Hall et al v. City of Fairfield et al
Filing
173
ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. on 1/7/2013 ORDERING that partial summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs' state law false arrest claims. Further, Defendants' request to expand the Tentative Ruling to grant summary judgment on Plaintiffs federal false arrest claims is DENIED. (Zignago, K.)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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Markus M. Hall, Monique G.
Rankin, Lindsey K. Sanders,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
City of Fairfield, Officer Nick
McDowell, Officer Chris Grimm,
Officer Tom Shackford, Officer
Zack Sandoval, and Sergeant
Steve Crane,
Defendants.
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2:10-cv-00508-GEB-DAD
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS ON PLAINTIFFS’
STATE LAW FALSE ARREST
CLAIMS*
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A Tentative Ruling granting partial summary judgment sua
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sponte in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ state law false arrest
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claims was filed on April 11, 2012. (ECF No. 169.) The April 11, 2012
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Tentative Ruling (“Tentative Ruling”) gave the parties an opportunity to
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file and serve written objections to any part of the Tentative Ruling.
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Plaintiffs filed objections to the Tentative Ruling on May 14,
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2012. Defendants filed a “Response” to the Tentative Ruling on May 14,
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2012, in which they state that they “agree with the Court’s tentative
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ruling[,]” but “contend [the] ruling necessarily requires the Court to
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also grant summary judgment in Defendants’ favor as to the federal false
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*
argument.
This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral
E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).
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arrest claims pursuant to the qualified immunity doctrine.” (Defs.’
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Resp. 1:5-9, ECF No. 170.)
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After considering the parties’ filings, the Court will grant
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partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ state law
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false arrest claims. Defendants’ request to expand the scope of the
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Tentative Ruling will be denied.
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I. LEGAL STANDARD
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“District courts unquestionably possess the power to enter
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summary judgment sua sponte, even on the eve of trial.” Norse v. City of
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Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2010). As prescribed in Federal
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Rule
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reasonable time to respond, the court may . . . consider summary
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judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts
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that may not be genuinely in dispute.”
of
Civil
Procedure
56(f)(3):
“[a]fter
giving
notice
and
a
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“A fact is ‘material’ when, under the governing substantive
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law, it could affect the outcome of the case.” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank
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of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003)
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(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An
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issue of material fact is “genuine” when “‘the evidence is such that a
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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id.
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(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
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The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to
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[Plaintiffs],” and “all reasonable inferences” that can be drawn from
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the evidence must be drawn “in [Plaintiffs’] favor . . . .” Nunez v.
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Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). However, “[t]he district court must . . . undertake some
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initial scrutiny of the inferences that could be reasonably drawn from
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the evidence” to determine “whether there remains sufficient probative
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evidence which would permit a finding in favor of [Plaintiffs] based on
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more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” Barnes v. Arden
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Mayfair, Inc., 759 F.2d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1985).
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II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
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This litigation concerns Plaintiffs’ arrests at an In-N-Out
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Burger restaurant in Fairfield, California during the early morning
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hours of July 4, 2009.
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It is undisputed that all three Plaintiffs were arrested
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pursuant to the citizen’s arrests of In-N-Out Burger’s manager, Marc
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Young.
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Statement 3:4, 4:12-19, ECF No. 98; Arrest Reports of Monique Rankin,
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Markus Hall & Lindsey Sanders pp. 000403-000410, filed as Ex. E to the
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Decl. of Garret D. Murai in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. Adjudication,
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ECF No. 56-2.) However, Plaintiffs dispute the legality of Mr. Young’s
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citizen’s
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arrests, i.e., whether Mr. Young or the defendant officers initiated
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them. (Pls.’ Objections 2:8-10, 5:14-15, 8:11-27.)
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(Pls.’
Objections
arrests
and
the
5:6-9,
ECF
No.
circumstances
171;
Am.
surrounding
Joint
the
Pretrial
citizen’s
III. DISCUSSION
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“[T]he federal Constitution requires police officers to have
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independent probable cause when effectuating a citizen’s arrest . . . .”
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Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 774 (9th Cir. 2009). In contrast,
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“California law explicitly exempts officers effectuating a citizen's
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arrest from civil liability.” Id. (citing Cal. Penal Code § 847(b)(3));
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see also Meyers v. Redwood City, 400 F.3d 765, 772-73 (9th Cir. 2005)
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(stating “California courts have held that . . . an officer cannot be
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sued civilly if he makes [an arrest pursuant to a citizen’s arrest] and,
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it turns out, there were no grounds for the citizen’s arrest”). Since
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the undisputed facts establish Defendants arrested Plaintiffs pursuant
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to Mr. Young’s citizen’s arrests, the Tentative Ruling issued granting
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partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ state law
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false arrest claims. (Tentative Ruling 4:3-6.)
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Plaintiffs object to the Tentative Ruling, arguing “there
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[are] genuine issue[s] of material fact” as to “the lawfulness of Marc
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Young’s citizen’s arrest[s]” and as to who initiated the citizen’s
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arrests, which prevent the Court from granting partial summary judgment
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in favor of Defendants on their state false arrest claims. (Pls.’
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Objections 2:9-10, 2:16-19.) Plaintiffs’ arguments are addressed in
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turn.
A.
The Lawfulness of Marc Young’s Citizen’s Arrests
Plaintiffs state the Tentative Ruling “correctly distinguishes
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the federal and state requirements in effectuating a citizen’s arrest.”
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(Pls.’ Objection 2:24-25.) However, Plaintiffs argue that under Bobol v.
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City of Daly City, “in order for a police officer not to be held liable
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for a state law false arrest claim, the citizen’s arrest must be lawful
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under state law.” (Id. at 5:9-11 (citing Bobol v. City of Daly City, 754
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F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2010)). Plaintiffs further argue:
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“[b]ecause the Court must view all facts in favor of Plaintiffs, the
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Court can only conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact
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as to the lawfulness of Young’s citizen arrest[s] and, ultimately, not
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adopt its Tentative Ruling.” (Id. at 5:14-17.)
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The following statements from the Bolbol v. City of Daly City
decision appear to support Plaintiffs’ position:
[I]n California, where the citizen’s arrest is
valid under state law, the officer effectuating the
citizen’s arrest may not be held liable. [Kesmodel
v. Rand, 119 Cal. App. 4th 1128, 1137 (2004)]
(citing Cal. Penal Code § 847(b)). Accordingly, for
the
purposes
of
determining
both
a
state
constitutional unlawful seizure and a state section
236 false imprisonment/false arrest claim, the
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court addresses whether the underlying citizen’s
arrest on its own was reasonable, and thus lawful.
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Bolbol, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. Further, the Bolbol court denied the
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officer defendant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law false
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imprisonment claim stating, “whether [the officer defendant] arrested
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[Plaintiff] pursuant to a lawful citizen’s arrest under state law, and
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thus whether [the officer defendant] unlawfully seized and falsely
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imprisoned [Plaintiff] as a matter of state law, is a genuine issue of
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material fact.” Id.
However, the California decision cited by the
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Bolbol Court in support of its ruling on this issue, Kesmodel v. Rand,
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does not discuss the validity of the citizen’s arrest at issue anywhere
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in its opinion. To the contrary, the Kesmodel decision states on page
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1137 of the decision: “[a] peace officer who accepts custody of a person
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following a citizen arrest is not required to correctly determine
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whether the arrest as justified, and cannot be held liable for the
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arrest if it was improper.” Id. at 1137 (emphasis added). Therefore the
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Court finds the Bolbol decision on this issue unpersuasive and declines
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to follow its ruling.
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Moreover, Ninth Circuit and California state court decisions,
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which discuss police officer liability under state law in arresting
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individuals
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liability does not depend upon the validity of the underlying citizen’s
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arrest. For example, the Ninth Circuit states in Arpin v. Santa Clara
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Valley Transportation Agency:
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pursuant
to
citizen’s
arrests,
indicate
the
In Kinney v. County of Contra Costa,. . . , the
California Court of Appeal held that a peace
officer who accepts delivery of a person following
a citizen’s arrest is not liable for false arrest
or
false
imprisonment
even
if the
officer
determines that there is no grounds for making a
criminal complaint. . . . Because the undisputed
facts indicate that [the] Officers . . . accepted
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officer’s
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delivery of [Plaintiff] after Ruiz made a citizen's
arrest, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment to [the Officers] on the state law
claims of false arrest and unlawful imprisonment.
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Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 920-21 (9th
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Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (citing Kinney v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 8
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Cal. App. 3d 761, 767-68 (1970)). In Arpin, the parties disputed the
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validity of the underlying citizen’s arrest. Id. at 918. However, this
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factual dispute did not affect the Ninth Circuit’s review of the
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district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Defendants on
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Plaintiff’s state law false arrest claim. Similarly, in Hamburg v. Wal-
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Mart Stores, Inc., the California Court of Appeal states:
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A peace officer who accepts custody of a person
following a citizen’s arrest is not required to
correctly
determine
whether
the
arrest
was
justified and cannot be held liable for the arrest
if it was improper. Therefore, while a person
falsely arrested by a citizen ordinarily has no
remedy against the peace officer who took him or
her into custody as a result of the arrest, he or
she has a tort remedy against the offending
citizen.
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Hamburg v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 4th at 573-74 (2004)
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(emphasis added) (internal citations and footnote omitted).
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The legislative history of California Penal Code sections 142
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and 847 also indicates the validity of a citizen’s arrest is not
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material in determining whether a police officer is liable for false
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arrest under state law.
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“imposed criminal liability on peace officers who willfully refused to
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receive, inter alia, persons placed under citizen’s arrest.” Hamburg,
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116 Cal. App. 4th at 573 n.2. California Assembly Bill 1835, 2002 Cal.
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Stats. ch. 526 (“AB 1835”) amended section 142 “so as to make it
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inapplicable to arrests made by private persons.” Id.
California Penal Code section 142 previously
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AB 1835 also amended California Penal Code section 847 “to
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provide that [subsection (b)’s limitations to] the civil liability of a
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peace officer . . . shall apply to arrests made pursuant to the
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provisions authorizing a private person to make a citizen’s arrest.”
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Legislative Counsel’s Digest, Assembly Bill 1835 (2002). The staff
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analysis for the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, which related the
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“need for [AB 1835]” stated:
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This bill . . . provides that an officer cannot be
sued for false arrest or false imprisonment under
state law if the officer arrests or takes custody
of a person who has been arrested by a citizen. Two
California cases have already addressed the issue
of whether an officer who arrests a person pursuant
to a citizen's arrest can be sued under state law
for false arrest and false imprisonment. Both cases
concluded that the officer was immune from civil
liability. Shakespeare v. Pasadena (1964) 230 Cal.
App. 2d 375, and Kinney v. County of Contra Costa
(1970) 8 Cal. App. 3d 761.
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Hearings on AB 1835 before the Assembly Committee on Public Safety
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(March 12, 2002). The Senate Committee on Public Safety related similar
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objectives of the proposed legislation: “[A] purpose[] of this bill is
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to . . . clarify or reiterate that an officer is immune from civil
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liability for accepting or receiving a citizen’s arrest.” Hearings on AB
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1835 before the Senate Committee on Public Safety (June 11, 2002).
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For the stated reasons, Plaintiffs have not shown that any
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factual dispute concerning the validity of Mr. Young’s citizen’s arrests
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is material to Plaintiffs’ state law false arrest claims.
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B.
Initiation of the Citizen’s Arrest
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Plaintiffs also argue the Court should not adopt its Tentative
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Ruling because “there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
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Defendants initiated the arrests[,]” and “an officer’s obligation to
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accept custody of the person placed under a citizen’s arrest and thus,
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immunity from a [state] false arrest claim, is triggered by a citizen’s
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arrest already in effect.” (Pls.’ Objections 2:16-19, 8:7-9.) However,
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Plaintiffs have not cited any authority to support their contention that
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an officer is immune from a state false arrest claim only when they
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accept custody of a person who has already been arrested by a citizen.
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Therefore, Plaintiffs have not shown that any factual dispute concerning
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the
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Plaintiffs’ state false arrest claims.
initiation
of
Mr.
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Young’s
citizen’s
arrests
is
material
to
IV. CONCLUSION
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For the stated reasons, partial summary judgment is granted in
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favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ state law false arrest claims.
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Further, Defendants’ request to expand the Tentative Ruling to grant
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summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ federal false arrest claims is denied.
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Dated:
January 7, 2013
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GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.
Senior United States District Judge
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