Mitchell v. Schwartzenegger et al

Filing 226

ORDER signed by District Judge Robert C. Jones on 10/30/15 ORDERING that the 225 Motion in Limine is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Benson, A)

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1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 7 _____________________________________ JOHN EDWARD MITCHELL, 8 Plaintiff, 9 10 vs. D. ROSARIO et al. 11 Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2:09-cv-03012-RCJ AMENDED ORDER 12 This is a prisoner civil rights case. Trial is set for November 2, 2015 in Sacramento, 13 14 California. Pending before the Court is a Motion in Limine (ECF No. 225). 15 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 16 On October 28, 2009, Plaintiff John Edward Mitchell, a prisoner in the custody of the 17 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) currently incarcerated at 18 California State Prison (“CSP”) Corcoran, sued thirteen Defendants in this Court based on events 19 that occurred while he was incarcerated at CSP Solano. Plaintiff alleged that on August 5, 2008, 20 he refused to be placed into a cell with a new, unfamiliar cell mate, asking to be put into 21 administrative segregation instead. Eventually, guards interpreted his requests as noncompliance 22 and tackled him to the ground before taking him to the infirmary and then to administrative 23 segregation. When Plaintiff indicated he intended to file a complaint for excessive force, he was 24 1 of 7 1 threatened with 90 days of administrative segregation. Defendants carried out their threat when 2 Plaintiff refused to relent and filed his grievance, keeping him in administrative segregation until 3 he was transferred to California Men’s Colony on April 28, 2009. The Complaint listed four 4 nominal constitutional claims and two nominal state law claims. 5 Plaintiff filed two supplemental complaints and separate motions for leave to file an 6 amended supplemental complaint and an amended complaint. The magistrate judge instructed 7 Plaintiff to consolidate his claims into a single amended complaint and gave him general 8 guidance as to pleading. Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on March 4, 9 2010. The FAC lists seven nominal claims: (1) excessive force in violation of the Eighth 10 Amendment; (2)–(4), (7) denial of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances 11 and retaliation in violation of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and (5)–(6) 12 violation of the California State Tort Act (“CSTA”). Defendants moved to dismiss the FAC. 13 The district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to dismiss the FAC, with 14 leave to amend in part, denying leave to amend: (1) as against Defendants Durfey, 15 Schwarzenegger, and Cate for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) as to the fifth claim 16 for untimeliness; (3) as to claims for verbal harassment by Defendants Singh, Cappel, McGuire, 17 and Fowler; (4) as to the due process components of claims three and seven against Defendants 18 Singh, Cappel, Bickham, and Scavetta; (5) as to claim seven as against Defendants Bickham and 19 Scavetta; (6) as to the sixth claim for failure to state a claim; (7) and as to the Eighth Amendment 20 component of the fourth claim as against Defendants Haviland and Singh. 21 On February 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), listing 22 three claims: (1) excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment (against Defendants 23 Rosario, Easterling, and Durfey); (2) denial of the right to petition the government for redress of 24 2 of 7 1 grievances and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment (against Defendants Rosario and 2 Garcia); and (3) a similar claim (against Defendants Haviland, Singh, Cappel, Bickham, and 3 McGuire). Defendants moved to dismiss the SAC. The district judge adopted the magistrate 4 judge’s recommendation to dismiss the excessive force claim as against Easterling without 5 prejudice; to dismiss the retaliation claims as against Bickham, Cappel, Singh, and Haviland with 6 prejudice; and to permit the retaliation claims to proceed as against McGuire. The district judge 7 ordered Rosario to answer the excessive force claim and ordered Rosario, Garcia, and McGuire 8 to answer the respective First Amendment retaliation claims against them. Defendants jointly 9 answered. A settlement conference was unsuccessful. Defendants moved for summary 10 judgment. The district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant summary 11 judgment as to the retaliation claim against Garcia but otherwise to deny the motion. The Eighth 12 Amendment excessive force claim against Rosario and the separate First Amendment retaliation 13 claims against Rosario and McGuire remain for trial. Defendants have filed a motion in limine. 14 II. 15 LEGAL STANDARDS A motion in limine is a procedural device to obtain an early and preliminary ruling on the 16 admissibility of evidence. Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[a] pretrial request that certain 17 inadmissible evidence not be referred to or offered at trial. Typically, a party makes this motion 18 when it believes that mere mention of the evidence during trial would be highly prejudicial and 19 could not be remedied by an instruction to disregard.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1171 (10th ed. 20 2014). Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize a motion in limine, 21 the Supreme Court has held that trial judges are authorized to rule on motions in limine pursuant 22 to their authority to manage trials. See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984) (citing 23 24 3 of 7 1 Fed. R. Evid. 103(c) (providing that trial should be conducted so as to “prevent inadmissible 2 evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means”)). Judges have broad discretion when ruling on motions in limine. See Jenkins v. Chrysler 3 4 Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). However, a motion in limine should not be 5 used to resolve factual disputes or weigh evidence. See C&E Servs., Inc., v. Ashland, Inc., 539 F. 6 Supp. 2d 316, 323 (D.D.C. 2008). To exclude evidence on a motion in limine “the evidence 7 must be inadmissible on all potential grounds.” E.g., Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 8 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004). “Unless evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings 9 should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential prejudice 10 may be resolved in proper context.” Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 11 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993). This is because although rulings on motions in limine may save 12 “time, costs, effort and preparation, a court is almost always better situated during the actual trial 13 to assess the value and utility of evidence.” Wilkins v. Kmart Corp., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1219 14 (D. Kan. 2007). 15 In limine rulings are preliminary and therefore “are not binding on the trial judge [who] 16 may always change his mind during the course of a trial.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 17 758 n.3 (2000); accord Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 (noting that in limine rulings are always subject to 18 change, especially if the evidence unfolds in an unanticipated manner). “Denial of a motion in 19 limine does not necessarily mean that all evidence contemplated by the motion will be admitted 20 to trial. Denial merely means that without the context of trial, the court is unable to determine 21 whether the evidence in question should be excluded.” Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 846. 22 /// 23 /// 24 4 of 7 1 2 III. ANALYSIS First, Defendants ask the Court to preclude Plaintiff from offering opinions about the 3 cause of his back, shoulder, and mental-health conditions. Defendants argue that under the 4 evidence rules, opinions on the causation of injuries may only be rendered by experts. The Court 5 disagrees. Although expert opinions under Rule 702 may only be adduced by qualified experts, 6 lay opinion may be offered by laymen under Rule 701 so long as the opinion based on the 7 witness’s own perception, is helpful to understanding the witness’s testimony, and is not based 8 on the kinds of specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. 9 Plaintiff’s opinion of the cause of his own injuries is within the scope of his lay opinion. 10 Plaintiff has direct perceptive knowledge of his pain and function both before and after the 11 events at issue. Plaintiff may not testify as to a future prognosis, which would require expert 12 medical opinion, but he may testify as to his direct perceptions of pain, function of his own body 13 parts, his own mental perceptions, and his perceived causes of those ailments. 14 Second, Defendants ask the Court to preclude Plaintiff from referring to any incidents 15 that are no longer at issue. The Court grants the motion in part. Although Plaintiff may discuss 16 persons who are themselves no longer Defendants so long as the testimony is relevant to claims 17 that remain, he may not introduce testimony or argumentation as to events that are only relevant 18 to claims that have been dismissed. 19 Third, Defendants ask the Court to preclude evidence that any Defendant is a party to 20 another lawsuit or was party to other alleged incidents of misconduct. The Court denies the 21 motion. Defendants seek to exclude irrelevant evidence and improper character evidence. The 22 Court cannot make broad Rule 401 or Rule 404 rulings as to entire categories of potential 23 evidence. Evidence of other litigation that is not relevant will not be admissible. But the Court 24 5 of 7 1 cannot say that there is no context in which such evidence might be relevant, particularly in a 2 First Amendment retaliation case. Also, any “other acts” evidence will be subject to objection at 3 trial under Rule 404(a) and will be subject to exception under Rule 404(b). The Court cannot 4 now make a broad ruling without the context of particularly objected-to testimony. 5 Fourth, Defendants ask the Court to preclude evidence of the March 25, 2014 settlement 6 conference. The Court denies the motion at this time, because the Court does not have any 7 proffered testimony to examine under the Rule 408 and the exception listed thereunder. 8 9 Fifth, Defendants ask the Court to preclude evidence that the State of California may pay any judgment rendered against Defendants as irrelevant and prejudicial. The Court grants the 10 motion in this regard. Even if not explicitly barred by Rule 411, such argumentation or evidence 11 would be both irrelevant and far more prejudicial than probative, unless Defendants were to first 12 argue against damages based on their personal financial conditions. 13 Sixth, Defendants ask the Court to rule that the fact of Plaintiff’s (and other witnesses’) 14 felony convictions will be admissible for the purposes of impeachment as to any of them who 15 testify, assuming the convictions or latest date of incarceration therefore is not greater than ten 16 years. The Court grants the motion in this regard. See Fed. R. Evid. 609. 17 Seventh, Defendants ask the Court to rule that Sergeant Durfey’s June 20, 2014 18 testimony in the case of Draper v. Rosario, No. 2:10-cv-32, is admissible in this case. The Court 19 denies the motion. Defendants appear to admit that although Plaintiff was a witness in that case 20 he was not a plaintiff, and only Draper’s counsel had an opportunity to examine Durfey. Even 21 assuming Plaintiff had a “similar motive” to examine Durfey in the Draper case as Draper 22 himself had, Plaintiff as a non-party witness clearly had no “opportunity” to examine Durfey. See 23 Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). 24 6 of 7 CONCLUSION 1 2 3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion in Limine (ECF No. 225) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Dated this 30th day of October, 2015. 6 7 8 _____________________________________ ROBERT C. JONES United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 7 of 7

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