Peralta v. Martel et al

Filing 45

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows on 12/15/11 ORDERING that 39 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, construed as a protective order is DENIED without prejudice. (Dillon, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CION PERALTA,

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Plaintiff,

No. CIV S-09-3228 GEB GGH P

vs.
MICHAEL MARTEL, et al.,

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Defendants.

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ORDER
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Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this

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civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently pending is plaintiff’s motion

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for a preliminary injunction to prevent his transfer to another prison. Doc. 39.

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Protective Order

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Local Rule 302 of the Eastern District of California permits magistrate judges to

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handle all aspects of a prisoner’s case short of jury trial. It has also been interpreted as

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authorizing magistrate judges to issue orders under § 636(b)(1)(A) for non-dispositive motions or

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motions not involving injunctive relief. See also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673,

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100 S. Ct. 2406, 2411 (1980) (magistrate judge may hear any pretrial matter except “dispositive”

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motions).

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Clearly, the request addressed in plaintiff’s motion does not seek dispositive relief
on the merits of the complaint. The motion is addressed to procedures that the parties must
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utilize in litigating this case. See United States v. Flaherty, 666 F.2d 566, 586 (1st Cir. 1981): “A

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pretrial matter within the magistrate’s jurisdiction would thus seem to be a matter unconnected to

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issues litigated at trial and not defined with respect to the time of trial.” Neither do the rulings

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herein involve injunctive relief.

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As in nearly all rulings of magistrate judges pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

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parties are told to do something or not do something. For example, in typical discovery motions,

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parties are compelled to answer interrogatories, answer a question or produce a document despite

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a claim of privilege, attend a deposition at a certain time or place, be compelled to undergo a

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medical examination, or pay costs associated with discovery in a cost-shifting sense. No one

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would think of asserting that such non-dispositive orders are invalid because they command or

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disallow a certain activity. Therefore, the fact that parties are directed in their activities by a

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magistrate judge, cannot, without more, transform the matter at hand into an “injunctive” relief

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situation governed by § 636(b)(1)(B). See e.g., Grimes v. City and County of San Francisco, 951

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F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1991) (magistrate judge may compel a party to pay prospective sanctions of

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$500.00 per day during period for non-compliance with discovery orders); Rockwell Int. Inc. v.

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Pos-A-Traction Indus., 712 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983) (magistrate judge had jurisdiction to

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order witnesses to answer questions); United States v. Bogard, 846 F.,2d 563, 567 (9th Cir. 1988)

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superseded by rule on unrelated matter, Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174

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(9th Cir. 1996) (magistrate judge may deny requests to see jury selection materials); New York v.

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United States Metals Roofing Co., 771 F.2d 796 (3rd Cir. 1985) (magistrate judge may prevent a

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party from releasing discovery information to the public; specifically held not to be an injunction

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beyond the authority of a magistrate judge); Affelt v. Carr, 628 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (N.D. Oh.

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1985) (issuance of gag orders and disqualification of counsel are duties permitted to a magistrate

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judge.). It is only where the relief sought goes to the merits of plaintiff’s actions or to complete

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stays of an action are orders under § 636(b)(1)((A) precluded. See e.g. Reynaga v. Camisa, 971

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F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1992); compare United States Metals etc., 771 F.2d at 801 (orders which
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restrain or direct the conduct of the parties are not to be characterized as an appealable injunction

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beyond the authority of the magistrate judge unless the restraint goes to the merits of the action).

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In other words, a motion for injunctive relief must relate to the allegations in the complaint. If

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there is no relation, it is not an injunctive relief situation. A party seeking preliminary injunctive

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relief “must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion

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and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir.

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1994). See also De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 65 S.Ct.

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1130 (1945) (“A preliminary injunction is always appropriate to grant intermediate relief of the

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same character as that which may be granted finally. The injunction in question is not of this

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character. It is not an injunction in the cause, and it deals with a matter lying wholly outside the

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issues in the suit.”); Board of Trustees etc. v. Welfare Trust Fund etc, 315 Fed. Appx. 175 (9th

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Cir. 2009). In other words, plaintiff must seek injunctive relief related to the merits of his

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underlying claim.

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Moreover, the rule that governs interlocutory injunctions, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, also

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indicates that the matters at issue have to be encompassed by the complaint, e.g., provision which

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allows the hearing on preliminary injunction to be accelerated into a trial on the merits,

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preserving the right to jury trial if otherwise appropriate, making evidence received at the hearing

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on preliminary injunction admissible at trial. None of the provisions would make sense if

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disputes outside the complaint, and on which no trial by definition will be had, could be

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considered as proceedings for injunctions. In addition, the standards for granting injunctions are

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much different than the standards applicable to protective orders. Applying established standards

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on the need to grant an injunction only in extraordinary circumstances, absence of legal remedy,

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balance of hardships, irreparable harm, and so forth are foreign to resolution of discovery and

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other procedural disputes which crop up in the course of a litigation.

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In the instant case, plaintiff’s requests do not go to the merits of plaintiff’s action.
The gravamen of the amended complaint concerns the denial of jobs and vocational training to
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plaintiff and other similarly situated inmates based solely on their classification status and that

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they have life sentences. None of plaintiff’s allegations in the instant motion relate to these facts.

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Accordingly, this matter may be handled by court order as it is merely a request for a protective

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order of sorts.

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Plaintiff alleges that he is being transferred to another prison in retaliation for the

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filing of this lawsuit and that he has a documented enemy at the new prison. Plaintiff states that

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CDCR staff have told him he is being transferred in retaliation, however plaintiff provides no

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other details. Plaintiff does not identify who allegedly told him this information, where and

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when it occurred and if the people who told him this are even defendants in this action.

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Plaintiff’s general conclusory allegations without support are woefully inadequate to demonstrate

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retaliation. That plaintiff has one enemy at another prison is also insufficient to support the

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apparent claim that prison officials are violating the Eighth Amendment by transferring him.

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Plaintiff’s motion is therefore dismissed without prejudice.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary

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injunction (Doc. 39), construed as a protective order is denied without prejudice.

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DATED: December 15, 2011

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/s/ Gregory G. Hollows
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ggh: ab
pera3228.po

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