Stewart v. Cintas Corporation No. 3

Filing 49

ORDER granting 44 Motion for Reconsideration signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr on 1/5/12; For the stated reasons, Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion for relief is GRANTED. Therefore, the Order in Docket No. 39 is rescinded and the judgment is vacated. A separate order will issue on the merits of the summary judgment motion.(Matson, R)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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KATHLEEN STEWART,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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CINTAS CORPORATION NO. 3,

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Defendant.
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2:10-cv-01648-GEB-KJN
ORDER

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Plaintiff moves under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e)

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and 60(b) for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting summary

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judgment in favor of Defendant. Specifically, Plaintiff requests that

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the Court vacate judgment entered in favor of Defendant, reconsider its

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evidentiary ruling which found that Plaintiff failed to show she had

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personal knowledge about matters on which she gave opinions in her

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original declaration, and reconsider Defendant’s summary judgment motion

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in light of Plaintiff’s supplemental declaration which is attached to

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her reconsideration motion. Further, Plaintiff requests that the Court

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grant Plaintiff relief from the judgment so that she may conduct

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discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) in opposition to

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Defendant’s summary judgment motion. This Rule 56(d) request is denied

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because it was not made in connection with Defendant’s summary judgment

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motion,

and

fails

to

show

that

good

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cause

justifies

authorizing

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Plaintiff to conduct discovery after expiration of the prescribed

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discovery completion date. Defendant opposes the motion.

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I. DISCUSSION
A. Rule 59(e)

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Plaintiff

seeks

relief

under

the

district

court

Rule

59(e),

which

is

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“appropriate

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discovered evidence, (2) the district court committed clear error or

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made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an

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intervening change in controlling law.” S.E.C. v. Platforms Wireless

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Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation

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marks omitted).

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if

(1)

Plaintiff

argues

that

“the

is

Court

presented

erred

in

with

newly

finding

that

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Plaintiff’s [original] declaration lacked foundation or that Plaintiff

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failed

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Defendant’s re-route proposal,” which Plaintiff opines supported her

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opposition to Defendant’s summary judgment motion. (Mot. 5:14-16.)

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Defendant counters that Plaintiff does not present newly discovered

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evidence and that “a motion for reconsideration is an inappropriate

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vehicle for presenting additional facts or arguments available at the

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time of the original motion.” (Opp’n 5:19-21.) Defendant also argues

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that “[n]either the Court’s evidentiary ruling nor summary judgment

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ruling . . . [are] clearly erroneous . . . .” (Opp’n 6:25-26.) Plaintiff

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contends her “arguments could not have been reasonably presented earlier

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in the litigation because Plaintiff could not have anticipated that she

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would be perceived as unqualified to interpret the re-route proposal

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spreadsheet, when (as part of her daily duties in servicing her route)

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she

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employment.” (Mot. 2:23-26.)

to

produce

interpreted

the

evidence

same

that

she

information

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was

daily

qualified

in

the

to

interpret

course

of

her

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“The overwhelming weight of authority is that the failure to

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file documents in an original motion or opposition does not turn the

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late filed documents into ‘newly discovered evidence.’” School Dist. No.

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1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Since Plaintiff

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did not explain at the summary judgment stage that her opinions in her

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original declaration were based on experience she had in her employment

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with Defendant, it was not clear error to refuse to consider Plaintiff’s

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opinions. Since Plaintiff has not shown her reconsideration motion

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should be granted under Rule 59(e), this portion of her motion is

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denied.

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B. Rule 60(b)

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Plaintiff argues her reconsideration motion should be granted

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under Rule 60(b)(1), which prescribes: “On motion and just terms, the

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court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final

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judgment,

order,

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surprise,

or

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Plaintiff argues her “failure to include [information regarding her

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ability to read Defendant’s re-route proposal in her] declaration in

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[support of] her Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

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is at most, excusable neglect.” (Mot. 5:9-10 (citing Pincay v. Andrews,

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389 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2004); Reply 4:17-19.) Defendant counters:

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“Determining whether an omission is ‘excusable neglect’ implicates the

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four-part balancing test articulated in Pioneer Investment Services Co.

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v. Brunswick Associated Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 123 L. Ed. 2d

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74, 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993)[,] . . . [and that] review of the Pioneer

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factors . . . reveals that Plaintiff’s actions do not constitute

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excusable neglect.” (Opp’n 9:25-27, 10:7-8.) Further, Defendant argues

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Plaintiff’s reconsideration motion is barred by the law of the case

or

proceeding

excusable

for

neglect[.]”

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.

.

Fed.

.
R.

mistake,
Civ.

inadvertence,

Proc.

60(b)(1).

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doctrine. (Opp’n 3:14.) However, this “doctrine is not a limitation on

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a tribunal’s power, but rather a guide to discretion[],” and does not

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preclude

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reconsideration motion should be granted. United States v. Alexander,

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106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997).

the

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Court

from

deciding

whether

Plaintiff’s

Rule

60(b)

“To determine whether a party’s failure . . . constitutes

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‘excusable

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four-factor [Pioneer] equitable test, examining: (1) the danger of

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prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its

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potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and

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(4)

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Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Pioneer

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Invest. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395

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(1993)). “We start by recognizing that Rule 60(b) is remedial in nature

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and . . . must be liberally applied.” Id. at 1262 (internal quotation

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marks omitted).

neglect

whether

the

[under

movant

Rule

acted

60(b)(1)],’

in

good

courts

faith.”

must

apply

Ahanchian

v.

a

Xenon

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Plaintiff does not argue under these factors in her motion,

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and Defendant makes only conclusory arguments concerning prejudice and

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the potential impact on the proceedings. Defendant argues in pertinent

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part that “[r]econsideration based on Plaintiff’s failure . . . to

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submit admissible evidence, or . . . to raise a material issue of fact

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in opposition to summary judgment would clearly prejudice Defendant,

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undercut the judicial principle of finality, and result in extended

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delay of the judicial proceedings.” (Opp’n 10:10-13.) However, Defendant

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does not explain how it would be prejudiced. Here, the record reveals

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that prejudice to the Defendant is minimal. “[Defendant] would . . .

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los[e] a quick victory and, should it ultimately los[e] the summary

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judgment

motion

on

the

merits,

[the
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Court]

would

have

.

.

.

to

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reschedule the [final pretrial conference and] trial date[s].” Bateman

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v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir. 2000). This degree

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of prejudice has not been shown sufficient to justify denial of relief

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under Rule 60(b)(1). Id. at 1225 (stating that the loss of “a quick

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victory” and the need to reschedule the trial date “is insufficient to

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justify denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(1)”).

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Plaintiff filed her motion for reconsideration twenty-eight

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days after the entry of final judgment, which is a “short delay.” TCI

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Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2001)

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(finding that a motion filed less than a month after final judgment was

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entered was a “short delay”). Further, “there is no evidence that

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[Plaintiff] acted with anything less than good faith. H[er] error[] [in

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failing to provide an adequate foundation for the opinions in her

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declaration]

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deviousness or willfulness.” Bateman, 231 F.3d at 1225.

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resulted

from

negligence

and

carelessness,

not

from

Because the equities in this case weigh in favor of Plaintiff,
Plaintiff is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1).

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II. CONCLUSION

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For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion for

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relief is GRANTED. Therefore, the Order in Docket No. 39 is rescinded

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and the judgment is vacated. A separate order will issue on the merits

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of the summary judgment motion.

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Dated:

January 5, 2012

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GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.
United States District Judge

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