Christ v. Blackwell et al
Filing
176
ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 08/31/15 ordering defendants' 12/30/14 motion for summary judgment 159 is construed as a motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims against defendant Roszko only, and, as such, is granted. Plaintiff's 2/23/15 motion for a court order regarding law library access 165 is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff's 3/25/15 motion for a court order regarding evidence 171 is denied without prejudice. (Plummer, M)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JON CHRIST,
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Plaintiff,
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No. 2:10-cv-0760-EFB P
v.
ORDER
R. BLACKWELL, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42
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U.S.C. § 1983.1 Currently pending are defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No.
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159), plaintiff’s motion for an order compelling prison officials to allow him more time in the law
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library (ECF No. 165), and plaintiff’s motion regarding a witness declaration (ECF No. 171). For
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the reasons stated below, the motion for summary judgment is granted as to defendant Roszko
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only. Further, plaintiff’s motion for law library time and motion regarding a witness declaration
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are denied.
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The parties have consented to have the case heard by the undersigned. ECF Nos. 4, 14,
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I.
Preliminary Procedural Matters
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A. Relevant Procedural History of the Case
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Plaintiff filed this action in Santa Clara County Superior Court on January 5, 2010. ECF
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No. 1-1. Defendants removed the case to the court, ECF No. 1, and it had progressed through
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discovery and the filing of pretrial statements when the court discovered that two named
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defendants – Weiglein and Roszko – had not responded to the complaint. See ECF No. 101.
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Plaintiff informed the court that he was pursuing his claims against Weiglein in a separate action
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and the court accordingly dismissed him from this case. ECF No. 106. After a lengthy process
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not necessary to recount here (see id. at 2), defendant Roszko was properly served with the
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complaint. ECF No. 135. The court then issued a revised scheduling order governing discovery
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and dispositive motions “so that plaintiff and defendant Roszko may engage in discovery and
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pretrial motions with respect to plaintiff’s claims against defendant Roszko.” ECF No. 145 at 1.
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B. Plaintiff’s Objection to the Instant Motion
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Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment addressing all of plaintiff’s claims
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against all defendants. ECF No. 160. Defendants did not seek relief from the schedule that
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governed all of them except Roszko, under which the dispositive motion filing deadline had
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passed. ECF No. 19 (providing a dispositive motion deadline of April 22, 2011). Plaintiff
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objects to the motion, noting that the deadline for defendants Blackwell, Broyles, Lopez, Voight,
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and Zuniga to file a motion for summary judgment is long past. ECF No. 162. Defendants
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respond that they filed a motion addressing all claims against all defendants because they “were
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unable to determine which claims or causes of actions were directed to which defendant.” ECF
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No. 161. The court has reviewed the complaint and finds this representation disingenuous. See
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ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Roszko (summarized below) and the other
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defendants are easily differentiated. Because defendants Blackwell, Broyles, Lopez, Voight, and
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Zuniga have not shown good cause why they did not seek summary judgment on or before April
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22, 2011, the court will not consider their arguments at this time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A
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schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”); Johnson v.
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Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a motion to modify
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the schedule must be supported by a showing of good cause; i.e., that the schedule could not have
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been met despite the moving party’s diligence). If these defendants wish to seek summary
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judgment on plaintiff’s claims against them, they must file a motion for modification of the
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schedule, supported by a showing of good cause. The court will proceed to consider the instant
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motion only as it pertains to the claims against defendant Roszko.
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C. Plaintiff’s Motion for More Law Library Time
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Plaintiff has filed a motion asking the court to order prison officials to allow him greater
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access to the law library. ECF No. 165. Plaintiff states that, due to the interplay between his
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work schedule and the library schedule, he can go to the library only two days per week for
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between 1.5 and 5.5 hours each day. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff asks the court to order the librarian to
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designate him a priority library user, but does not explain why he cannot adequately perform his
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legal research during the time he is currently allotted or why he has not sought preferred status
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through the ordinary administrative channels available at the prison.
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Plaintiff’s request for court intervention against persons who are not parties to this case is
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governed by The All Writs Act. That Act gives federal courts the authority to issue “all writs
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necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
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principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. 1651(a). The United States Supreme Court has authorized the use
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of the All Writs Act in appropriate circumstances against persons who, “though not parties to the
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original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a
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court order or the proper administration of justice.” United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159
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(1977). To obtain an order under the All Writs Act, the requested order must be “necessary.”
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This language requires that the relief requested is not available through some alternative means.
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Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529 (1999).
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Here, there is no question that an inmate has a constitutionally protected right of
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meaningful access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 820-21 (1977). However, there
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is no freestanding constitutional right to law library access for prisoners. See Lewis v. Casey, 518
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U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996). Instead, law library access serves as one means of ensuring the
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constitutional right of access to the courts. See id. at 351. “[T]he Constitution does not guarantee
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a prisoner unlimited access to a law library. Prison officials of necessity must regulate the time,
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manner, and place in which library facilities are used.” Linguist v. Idaho State Bd. of
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Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). A prisoner claiming that his right of access to the
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courts has been (or will be) violated due to inadequate library access must show that: 1) access
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was (or will be) so limited as to be unreasonable, and 2) the inadequate access caused (or will
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cause) actual injury. Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Plaintiff has not shown that his current amount of access to the library is unreasonably
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limited, that the limited access will cause him injury, or that – even if his access is unreasonably
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limited and will cause injury – a court order (rather than an administrative request) is necessary to
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obtain greater access. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion is denied.
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D. Motion Regarding Phil Pappas’s Declaration
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Plaintiff informs the court that one of his witnesses, Phil Pappas, has died. ECF No. 171.
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Plaintiff asks the court to receive Pappas’s declaration into evidence. Id. As the case has not yet
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advanced to trial, plaintiff’s motion is denied as premature. The admissibility of Pappas’s
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declaration can be addressed by an appropriate motion in limine prior to trial.2
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Defendant Roszko’s Motion for Summary Judgment
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A. Plaintiff’s Allegations Against Defendant Roszko
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Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Roszko arises from an allegedly false disciplinary
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report defendant Voight filed against plaintiff in 2009 for obstructing a peace officer. ECF No. 1-
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1 at 8. The report alleged that plaintiff feigned sickness to delay a move to a new cell. Id. at 9-
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10. Defendant Roszko served as the senior hearing officer (“SHO”) at the hearing on the
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disciplinary report. Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges that Roszko denied plaintiff all of his requested
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witnesses, including defendant Voight, Eddie Munoz (plaintiff’s work supervisor, who plaintiff
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alleges would have corroborated plaintiff’s claim that he had been legitimately ill on the day in
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question), and medical personnel who would have confirmed that plaintiff had been ill. Id. at 10-
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11. According to the complaint, Roszko also refused to consider Munoz’s declaration, in which
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A final pretrial order will issue that will set the schedule for such motions.
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he attested that he had sent plaintiff back to his cell because he was sick at work. Id. at 11.
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Plaintiff alleges that Roszko refused to allow plaintiff to present these witnesses and other
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evidence in retaliation against plaintiff for plaintiff’s grievances against other defendants in this
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action. Id.
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B. Standards on Summary Judgment
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Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any material
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fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary
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judgment avoids unnecessary trials in cases in which the parties do not dispute the facts relevant
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to the determination of the issues in the case, or in which there is insufficient evidence for a jury
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to determine those facts in favor of the nonmovant. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600
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(1998); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986); Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v.
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U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994). At bottom, a summary judgment
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motion asks whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
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jury.
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The principal purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims
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or defenses. Celotex Cop. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Thus, the rule functions to
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“‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for
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trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
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(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments). Procedurally,
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under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting
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the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if
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any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477
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U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). If the moving
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party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden then shifts to the opposing
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party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);
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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995).
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A clear focus on where the burden of proof lies as to the factual issue in question is crucial
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to summary judgment procedures. Depending on which party bears that burden, the party seeking
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summary judgment does not necessarily need to submit any evidence of its own. When the
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opposing party would have the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the moving party
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need not produce evidence which negates the opponent’s claim. See, e.g., Lujan v. National
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Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990). Rather, the moving party need only point to matters
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which demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual issue. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-
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summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings,
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”). Indeed, summary judgment
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should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
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make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
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and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. In such a
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circumstance, summary judgment must be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district
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court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is
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satisfied.” Id. at 323.
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To defeat summary judgment the opposing party must establish a genuine dispute as to a
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material issue of fact. This entails two requirements. First, the dispute must be over a fact(s) that
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is material, i.e., one that makes a difference in the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
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248 (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
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will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.’). Whether a factual dispute is material is
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determined by the substantive law applicable for the claim in question. Id. If the opposing party
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is unable to produce evidence sufficient to establish a required element of its claim that party fails
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in opposing summary judgment. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element
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of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S.
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at 322.
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Second, the dispute must be genuine. In determining whether a factual dispute is genuine
the court must again focus on which party bears the burden of proof on the factual issue in
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question. Where the party opposing summary judgment would bear the burden of proof at trial on
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the factual issue in dispute, that party must produce evidence sufficient to support its factual
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claim. Conclusory allegations, unsupported by evidence are insufficient to defeat the motion.
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Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Rather, the opposing party must, by affidavit
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or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate specific facts that show there is a genuine issue
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for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076. More significantly, to
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demonstrate a genuine factual dispute the evidence relied on by the opposing party must be such
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that a fair-minded jury “could return a verdict for [him] on the evidence presented.” Anderson,
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477 U.S. at 248, 252. Absent any such evidence there simply is no reason for trial.
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The court does not determine witness credibility. It believes the opposing party’s
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evidence, and draws inferences most favorably for the opposing party. See id. at 249, 255;
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Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of “thin air,” and the
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proponent must adduce evidence of a factual predicate from which to draw inferences. American
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Int'l Group, Inc. v. American Int’l Bank, 926 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1991) (Kozinski, J.,
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dissenting) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). If reasonable minds could differ on material facts at
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issue, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th
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Cir. 1995). On the other hand, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is
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some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could
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not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for
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trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted). In that case, the court must grant
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summary judgment.
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Concurrent with the instant motion, defendant advised plaintiff of the requirements for
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opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Woods v.
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Carey, 684 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en
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banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).
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C. Analysis
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Plaintiff alleges that defendant Roszko deprived him of due process at the disciplinary
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hearing in retaliation for plaintiff’s grievances against other officers. These allegations support
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two distinct constitutional claims: one for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and one
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for deprivation of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court will address
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each claim in turn.
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i.
Retaliation Claim
To establish liability for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a prisoner must
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show five elements: (1) that a state actor took some adverse action against him (2) because of (3)
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his protected conduct, (4) that such action chilled his exercise of his First Amendment rights, and
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(5) that the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson,
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408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff need not demonstrate that his speech was
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actually inhibited or suppressed, but merely that the defendant’s conduct was such as would chill
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or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities. Id. at 568-69.
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Conduct protected by the First Amendment includes communications that are “part of the
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grievance process.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Defendant Roszko argues that summary judgment is appropriate on plaintiff’s retaliation
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claim against him because plaintiff has no evidence that Roszko’s conduct was motivated by
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plaintiff’s grievances against others. Roszko points to the following exchanges in plaintiff’s
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deposition, arguing that all that plaintiff has to support his charge of retaliation is “speculation”:
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Q. All right. And you believe that the violations in this complaint that you
drafted are based on a conspiracy among the defendants; is that correct?
A. Correct.
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Q. All right. So since May of 2008, there has been a conspiracy to deny you your
civil and constitutional rights by CDCR personnel, correct?
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A. Correct.
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Q. And you have no – strike that. And that’s based on your speculation; correct?
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A.
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Correct.
ECF No. 160 at 26-27.
Q. And so if I understand you, the allegations made in this complaint are based
on what you believe to be a conspiracy to deny you your constitutional and civil
rights; correct?
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A. Correct.
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Q. And your evidence is based on your speculation that your rights have been
violated as it relates to this conspiracy; correct?
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A. Correct.
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Id. at 30. In response, plaintiff states that “it was not speculation” that he was sick on the day of
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the cell move, that the disciplinary report was false, that the cell move was contrary to doctor’s
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orders, and that defendant denied his witnesses. Plaintiff fails to present any evidence, however,
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that Roszko denied the witnesses because of plaintiff’s grievances against other officers. Plaintiff
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presents no evidence from which the court could infer a retaliatory motive (e.g., evidence
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showing that that Roszko mentioned the grievances or even knew of them). Because plaintiff has
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failed to present evidence supporting this necessary element of his retaliation claim against
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Roszko, summary judgment must be granted in favor of Roszko on that claim. See Celotex, 477
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U.S. at 322.
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ii.
Due Process Claim
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Prisoners are entitled to certain due process protections when subject to disciplinary
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sanctions that impinge on an interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Brown v. Or. Dep’t of
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Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2014). To prevail on a claim for violation of the right to
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procedural due process under the 14th Amendment, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a deprivation of a
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constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural
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protections.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003).
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A liberty interest triggering procedural protections under the Due Process Clause may
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arise from two sources: the Clause itself or state law. Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052,
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1062 (9th Cir. 2013). The Due Process Clause of its own force protects prisoners from conditions
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which depart from the sentence imposed on them in a way that is “‘qualitatively different’ from
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the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime [and has] ‘stigmatizing
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consequences.’” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478-79 n.4 (1995) (discussing and quoting
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Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)). The
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Clause, by itself, confers no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within the sentence
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imposed. Id. at 480.
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A condition of confinement impinges on an inmate’s state-law-created liberty interest
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(triggering the necessity for procedural protections) if it imposes an atypical and significant
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hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life (while not departing
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from the sentence in such a manner as to trigger protection under the Due Process Clause by its
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own force). Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Brown, 751 F.3d at 987. To determine whether a liberty
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interest is at stake, the court may consider: “(1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those
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conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus
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comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; (2) the duration of the condition, and the
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degree of restraint imposed; and (3) whether the state’s action will invariably affect the duration
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of the prisoner’s sentence.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations
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omitted).
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The conditions imposed on plaintiff as a result of the hearing presided over by defendant
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Roszko were: (1) forfeiture of 60 days’ worktime credits (also called worktime credits, see
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California Penal Code § 2933); (2) a loss of privileges to the day/night yard, dayroom,
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telephones, canteen, and quarterly packages for 30 days; (3) a 90-day suspension of Friday visits;
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and (4) plaintiff was counseled and reprimanded. ECF No. 160 at 52. Roszko argues that these
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disciplinary measures did not deprive plaintiff of a constitutionally-protected interest.
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Defendant is correct that, as a matter of law, these conditions do not impinge on a liberty
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interest created by the Due Process clause of its own force. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
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557 (1974) (good-time credits); Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)
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(unfettered visitation); Davis v. Small, 595 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2014) (phone and yard
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privileges); Koerner v. Angelone, Nos. 97-15681 & 97-15799, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32181, at
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*9 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 1999) (canteen).
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In addition, plaintiff has failed to discharge his burden of showing that the disciplinary
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measures imposed by defendant Roszko impinged on a liberty interest created by state law.
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Plaintiff states simply that, “when prisoners lose good time credits because of a disciplinary
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offense, they are entitled to” procedural protections under the Due Process Clause. ECF No. 168
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at 3. The law is not so cut-and-dried.
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It is true that the Supreme Court has held that a state can create a protected liberty interest
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in a shortened prison sentence resulting from good time credits by making the revocation of such
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credits allowable only for major misconduct. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78.
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It is currently an open question in the Ninth Circuit whether California’s scheme of worktime
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credits under California Penal Code § 2933, as amended in 2010, gives rise to a liberty interest.
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Edwards v. Swarthout, 597 F. App’x 914 (9th Cir. 2014). Absent any further direction from the
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Ninth Circuit, and applying the Supreme Court’s holdings in Wolff and Sandin, the court finds
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that plaintiff here has failed to establish that the deprivation of worktime credits deprived him of a
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protected liberty interest because he has not provided any evidence that the credits revoked by
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defendant Roszko would have shortened his sentence if left in place. The liberty interest
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recognized by the Court in Wolff lay in the shortened sentence generated by the operation of the
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credit statutes, not in the credits themselves. 418 U.S. at 557; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-78. It is
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undisputed that plaintiff was serving a term of 25-years-to life, plus 12 years, at the time of the
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hearing. ECF No. 160 at 9-10. Plaintiff has made no showing that he would be serving a shorter
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prison sentence if the 60-days’ worth of worktime credits had not been forfeited. Sandin, 515
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U.S. at 485-87 (finding that a prison disciplinary action did not impinge on a protected liberty
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interest where it would not inevitably affect the duration of the inmate’s indeterminate sentence);
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Harvey v. Lewis, No. No.1:12-cv-00904-AWI-DLB (HC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163667, at *5-
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8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2012) (discussing the impact of good time credits on an inmate serving both
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a determinate and indeterminate term of incarceration). Even if plaintiff were to make such a
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showing, his due process claim challenging the loss of credits would not survive in this action, as
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he would be required by the rule of Heck v. Humphrey to secure a finding that the discipline
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imposed by defendant Roszko was invalid through some other means before pursuing that claim
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in a § 1983 action for damages. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644-48 (1997).
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Plaintiff has also failed to show that the remaining disciplinary measures – loss of access
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to some facilities, telephone, canteen, and quarterly packages for 30 days and loss of Friday visits
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for 90 days – presented an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary prison life. See
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Koerner, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32181, at *9 (80-day suspension of canteen privileges was not
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an atypical and significant hardship); Song v. Ignacio, No. 96-15901, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
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2217, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 1997) (affirming dismissal of due process claim where the plaintiff
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failed to allege how his temporary loss of access to the canteen, phone, showers, and recreation
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equipment presented a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of prison life). Plaintiff has
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provided no evidence from which the court can compare the disciplinary measures defendant
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Roszko imposed on him to the norms of prison life, and has thus failed to provide evidence from
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which a rational factfinder could conclude that those measures departed from those norms in such
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a significant way as to deprive him of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.3 As
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plaintiff has failed to show that he was denied procedural protections due to him under the
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Constitution, the court need not reach the question of whether the process provided by defendant
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Roszko comported with due process. Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted in favor
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of Roszko on plaintiff’s due process claim.
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iii.
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Remaining Arguments
Defendant Roszko also argues that plaintiff’s claim for damages against him is barred by
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the Eleventh Amendment because he was acting in his official capacity when he was the senior
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hearing officer at plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing and that he should be granted qualified immunity
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from plaintiff’s claims. The court need not reach these arguments as it has determined that
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summary judgment in favor of defendant Roszko is appropriate for the reasons stated above.
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The court notes that the Ninth Circuit held in Funtanilla v. Campbell, No. 96-15439,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22581, at *5-6 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1996) that California Penal Code § 2601
created a liberty interest in prison visits by stating that such visits were a “civil right” of
prisoners. The California legislature amended § 2601 in 1996 to delete that provision. Plaintiff
has not offered any other source of law from which the court can conclude that California has
created a liberty interest in prison visits.
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II.
Order
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For the reasons provided above, it is hereby ORDERED that:
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1. Defendants’ December 30, 2014 motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 159) is
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construed as a motion for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claims against defendant
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Roszko only, and, as such, is GRANTED.
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2. Plaintiff’s February 23, 2015 motion for a court order regarding law library access
(ECF No. 165) is DENIED without prejudice.
3. Plaintiff’s March 25, 2015 motion for a court order regarding evidence (ECF No. 171)
is DENIED without prejudice.
DATED: August 31, 2015.
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