Hall et al v. City of Fairfield et al
Filing
95
ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 1/11/12; the cross motions for summary judgment of each Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim against each Defendant Officer is denied; Defendants Grimm, Sandoval, Shackford and Crane& #039;s motion for summary judgment of their defense of qualified immunity against each Plaintiff's federal unlawful arrest claim is granted; Defendant City of Fairfield's motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment unla wful arrest claim alleged under Monell is granted and Plaintiffs' motion is denied; Defendants' motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff Hall's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is granted; Defendants' motion for summary judg ment is granted on each Plaintiff's claim alleged under Civil Code section 51.7 and denied on each Plaintiffs' Civil Code section 52.1 claim; Defendant Officers' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs state battery and unlawful arre st claims is denied; and each Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is dismissed, Plaintiff Monique Rankin's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is dismissed, and Plaintiff Monique Rankin's state battery claim is dismissed. (Matson, R)
1
2
3
4
5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7
8
Markus M. Hall, Monique G.
Rankin, Lindsey K. Sanders,
9
Plaintiffs,
10
11
v.
13
City of Fairfield, Nick
McDowell, Chris Grimm, Tom
Shackford, Zack Sandoval, Steve
Crane,
14
Defendants.
________________________________
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2:10-cv-0508-GEB-DAD
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
15
Pending are cross summary judgment motions on each Plaintiff’s
16
17
federal
Fourth
Amendment
18
Defendants Officer Nick McDowell, Officer Chris Grimm, Officer Tom
19
Shackford,
20
(collectively “Defendant Officers”); and on each Plaintiff’s Fourth
21
Amendment unlawful arrest claim alleged against the City of Fairfield
22
under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Monell”).
23
(Plaintiffs’
24
Defendants City of Fairfield, Officers Nick McDowell, Christopher Grimm,
25
Tom Shackford, Zachary Sandoval and Sergeant Steve Crane’s Motion for
26
Summary Judgment (“D MSJ”), ECF No. 66.)
Officer
Motion
Zack
for
unlawful
arrest
Sandoval,
Summary
and
Judgment
claim
alleged
Sergeant
(“P
MSJ”),
Steve
ECF
against
Crane,
No.
48;
27
Further, Defendants seek summary judgment on the following
28
claims: Plaintiff Markus Hall’s federal Fourth Amendment excessive force
1
1
claim alleged against Defendant Officers; and each Plaintiff’s claims
2
alleged under Civil Code sections 51.7 and 52.1.
3
Each Defendant Officer also argues his federal qualified
4
immunity defense shields him from exposure to liability for Plaintiff’s
5
federal false arrest claim; and that California Government Code section
6
821.6 shields him from exposure to liability for Plaintiffs’ state false
7
arrest and battery claims.
8
Further, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the following claims
9
in their opposition to the summary judgment motion and during the
10
hearing on the motions: each Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of
11
emotional distress claim; Plaintiff Monique Rankin’s federal Fourth
12
Amendment excessive force claim; and Plaintiff Monique Rankin’s state
13
battery claim. Therefore, these claims are dismissed.
14
This case concerns the citizen’s arrests of Plaintiffs Markus
15
Hall, Monique Rankin and Lindsey Sanders on July 4, 2009 for violation
16
of California Penal Code section 602.1, made by In-N-Out Restaurant
17
Manager Marc Young under California Penal Code section 837. Section 837
18
allows “[a] private person [to] arrest another . . . [f]or a public
19
offense committed or attempted in his presence.” Each Plaintiff was
20
taken into custody pursuant to this citizen’s arrest by a City of
21
Fairfield Police Department officer or officers, and was also arrested
22
under California Penal Code section 148 due to their failure to comply
23
with officers’ directions to leave the premises.
24
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
25
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
26
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
27
Celotex
28
‘material’ when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect
Corp.
v.
Catrett,
477
U.S.
2
317,
323
(1986).
“A
fact
is
1
the outcome of the case.” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust and
2
Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v.
3
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An issue of material
4
fact is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
5
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The moving party’s
6
initial burden “may be met by . . . pointing out to the district court
7
that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
8
case.” Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2000)
9
(internal quotation and citation omitted).
10
If the movant satisfies its initial burden, “the non-moving
11
party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in [Federal]
12
Rule [of Civil Procedure] 56, specific facts showing that there is a
13
genuine issue for trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec.
14
Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and
15
internal quotation marks omitted). The “non-moving [party] cannot rest
16
upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading but
17
must instead produce evidence that sets forth specific facts showing
18
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Estate of Tucker ex rel.
19
Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008)
20
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
21
Further, Local Rule 260(b) requires:
22
Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication [must] reproduce the itemized
facts in the [moving party’s] Statement of
Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that are
undisputed and deny those that are disputed,
including with each denial a citation to the
particular portions of any pleading, affidavit,
deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, or
other document relied upon in support of that
denial.
23
24
25
26
27
If
the
nonmovant
does
not
“specifically
.
.
.
[controvert
duly
28
supported] facts identified in the [movant’s] statement of undisputed
3
1
facts,” the nonmovant “is deemed to have admitted the validity of the
2
facts contained in the [movant’s] statement.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S.
3
521, 527 (2006).
4
Because a district court has no independent duty to
scour the record in search of a genuine issue of
triable fact, and may rely on the nonmoving party
to identify with reasonable particularity the
evidence that precludes summary judgment, . . . the
district court . . . [is] under no obligation to
undertake a cumbersome review of the record on the
[nonmoving party’s] behalf.
5
6
7
8
Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Arizona, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010)
9
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
10
Evidence must be “view[ed] . . . in the light most favorable
11
to the non-moving party[,]” and “all reasonable inferences” that can be
12
drawn from the evidence must be drawn “in favor of [the non-moving]
13
party.” Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
14
Bank of N.Y.C. v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 523 F.3d 902, 909 (9th Cir.
15
2008)).
16
II.
SUMMARY OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
17
“On July 4, 2009, at approximately 12:55 a.m., Plaintiffs
18
. . . arrived at an In-N-Out Burger restaurant located at 1364 Holiday
19
Lane, Fairfield, California.” (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts
20
in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication (“P SUF”) No. 1, ECF No.
21
50.) “Prior to Plaintiffs arriving at the restaurant, at approximately
22
12:54
a.m.,
the
manager
of
the
restaurant,
.
.
.
MARC
L.
YOUNG
23
(“Young”), had called the Fairfield Police Department to report a
24
disturbance at the restaurant by a group of African Americans who were
25
acting ‘rowdy and throwing food around.’ The call was logged by the
26
Fairfield Police Department at ‘12:54:50 AM.’” (P SUF No. 2.) “At
27
approximately 12:55 a.m., the Fairfield Police Department dispatched
28
officers to the restaurant[, t]he . . . dispatch report described black
4
1
males and black females throwing food around and refusing to leave –
2
‘BM’s AND BF’s’ ‘THROWING FOOD AROUND’ ‘REF TO LEAVE.’” (P SUF No. 3.)
3
“At approximately 12:59 a.m., . . . Defendants NICK McDOWELL
4
(“McDowell”), CHRIS GRIMM (“Grimm”), TOM SHACKFORD (“Shackford”), and
5
ZACK SANDOVAL (“Sandoval”) . . . entered the restaurant.” (P SUF No. 5.)
6
“When the officers arrived, Officer McDowell spoke . . . to Young who,
7
according to Officer McDowell, stated words to the effect that ‘there
8
was a disturbance, there was a lot of people in the restaurant.’” (P SUF
9
No. 5.) “Young then proceeded to the table where Plaintiffs were seated
10
and, pointing his fingers toward the counter and the door, told them
11
that they had to ‘order or leave.’” Id. “In-N-Out Manager Marc Young
12
requested the City of Fairfield officers remove Plaintiffs from the In-
13
N-Out property.” (Defendants City of Fairfield, Officers Nick McDowell,
14
Christopher Grimm, Tom Shackford, Zachary Sandoval and Sergeant Steve
15
Crane’s Separate Statement in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or,
16
in the alternative, Summary Adjudication (“D SUF”) No. 13, ECF No. 66-
17
1.)
18
“Defendant officers approached Plaintiffs inside the In-N-Out
19
Restaurant and requested they voluntarily leave, with that request
20
repeated multiple times.” (D SUF No. 13; P SUF No. 6.) “The officers did
21
not explain to Plaintiffs why they were being told to leave, did not
22
respond to Plaintiffs when they asked why they were being told to leave
23
and, although there were a number of employees and patrons at the
24
restaurant, the officers did not inquire of any of them if Plaintiffs
25
had
26
restaurant.”
27
Plaintiffs got up from their chairs and left the restaurant[,]” and
28
traveled into the parking lot. (P SUF No. 7; D SUF No. 17.)
been
interfering,
(P
SUF
obstructing
No.
6.)
“At
5
or
intimidating
approximately
1:00
anyone
a.m.,
at
.
the
.
.
1
“At approximately 1:02 a.m., the officers left the restaurant
2
and approached Plaintiffs, who were now standing near the car they had
3
arrived in, while they waited for the two members of their group who
4
were inside ordering.” (P SUF No. 8.) “Defendant officers approached
5
Plaintiffs in the parking lot and again requested they leave the
6
premise[s], with the Officers’ request for Plaintiffs to leave being
7
repeated multiple times.” (D SUF No. 19.)
8
Sergeant Crane did not arrive on the premises until after
9
Plaintiffs and the other Defendant Officers had exited the restaurant.
10
(P SUF No. 9.) Plaintiffs were arrested for violations of California
11
Penal Code sections 602.1(a) and 148(a)(1). (P SUF No. 9; D SUF No. 22.)
12
In-N-Out
13
included in the Arrest Report for each Plaintiff’s arrest which stated
14
the following: “I hereby arrest the above person on the charge indicated
15
herein and request a peace officer to take him/her into custody.”
16
(Declaration of Garret D. Murai in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
17
Summary Adjudication (“Murai Decl.”) Ex. E, Arrest Reports of Monique
18
Rankin, Markus Hall and Lindsey Sanders pp. 000403-000410, ECF No. 56-
19
2.)
20
to their failure to comply with the officers’ official directions to
21
leave the premise[s] . . . .” (D SUF No. 21.)
Manager
Marc
signed
III.
A.
a
“Citizens
Arrest
Statement”
“Plaintiffs’ arrest . . . [under] Penal Code Section 148 [was] due
22
23
Young
DISCUSSION
Fourth Amendment Unlawful Arrest Claim against Defendant Officers
24
Plaintiffs and Defendant Officers cross move for summary
25
judgment of each Plaintiff’s federal unlawful arrest claim against each
26
Defendant
27
judgment on his qualified immunity defense.
28
Officer.
Further,
each
Defendant
Officer
seeks
summary
Defendant Officers argue that “the situation encountered by
6
1
the officers on the night in question, together with each officer’s
2
independent observations, confirms probable cause existed to arrest each
3
Plaintiff.” (D MSJ 12:26-26.) Further, Defendants argue that “[s]hould
4
this Court determine that the officers did not have probable cause to
5
proceed with Plaintiffs’ arrest” they are shielded from liability from
6
the federal unlawful arrest claims because “even if the officers were
7
mistaken about having probable cause to arrest . . . to the extent that
8
their response was reasonable, they are entitled to qualified immunity.”
9
(D MSJ 16:25-28, 17:1–4; 18:3-4.)
10
Plaintiffs
argue
that
“because
none
of
the
[Defendant]
11
officers ‘independently investigated’ the alleged violation underlying
12
Young’s citizen’s arrest [for trespassing], none of the officer[s] had
13
probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs.” (P MSJ 10:26-28.) Plaintiffs also
14
counter each Defendant Officer’s qualified immunity argument by arguing
15
that “the law was clear at [the time of the arrests] that statements
16
from
17
insufficient to support probable cause[,]” and therefore “Defendants
18
cannot contend that the officers were unaware that an independent
19
investigation was required by the [Fourth] Amendment.”
20
Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (“P Opp’n”)
21
20:22-24; 21:7-8, ECF No.
22
a
I.
witness,
without
further
investigation
by
the
police
were
(Plaintiffs’
82.)
Probable Cause
23
The citizen’s arrest by Mr. Young of each Plaintiff was for a
24
violation of California Penal Code Section 602.1(a). This statute
25
prescribes:
26
27
28
Any person who intentionally interferes with any
lawful business or occupation carried on by the
owner or agent of a business establishment open to
the public, by obstructing or intimidating those
attempting
to
carry
on
business,
or
their
customers, and who refuses to leave the premises of
7
1
the business establishment after being requested to
leave by the owner or the owner's agent, or by a
peace officer acting at the request of the owner or
owner's agent, is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .
2
3
“[A]
violation
of
§
602.1
has
two
elements:
(1)
intentional
4
interference, and (2) refusal to leave.” Dubner v. City and Cnty. of San
5
Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2001).
6
“[T]he federal Constitution requires police officers to have
7
independent
probable
cause
Hopkins
Bonvicino,
when
effectuating
a
citizen’s
arrest.”
8
v.
573
F.3d
752,
774
(9th
Cir.
2009).
“In
9
establishing probable cause, officers may not solely rely on the claim
10
of a citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must
11
independently investigate the basis of the [citizen’s] knowledge or
12
interview other witnesses.” Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Trans. Agency,
13
261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). “A sufficient basis of knowledge is
14
established if the [citizen] provides ‘facts sufficiently detailed to
15
cause a reasonable person to believe a crime had been committed and the
16
named suspect was the perpetrator.’” Peng v. Hu, 335 F.3d 970, 978 (9th
17
Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).
18
The City of Fairfield police officers argue that Mr. Young
19
provided them with sufficiently detailed information that caused them
20
to reasonably believe that Plaintiffs had violated the “intentional
21
interference” prong of section 602.1(a), and rely on the following
22
asserted undisputed facts in support of this argument: “In-N-Out Manager
23
Marc Young told the officers that Plaintiffs group was refusing to leave
24
the
restaurant,
were
argumentative
with
In-N-Out
staff,
were
not
25
ordering food, throwing items around the restaurant and being a general
26
disruption.” (D SUF No. 12.) However, Plaintiffs counter Defendants
27
evidence concerning what Mr. Young said to a police officer by citing
28
the deposition testimony of Mr. Young in which he answered “No” to the
8
1
following questions: “[D]id you have a conversation with an officer
2
about what [Plaintiffs] had done prior to the time that the officers
3
arrived[;]” “Did any officer ask you to give them any detail about what
4
[Plaintiffs] had done[;]” and “before the officers arrived, you’re not
5
aware of anything that [Plaintiffs] had done, are you?” (Declaration of
6
Garret D. Murai in Support of Plaintiffs’ Reply,
7
No. 73-1.)
Ex. A 36:10-24, ECF
8
Because of the factual dispute concerning what Mr. Young told
9
a Fairfield police officer, triable issues of fact exist concerning
10
whether probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiffs. Therefore, each
11
motion on each Plaintiff’s federal unlawful arrest claims is denied.
12
ii.
13
Qualified Immunity
However, each officer also seeks decision on his qualified
14
immunity defense.
15
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis can be summarized as: (1)
16
whether there was probable cause for the arrest; and (2) whether it is
17
reasonably arguable that there was probable cause for arrest—that is,
18
whether reasonable officers could disagree as to the legality of the
19
arrest
20
immunity.”
21
5966207, at *3, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23804, at *9 (9th Cir. Nov. 30,
22
2011).
23
the second prong of the analysis, since under this prong “[e]ven if the
24
arrest is made without . . . probable cause, . . . the officer may still
25
be immune from suit if it was objectively reasonable for him to believe
26
that he had probable cause.” Id. at
27
“The relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to
28
a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
such
that
“In the context of an unlawful arrest . . . the two
the
arresting
officer
is
entitled
to
qualified
Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., - - - F.3d - - -, 2011 WL
The focus of the qualified immunity analysis here is on
9
*5, *14 (emphasis in original).
1
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). “Framing the
2
reasonableness
3
determining whether qualified immunity applies is whether all reasonable
4
officers would agree that there was no probable cause in this instance.”
5
Rosenbaum, - - - F.3d - - -, 2011 WL 5966207, at *6, 2011 U.S. App.
6
LEXIS 23804, at *15. Further, “[w]here an officer has an objectively
7
reasonable, good faith belief that he is acting pursuant to proper
8
authority, he cannot be held liable if the information supplied by other
9
officers turns out to be erroneous.” Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072,
10
1082 (9th Cir. 2005). “The linchpin is whether the officer’s reliance on
11
the information was objectively reasonable.” Id. (citation omitted).
question
somewhat
differently,
the
question
in
12
Plaintiffs state in their statement of undisputed facts: “The
13
officers, who were later joined by Sergeant Crane, were directed by
14
Sergeant Crane to arrest Plaintiffs based solely on information Sergeant
15
Crane had received from Officer McDowell.” (P SUF No. 9.) Plaintiffs
16
cite
17
support of these undisputed facts:
18
19
20
21
Defendant
Sergeant
Crane’s
following
deposition
testimony
in
The general statement that Officer McDowell
gave me when I initially arrived on scene is that
management had pointed out [Plaintiffs] as being
part of the original disturbance that we were
called for, that Mr. Young had asked them to leave
in [McDowell’s] presence, [Plaintiffs] refused, and
that the officers had asked them to leave multiple
times and they refused to do so.
22
24
Officer McDowell relayed to me that Mr. Young
was willing to make a citizen’s arrest and wished
to do so if [Plaintiffs] refused to leave the
premises for criminal trespass.
25
(Murai Decl. Ex. K, Sergeant Crane Deposition, 65:21-25, 66:1-2; 76:3-
26
6.) Plaintiffs also cite Defendant Officer Grimm’s deposition testimony
27
in support their statement of undisputed facts concerning what Officer
28
McDowell told Sergeant Crane, in which Officer Grimm testified that
23
10
1
after Sergeant Crane arrived on scene and spoke with Officer McDowell,
2
Sergeant Crane “told [Grimm] and the other officers to take [Plaintiffs]
3
into custody.” (Murai Decl. Ex. H, Officer Grimm Deposition 39:4-12.)
4
This
5
reasonably relied on the information he received from Officer McDowell
6
when he ordered the arrests of Plaintiffs, and that the Defendant
7
Officers, except Officer McDowell, reasonably relied on Sergeant Crane’s
8
order to arrest Plaintiffs. Although a genuine issue of material fact
9
exists concerning what Mr. Young said to Officer McDowell, that factual
10
dispute does not controvert Sergeant Crane’s testimony concerning what
11
he testified Officer McDowell told him. The information Sergeant Crane
12
testified he received from Officer McDowell is sufficient for Sergeant
13
Crane to have had an arguable objective reasonable belief that he had
14
probable cause to arrest each Plaintiff for the charged offenses.
15
Further, since it is uncontroverted that the arrests were made pursuant
16
to this belief, the following Defendant Officers are granted summary
17
judgment on their qualified immunity defense against each Plaintiff’s
18
federal unlawful arrest claim: Grimm, Shackford, Sandoval and Sergeant
19
Crane.
20
B.
evidence
drawing
the
inference
that
Sergeant
Crane
Liability of City of Fairfield under Monell
21
22
supports
Plaintiffs and the City of Fairfield each move for summary
judgment of Plaintiffs’ Monell claim.
23
Under Monell, “[m]unicipalities are considered persons under
24
42
25
deprivation.” Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th
26
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “it is only when
27
execution of a government’s policy or custom inflicts the injury that
28
the municipality as an entity is responsible.” Id.
U.S.C.
§
1983
and
thus
may
11
be
liable
for
a
constitutional
1
The City of Fairfield argues that “[b]ased on the facts
2
alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, as well as their verified responses to
3
discovery, there is no basis for a Monell claim against the City,
4
thereby requiring the City to be dismissed.” (D MSJ 12:3-5.) The City of
5
Fairfield contends it “served Plaintiffs with precise discovery requests
6
which required Plaintiffs to identify the exact policy allegedly causing
7
or contributing to the alleged unlawful actions.” (D MSJ 11:23-24.)
8
Plaintiffs
responded
9
Fairfield
Police
that
“Defendant
Department’s
Code
officers
of
.
.
.
violated
the
Professional
Conduct
and
10
Responsibilities for Peace Officers and General Orders.” (Decl. of Kevin
11
E.
12
(“Gilbert Decl.”) Exs. C, F, H, each Plaintiff’s Response to the City’s
13
Interrogatory No. 21.) The City of Fairfield’s argument in its motion is
14
sufficient to satisfy its “initial burden of establishing the absence of
15
a genuine issue of material fact” since it
16
out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to
17
support the nonmoving party’s case[.]” Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato
18
Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
19
Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he City of Fairfield is liable for
20
. . . the ratification of the officers’ actions by the Fairfield Police
21
Department’s Chief of Police.” (P MSJ 14:16-20.) Under this theory of
22
Monell liability, “[a] municipality . . . can be liable for an isolated
23
constitutional
24
subordinate's actions.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir.
25
1999).
26
‘authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis
27
for it.’” Id. at 1239 (quoting St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,
28
127 (1988).
Gilbert
“To
in
Support
of
violation
show
Defendants
if
[a]
ratification,
a
12
Motion
final
for
Summary
Judgment
“show[s]—that is, point[s]
policymaker
plaintiff
must
‘ratified’
prove
that
a
the
1
Plaintiffs argue that “the recommendation of the [Fairfield
2
Police Department’s Internal Affairs] investigator as to each Defendant
3
officer’s [alleged] violation of the Fairfield Police Department’s
4
Policy and Procedure No. 4155 – Citizen’s Arrest – was to exonerate each
5
Defendant officer[, and] . . . [e]ach of the Defendant officers were
6
later ‘exonerated’ by the former Chief of Police of the Fairfield Police
7
Department,
8
Plaintiffs have not presented evidence from which it could be reasonably
9
inferred that the Chief of Police’s exoneration of Defendant Officers
10
based on the version of the facts presented in the Internal Affairs
11
investigation report was improper. See Koenig v. City of Bainbridge
12
Island, No. C10-5700 RJB, 2011 WL 3759779, at *9, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13
95607, at *25-26 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2011) (finding the Chief’s
14
“agreement with the independent findings that the allegations were
15
‘unsubstantiated,’ does not rise to the level of ratification of [the
16
officers’] alleged unconstitutional conduct. In other words, [the Chief]
17
did not ratify unconstitutional or wrongful conduct; he ratified conduct
18
he reasonably believe to be appropriate under the circumstances.”).
Walter
Tibbett.”
(P
MSJ
13:25-28,
14:6-7.)
However,
19
Therefore, the City of Fairfield’s motion for summary judgment
20
on each Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claims alleged
21
under Monell is granted and Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on these
22
claims is denied.
23
C.
Plaintiff Hall’s Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claim
24
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff Hall’s excessive
25
force claim. Defendants argue that “the ‘force’ used [on Plaintiff Hall]
26
amounted to . . . Officer Sandoval placing his knee on Hall’s lower or
27
middle back for less than 10 seconds while he was being handcuffed [,
28
and that s]uch conduct . . . is clearly appropriate and objectively
13
1
reasonable.” (D MSJ 16:12-15.) Plaintiff Hall counters that there is a
2
factual dispute concerning the force used because “Hall . . . was
3
grabbed by the officer as he attempted to comply with [the officer’s]
4
instructions, was thrown to the ground and a knee placed in his back.”
5
(P Opp’n 25:8-11.)
6
“[T]he protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . guarantees
7
citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against
8
unreasonable . . . seizures’ of the person.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
9
386, 394 (1989). “[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force
10
case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions
11
are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances
12
confronting
13
motivation.” Id. at 397. When analyzing an excessive force claim “the
14
facts and circumstances of each particular case, . . .
15
whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
16
evade arrest by flight” are considered. Id. at 396.
17
18
19
20
21
22
them,
without
regard
to
their
underlying
intent
or
including
Defendants and Plaintiff Hall cite the following portion of
Defendant Sandoval’s deposition testimony in argument on the motion:
I went up to grab [Hall] by the left arm to place
him in a rear wrist lock which is an arrest control
technique that we use. As I went to go grab his
right arm, I felt him start to pull his arm away
from me. At that point, I placed him in an arm bar
extension and I used a take down technique where
you actually twist the arm to bring them to the
ground to gain control and compliance over them.
23
(Gilbert Decl. Ex. E 97:6-14.)
In addition, Plaintiff Hall declares in
24
his declaration: “I was forced to the ground, my arms were grabbed and
25
pulled behind my back, and handcuffs were placed on my wrists.” (Decl.
26
of Markus M. Hall in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication ¶ 7.)
27
The undisputed facts and the evidence presented by Plaintiff
28
Hall do not establish a triable issue of fact concerning the objective
14
1
reasonableness of Defendant Sandoval’s use of a control hold and take
2
down technique after Defendant Sandoval felt Plaintiff Hall start to
3
pull his arm away from Defendant Sandoval. At that point, Defendant
4
Sandoval placed Plaintiff Hall in an arm bar extension and used a take
5
down technique. Since there is no evidence that Defendant Sandoval
6
applied more force than necessary to restrain Plaintiff Hall while
7
attempting to secure him in handcuffs, Defendant Sandoval’s use of a
8
control hold was objectively reasonable. See Tatum v. City and Cnty. of
9
San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating summary
10
judgment is appropriate when the reason for the officer’s use of force
11
was uncontroverted and clear, and “the record . . . does not permit the
12
inference
13
Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff Hall’s
14
excessive force claim is granted.
15
D.
that
[the
officer's]
use
of
force
was
unwarranted”).
California Civil Code Sections 51.7 and 52.1
16
Defendants move for summary judgment of each Plaintiff’s
17
claims alleged under California Civil Code section 51.7, arguing that
18
Plaintiffs have not “establish[ed] wrongful conduct by each individual
19
Defendant which was motivated by Plaintiffs’ membership in a protected
20
class[,]” as required for liability under section 51.7. (D MSJ 19:12-
21
14.) Plaintiffs counter that they “have presented a prima faciae [sic]
22
case by tendering evidence that each was a member of a protected class
23
and that each was threatened with arrest, arrested and subjected to
24
violent acts.” (P Opp’n 22:20-22.)
25
California Civil Code section 51.7 prescribes “[a]ll persons
26
within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any
27
violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their
28
person . . . on account of [race.]”
15
1
Plaintiffs argue in their opposition brief “circumstantial
2
evidence” exists which is “sufficient to raise a triable issue as to
3
whether
4
[Plaintiffs’] race.” (P Opp’n 23:1-2.) However, the only reference to
5
race in Plaintiffs’ evidence is the following: “The officers received a
6
report that ‘BM’s and BF’s’ were causing a disturbance[; t]he officers
7
arrived
8
restaurant[; and t]he surveillance video clearly shows that the vast
9
majority if not all persons leaving were African American.” (P Opp’n
10
23:3-6.) Plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to support a reasonable
11
inference that “a motivating reason for [Defendant Officers’ allegedly
12
unlawful] conduct was [their] perception of [Plaintiffs’ race].” Austin
13
B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 881 (2007)
14
(citing Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions, CACI No.
15
3023A
16
judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim alleged under California Civil Code
17
section 51.7 is granted.
[Defendant
and
saw
(formerly
Officers’]
African
3023)).
actions
American
Therefore,
males
were
and
Defendants’
taken
females
motion
because
leaving
for
of
the
summary
18
Defendants also seek summary judgment of each Plaintiff’s
19
claim alleged under California Civil Code section 52.1. California Civil
20
Code section 52.1 proscribes “interfere[nce] by threats, intimidation,
21
or coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or
22
individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
23
States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this
24
state[.]” “Civil Code section 52.1 does not extend to all ordinary tort
25
actions because its provisions are limited to threats, intimidation, or
26
coercion that interferes with a constitutional or statutory right.”
27
Venegas v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 843 (2004). Defendants
28
argue Plaintiffs have not “show[n] that Defendants interfered with or
16
1
attempted to interfere with Plaintiffs’ state or federal rights by
2
threatening to or committing violent acts[,]” proscribed by California
3
Civil Code section 52.1. (D MSJ 19:15-19.)
4
Defendants
argue
they
“served
each
Plaintiff
with
5
Interrogatory No. 22, which requested Plaintiffs identify the specific
6
right that each Plaintiff contended the Defendant officers intentionally
7
interfered with.” (D MSJ 19:21-22.) Plaintiffs responded that they “were
8
exercising their constitutionally protected right to be in the In-N-Out
9
Burger restaurant, [and] to question Defendant officers . . . about why
10
they were being asked to leave.” Defendants have not sustained their
11
burden of showing their that they are entitled to summary judgment of
12
this claim; therefore this portion of the motion is denied.
13
E.
14
Immunity under California Government Code Section 821.6
Defendants
also
argue
“Plaintiffs
are
precluded
from
15
prosecuting their [state false arrest and battery] causes of action
16
based upon the complete defense provided by [California] Government Code
17
Section 821.6.” (D MSJ 18:20-22.) However, since Defendants have not
18
shown that Section 821.6 confers immunity from the claims at issue, this
19
portion of the motion is denied.
20
IV.
CONCLUSION
21
For the stated reasons, the cross motions for summary judgment
22
of each Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim against each
23
Defendant Officer is denied; Defendants Grimm, Sandoval, Shackford and
24
Crane’s motion for summary judgment of their defense of qualified
25
immunity against each Plaintiff’s federal unlawful arrest claim is
26
granted; Defendant City of Fairfield’s motion for summary judgment of
27
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim alleged under Monell
28
is granted and Plaintiffs’ motion is denied; Defendants’ motion for
17
1
summary judgment of Plaintiff Hall’s Fourth Amendment excessive force
2
claim is granted; Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on
3
each Plaintiff’s claim alleged under Civil Code section 51.7 and denied
4
on each Plaintiffs’ Civil Code section 52.1 claim; Defendant Officers’
5
motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs state battery and unlawful
6
arrest claims is denied; and each Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of
7
emotional
8
Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is dismissed, and Plaintiff
9
Monique Rankin’s state battery claim is dismissed.
10
Dated:
distress
claim
is
dismissed,
Plaintiff
Monique
January 11, 2012
11
12
13
GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.
United States District Judge
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
18
Rankin’s
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