Hernandez v. Bouwman et al
Filing
89
FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Carolyn K. Delaney on 11/27/2012 RECOMMENDING that defendant's 66 motion for summary judgment be granted; defendant McDaniels be dismissed from this action; and this case be closed. Referred to Judge Lawrence K. Karlton; Objections due within 14 days. (Yin, K)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ALVARO HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff,
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vs.
K. BOUWMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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No. 2:10-cv-2446 LKK CKD P
Plaintiff is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with an action for violation of
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civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s remaining claim is that defendant McDaniels
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(defendant) violated plaintiff’s rights arising under the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect
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plaintiff from inmate violence. Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment.
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I. Summary Judgment Standard
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Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no
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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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Under summary judgment practice, the moving party
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always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
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on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the
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nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary
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judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers
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to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,
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after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
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sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
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party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof
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concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
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immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as
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whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary
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judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.
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If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the
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opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See
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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to
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establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the
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allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the
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form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the
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dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party
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must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome
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of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
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(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.
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1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
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return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,
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1436 (9th Cir. 1987).
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In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party
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need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the
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claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing
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versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary
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judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a
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genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory
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committee’s note on 1963 amendments).
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In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
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any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,
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477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the
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court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
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Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to
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produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen
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Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.
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1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply
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show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken
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as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
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‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
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II. Plaintiff’s Allegations
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In his December 27, 2011 first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges as follows:
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1. On June 10, 2008 defendant was the floor officer in charge of T-wing at the
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California Medical Facility (CMF). T-wing is separated from other sections of CMF by a gate
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that can only be opened by correctional staff.
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2. At some point that day, inmate Hill spoke with defendant from outside the Twing gate. He appeared to be asking defendant to open the gate. Hill was housed in V-Wing and
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was not permitted to be in T-wing. Defendant opened the gate, and allowed Hill to enter
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unsupervised.
3. After gaining entrance, Hill attacked plaintiff. During the attack, Hill knocked
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out two of plaintiff’s teeth.
4. Defendant heard plaintiff yell, exited his office and found plaintiff lying on the
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ground.
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III. Eighth Amendment Standard For Protecting Inmates From Violence
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The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes
on prison officials, among other things, a duty to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the
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safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1991) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer,
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468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). An inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights can only be violated by a
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prison official if that official exposes an inmate to a “substantial risk of serious harm,” while
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displaying “deliberate indifference” to that risk. Id. at 834. An official is deliberately indifferent
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if he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official
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must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
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serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Id. at 837.
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In the context of failure to protect an inmate from a known threat to safety,
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deliberate indifference does not require an express intent to punish. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d
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457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). The standard also does not require that the official believe “to a moral
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certainty that one inmate intends to attack another at a given place at a time certain before that
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officer is obligated to take steps to prevent such an assault. But, on the other hand, he must have
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more than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.” Id.
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IV. Defendant’s Argument And Analysis
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Defendant argues there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was
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deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm to plaintiff. Defendant presents his own
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affidavit. In the affidavit, he asserts as follows:
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1. On June 10, 2008, defendant worked as a housing officer in T-wing. He was
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not normally assigned to T-wing. His duties included controlling the movements of inmates.
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When inmates returned from breakfast that day, it was defendant who allowed the inmates to
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enter through the T-wing gate. Because defendant was not normally assigned to T-wing he was
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not familiar with the inmates living there. Defendant locked the gate behind the inmates that
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entered after breakfast.
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2. Defendant admits that inmates are generally not permitted inside housing units
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other than their own, unless the inmate works in the housing unit. However, because he was not
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regularly assigned to T-wing, it was difficult for defendant to determine who lived there.
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3. At approximately 10:10 a.m., while working in the T-wing office, defendant
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heard someone yell. Defendant and another officer exited the office and saw plaintiff lying on
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the floor with inmate Hill standing across from him. Both inmates were handcuffed and
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questioned and then taken to the Unit IV Sergeant.
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4. Defendant does not remember letting inmate Hill into T-wing and was not
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familiar with Hill before the altercation with plaintiff. Prior to the incident with plaintiff,
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defendant had no knowledge of any animosity between plaintiff and inmate Hill, nor did
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defendant know Hill was a threat to plaintiff’s safety.
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Defendant also presents plaintiff’s answers to defendant’s interrogatories in which
plaintiff admits as follows:
1. The altercation with inmate Hill took place in front of the T-wing office. Hill
attacked plaintiff without provocation. Resp. to Interrog. #13.
2. Plaintiff did not hear the conversation he alleges occurred between defendant
and inmate Hill prior to defendant admitting Hill into T-wing. Resp. to Interrog. #16.
Finally, defendant presents the transcript of plaintiff’s deposition. At his
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deposition, plaintiff indicated he had met inmate Hill previously at CMF, and he did not know
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why Hill attacked plaintiff. RT 17.
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Plaintiff does not present any evidence in opposition to defendant’s motion.
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For purposes of defendant’s motion, the court accepts plaintiff’s assertion that if
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defendant had not permitted inmate Hill entrance into T-wing, plaintiff would not have been
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attacked by Hill. However, defendant is still entitled to summary judgment as there is nothing
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before the court suggesting defendant had any reason to suspect that allowing Hill to enter T-
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wing posed a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff. Most importantly, there is nothing
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before the court suggesting what Hill’s motive for attacking plaintiff was or that Hill was known
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to be dangerous in general, let alone that defendant knew that Hill posed a threat to plaintiff. For
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these reasons, the court will recommend that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be
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granted, and this case be closed.
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
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1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 66) be granted;
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2. Defendant McDaniels be dismissed from this action; and
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3. This case be closed.
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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen
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days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
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“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections
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shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are
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advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the
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District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Dated: November 27, 2012
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_____________________________________
CAROLYN K. DELANEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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1/hern2446.57
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