence which could not be reasonably anticipated at the Pretrial Conference, or (2) The exhibit was discovered after the Pretrial Conference and the proffering party makes the showing required in paragraph "B , B. below. Upon the post-Pretrial discovery of exhibits, the attorneys shall promptly inform the court and opposing counsel of the existence of such exhibits so that the court may consider at trial their admissibility. The exhibits will not be received unless the proffering party demonstrates: (1) The exhibits could not reasonably have been discovered prior to Pretrial; (2) The court and counsel were promptly informed of their existence; (3) Counsel forwarded a copy of the exhibit(s) (if physically possible) to opposing counsel. If the exhibit(s) may not be copied, the proffering counsel must show that he has made the exhibit(s) reasonably available for inspection by opposing counsel. As to each exhibit, each party is ordered to exchange copies of the exhibit not later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this Pretrial Order. Each party is then granted fourteen (14) days to file with the court and serve on opposing counsel any objections to said exhibits. 23 In making said objections, the party is to set forth the grounds for the objection. As to each exhibit which is not objected to, it shall be marked and received into evidence and will require no further foundation. Each exhibit which is objected to will be marked for identification only. In addition to electronically filing said objections, if any, the objections must be submitted by email, as an attachment WordPerfecC in Word or format, to: arivas@caed.uscourts.qov. The attorney for each party is directed to appear before and present an original and one (1) copy of said exhibit to Ana Rivas, Deputy Courtroom Clerk, not later than 10 :30 a.m. on the date set for trial. All exhibits shall be submitted to the court in binders. Plaintiff's exhibits shall be listed numerically. Defendant's exhibits alphabetically. The parties shall use the standard exhibit stickers provided by the court: shall be listed pink for plaintiff and blue for defendant. XIII. DISCOVERY DOCUMENTS Discovery documents to be used in the case-in-chief: Pursuant to Local Rule 281 (b)(12), Plaintiff designates the following answers to interrogatories and responses to requests for admissions to be offered at trial: Defendants' Answers to Interrogatories Nos. 1,2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 17, 18, 21. //// Defendants1 Requests for Admissions Response Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22. Defendants' Request for Production of DocUments Responses Nos. 7, 8, 55. United States Discovery Documents: The United States intends to use at trial the following discovery: PlaintiffsT responses to admissions nos. 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 51, . Plaintiffs1 response to interrogatory nos. 3, 4, 5. XIV. FURTHER DISCOVERY OR MOTIONS None, save and except for the permission to bring a motion to reconsider relative to compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act. XV. STIPULATIONS The parties have agreed that the plaintiff's mother will be permitted to testify as to her perceptions of the plaintiff's emotional upset but will not be permitted to testify as to any medical condition, despite the fact she is a psychologist. The jury will also not be informed that she is a psychologist. In light of this stipulation, the defendants will withdraw exhibit 3 (a). XVI. None. AMENDMENTS/DISMISSALS XVII. A. Counsel are directed to Local Rule 285 regarding the contents of and the time for filing trial briefs. B. Counsel are informed that the court has prepared a set of standard jury instructions. In general, they cover all aspects of the trial except those relating to the specific claims of the complaint. Accordingly, counsel need not prepare instructions concerning matters within the scope of the prepared instructions. A copy of the prepared instructions is given to the parties at the Pretrial Conference. C. Counsel are further directedthat their specific jury instructions shall be filed fourteen (14) calendar days prior to the date of trial. As to any instructions counsel desires to offer, they shall be prepared in accordance with Local Rule 163 (b)(1) which provides: "Two copies of the instructions shall be submitted. One copy shall be electronically filed as a .pdf document and shall contain each instruction on a separate page, numbered and identified as to the party presenting it. Each instruction shall cite the decision, statute, ordinance, regulation or other authority supporting the proposition stated in the instruction. The second copy (Trjury copyTT) shall be submitted by e-mail to 1kkorderslcaed.uscourts.qov. //// 26 In addition, counsel shall provide copies of proposed Corms of verdict, including special verdict forms, at the time : e proposed jury instructions are filed with the court. h D. It is the duty of counsel to ensure that any leposition which is to be used at trial has been filed with the 2lerk of the Court. Counsel are cautioned that a failure to iischarge this duty may result in the court precluding use of : e deposition or imposition of such other sanctions as the h :ourt deems appropriate. E. The parties are ordered to file with the court and sxchange between themselves not later than one (1) week before : e trial a statement designating portions of depositions h intended to be offered or read into evidence (except for ?ortions to be used only for impeachment or rebuttal). F. The parties are ordered to file with the court and sxchange between themselves not later than one (1) week before :rial the portions of answers to interrogatories which the respective parties intend to offer or read into evidence at the :rial (except portions to be used only for impeachment or rebuttal) . G. The court has extensive audiovisual equipment wailable. Any counsel contemplating its use shall contact the 2ourtUs Telecommunications Manager, Andre Carrier, at (916) 33 0-4223, at least two weeks in advance of trial to receive the nppropriate training. I/// XVIII. SETTLEaNT NEGOTIATIONS A Settlement Conference is SET before the Honorable Dale A. Drozd, United States Magistrate Judge, on January 12, 2012 at 10:OO a.m. Counsel are directed to submit settlement conference statements to the settlement judge not later than seven ( 7 ) days prior to the conference and shall be e-mailed to: dadorders@caed.uscourts.gov. At counsel's option, such statements may be submitted in confidence pursuant to Local Rule 270 (d). Each party is directed to have a principal capable of disposition at the Settlement Conference or to be fully authorized to settle the matter on any terms and at the Settlement Conference. XIX. TRIAL EXHIBITS Plaintiff reserves the right to use trial presentation software. I XX. SEPARATE TRIAL OF ISSUES None. XXI. IMPARTIAL EXPERTS/LIMITATION OF EXPERTS None. XXII. ATTORNEYS' FEES Plaintiff will seek attorney's fees pursuant to the statute. XXIII. None. MISCELULNEOUS DATED: October 7 , 2011. Case 2:09-cv-01973-LKK -CMK Document 85 Filed 09/19/11 Page 1 of 4 John Ota (SBN 195532) LAW OFFICES OF JOHN OTA 1720 Broadway Alameda, CA 94501 T. 510.521.7047 johnota@sbcglobal.net LAWRENCE A. ORGAN (SBN 175503) BARBARA E. FIGARI (SBN 251942) EQUALITY LAWYERS LLP 407 San Anselmo Avenue. Suite 201 San Anselmo, CA 94960 T. 415.453.4740 F. 415.963.4301 lany@e ualitylawyers.com barbar~equalitylawyeTs.com -~~ ~ ~ - ~ -> - ~ ~ ~ - Attorneys for Plaintiff ROSLYN G. MCCOY IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA (SACRAMENTO DIVISION) I ROSLYN G. McCOY, CASE NO: 2:09-CV-01973 LKK-CMK PLAINTIFF ROSLYN McCOY'S WITNESS LIST Plaintiff, V. S JOHN MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, collectively, Pretrial Conference: September 6,201 1 Time: 1:30 p.m. Trial Date: December 6,201 1 Judge: Hon. Lawrence K. Karlton Defendants. AWAaWy "A" PLAINTIFF ROSLYN McCOY'S WITNESS LIST Case No. 2:OPEV-01973LKK-< Case 2:09-cv-01973-LKK -CMK Document 85 Filed 09/19/11 Page 2 of 4 Pursuant to Local Rule 281(b)(10) Plaintiff Roslyn McCoy intends to call the following witnesses at trial: 1. Polly Bambauer 2060 Butte St. Redding, CA 96001 2. Linda Brown -Employee of Defendant 1325 J Street, Room 840 Sacramento CA, 95814 3 Penelope Cross 1325 J Street, Room 1440 Sacramento, CA 95814 4. Deanna D. Cooper 404 East Lake Street Mt. Shasta, CA 96067 5. BarbaraDwyer 1325 J Street Sacramento CA, 95814 6. John Esparza I 3041 Pebble Beach Circle I Fah5eld, CA 94534 7. Jason Faridi 9707 Almond Wood Drive i I Oakdale, CA 95361 8. Jonathan McCoy ! 404 East Lake Street ) Mt. Shasta, CA 96067 7 5 9. Lois E. McCoy 1327 Tipperary St. 2 PLAINTTFF ROSLYN McCOY'S WTNESS LIST Case No. 2 09-CV-01973 WaC-CI Case 2:09-cv-01973-LKK -CMK Document 85 Filed 09/19/11 Page 3 of 4 Boulder, CO 80303 10. Roslyn McCoy - Plaintiff 404 East Lake Street Mt. Shasta, CA 96067 11. Debora Richert - Former Chief of Staff, USACOE, Sacramento District 204 Lee Avenue Fort Meyer, VA 2221 1 12. Katherine E. Sawyer 1325 J Street Sacramento CA, 95814 13. Arthur R Smith 2100 Bridgeway Boulevard Sausalito, CA 94965 - 14. Ted Surratt Employee of Defendant 1325 J Street, Room 840 Sacramento CA, 95814 15. Robert Taylor Last known address: 1325 J Street Sacramento, CA 95814 16. Helen Warren Civilian Personnel Management Service Investigations and Resolutions Division P.O. Box 135 Roseville, CA 95678 17. Keiko Wilson 1325 J Street Sacramento. CA 95814 PLAINTIFF ROSLYN McCOY'S WIlXESS LIST CaseNo. 299-CV-01973 LKK-Ch Case 2:09-cv-01973-LKK -CMK Document 85 Filed 09/19/11 Page 4 of 4 18. Elaine Woodhall - Employee of Defendant 1325 J Street Sacramento CA, 95814 Respectfully submitted, DATED: September 19,201 1 EQUALITY LAWYERS, LLP /s/Barbara E. Figan LAWRENCE A. ORGAN, ESQ. BARBARA E. FIGARI, ESQ. 4 PLAINllF'F ROSLYN McCOY'S WITNESS LIST Attachment A to Secretary's Pretrial Conference Statement Linda L. Brown EEO Manager, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Sacramento District 1325 J. Street, Room 840 Sacramento, CA 95825 To be contacted through defense counsel only Debora C. Richert Formerly Chief of Staff, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Sacramento District 204 Lee Avenue Fort Myer, VA 2221 1 To be contacted through defense counsel only Arthur R. Smith Formerly Chief of Safety & Occupational Health Office, United States Armv Corns of Eneineers. Sacramento District 2100 Bridgeway ~bule<ard Sausalito, CA 94965 - To be contacted throueh defense counsel only Ted D.Surratt Formerly Human Resources Specialist, Civilian Human Resources Agency, United States Army Corps of Engineers, South Pacific Division-Civihan Personnel Advisory Center Current contact information to be determined To be contacted through defense counsel only Larry Rinetti Formerly Supervisory Human Resources Specialist Civilian Human Resources A ency, United States Army Corps of ngneers, South Pacific Division-Civilian Personnel Advisory Center Current contact information to be detennined i To be contacted through defense counsel only Barbara Dwyer 1325 J. Street, Room 840 Sacramento, CA 95825 Susan Bayless United States Army Corps of Engineers, Sacramento District 1325 J. Street Sacramento, CA 95825 To be contacted through defense counsel only 1 Attachment A to Secretary's Pretrial Conference Statement lproposed Witness List] A ' r u m m c "E" 8. Roslyn McCoy Plaintiff 404 East Lake Street Mt. Shasta, CA 96067 2 Attachment A to Secretary's Pretrial Conference Statement [Proposed Witness List] Case 2:OQ-cv-01973-LKK -CMK Document 84 Filed 0911911 1 Page Iof 6 I 1 John Ota (SBN 195532) LAW OFFICES or JOHN om OF Jam OTA 2 1720 Broadway Alameda, CA 94501 3 T. 510.521 -7047 510.521.7047 johnota@sbcglobal.net 4 LAWRENCE A. ORGAN (SBN 175503) 5 BARBARA E. FIGARI (SBN 25 1942) EQUALITY LAWYERS LLP 6 407 San Anselmo Avenue, Suite 201 San Anselmo, CA 94960 7 T. 415.453.4740 F. 415.963.4301 8 lany@equalitylawyers.com barbara@equalitylawyers.com I 0 I Attorneys for Plaintiff ROSLYN G. MCCOY IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNLA (SACRAMENTO DIVISION) 1 ROSLYN G. McCOY. CASE NO: 2:09-CV-01973 LKK-CMK PLAINTIFF ROSLYN McCOY'S EXHIBIT LIST Plaintiff, VS. JOHN MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, collectively, Pretrial Conference: October 3,201 1 Time: 1:30 p.m. Trial Date: December 6,201 1 Judge: Hon. Lawrence K.Karlton Defendants. A l l x c m p 'C' PLA[NTIPF ROSLYN McCOY'S EXHIBIT LIST Case No. 2:09-CV01973 LKK4 Case 2:09-cv-01973-LKK -CMK Document 84 Filed 09/19/11 Page 2 of 6 PLAINTIFF ROSLYN McCOY'S EXHIBIT LIST Case No. 2:09CVJJIT73LKKEM Case 2:09-cv-01973-LKK -CMK Document 84 Filed 09119111 Page 3 of 6 3 PLAINTIFF ROSLYN McCOY'S EXHIBIT LIST Case No 209-CV01973LKK-CM Case 2:09-cv-01973-LKK -CMK Document 84 Ii 1- I 42 43 44 45 46 I 47 49 50 51 52 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 I Filed 09/19/11 Page 4 of 6 2006 Ernail chain between Plaintiff and Frederick Rover. Subject: requesting upgrade dared July 19,2006 Email from Plaintiff 10 Frederick Royer. Subject: grammar checker accommodation. Dated August 28, 2006 Handwritten Notes marked: "Roslyn 2 May 0950 Letter from Plaintiff to EEOICivil Rights Office dated October 5,2009 Email &om Sandra L. Olivares to Plaintiff, Kenneth Manning, Carl Koman dated February 20,2009 Photoeravhs of 1325 J Street Sacramento. CA and adjacent parking lot. Email from Merle Heard to Linda Brown dated - I I I No Bates Number No Bates Number USACOEOO94 No Bates Number No Bates Number A No Bates Number USACOE-0298 USACOE-1338 Memorandum For Record dated 12 June 2006 USACOE-1341-43 Memorandum for Record Dated 21 April 2006 Notice of Termination and Accompanying USACOE-1461 - 1470 Documentation (signed versions) Relevant Excerpts of Anny Regulation 690-600 - Civilian personn~l Equal Employment Opportunity No Bates Number Discrimination Complaints Pertinent Agency and Local Guidelines Concerning Excepted Appointments Under the Authority No Bates Number Supporting Complainant's Appointment. Pertinent Agency and Local Guidelines Regarding Disciplinary and Adverse Actions in Effect at the No Bates Number time of the Action at Issue A.R. Smith Declaration &om EEO Investigation and ernail to A.R. Smith from Marie Robichau Subject: Draft - Declaration for the Investigation on Ms. No Bates Number Roslyn McCoy Ted Surratt Declaration from EEO Investigation and email to Ted Surratt from Marie Robichau Subject: No Bates Number Formal EEO Investigation -Ms. Roslyn ~ c d o y No Bates Number Flow Chart of EEO Complaint Process No Bates Number Plaintiffs Delta Dental Policy Information RM793 - 800; 802 806; 810- 838 Plaintiffs Dental Bills RM0659 - 694 Plaintiffs Plan to Achieve Self-Support Plaintiffs Business Plan for Social Security RM0644 - 658 Administration Job Description County of Siskiyou Behavioral RM0701 Health Clinician UII Job Description Behavioral Health Services RMQ702 - 705 Specialist II 4 PLAINTIFF ROSLYN McCOY'S EXHIBIT LIST CaseNo. 2.09-CV.01973LKK-C Case 2:09-cv-01973-LKK -CMK Document 84 Filed 09/19/11 Page 5 of 6 1 1 N 1 1 /I N N 5 PLAINTIFF ROSLYN McCOY'S EXHIBIT LIST Case No. 2:09-CV41973LKK-C Case 209-cv-01973-LKK -CMK Document 84 Filed 09/19/11 Page 6 of 6 Plaintiff reserves the right to introduce as exhibits any exhibits not listed here but that appear n Defendant's exhibit list. Respectfully submitted, )ATED: September 19,201 1 EQUALITY LAWYERS, LLP /s/ Barbara E. Figari LAWRENCE A. ORGAN, ESQ. BARBARA E. FIGARI, ESQ. 6 PLAINTIFF ROSLYN McCOY'S EXHIBIT LIST Case No. 2:0rCV.01973 LKK-CM Attachment B to Secretary's Pretrial Conference Statement Secretary's Proposed Exhibit List 1 Attachment B to Secretary's Pretrial Conference Statement [Proposed Exhibit List] ATrAamEm "D'' \ 2 Attachment B to Secretary's Pretrial Conference Statement [Proposed Exbibit List] 14A. Email correspondence between Roslyn McCoy and Linda Brown, May 22, 2006 USACOE-0981 15A. Email correspondence between Linda Brown, Deborah Richert, and Barbara Dwyer, May 19,2006 USACOE-01005- 1006 16A. Email correspondence beteen Linda Brown and Roslyn McCoy, May 22, 2006 USACOE-0985-86 17A. Email correspondence between Linda Brown and Roslyn McCoy, June 26, 2006 USACOE-1050-52 18A. Email correspondence between Linda Brown and Tony Coepland, June 26, 2006 USACOE-1053-55 19A. Email correspondence between Linda Brown, Susan Ba less, and Roslyn McCoy, July 10, 006 USACOE-1096-97 Email correspondence between Linda USACOE-1127 1 20A. 3 W Attachment B to Secretary's Pretrial Conference Statement [Proposed Exhibit List] 4 Attachment B to Secretaty's Pretrial Conference Statement [Proposed Exhibit List]

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