Coston v. Nangalama et al

Filing 151

ORDER signed by Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr on 3/25/15 DENYING 144 Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for a New Trial. (Manzer, C)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DANNY MURPHY COSTON,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:10-cv-02009-MCE-EFB P

v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ANDREW NANGALAMA, M.D., et al.,

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Defendants.

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Plaintiff Danny Murphy Coston (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

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filed a civil rights action against Defendants Andrew Nangalama, M.D., (“Nangalama”)

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and Ronald Hale, L.V.N., (“Hale”) (collectively “Defendants”) alleging that Defendants

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failed to provide medical treatment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights under

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 2, 2015, following the close of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief,

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this Court granted Defendants’ Motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50

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and dismissed this case. ECF No. 143. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to

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Amend or Alter the Judgment, Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, and Motion for a New

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Trial. ECF No. 144. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motions are DENIED.

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BACKGROUND

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On July 28, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (ECF No. 1) naming Nangalama,

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Hale, and various other staff members of California State Prison, Sacramento, as

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Defendants. At the time of trial, only Nangalama and Hale remained parties to this

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action. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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because they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs when they

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discontinued his Morphine prescription “cold turkey” after Plaintiff was caught passing

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Morphine pills to other inmates and hoarding 25 days’ worth of Morphine in his cell. At

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the close of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, this Court granted Defendants’ Rule 50 motion,

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concluding that Plaintiff presented no evidence at trial to establish that Defendants were

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deliberately indifferent to any serious medical needs.

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ANALYSIS

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A. Defendants’ Rule 50 Motion Was Not Granted in Clear Error Because
Plaintiff Failed to Establish the Necessary Elements to Succeed on a
§ 1983 Claim.

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“A district court has considerable discretion when considering a motion to amend

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a judgment under Rule 59(e).” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338 F.3d

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1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted,

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absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly

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discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the

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controlling law.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d

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873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665

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(9th Cir. 1999)). A Rule 59(e) motion should not be used to raise arguments or present

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evidence that could have reasonably been raised or presented earlier. Id. (citing Kona

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Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). Additionally, Local

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Rule 230(j) similarly requires a party seeking reconsideration to demonstrate “what new
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or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not

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shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion,” and “why the

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facts or circumstances were not shown at the time of the prior motion.”

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Plaintiff contends that the Court erroneously granted Defendants’ Rule 50 motion
at the close of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) provides:

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(1) If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury
trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have
a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on
that issue, the court may:

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(A) resolve the issue against the party; and

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(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the
party on a claim . . . that, under the controlling law, can be
maintained . . . only with a favorable finding on that issue.

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As the rule itself indicates, “[j]udgment as a matter of law is appropriate when the

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evidence presented at trial permits only one reasonable conclusion.” Santos v. Gates,

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287 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, “the court is permitted to take a case away

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from the jury by entering a judgment if there is not sufficient evidence to raise a genuine

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factual controversy.” Tijani v. Blanas, No. 2:00-cv-00069-RRB-EFB, 2007 WL 1139408,

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at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007).

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Since no new evidence or a change of controlling law has been offered, Plaintiff

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essentially contends that the Court committed clear error when it found that the evidence

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presented during trial was insufficient to substantiate the allegations that Defendants

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were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff’s complaint

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identified two areas in which he alleged the Defendants’ care was deficient: (1) by

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discontinuing Plaintiff’s Morphine prescription “cold turkey” after Plaintiff was found

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hoarding the medication in his cell, and (2) by Defendants’ failure or refusal to provide

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Plaintiff alternative pain medication. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 11-13. Consistent with this

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Court’s previous determination, no reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ alleged

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actions rose to the requisite level of deliberate indifference for Plaintiff to succeed on his

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§ 1983 claim.
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In order to recover under § 1983 for the deprivation of a citizen’s Due Process

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rights, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) a government employee (2) was subjectively aware

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(3) of a serious medical need and (4) acted with deliberate indifference. Estelle v.

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Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976); Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017-18

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(9th Cir. 2010). A medical need is serious if failure to treat it will result in “further

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significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Jett v. Penner,

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439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059

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(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d

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1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). A prison official is deliberately indifferent to that

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need if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). To be liable, “the official must both be

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aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

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harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. Even if a prison official “should

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have been aware of the risk, but was not, then [the official] has not violated the Eighth

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Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d

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1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Additionally, when a physician is implicated under a deliberate indifference claim,

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a plaintiff must show that “the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically

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unacceptable under the circumstances” and that the treatment was chosen “in conscious

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disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff's health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330,

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332 (9th Cir. 1996). If a delay in treatment is alleged as the basis for the claim, the

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inaction will only constitute an Eighth Amendment violation if the delay is shown to have

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caused the plaintiff substantial harm. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335

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(9th Cir. 1990).

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As to the Defendants’ knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged condition, Plaintiff claims he

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filed a Request for Medical Care five days after his Morphine prescription was

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discontinued. ECF No. 1 at 9:24; Yokley Decl., ECF No. 56-4, Ex. 24, at ¶ 4.

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Defendants contend that they have no documentation of this request, and a subpoena of
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Plaintiff’s medical records did not produce such a document, indicating it was not

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received in the medical department. See Medina v. Chen, No. 1:10-cv-00683-DLB-PC,

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2013 WL 753347, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013) (holding that sending a letter does not

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support a presumption of knowledge, and that plaintiff must affirmatively allege that

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Defendant received the letter and knew of its contents to prove an Eighth Amendment

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violation). Thus, this alleged request is not enough to establish Defendants’ knowledge.

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Plaintiff also alleged that the day after his Morphine prescription was

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discontinued, he verbally alerted Defendant Hale of his need for pain relief, and that

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Hale responded, “Yeah! You don’t look well at all inmate Coston,” and that Hale

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subsequently laughed and walked away. Hale disputes that this incident occurred.

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Regardless, even if this statement is taken as true, it is insufficient to prove deliberate

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indifference. It was undisputed that when this alleged conversation occurred, Plaintiff

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had not requested an appointment to be seen by prison medical staff. Plaintiff’s

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testimony during trial established that he was aware of the appropriate administrative

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steps he must take in order to seek a medical appointment. Hale was not required to

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take immediate action because Plaintiff told him he “was not feeling so good” as Hale

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was passing by Plaintiff’s cell on his way to visit another inmate. Wood, 900 F.2d at

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1335 (holding that a several day delay when an inmate’s condition does not require

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emergency attention is insufficient to amount to deliberate indifference). Plaintiff failed to

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establish any facts during trial to indicate that a delay in treatment resulted in substantial

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harm, or that his condition at that time amounted to an emergency. Id. Thus, Hale’s

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alleged initial disregard of a verbal complaint was inadequate to allow a jury to find that

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Hale acted with deliberate indifference. See also Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136,

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139 (9th Cir.1987) (“[v]erbal harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a

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constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”) (quoting Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d

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825, 827 (10th Cir.1979)).

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Additionally, Plaintiff presented no evidence in his case in chief that discontinuing
a Morphine prescription was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances”
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(circumstances that would include Plaintiff failing to take the medication previously and

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having substitute pain medication available) and that that Defendants’ actions were done

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“in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [a] plaintiff’s health.” Jackson, 90 F.3d at

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332. See Vlasich v. Neubarth, No. 1:07-cv-1760-SMM, 2009 WL 4673903, at *5 (E.D.

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Cal. Dec. 4, 2009) (holding that plaintiff’s experience of withdrawal symptoms for a few

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days did not result in any permanent physical injury, and defendant’s lack of knowledge

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of those symptoms precluded plaintiff’s recovery under his § 1983 deliberate indifference

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claim).

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Plaintiff did not dispute that during the four months following the discontinuation of

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his Morphine prescription Plaintiff was prescribed Gabapentin and Salsalate (ECF

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No. 56-4, Exs. 4, at 22), Ibuprofen (ECF No. 56-4, Exs. 5, at 22), Celebrex (Decl. of

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Nangalama, ECF No. 56-4, Ex. 22, at ¶ 23), and Phenergen (ECF No. 56-4, Ex. 11), all

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of which assisted with pain and any potential opiate withdrawal symptoms. It was

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similarly established during the trial that Plaintiff was seen by multiple (non-defendant)

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physicians following his removal from Morphine and that these physicians also denied

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any additional pain medication. ECF No. 56-4, Exs. 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 22. These facts

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directly contradicted Plaintiff’s assertion that it was “medically unacceptable” for

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Defendants to decline to provide additional pain management. See Toguchi v. Chung,

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391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that “a mere difference of medical

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opinion . . . [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference”).

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In sum, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that the

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Defendants were aware of and disregarded any immediate medical need of Plaintiff.

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Instead, the evidence showed that Plaintiff continued to be prescribed multiple forms of

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medication to combat any pain or withdrawal side effects, and that Plaintiff visited

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several other physicians in the days following the discontinuation of his Morphine

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prescription with no reported complaints of excessive pain or withdrawal symptoms.

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ECF No. 56-4, Ex. 22. When Plaintiff did exhibit possible withdrawal symptoms eleven

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days after removal from Morphine, he was immediately taken to the emergency room
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and was ultimately denied any additional form of pain relief by the (non-defendant)

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physician. ECF No. 56-4, Ex. 11.

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Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege any new facts to indicate that the granting of the

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Rule 50 motion was made in error, and this Court adheres to its original decision that

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Plaintiff failed to meet his burden in proving deliberate indifference such that a

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reasonable jury could find in his favor. Thus, judgment as a matter of law was warranted

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and Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

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B.

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As Plaintiff has Failed to Prove that this Court Erred in Granting the
Rule 50 Motion, Plaintiff’s Rule 59(a) Motion to Set Aside and for a
New Trial Must Be Denied.

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Authority to grant a new trial is confided almost entirely to the exercise of

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discretion on the part of the trial court. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33,

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36 (1980) (per curiam). However, courts are “bound by those grounds that have been

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historically recognized” for a new trial, including claims “that the verdict is against the

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weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the

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trial was not fair to the party moving.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729

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(9th Cir. 2007). It has been held that “[t]he trial court may grant a new trial only if the

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verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, is based upon false or perjurious

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evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson

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Consumer Prods. Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000).

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In ruling on a Rule 59(a) motion, “[t]he judge can weigh the evidence and assess

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the credibility of witnesses, and need not view the evidence from the perspective most

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favorable to the prevailing party.” Landes Const. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d

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1365, 1371 (9th Cir. 1973). Additionally, “a stringent standard applies when the motion

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is based on insufficiency of the evidence.” Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514, 1519

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(9th Cir. 1987). On this basis, a motion will be granted only if the verdict “is against the

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great weight of the evidence.” E.E.O.C. v. Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir.

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1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Plaintiff’s Rule 59(a) Motion is based on his belief that he presented a legally

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sufficient evidentiary basis to support his claim of deliberate indifference against

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Defendants. Mot. to Set Aside, ECF No. 144, at 2. As the foregoing analysis has made

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clear, Plaintiff’s belief is mistaken and the decision to grant Plaintiff’s Rule 50 motion was

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proper. Plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the Defendants had the

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requisite knowledge to support a deliberate indifference claim, or that the Defendants’

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chosen course of action was medically unacceptable under the circumstances. For

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those reasons, judgment on the Rule 50 motion in favor of the Defendants was not

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against the clear weight of the evidence, nor did it amount to a miscarriage of justice.

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Plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial is therefore denied.

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C.

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Plaintiff’s claim that he is entitled to a pretrial hearing under Rule 16(e) is

Plaintiff’s Objection Under Rule 16(e) Is Unmeritorious.

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misguided. The purpose of a pretrial order is to promote efficiency and conserve judicial

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resources “by identifying the real issues prior to trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, Adv. Comm.

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Notes to subd. (c) (1983). Whether pretrial proceedings should be had “is a matter

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resting in the sound discretion of the [Court].” Hayden v. Chalfant Press, Inc., 281 F.2d

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543, 545 (9th Cir. 1960). Thus, the Court’s decision to not issue a pretrial order as to the

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admissibility of Defendants’ exhibits was discretionary.1

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Plaintiff contests Defendant’s Exhibit AA, despite the fact that it was never formally moved into
evidence. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the admission of Exhibit K (ECF No. 109-2), regarding
documents relating to Plaintiff’s prison rule violations, was a violation of Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”)
609. Irrespective of the fact that Plaintiff was the one responsible for moving Exhibit K into evidence,
which essentially ensured that no objection would be made, the reliance on FRE 609 is mistaken. FRE
609 pertains to attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction.
Accordingly, since Exhibit K did not pertain to evidence of a criminal conviction, FRE 609 is inapplicable.

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CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend or Alter the Judgment and
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and for a New Trial (ECF No. 144) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 25, 2015

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