Feezor v. Patterson et al

Filing 132

ORDER signed by Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 3/21/2013 DENYING 125 & 126 Motion for Attorney Fees. (Donati, J)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LARY FEEZOR,
Plaintiff,

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Civ. No. S-10-1165 KJM GGH

vs.
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GARY L. PATTERSON, et al.,

ORDER

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Defendants.
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This matter is before the court on the motions for attorneys’ fees and requests for

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costs filed by defendants Eddie Bauer LLC (“Eddie Bauer”) and Hanesbrands Direct, LLC’s

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("Hanesbrands") (collectively, “defendants”). (ECF 125, 126, 120 and 121.) Plaintiff Lary

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Feezor (“Feezor” or “plaintiff”) opposes the motions (ECF 129) and objects to the requests for

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costs (ECF 123). For the following reasons, Eddie Bauer’s and Hanesbrands’ motions are

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DENIED.

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I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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On May 12, 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants asserting various

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claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),1 alleging that, at both defendants’

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stores, he encountered barriers that prevented his full and equal enjoyment of defendants’

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facilities. (See generally ECF 1.) Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, statutory

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damages and attorneys’ fees.

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Eddie Bauer moved for summary judgment on November 16, 2011. (ECF 76.) In

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response, plaintiff filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF 85.)

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Plaintiff also filed a separate motion for summary judgment against Eddie Bauer. (ECF 92.)

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Plaintiff’s opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment, and his separate motion for

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summary judgment were identical, save one difference: plaintiff added a notice of motion to the

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latter and labeled it a motion for summary judgment. (Compare ECF 85 with ECF 92.)

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Hanesbrands moved for summary judgment on November 16, 2011. (ECF 77.)

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In response, plaintiff filed an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF 87.)

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Plaintiff filed a separate motion for summary judgment against defendant on December 5, 2011.

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(ECF 93.) Plaintiff’s opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment, and separate motion

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for summary judgment against Hanesbrands are identical to his filings against Eddie Bauer,

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including the added notice of motion and labeling as a motion for summary judgment. (Compare

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ECF 87 with ECF 93.)

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On October 5, 2012, this court issued its order on the parties’ cross-motions for

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summary judgment. See Feezor v. Patterson, 2012 WL 4764412 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2012). The

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court held that, under the ADA rubric set forth in Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, 631 F.3d 939, 944

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(9th Cir. 2011), plaintiff did not have standing to assert any of his claims under Article III of the

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Constitution because he did not direct the court to any evidence that he suffered an injury-in-fact

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Plaintiff also filed a variety of state law claims. The court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims after dismissing all of plaintiff’s federal claims.
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coupled with an intent to return to either facility. 2012 WL 4764412, at *5-8. The court

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explained that, in the alternative, “[e]ven if plaintiff had standing to bring his ADA claims,

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defendants [were] correct in arguing those claims would be denied as moot” because “[b]oth

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defendants present[ed] uncontroverted evidence that the alleged” violations no longer existed.

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(Id at *6 n.4.)
On November 26, 2012, defendants filed identical2 motions for attorneys’ fees

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and litigation expenses. (Compare ECF 125-1 with ECF 126-1.) Plaintiff filed a single

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opposition to both motions on January 4, 2013. (ECF 129.) Defendants filed a joint reply on

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January 11, 213. (ECF 130.)

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

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The ADA provides for an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party:

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In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to
this chapter,3 the court . . . in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation
expenses, and costs, . . .

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42 U.S.C. § 12205.
The Ninth Circuit has held that attorneys’ fees should only be awarded in an ADA

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case “upon ‘a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without

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foundation.’” Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

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Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). A claim is “frivolous” if it

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“lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

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Before considering whether attorneys’ fees are merited, the court must consider

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whether an award of fees is within the court’s power. Ordinarily, a court that has dismissed a

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Because the motions are identical, the court will hereinafter cite to the motions as
“defendants’ motions.”
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“[T]his chapter” refers to Chapter 126: “Equal Opportunity for Individuals with
Disabilities.”
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case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction has no jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees or costs.

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Latch v. United States, 842 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1988); Smith v. Brady, 972 F.2d 1095,

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1097 (9th Cir. 1992); Feezor v. Lopez DeJesus, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2006)

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(“In the Ninth Circuit, summary judgment on standing grounds is not considered a judgment on

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the merits entitling defendants to an award of attorney's fees and costs as prevailing parties under

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the ADA.”). The court does not have jurisdiction to hear a case where the plaintiff has no

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standing. Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534, 541-42 (1986).

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III.

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ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues the court has no jurisdiction to grant attorneys’ fees in this case

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because the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint on standing grounds. (ECF 129 at 7-18.)

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Defendants, in reply, argue although the court did grant them summary judgment on standing

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grounds, “the summary judgment order was based, in part, on a finding that some of the alleged

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ADA violations were remedied, thereby rendering the ADA claims moot.” (ECF 130 at

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2:23-25.) Defendants also argue that an award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate in light of

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Peters v. Winco Foods Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
Contrary to defendants’ contention, the court did not grant defendants’ motion for

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summary judgment on mootness grounds; it granted defendants’ motion on the grounds that, as

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stated above, plaintiff did not meet his burden of proffering evidence that he had standing, and

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thus, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court, in a footnote, addressed mootness

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only in the alternative, explaining that even if plaintiff had standing, his claims were moot.

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Defendants’ reliance on Peters is also misplaced. The Peters court did award attorneys’ fees to a

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prevailing defendant in an ADA case involving standing. Id. at 1043. In Peters, however, the

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court only found the plaintiff lacked standing on two of her ADA claims; plaintiff’s remaining

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claims were dismissed on other grounds. See generally Peters v. Winco, No. 2:10-cv-0210 (E.D.

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Cal. filed 12/18/2003).

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Because the court’s prior determination that plaintiff lacks standing means

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jurisdiction is lacking, the court has no power to award attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C.

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§ 12205.

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IV.

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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants’ motions for

attorneys’ fees and costs are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 21, 2013.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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