Hall et al v. City of Fairfield et al

Filing 95

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 1/11/12; the cross motions for summary judgment of each Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim against each Defendant Officer is denied; Defendants Grimm, Sandoval, Shackford and Crane& #039;s motion for summary judgment of their defense of qualified immunity against each Plaintiff's federal unlawful arrest claim is granted; Defendant City of Fairfield's motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment unla wful arrest claim alleged under Monell is granted and Plaintiffs' motion is denied; Defendants' motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff Hall's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is granted; Defendants' motion for summary judg ment is granted on each Plaintiff's claim alleged under Civil Code section 51.7 and denied on each Plaintiffs' Civil Code section 52.1 claim; Defendant Officers' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs state battery and unlawful arre st claims is denied; and each Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is dismissed, Plaintiff Monique Rankin's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is dismissed, and Plaintiff Monique Rankin's state battery claim is dismissed. (Matson, R)

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1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 Markus M. Hall, Monique G. Rankin, Lindsey K. Sanders, 9 Plaintiffs, 10 11 v. 13 City of Fairfield, Nick McDowell, Chris Grimm, Tom Shackford, Zack Sandoval, Steve Crane, 14 Defendants. ________________________________ 12 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2:10-cv-0508-GEB-DAD ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 15 Pending are cross summary judgment motions on each Plaintiff’s 16 17 federal Fourth Amendment 18 Defendants Officer Nick McDowell, Officer Chris Grimm, Officer Tom 19 Shackford, 20 (collectively “Defendant Officers”); and on each Plaintiff’s Fourth 21 Amendment unlawful arrest claim alleged against the City of Fairfield 22 under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Monell”). 23 (Plaintiffs’ 24 Defendants City of Fairfield, Officers Nick McDowell, Christopher Grimm, 25 Tom Shackford, Zachary Sandoval and Sergeant Steve Crane’s Motion for 26 Summary Judgment (“D MSJ”), ECF No. 66.) Officer Motion Zack for unlawful arrest Sandoval, Summary and Judgment claim alleged Sergeant (“P MSJ”), Steve ECF against Crane, No. 48; 27 Further, Defendants seek summary judgment on the following 28 claims: Plaintiff Markus Hall’s federal Fourth Amendment excessive force 1 1 claim alleged against Defendant Officers; and each Plaintiff’s claims 2 alleged under Civil Code sections 51.7 and 52.1. 3 Each Defendant Officer also argues his federal qualified 4 immunity defense shields him from exposure to liability for Plaintiff’s 5 federal false arrest claim; and that California Government Code section 6 821.6 shields him from exposure to liability for Plaintiffs’ state false 7 arrest and battery claims. 8 Further, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the following claims 9 in their opposition to the summary judgment motion and during the 10 hearing on the motions: each Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of 11 emotional distress claim; Plaintiff Monique Rankin’s federal Fourth 12 Amendment excessive force claim; and Plaintiff Monique Rankin’s state 13 battery claim. Therefore, these claims are dismissed. 14 This case concerns the citizen’s arrests of Plaintiffs Markus 15 Hall, Monique Rankin and Lindsey Sanders on July 4, 2009 for violation 16 of California Penal Code section 602.1, made by In-N-Out Restaurant 17 Manager Marc Young under California Penal Code section 837. Section 837 18 allows “[a] private person [to] arrest another . . . [f]or a public 19 offense committed or attempted in his presence.” Each Plaintiff was 20 taken into custody pursuant to this citizen’s arrest by a City of 21 Fairfield Police Department officer or officers, and was also arrested 22 under California Penal Code section 148 due to their failure to comply 23 with officers’ directions to leave the premises. 24 I. LEGAL STANDARD 25 A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of 26 demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. 27 Celotex 28 ‘material’ when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 2 317, 323 (1986). “A fact is 1 the outcome of the case.” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust and 2 Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. 3 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An issue of material 4 fact is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 5 could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The moving party’s 6 initial burden “may be met by . . . pointing out to the district court 7 that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s 8 case.” Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato Johnson, 212 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2000) 9 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 10 If the movant satisfies its initial burden, “the non-moving 11 party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in [Federal] 12 Rule [of Civil Procedure] 56, specific facts showing that there is a 13 genuine issue for trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. 14 Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and 15 internal quotation marks omitted). The “non-moving [party] cannot rest 16 upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading but 17 must instead produce evidence that sets forth specific facts showing 18 that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Estate of Tucker ex rel. 19 Tucker v. Interscope Records, Inc., 515 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) 20 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 21 Further, Local Rule 260(b) requires: 22 Any party opposing a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication [must] reproduce the itemized facts in the [moving party’s] Statement of Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that are undisputed and deny those that are disputed, including with each denial a citation to the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit, deposition, interrogatory answer, admission, or other document relied upon in support of that denial. 23 24 25 26 27 If the nonmovant does not “specifically . . . [controvert duly 28 supported] facts identified in the [movant’s] statement of undisputed 3 1 facts,” the nonmovant “is deemed to have admitted the validity of the 2 facts contained in the [movant’s] statement.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 3 521, 527 (2006). 4 Because a district court has no independent duty to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact, and may rely on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment, . . . the district court . . . [is] under no obligation to undertake a cumbersome review of the record on the [nonmoving party’s] behalf. 5 6 7 8 Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Arizona, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010) 9 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 10 Evidence must be “view[ed] . . . in the light most favorable 11 to the non-moving party[,]” and “all reasonable inferences” that can be 12 drawn from the evidence must be drawn “in favor of [the non-moving] 13 party.” Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 14 Bank of N.Y.C. v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 523 F.3d 902, 909 (9th Cir. 15 2008)). 16 II. SUMMARY OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS 17 “On July 4, 2009, at approximately 12:55 a.m., Plaintiffs 18 . . . arrived at an In-N-Out Burger restaurant located at 1364 Holiday 19 Lane, Fairfield, California.” (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Facts 20 in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication (“P SUF”) No. 1, ECF No. 21 50.) “Prior to Plaintiffs arriving at the restaurant, at approximately 22 12:54 a.m., the manager of the restaurant, . . . MARC L. YOUNG 23 (“Young”), had called the Fairfield Police Department to report a 24 disturbance at the restaurant by a group of African Americans who were 25 acting ‘rowdy and throwing food around.’ The call was logged by the 26 Fairfield Police Department at ‘12:54:50 AM.’” (P SUF No. 2.) “At 27 approximately 12:55 a.m., the Fairfield Police Department dispatched 28 officers to the restaurant[, t]he . . . dispatch report described black 4 1 males and black females throwing food around and refusing to leave – 2 ‘BM’s AND BF’s’ ‘THROWING FOOD AROUND’ ‘REF TO LEAVE.’” (P SUF No. 3.) 3 “At approximately 12:59 a.m., . . . Defendants NICK McDOWELL 4 (“McDowell”), CHRIS GRIMM (“Grimm”), TOM SHACKFORD (“Shackford”), and 5 ZACK SANDOVAL (“Sandoval”) . . . entered the restaurant.” (P SUF No. 5.) 6 “When the officers arrived, Officer McDowell spoke . . . to Young who, 7 according to Officer McDowell, stated words to the effect that ‘there 8 was a disturbance, there was a lot of people in the restaurant.’” (P SUF 9 No. 5.) “Young then proceeded to the table where Plaintiffs were seated 10 and, pointing his fingers toward the counter and the door, told them 11 that they had to ‘order or leave.’” Id. “In-N-Out Manager Marc Young 12 requested the City of Fairfield officers remove Plaintiffs from the In- 13 N-Out property.” (Defendants City of Fairfield, Officers Nick McDowell, 14 Christopher Grimm, Tom Shackford, Zachary Sandoval and Sergeant Steve 15 Crane’s Separate Statement in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or, 16 in the alternative, Summary Adjudication (“D SUF”) No. 13, ECF No. 66- 17 1.) 18 “Defendant officers approached Plaintiffs inside the In-N-Out 19 Restaurant and requested they voluntarily leave, with that request 20 repeated multiple times.” (D SUF No. 13; P SUF No. 6.) “The officers did 21 not explain to Plaintiffs why they were being told to leave, did not 22 respond to Plaintiffs when they asked why they were being told to leave 23 and, although there were a number of employees and patrons at the 24 restaurant, the officers did not inquire of any of them if Plaintiffs 25 had 26 restaurant.” 27 Plaintiffs got up from their chairs and left the restaurant[,]” and 28 traveled into the parking lot. (P SUF No. 7; D SUF No. 17.) been interfering, (P SUF obstructing No. 6.) “At 5 or intimidating approximately 1:00 anyone a.m., at . the . . 1 “At approximately 1:02 a.m., the officers left the restaurant 2 and approached Plaintiffs, who were now standing near the car they had 3 arrived in, while they waited for the two members of their group who 4 were inside ordering.” (P SUF No. 8.) “Defendant officers approached 5 Plaintiffs in the parking lot and again requested they leave the 6 premise[s], with the Officers’ request for Plaintiffs to leave being 7 repeated multiple times.” (D SUF No. 19.) 8 Sergeant Crane did not arrive on the premises until after 9 Plaintiffs and the other Defendant Officers had exited the restaurant. 10 (P SUF No. 9.) Plaintiffs were arrested for violations of California 11 Penal Code sections 602.1(a) and 148(a)(1). (P SUF No. 9; D SUF No. 22.) 12 In-N-Out 13 included in the Arrest Report for each Plaintiff’s arrest which stated 14 the following: “I hereby arrest the above person on the charge indicated 15 herein and request a peace officer to take him/her into custody.” 16 (Declaration of Garret D. Murai in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for 17 Summary Adjudication (“Murai Decl.”) Ex. E, Arrest Reports of Monique 18 Rankin, Markus Hall and Lindsey Sanders pp. 000403-000410, ECF No. 56- 19 2.) 20 to their failure to comply with the officers’ official directions to 21 leave the premise[s] . . . .” (D SUF No. 21.) Manager Marc signed III. A. a “Citizens Arrest Statement” “Plaintiffs’ arrest . . . [under] Penal Code Section 148 [was] due 22 23 Young DISCUSSION Fourth Amendment Unlawful Arrest Claim against Defendant Officers 24 Plaintiffs and Defendant Officers cross move for summary 25 judgment of each Plaintiff’s federal unlawful arrest claim against each 26 Defendant 27 judgment on his qualified immunity defense. 28 Officer. Further, each Defendant Officer seeks summary Defendant Officers argue that “the situation encountered by 6 1 the officers on the night in question, together with each officer’s 2 independent observations, confirms probable cause existed to arrest each 3 Plaintiff.” (D MSJ 12:26-26.) Further, Defendants argue that “[s]hould 4 this Court determine that the officers did not have probable cause to 5 proceed with Plaintiffs’ arrest” they are shielded from liability from 6 the federal unlawful arrest claims because “even if the officers were 7 mistaken about having probable cause to arrest . . . to the extent that 8 their response was reasonable, they are entitled to qualified immunity.” 9 (D MSJ 16:25-28, 17:1–4; 18:3-4.) 10 Plaintiffs argue that “because none of the [Defendant] 11 officers ‘independently investigated’ the alleged violation underlying 12 Young’s citizen’s arrest [for trespassing], none of the officer[s] had 13 probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs.” (P MSJ 10:26-28.) Plaintiffs also 14 counter each Defendant Officer’s qualified immunity argument by arguing 15 that “the law was clear at [the time of the arrests] that statements 16 from 17 insufficient to support probable cause[,]” and therefore “Defendants 18 cannot contend that the officers were unaware that an independent 19 investigation was required by the [Fourth] Amendment.” 20 Opposition to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (“P Opp’n”) 21 20:22-24; 21:7-8, ECF No. 22 a I. witness, without further investigation by the police were (Plaintiffs’ 82.) Probable Cause 23 The citizen’s arrest by Mr. Young of each Plaintiff was for a 24 violation of California Penal Code Section 602.1(a). This statute 25 prescribes: 26 27 28 Any person who intentionally interferes with any lawful business or occupation carried on by the owner or agent of a business establishment open to the public, by obstructing or intimidating those attempting to carry on business, or their customers, and who refuses to leave the premises of 7 1 the business establishment after being requested to leave by the owner or the owner's agent, or by a peace officer acting at the request of the owner or owner's agent, is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . 2 3 “[A] violation of § 602.1 has two elements: (1) intentional 4 interference, and (2) refusal to leave.” Dubner v. City and Cnty. of San 5 Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2001). 6 “[T]he federal Constitution requires police officers to have 7 independent probable cause Hopkins Bonvicino, when effectuating a citizen’s arrest.” 8 v. 573 F.3d 752, 774 (9th Cir. 2009). “In 9 establishing probable cause, officers may not solely rely on the claim 10 of a citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must 11 independently investigate the basis of the [citizen’s] knowledge or 12 interview other witnesses.” Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Trans. Agency, 13 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). “A sufficient basis of knowledge is 14 established if the [citizen] provides ‘facts sufficiently detailed to 15 cause a reasonable person to believe a crime had been committed and the 16 named suspect was the perpetrator.’” Peng v. Hu, 335 F.3d 970, 978 (9th 17 Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). 18 The City of Fairfield police officers argue that Mr. Young 19 provided them with sufficiently detailed information that caused them 20 to reasonably believe that Plaintiffs had violated the “intentional 21 interference” prong of section 602.1(a), and rely on the following 22 asserted undisputed facts in support of this argument: “In-N-Out Manager 23 Marc Young told the officers that Plaintiffs group was refusing to leave 24 the restaurant, were argumentative with In-N-Out staff, were not 25 ordering food, throwing items around the restaurant and being a general 26 disruption.” (D SUF No. 12.) However, Plaintiffs counter Defendants 27 evidence concerning what Mr. Young said to a police officer by citing 28 the deposition testimony of Mr. Young in which he answered “No” to the 8 1 following questions: “[D]id you have a conversation with an officer 2 about what [Plaintiffs] had done prior to the time that the officers 3 arrived[;]” “Did any officer ask you to give them any detail about what 4 [Plaintiffs] had done[;]” and “before the officers arrived, you’re not 5 aware of anything that [Plaintiffs] had done, are you?” (Declaration of 6 Garret D. Murai in Support of Plaintiffs’ Reply, 7 No. 73-1.) Ex. A 36:10-24, ECF 8 Because of the factual dispute concerning what Mr. Young told 9 a Fairfield police officer, triable issues of fact exist concerning 10 whether probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiffs. Therefore, each 11 motion on each Plaintiff’s federal unlawful arrest claims is denied. 12 ii. 13 Qualified Immunity However, each officer also seeks decision on his qualified 14 immunity defense. 15 prongs of the qualified immunity analysis can be summarized as: (1) 16 whether there was probable cause for the arrest; and (2) whether it is 17 reasonably arguable that there was probable cause for arrest—that is, 18 whether reasonable officers could disagree as to the legality of the 19 arrest 20 immunity.” 21 5966207, at *3, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23804, at *9 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 22 2011). 23 the second prong of the analysis, since under this prong “[e]ven if the 24 arrest is made without . . . probable cause, . . . the officer may still 25 be immune from suit if it was objectively reasonable for him to believe 26 that he had probable cause.” Id. at 27 “The relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to 28 a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he such that “In the context of an unlawful arrest . . . the two the arresting officer is entitled to qualified Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., - - - F.3d - - -, 2011 WL The focus of the qualified immunity analysis here is on 9 *5, *14 (emphasis in original). 1 confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). “Framing the 2 reasonableness 3 determining whether qualified immunity applies is whether all reasonable 4 officers would agree that there was no probable cause in this instance.” 5 Rosenbaum, - - - F.3d - - -, 2011 WL 5966207, at *6, 2011 U.S. App. 6 LEXIS 23804, at *15. Further, “[w]here an officer has an objectively 7 reasonable, good faith belief that he is acting pursuant to proper 8 authority, he cannot be held liable if the information supplied by other 9 officers turns out to be erroneous.” Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 10 1082 (9th Cir. 2005). “The linchpin is whether the officer’s reliance on 11 the information was objectively reasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). question somewhat differently, the question in 12 Plaintiffs state in their statement of undisputed facts: “The 13 officers, who were later joined by Sergeant Crane, were directed by 14 Sergeant Crane to arrest Plaintiffs based solely on information Sergeant 15 Crane had received from Officer McDowell.” (P SUF No. 9.) Plaintiffs 16 cite 17 support of these undisputed facts: 18 19 20 21 Defendant Sergeant Crane’s following deposition testimony in The general statement that Officer McDowell gave me when I initially arrived on scene is that management had pointed out [Plaintiffs] as being part of the original disturbance that we were called for, that Mr. Young had asked them to leave in [McDowell’s] presence, [Plaintiffs] refused, and that the officers had asked them to leave multiple times and they refused to do so. 22 24 Officer McDowell relayed to me that Mr. Young was willing to make a citizen’s arrest and wished to do so if [Plaintiffs] refused to leave the premises for criminal trespass. 25 (Murai Decl. Ex. K, Sergeant Crane Deposition, 65:21-25, 66:1-2; 76:3- 26 6.) Plaintiffs also cite Defendant Officer Grimm’s deposition testimony 27 in support their statement of undisputed facts concerning what Officer 28 McDowell told Sergeant Crane, in which Officer Grimm testified that 23 10 1 after Sergeant Crane arrived on scene and spoke with Officer McDowell, 2 Sergeant Crane “told [Grimm] and the other officers to take [Plaintiffs] 3 into custody.” (Murai Decl. Ex. H, Officer Grimm Deposition 39:4-12.) 4 This 5 reasonably relied on the information he received from Officer McDowell 6 when he ordered the arrests of Plaintiffs, and that the Defendant 7 Officers, except Officer McDowell, reasonably relied on Sergeant Crane’s 8 order to arrest Plaintiffs. Although a genuine issue of material fact 9 exists concerning what Mr. Young said to Officer McDowell, that factual 10 dispute does not controvert Sergeant Crane’s testimony concerning what 11 he testified Officer McDowell told him. The information Sergeant Crane 12 testified he received from Officer McDowell is sufficient for Sergeant 13 Crane to have had an arguable objective reasonable belief that he had 14 probable cause to arrest each Plaintiff for the charged offenses. 15 Further, since it is uncontroverted that the arrests were made pursuant 16 to this belief, the following Defendant Officers are granted summary 17 judgment on their qualified immunity defense against each Plaintiff’s 18 federal unlawful arrest claim: Grimm, Shackford, Sandoval and Sergeant 19 Crane. 20 B. evidence drawing the inference that Sergeant Crane Liability of City of Fairfield under Monell 21 22 supports Plaintiffs and the City of Fairfield each move for summary judgment of Plaintiffs’ Monell claim. 23 Under Monell, “[m]unicipalities are considered persons under 24 42 25 deprivation.” Waggy v. Spokane Cnty. Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th 26 Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “it is only when 27 execution of a government’s policy or custom inflicts the injury that 28 the municipality as an entity is responsible.” Id. U.S.C. § 1983 and thus may 11 be liable for a constitutional 1 The City of Fairfield argues that “[b]ased on the facts 2 alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, as well as their verified responses to 3 discovery, there is no basis for a Monell claim against the City, 4 thereby requiring the City to be dismissed.” (D MSJ 12:3-5.) The City of 5 Fairfield contends it “served Plaintiffs with precise discovery requests 6 which required Plaintiffs to identify the exact policy allegedly causing 7 or contributing to the alleged unlawful actions.” (D MSJ 11:23-24.) 8 Plaintiffs responded 9 Fairfield Police that “Defendant Department’s Code officers of . . . violated the Professional Conduct and 10 Responsibilities for Peace Officers and General Orders.” (Decl. of Kevin 11 E. 12 (“Gilbert Decl.”) Exs. C, F, H, each Plaintiff’s Response to the City’s 13 Interrogatory No. 21.) The City of Fairfield’s argument in its motion is 14 sufficient to satisfy its “initial burden of establishing the absence of 15 a genuine issue of material fact” since it 16 out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to 17 support the nonmoving party’s case[.]” Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato 18 Johnson, 212 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). 19 Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he City of Fairfield is liable for 20 . . . the ratification of the officers’ actions by the Fairfield Police 21 Department’s Chief of Police.” (P MSJ 14:16-20.) Under this theory of 22 Monell liability, “[a] municipality . . . can be liable for an isolated 23 constitutional 24 subordinate's actions.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 25 1999). 26 ‘authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis 27 for it.’” Id. at 1239 (quoting St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 28 127 (1988). Gilbert “To in Support of violation show Defendants if [a] ratification, a 12 Motion final for Summary Judgment “show[s]—that is, point[s] policymaker plaintiff must ‘ratified’ prove that a the 1 Plaintiffs argue that “the recommendation of the [Fairfield 2 Police Department’s Internal Affairs] investigator as to each Defendant 3 officer’s [alleged] violation of the Fairfield Police Department’s 4 Policy and Procedure No. 4155 – Citizen’s Arrest – was to exonerate each 5 Defendant officer[, and] . . . [e]ach of the Defendant officers were 6 later ‘exonerated’ by the former Chief of Police of the Fairfield Police 7 Department, 8 Plaintiffs have not presented evidence from which it could be reasonably 9 inferred that the Chief of Police’s exoneration of Defendant Officers 10 based on the version of the facts presented in the Internal Affairs 11 investigation report was improper. See Koenig v. City of Bainbridge 12 Island, No. C10-5700 RJB, 2011 WL 3759779, at *9, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13 95607, at *25-26 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2011) (finding the Chief’s 14 “agreement with the independent findings that the allegations were 15 ‘unsubstantiated,’ does not rise to the level of ratification of [the 16 officers’] alleged unconstitutional conduct. In other words, [the Chief] 17 did not ratify unconstitutional or wrongful conduct; he ratified conduct 18 he reasonably believe to be appropriate under the circumstances.”). Walter Tibbett.” (P MSJ 13:25-28, 14:6-7.) However, 19 Therefore, the City of Fairfield’s motion for summary judgment 20 on each Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claims alleged 21 under Monell is granted and Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on these 22 claims is denied. 23 C. Plaintiff Hall’s Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claim 24 Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff Hall’s excessive 25 force claim. Defendants argue that “the ‘force’ used [on Plaintiff Hall] 26 amounted to . . . Officer Sandoval placing his knee on Hall’s lower or 27 middle back for less than 10 seconds while he was being handcuffed [, 28 and that s]uch conduct . . . is clearly appropriate and objectively 13 1 reasonable.” (D MSJ 16:12-15.) Plaintiff Hall counters that there is a 2 factual dispute concerning the force used because “Hall . . . was 3 grabbed by the officer as he attempted to comply with [the officer’s] 4 instructions, was thrown to the ground and a knee placed in his back.” 5 (P Opp’n 25:8-11.) 6 “[T]he protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . guarantees 7 citizens the right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against 8 unreasonable . . . seizures’ of the person.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 9 386, 394 (1989). “[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force 10 case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions 11 are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances 12 confronting 13 motivation.” Id. at 397. When analyzing an excessive force claim “the 14 facts and circumstances of each particular case, . . . 15 whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to 16 evade arrest by flight” are considered. Id. at 396. 17 18 19 20 21 22 them, without regard to their underlying intent or including Defendants and Plaintiff Hall cite the following portion of Defendant Sandoval’s deposition testimony in argument on the motion: I went up to grab [Hall] by the left arm to place him in a rear wrist lock which is an arrest control technique that we use. As I went to go grab his right arm, I felt him start to pull his arm away from me. At that point, I placed him in an arm bar extension and I used a take down technique where you actually twist the arm to bring them to the ground to gain control and compliance over them. 23 (Gilbert Decl. Ex. E 97:6-14.) In addition, Plaintiff Hall declares in 24 his declaration: “I was forced to the ground, my arms were grabbed and 25 pulled behind my back, and handcuffs were placed on my wrists.” (Decl. 26 of Markus M. Hall in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication ¶ 7.) 27 The undisputed facts and the evidence presented by Plaintiff 28 Hall do not establish a triable issue of fact concerning the objective 14 1 reasonableness of Defendant Sandoval’s use of a control hold and take 2 down technique after Defendant Sandoval felt Plaintiff Hall start to 3 pull his arm away from Defendant Sandoval. At that point, Defendant 4 Sandoval placed Plaintiff Hall in an arm bar extension and used a take 5 down technique. Since there is no evidence that Defendant Sandoval 6 applied more force than necessary to restrain Plaintiff Hall while 7 attempting to secure him in handcuffs, Defendant Sandoval’s use of a 8 control hold was objectively reasonable. See Tatum v. City and Cnty. of 9 San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating summary 10 judgment is appropriate when the reason for the officer’s use of force 11 was uncontroverted and clear, and “the record . . . does not permit the 12 inference 13 Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff Hall’s 14 excessive force claim is granted. 15 D. that [the officer's] use of force was unwarranted”). California Civil Code Sections 51.7 and 52.1 16 Defendants move for summary judgment of each Plaintiff’s 17 claims alleged under California Civil Code section 51.7, arguing that 18 Plaintiffs have not “establish[ed] wrongful conduct by each individual 19 Defendant which was motivated by Plaintiffs’ membership in a protected 20 class[,]” as required for liability under section 51.7. (D MSJ 19:12- 21 14.) Plaintiffs counter that they “have presented a prima faciae [sic] 22 case by tendering evidence that each was a member of a protected class 23 and that each was threatened with arrest, arrested and subjected to 24 violent acts.” (P Opp’n 22:20-22.) 25 California Civil Code section 51.7 prescribes “[a]ll persons 26 within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any 27 violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their 28 person . . . on account of [race.]” 15 1 Plaintiffs argue in their opposition brief “circumstantial 2 evidence” exists which is “sufficient to raise a triable issue as to 3 whether 4 [Plaintiffs’] race.” (P Opp’n 23:1-2.) However, the only reference to 5 race in Plaintiffs’ evidence is the following: “The officers received a 6 report that ‘BM’s and BF’s’ were causing a disturbance[; t]he officers 7 arrived 8 restaurant[; and t]he surveillance video clearly shows that the vast 9 majority if not all persons leaving were African American.” (P Opp’n 10 23:3-6.) Plaintiffs evidence is insufficient to support a reasonable 11 inference that “a motivating reason for [Defendant Officers’ allegedly 12 unlawful] conduct was [their] perception of [Plaintiffs’ race].” Austin 13 B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 881 (2007) 14 (citing Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions, CACI No. 15 3023A 16 judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim alleged under California Civil Code 17 section 51.7 is granted. [Defendant and saw (formerly Officers’] African 3023)). actions American Therefore, males were and Defendants’ taken females motion because leaving for of the summary 18 Defendants also seek summary judgment of each Plaintiff’s 19 claim alleged under California Civil Code section 52.1. California Civil 20 Code section 52.1 proscribes “interfere[nce] by threats, intimidation, 21 or coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or 22 individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 23 States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this 24 state[.]” “Civil Code section 52.1 does not extend to all ordinary tort 25 actions because its provisions are limited to threats, intimidation, or 26 coercion that interferes with a constitutional or statutory right.” 27 Venegas v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 843 (2004). Defendants 28 argue Plaintiffs have not “show[n] that Defendants interfered with or 16 1 attempted to interfere with Plaintiffs’ state or federal rights by 2 threatening to or committing violent acts[,]” proscribed by California 3 Civil Code section 52.1. (D MSJ 19:15-19.) 4 Defendants argue they “served each Plaintiff with 5 Interrogatory No. 22, which requested Plaintiffs identify the specific 6 right that each Plaintiff contended the Defendant officers intentionally 7 interfered with.” (D MSJ 19:21-22.) Plaintiffs responded that they “were 8 exercising their constitutionally protected right to be in the In-N-Out 9 Burger restaurant, [and] to question Defendant officers . . . about why 10 they were being asked to leave.” Defendants have not sustained their 11 burden of showing their that they are entitled to summary judgment of 12 this claim; therefore this portion of the motion is denied. 13 E. 14 Immunity under California Government Code Section 821.6 Defendants also argue “Plaintiffs are precluded from 15 prosecuting their [state false arrest and battery] causes of action 16 based upon the complete defense provided by [California] Government Code 17 Section 821.6.” (D MSJ 18:20-22.) However, since Defendants have not 18 shown that Section 821.6 confers immunity from the claims at issue, this 19 portion of the motion is denied. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 For the stated reasons, the cross motions for summary judgment 22 of each Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim against each 23 Defendant Officer is denied; Defendants Grimm, Sandoval, Shackford and 24 Crane’s motion for summary judgment of their defense of qualified 25 immunity against each Plaintiff’s federal unlawful arrest claim is 26 granted; Defendant City of Fairfield’s motion for summary judgment of 27 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful arrest claim alleged under Monell 28 is granted and Plaintiffs’ motion is denied; Defendants’ motion for 17 1 summary judgment of Plaintiff Hall’s Fourth Amendment excessive force 2 claim is granted; Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted on 3 each Plaintiff’s claim alleged under Civil Code section 51.7 and denied 4 on each Plaintiffs’ Civil Code section 52.1 claim; Defendant Officers’ 5 motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs state battery and unlawful 6 arrest claims is denied; and each Plaintiff’s intentional infliction of 7 emotional 8 Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is dismissed, and Plaintiff 9 Monique Rankin’s state battery claim is dismissed. 10 Dated: distress claim is dismissed, Plaintiff Monique January 11, 2012 11 12 13 GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR. United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18 Rankin’s

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