Roeun v. Cate
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM DECISION signed by Senior Judge James K. Singleton on 8/12/11: The Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. The Court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. The Clerk of the Court is to enter judgment accordingly. (Kaminski, H)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KOEURN ROEUN,
No. 2:10-cv-00071-JKS
Petitioner,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs.
MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, California
Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation,
Respondent.
Koeurn Roeun, a state prisoner appearing pro se, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Roeun is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), incarcerated at the Avenal State Prison. Respondent has
answered, and Roeun has replied. In his Petition, Roeun challenges the disciplinary action taken
by the CDCR that resulted in the loss of 31 days of good time credit. Roeun does not challenge
his conviction or sentence in this proceeding.
I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDING
Roeun is currently serving an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life on his
November 1993 conviction of Murder in the Second Degree (Cal. Penal Code § 187). In January
2008 Roeun was issued a Rules Violation Report charging him with falsification of a lower bunk
chrono (California Code of Regulations, title 15, § 3021). After a disciplinary hearing before a
Senior Hearing Officer (“SHO”), Roeun was found guilty and assessed a penalty of the loss of 31
days good time credit. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Roeun timely filed a
petition for habeas relief in the Solano County Superior Court, which denied his petition in an
unreported, reasoned decision. The California Court of Appeal, First District, summarily denied
his petition for habeas relief without opinion or citation to authority, and the California Supreme
Court summarily denied his petition for habeas relief without opinion or citation to authority on
November 12, 2009. Roeun timely filed his Petition in this Court on January 7, 2010.
The facts underlying Roeun’s conviction as recited in the Rules Violation Report:
On 01-06-08, while verifying lower bunk chronos turned in by inmates the
evening before I saw a chrono with Inmate ROEUN’s (J-05804, 21-J-2-L) name
on it that appeared to be falsified. Specifically Inmate ROEUN presented a
chrono to staff that appeared identical in every respect to another chrono that was
turned in by another Inmate except for the name, CDCR number and housing
location. I took the medical chrono to medical records and they searched Inmate
ROEUN’s medical records for the original copy of the chrono to verify its
authenticity. Medical Records reported to me, after they searched Inmate
ROEUN’s medical record, the chrono that ROEUN presented to staff was fake
and they could not locate any medical chronos similar to the one that Inmate
ROEUN had presented to building staff. Presenting falsified lower bunk chronos
to staff in order to obtain a lower bunk disrupts the Facility IV program when staff
attempt to find housing for inmates with legitimate medical issues.1
The SHO found:
FINDINGS:
GUILTY of the Division E(4) offense FALSIFICATION OR FORGERY
OR ALTERATION OF ANY GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT OR RECORD
NOT AFFECTING AN INMATE’S TERM OR IMPRISONMENT. Forgery
means representing something as genuine that you know has been altered, forged
or counterfeited. This means that the inmate must attempt to pass a document or
record as genuine, that he must be aware that it is not genuine and this was done
with intent to defraud. This finding is based upon the following preponderance of
evidence:
1. The testimony of SERGEANT D. KYTE in the disciplinary report of
02-06-08; which states in part; “I discovered that Inmate ROEUN, J-058C4, had
falsified a lower bunk chrono.”
1
Docket No. 10-1, p. 22.
2
2. The lower bunk chrono appeared to be erased and rewritten with false
information that authorized Inmate ROEUN to be housed in a lower bunk.
3. On 02-22-08, Sergeant Kyte checked Medical Records and discovered
he did not have an authorized lower bunk chrono in his medical file.
4. In the hearing, Inmate ROEUN failed to produce a valid lower bed chrono.2
II. GROUNDS RAISED/DEFENSES
In his Petition, Roeun asserts a single ground: that, because there was no evidence that
Roeun falsified the chrono and the regulation under which he was convicted does not adequately
warn that possession of a forged document is a violation, Roeun was denied due process of law.
Respondent does not assert any affirmative defense.3
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States” at the time the state court renders its decision or “was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.”4 The Supreme Court has explained that “clearly established Federal law” in
§ 2254(d)(1) “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the
time of the relevant state-court decision.”5 The holding must also be intended to be binding upon
the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory
2
Docket No. 10-1, p. 24.
3
See Rules—Section 2254 Cases, Rule 5(b).
4
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-06 (2000); see also
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-75 (2003) (explaining this standard).
5
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
3
power of the Supreme Court over federal courts.6 Thus, where holdings of the Supreme Court
regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, “it cannot be said that the state court
‘unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.’”7 When a claim falls under the
“unreasonable application” prong, a state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent must
be objectively unreasonable, not just incorrect or erroneous.8 The Supreme Court has made clear
that the objectively unreasonable standard is a substantially higher threshold than simply
believing that the state court determination was incorrect.9 “[A]bsent a specific constitutional
violation, federal habeas corpus review of trial error is limited to whether the error ‘so infected
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’”10 In a
federal habeas proceeding, the standard under which this Court must assess the prejudicial
impact of constitutional error in a state court criminal trial is whether the error had a substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the outcome.11 Because state court judgments of
6
Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002).
7
Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (alterations by the Court); see Wright v. Van
Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 127 (2008) (per curiam); Kessee v. Mendoza-Powers, 574 F.3d 675, 67879 (9th Cir. 2009); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 753-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining the
difference between principles enunciated by the Supreme Court that are directly applicable to the
case and principles that must be modified in order to be applied to the case; the former are clearly
established precedent for purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the latter are not).
8
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
9
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).
10
Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
11
Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121 (2007) (adopting the standard set forth in Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)).
4
conviction and sentence carry a presumption of finality and legality, the petitioner has the burden
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she merits habeas relief.12
The Supreme Court recently underscored the magnitude of the deference required:
As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on
federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Cf.
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996)
(discussing AEDPA’s “modified res judicata rule” under § 2244). It preserves
authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists
could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with this Court’s
precedents. It goes no farther. Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas
corpus is a “guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice
systems,” not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment). As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a
federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim
being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility
for fairminded disagreement.13
In applying this standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state
court.14 State appellate court decisions that summarily affirm a lower court’s opinion without
explanation are presumed to have adopted the reasoning of the lower court.15 This Court gives
presumed decisions of state courts the same AEDPA deference that it would give a reasoned
decision of the state court.16
12
Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002); see Wood v. Bartholomew, 516
U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (per curiam) (stating that a federal court cannot grant “habeas relief on the basis
of little more than speculation with slight support”).
13
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (emphasis added).
14
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,
1055 (9th Cir. 2004).
15
Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802-03.
16
Richter, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85 (rejecting the argument that a summary
disposition was not entitled to § 2254(d) deference).
5
Under California’s unique habeas procedure, a defendant who is denied habeas relief in
the superior court files a new original petition for relief in the court of appeal. If denied relief by
the court of appeal, the defendant has the option of either filing a new original petition for habeas
relief or a petition for review of the court of appeal’s denial in the California Supreme Court.17
This is considered as the functional equivalent of the appeal process.18 Under AEDPA, the state
court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption
by clear and convincing evidence.19 This presumption applies to state trial courts and appellate
courts alike.20
IV. DISCUSSION
Roeun was convicted of violating § 3021, title 15, California Code of Regulations, which
provides:
Inmates and parolees must not intentionally enter or introduce false
information into or upon any record or document maintained by the Department of
Corrections. Inmates and parolees must not destroy, delete, remove or otherwise
intentionally cause any record or document maintained by the Department of
Corrections to be a false or incomplete record or document by reason of such
action.
Roeun does not contend that the medical chrono he was caught possessing was not forged
or falsified. Instead, Roeun argues that § 3021 does not provide adequate warning that his
conduct was prohibited. Roeun further argues that, because there was no evidence that he
17
See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221-22 (2002).
18
Id. at 222.
19
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
20
Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
6
falsified the chrono, only possessed it, he could not be guilty of violating § 3021. The Solano
County Superior Court rejected Roeun’s arguments, holding:
The Court has read and considered the petition for writ of habeas corpus
filed in the above-entitled matter on May 7, 2009, by Koerurn [sic] Roeun, a state
inmate at California State Prison - Solano. [Roeun] claims that the California
Department of Corrections (CDC) denied him due process of law by not fully
informing him that his conduct of falsifying a CDC document was prohibited by a
rule before he falsified the document.
[Roeun] has failed to state a prima facie case for relief on any of his
claims. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464.) The California Code of
Regulations, title 15, § 3021 clearly prohibits falsifying any CDC document.
[Roeun] had all the required notice.21
In reaching its decision, the Solano County Superior Court had before it the decisions
rendered in Roeun’s administrative appeal process by the Second Level (Warden) and the
Director’s Level, as well as the decision of the SHO. These decisions provided in relevant part:
On July 8, 2008[,] you were interviewed via institutional telephone by Lt.
C. Ferguson. You were afforded the opportunity to fully explain your appeal
position. You reiterated your contentions as stated in your appeal. You denied
the charge and claimed you were not the one who falsified the chrono but failed to
provide and [sic] explanation as to how you became in possession of a medical
chrono that was not authorized by a medical doctor. You had nothing else to add.
DECISION: The appeal is denied.
Your request for dismissal of the RVR is denied. The Second Level finds
all administrative due process safeguards were met. You failed to provide any
evidence to refute the RVR charge which indicates, “I saw a chrono with inmate
Roeun’s (J-05804, 21-J-2L), name on it that appeared to be falsified. Specifically,
inmate Roeun presented a chrono to staff that appeared identical in every respect
to another chrono that was turned in by another inmate except for the name, CDC
number and housing location. I took the medical chrono to the medical records
and they searched inmate Roeun’s medical records for the original copy of the
chrono to verify its authenticity.” The Second Level affirms the SHO [sic] guilty
finding.22
21
Docket No. 10-1, p. 34.
22
Second Level Decision, Docket No. 10-1, pp. 27-28 (emphasis in the original).
7
III DIRECTOR'S LEVEL DECISION: Appeal is denied.
A. FINDINGS: The appellant was afforded all due process rights in the
adjudication of the RVR and all procedural guidelines were met. A preponderance
of evidence was established by an impartial SHO to sustain the guilty finding.
Reports reflect that the appellant has presented no new or compelling evidence in
the appeal, which would warrant a modification of the decision reached by the
institution.
B. BASIS FOR THE DECISION:
California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section: 3005, 3021, 3270, 3312,
3315, 3318, 3320, 3323
C. ORDER: No changes or modifications are required by the
Institution.23
Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution; therefore, the full
panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply.24 In the context of prison
disciplinary proceedings the minimum requirements of due process are: (1) advance written
notice of the charges brought against the inmate; (2) the right to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his defense; (3) a written statement of the factfinder of the evidence
relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken,25 and (4) the findings must be
supported by some evidence in the record.26 Roeun’s Petition implicates the fourth element.
Roeun is correct that there is no direct evidence that he caused the medical chrono he
possessed to be falsified. Roeun is also correct that the language of § 3021 does not encompass
mere possession of a falsified document. If that were the test, Roeun would be entitled to the
relief he has requested. That is not, however, the correct test.
23
Director’s Level Decision, Docket No. 10-1, p. 30.
24
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
25
Id. at 563-66.
26
Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).
8
That Roeun created the falsified chrono may be established by circumstantial evidence.
Under California law, “[p]ossession of a forged [document] is, by itself, some evidence of
forgery. Combined with any other corroborative evidence, however slight, possession of a forged
[document] is sufficient to convict for forgery.”27 It is undisputed in this case that the medical
chrono was falsified, that Roeun had it in his possession, and that he used (or attempted to use)
the falsified chrono for the purpose of obtaining a lower bunk to which he was not medically
entitled. Implicit in the decisions of the California courts is that this was sufficient to establish a
violation of § 3021, i.e., Roeun had created (forged) the false chrono. Balanced against this
evidence is Roeun’s naked denial that he forged the chrono.
In reaching his decision, the SHO implicitly found that Roeun’s denial was not credible.
As the Supreme Court made clear in Hill, in applying the “some evidence” standard:
[. . . .] Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary board.28
The constitutional standard for sufficiency of the evidence is whether, “after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”29 In a federal habeas proceeding
challenging a state-court conviction, this Court is precluded from either re-weighing the evidence
27
See People v. Martinez, 26 Cal. Rptr.3d 234, 238 (Cal. App. 2005).
28
Id. at 455-56. California has adopted this approach. See In re Zepada, 47 Cal. Rptr.3d
172, 176 (Cal. App. 2006).
29
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in the original); see McDaniel
v. Brown, 558 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2010) (reaffirming this standard).
9
or assessing the credibility of witnesses. Where, as in this case, the question is one of credibility,
the finding of the finder-of-fact carries the day.30 Under Jackson, the role of this Court is to
simply determine whether there is any evidence, if accepted as credible by the trier of fact,
sufficient to sustain conviction.31 It is through this doubly-deferential lens that this Court must
view the Petition before it.
Applying the clear teachings of Williams-Andrade-Schriro-Richter, this Court cannot find
that the decision of the Solano County Superior Court upholding the necessarily implied
determination by the Senior Hearing Officer that Roeun intentionally falsified a CDCR document
was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”32
With that determination, Roeun’s argument that § 3021 failed to give adequate notice that his
conduct was prohibited becomes moot.
V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Roeun is not entitled to relief.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ
of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
30
See Bruce v Terhune, 376 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2004).
31
See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 340 (1995).
32
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
10
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Court declines to issue a Certificate of
Appealability.33 Any further request for a Certificate of Appealability must be addressed to the
Court of Appeals.34
The Clerk of the Court is to enter judgment accordingly.
Dated: August 12, 2011.
/s/ James K. Singleton, Jr.
JAMES K. SINGLETON, JR.
United States District Judge
33
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 705-06 (2004) (“to obtain a
certificate of appealability a prisoner must ‘demonstrat[e] that jurists of reason could disagree
with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the
issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”) (quoting Miller-El,
537 U.S. at 327).
34
See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); Ninth Circuit R. 22-1.
11
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