J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Juarez
Filing
23
FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Carolyn K. Delaney on 10/31/11: Recommending that 19 MOTION to SET ASIDE default judgment be denied. The case be closed. F&R referred to Judge William B. Shubb. Objections to F&R due within fourteen (14) days. (Kaminski, H)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
J&J SPORTS PRODUCTIONS, INC.,
10
Plaintiff,
11
CIV. NO. S-10-1071 WBS CKD PS
vs.
12
13
VICTORIA ELIZABETH
JUAREZ,
14
Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
15
16
/
Before the court is defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment entered in
17
favor of plaintiff on February 11, 2011. (Dkt. No. 19) The motion has been referred to the
18
undersigned for further proceedings and findings and recommendation. (Dkt. No. 20.) After
19
reviewing the papers in support of the motion, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT
20
FINDS AS FOLLOWS:
21
BACKGROUND
22
On April 30, 2010, plaintiff filed the underlying complaint in this action, alleging
23
that defendant unlawfully intercepted and intentionally exhibited a broadcast of a televised
24
boxing match titled “The Battle of East and West”: Manny Pacquiao v. Ricky Hatton, IBO Light
25
Welterweight Championship Fight Program (“Program”) in her establishment for commercial
26
advantage without obtaining a sublicense from plaintiff for its use, in violation of 47 U.S.C. §
1
1
605, 47 U.S.C. § 553, and state law. (Dkt. No. 1.) The summons and complaint were properly
2
served on defendant by substituted service on July 16, 2010. (Dkt. No. 5.) On October 18, 2010,
3
plaintiff filed a request for entry of default on the basis that defendant had failed to appear or
4
otherwise respond to plaintiff’s complaint. (Dkt. No. 6.) The request for entry of default was
5
served on defendant by mail. (Id.) The Clerk then entered default against defendant on October
6
19, 2010. (Dkt. No. 8.)
7
Subsequently, on December 16, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion for default
8
judgment, which was again served on the defendant. (Dkt. No. 11.) Defendant did not file an
9
opposition to the motion. On January 21, 2011, the previously assigned magistrate judge issued
10
findings and recommendations recommending that default judgment be granted in the amount of
11
$25,000. (Dkt. No. 16.) On February 11, 2011, the district judge adopted the findings and
12
recommendations and default judgment was entered. (Dkt. Nos. 17, 18.) Several months later,
13
on July 11, 2011, defendant filed the instant motion to set aside the default judgment. (Dkt. No.
14
19.)
15
DISCUSSION
16
As an initial matter, the court notes that while defendant’s motion is titled as a
17
“motion to set aside entry of default” in the caption and references Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) in the
18
introduction, the footer refers to it as a “motion to set aside default judgment.” (See Dkt. No. 19,
19
at p. 1.) Because a default judgment has already been entered, the court construes it as a motion
20
to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
21
As a general matter, “judgment by default is a drastic step appropriate only in
22
extreme circumstances; a case should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits.” United
23
States v. Signed Personal Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir.
24
2010). Thus, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) allows a defendant to be relieved from a final judgment for
25
various reasons, including excusable neglect. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “This does not mean, of
26
course, that the moving party is absolved from the burden of demonstrating that, in a particular
2
1
case, the interest in deciding the case on the merits should prevail over the very important interest
2
in the finality of judgments.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir.
3
2001). To determine whether good cause exists to set aside a default judgment under Fed. R.
4
Civ. P. 60(b), a court must consider three factors: (1) whether the party seeking to set aside the
5
default engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; (2) whether that party has no
6
meritorious defense; and (3) whether plaintiff would be prejudiced if the default judgment is set
7
aside. Mesle, 615 F.3d at 1091. A finding that any one of these factors is true is sufficient
8
reason for the district court to refuse to set aside the default judgment. Id. This same test is
9
applied when determining whether a default should be set aside under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c);
10
however, the test is applied more strictly with respect to default judgments due to the “interest in
11
the finality of the judgment.” Id. “[T]he party seeking to vacate a default judgment bears the
12
burden of demonstrating that these factors favor vacating the judgment.” TCI Group Life Ins.
13
Plan, 244 F.3d at 696.
14
Culpable Conduct
15
The Ninth Circuit has held that “a defendant’s conduct is culpable if he has
16
received actual or constructive notice of the filing of the action and intentionally failed to
17
answer.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan, 244 F.3d at 697 (emphasis in original). The concept of
18
“intentionally” in this context refers to conduct that is willful, deliberate, or that evidences bad
19
faith. Id. “Neglectful failure to answer as to which the defendant offers a credible good faith
20
explanation negating any intention to take advantage of the opposing party, interfere with judicial
21
decisionmaking, or otherwise manipulate the legal process is not ‘intentional’...and is therefore
22
not necessarily - although it certainly may be, once the equitable factors are considered - culpable
23
or inexcusable.” Id. at 697-98.
24
Here, defendant contends that she acted with excusable neglect. She states that,
25
around August 2010, she experienced medical problems with a torn rotator cuff, and that her
26
financial circumstances prohibited her from obtaining legal representation. Additionally, she
3
1
argues that she relied, to her detriment, on a business partner who represented that a friend of his
2
would be able to represent both of them in these types of cases.
3
Even assuming the truth of all defendant’s representations, she fails to explain
4
why this motion was not filed until July 11, 2011. The court’s records show that defendant is
5
involved in other similar cases in the Eastern District of California. (See Joe Hand Promotions,
6
Inc. v. Juarez, 2:10-CV-920-LKK-DAD, and G&G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Juarez, 2:10-
7
CV-2146-LKK-GGH.) Defendant admits in her motion that all three cases were brought to her
8
attention in August 2010 around the same time.1 (Mot. at 2.) Defendant first participated in the
9
G&G Closed Circuit Events, LLC case on February 15, 2011, when she filed objections to
10
findings and recommendations issued February 2, 2011, recommending that the plaintiff’s
11
motion for default judgment be granted in part. (See 2:10-CV-2146-LKK-GGH, Dkt. No. 16.)
12
In that case, defendant eventually moved for and obtained an extension of time to file a motion to
13
set aside the entry of default. (Id., Dkt. Nos. 20, 22.) As such, defendant was clearly aware of
14
what steps to take to contest the default and/or to request an extension of time. However, in this
15
case, even though findings and recommendations recommending that plaintiff’s motion for
16
default judgment be granted were issued on January 21, 2011 (dkt. no. 16.), defendant failed to
17
file any objections or request an extension, and did nothing until filing the instant motion more
18
than five months later. (Dkt. No. 19.)
19
Defendant provides no credible explanation for why she did not take action in this
20
case until July 2011, despite her activity in the G&G Closed Circuit Events, LLC case. Given
21
her choice, and apparent ability, to participate in that action, the court must conclude that she
22
chose not to participate in this action. That deliberate choice constitutes culpable conduct that
23
24
25
26
1
Although defendant claims that she did not receive several “letters” that were sent to her
closed restaurant, defendant was properly served via substituted service at her home. (Dkt. No.
5.) Moreover, the request for entry of default and motion for default judgment were served on
defendant at her home, which is still listed in the court records as her current address. (Dkt. Nos.
6, 11.) In any event, defendant does not dispute that she had notice of the instant action.
4
1
led to the default, and militates against setting aside the default judgment.
2
Meritorious Defense
3
The primary inquiry in evaluating the meritorious defense factor involves
4
determining “whether there is some possibility that the outcome of the suit after a full trial will
5
be contrary to the result achieved by the default.” Hawaii Carpenters’ Trust Funds v. Stone, 794
6
F.2d 508, 513 (9th Cir. 1986). “If...the defendant presents no meritorious defense, then nothing
7
but pointless delay can result from reopening the judgment.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan, 244 F.3d
8
at 697. To establish a meritorious defense sufficient to justify vacating a default judgment, the
9
moving party must “present the district court with specific facts that would constitute a defense”
10
– a mere general denial and/or conclusory statements are insufficient. Franchise Holding II, LLC
11
v. Huntington Restaurants Group, Inc., 375 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2004).
12
Here, defendant merely makes a blanket statement that she has “a good and
13
meritorious defense for relief alleged.” (Mot. at 1.) She fails to present any specific facts that
14
could constitute a defense to plaintiff’s claims. Without such a showing, the default judgment
15
cannot be set aside. See Hawaii Carpenters’ Trust Funds, 794 F.2d at 513 (holding that setting
16
aside an entry of default in the absence of some showing of a meritorious defense would be an
17
abuse of discretion).
18
Prejudice to plaintiff
19
Defendant does not address this factor in her motion. However, the court notes
20
that defendant was initially served with process on July 16, 2010. Almost a year later, on July
21
11, 2011, defendant for the first time elected to participate in the action by filing the instant
22
motion. It is true that “[t]o be prejudicial, the setting aside of a judgment must result in greater
23
harm than simply delaying resolution of the case.” TCI Group Life Ins. Plan, 244 F.3d at 701.
24
Naturally, setting aside a default judgment in any case would involve delaying resolution of the
25
case. However, the length in the delay here is key. Defendant waited approximately five months
26
before contesting the default judgment with no justifiable excuse. That delay may likely lead to
5
1
increased difficulties in discovery, for example in tracking down former restaurant employees
2
and patrons who may have been percipient witnesses. See TCI Group Life Ins. Plan, 244 F.3d at
3
701.
4
CONCLUSION
5
6
In sum, defendant has not made a satisfactory showing of good cause necessary to
set aside the default judgment. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
7
1. Defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment (dkt. no. 19) be denied.
8
2. The case be closed.
9
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
10
Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within
11
fourteen (14) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may
12
file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be
13
captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the
14
objections shall be served and filed within seven (7) days after service of the objections. The
15
parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to
16
appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
17
Dated: October 31, 2011
18
_____________________________________
CAROLYN K. DELANEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
19
20
21
22
5
23
J&J.1071.default.judgment.set.wpd
24
25
26
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?