Scott v. New Star Transport Inc. et al.,

Filing 85

ORDER signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 9/20/12 ORDERING that Defendants' MOTION for Sanctions 68 is DENIED; Defendants' MOTION for Summary Judgment 38 is DENIED it its entirety. (Mena-Sanchez, L)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9
NGOC SCOTT,
10
NO. CIV. S-10-2812 LKK/KJN
Plaintiff,

11
12

v.
O R D E R

13
14

NEW STAR TRANSPORT, INC. and
PREMJEET GREWAL SINGH, and
DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,

15
Defendants.
/

16
17

This diversity action arises from a traffic accident involving

18

Plaintiff

Ngoc

Scott

and

Defendant

Premjeet

Grewal

Singh.

19

Plaintiff brings a negligence claim against all Defendants.

20

Pending before the court are Defendants’ motions for: (1)

21

summary judgment, Defs’ Mot., ECF No. 38; and (2) discovery

22

sanctions, Defs’ Mot., ECF No. 68.

23

herein, the court denies both of Defendants’ motions.

24
25
26

For the reasons provided

I. BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff’s complaint is primarily based on the following
1

1

factual allegations:

2

On or about October 24, 2008, [P]laintiff Ngoc
Scott
was
driving
a
vehicle
eastbound
on
Interstate-80, near the off-ramp for Blue Canyon
Road, in the number one lane. Defendant Premjeet
Grewal Singh was driving a vehicle eastbound on
Interstate-80, in number three lane. It is alleged
that the drive shaft of [D]efendant Premjeet Grewal
Singh’s vehicle became detached from the vehicle,
striking another vehicle in the number two lane.
After the drive shaft struck the vehicle in the
number two lane, the vehicle driven by Plaintiff
Ngoc Scott was also struck by the drive shaft.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Pl’s First Am. Compl., ECF No. 19, at 2-3.

Plaintiff’s cause of

10

action is based solely on a negligence theory.

11

See id. at 3-4.

B. Undisputed Facts1

12

The subject accident occurred on October 24, 2008.

Prior to

13

the accident, Defendant Premjeet Grewal Singh (“Grewal” or “Singh”)

14

had been driving his truck eastbound on California Interstate 80,

15

near the off-ramp for Blue Canyon in Placer County, California.

16

Grewal was driving at approximately fifty miles per hour.

17

After Grewal pulled his truck over to the side of the road and

18

parked it,2 he noticed that the interaxle drive shaft had fallen

19

off his truck.

20
21

The interaxle drive shaft is the part of the truck that
transfers power from the engine to the axles.

The drive axle is

22
1

23
24
25
26

The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted.
See Pl’s Resp., ECF No. 77.
2

Defendants assert that Grewal pulled over to the side of the
road and parked it because Grewal “[s]uddenly and without warning,
[had] noticed that the revolutions per minute jumped on the track.”
Plaintiff asserts that Grewal “would have had warning.” See Pl’s
Resp., ECF No. 77, at 7, ¶ 30.
2

1
2

attached to the wheels and allows the wheels to move.
Grewal was not able to find the interaxle drive shaft on the

3

ground.

4

parked in front of his truck.

5

individuals in either of the two cars.

6

After checking his truck, he noticed that two cars had
Grewal did not speak to any

Grewal called a mechanic to examine his truck before leaving

7

the side of the road.

8

the drive axle that connects to the interaxle drive shaft by straps

9

and cups) and the interaxle drive shaft at the scene.

10

The mechanic replaced the yoke (the part of

On August 5, 2008, the truck had been inspected.

The vehicle

11

report for the August 5, 2008 inspection states that the mechanic

12

had inspected the interaxle drive shaft u-joints and slip yokes,

13

and that the mechanic had lubricated the interaxle drive shaft u-

14

joints.

15
16
17
18
19

On September 16, 2008, the truck had received either an
“inspection” or “repair work.”3
A few years before the accident, a mechanic had replaced the
yoke on the truck.4
Grewal is a licensed truck driver in Canada, where he resides.

20

Grewal obtained his AZ license in Canada in 1997, which permits him

21

to drive a truck with a tractor and a trailer.

22
3

23
24

Defendants assert that the truck received an “inspection”;
Plaintiff contends that the “[e]vidence suggests repair work, not
inspection.” Pl’s Resp., ECF No. 77, at 10, ¶ 51.
4

25
26

Defendants assert that the mechanic’s replacement of the
yoke was “part of regular maintenance,” whereas Plaintiff argues
that “[y]oke and interaxle are only replaced when they are not
working.” Pl’s Resp., ECF No. 77, at 12, at ¶ 57.
3

1

Grewal’s license remained current and active at all times

2

prior to and including October 24, 2008, except for a short period

3

of approximately one month or less (prior to October 24, 2008) when

4

his license had expired. Grewal has worked as a truck driver since

5

he obtained his license.

6

Grewal owned the truck and trailer that he was driving on

7

October 24, 2008.

The truck that Grewal was driving at the time

8

of the accident was a Volvo tractor, model year 2000, which Grewal

9

purchased used in 2006. The trailer that was attached to the Volvo

10

was a Great Dane trailer, which Grewal purchased in 2007.

11

C. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

12

On August 10, 2012, Defendants filed the motion for summary

13

judgment presently before court.

14

Defendants argue, inter alia, that: (1) because Plaintiff’s claim

15

is based “solely . . . [on] the fact that an accident took place,”

16

Plaintiff is “attempting to hold Defendants strictly liable for an

17

accident,” and “Plaintiff should be precluded from applying a

18

strict liability standard to hold Defendants liable in negligence”;

19

(2) “Plaintiff has no evidence that Defendants failed to exercise

20

reasonable care”; and (3) Plaintiff “has no evidence establishing

21

that

22

maintaining, driving, or operating the tractor.”

23

No. 39, at 7-9.

24

D. Defendants’ Motion for Discovery Sanctions

25
26

the

Defendants

were

Defs’ Mot., ECF No. 38.

negligent

in

entrusting,

managing,

Defs’ Mem., ECF

On August 31, 2012, Defendants filed the motion for discovery
sanctions presently before the court.
4

Defs’ Mot., ECF No. 68.

1

Defendants assert that, on August 13, 2012, Plaintiff cancelled a

2

deposition scheduled for August 15, 2012 in Toronto, Canada, but

3

Plaintiff refused to reimburse Defendants for the cost of their

4

airfare due to the last minute cancellation.

5

that the court impose sanctions on Plaintiff for the cost of

6

Defendants’ airfare.

Defendants request

See id.

7

According to this court’s status (pretrial scheduling) order,

8

all discovery was to be completed by July 31, 2012. Order, ECF No.

9

28.

10

On

July

17,

modify

complete

14

discovery.”
Finding

discovery,

deadline

the

13

necessary

discovery

to

“[d]espite all due diligence, the parties ha[d] been unable to
the

the

requested

12

of

extend

parties

scheduling

all

to

the

11

15

order

2012,

including

because

expert

Stip., ECF No. 30, at 2.
that

no

good

cause

had

been

demonstrated

for

16

modification of the scheduling order, the court denied the parties’

17

request.

18

conference with the parties to discuss the modification request,

19

the court specifically advised the parties that, while they were

20

free to proceed with discovery according to their own arrangements,

21

the court would not enforce any agreements as to discovery that

22

were not made in accordance with the pretrial scheduling order.

See Minutes, ECF No. 32.

During the telephonic status

23

Accordingly, the court will not impose sanctions on Plaintiff

24

for any costs incurred due to Plaintiff’s cancellation of a

25

deposition scheduled for after the discovery deadline. Defendants’

26

motion for discovery sanctions is DENIED.
5

1

II. STANDARD FOR A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

2

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that

3

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

4

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

5

56(a); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586, 129 S. Ct. 2658,

6

2677, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009) (it is the movant’s burden “to

7

demonstrate that there is ‘no genuine issue as to any material

8

fact’ and that they are ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of

9

law’”); Walls v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority, 653 F.3d

10

Fed. R. Civ. P.

963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (same).

11

Consequently, “[s]ummary judgment must be denied” if the court

12

“determines that a ‘genuine dispute as to [a] material fact’

13

precludes immediate entry of judgment as a matter of law.”

14

v. Jordan, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 884, 891, 178 L.Ed.2d 703

15

(2011), quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Comite de Jornaleros de

16

Redondo

17

Cir. 2011) (en banc) (same).

Beach

v.

City

of

Redondo

Beach,

657

F.3d

936

Ortiz

(9th

18

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the

19

initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis

20

for its motion, and “citing to particular parts of the materials

21

in the record,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), that show “that a fact

22

cannot be ... disputed.”

23

Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle Corp.

24

Securities Litigation), 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The

25

moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of

26

a genuine issue of material fact”), citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Nursing Home

6

1

U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

2

However, “[w]here the non-moving party bears the burden of

3

proof at trial, the moving party need only prove that there is an

4

absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.”

5

Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp. (In re Oracle

6

Corp. Securities Litigation), 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010).

7

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

8

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish the

9

existence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Matsushita Elec.

10

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct.

11

1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Oracle Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (where

12

the moving party meets its burden, “the burden then shifts to the

13

non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the

14

existence of genuine issues for trial”).

15

moving party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but

16

must tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits

17

and/or other admissible materials in support of its contention that

18

the dispute exists.

In doing so, the non-

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

19

“In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a

20

genuine issue of fact,” the court draws “all reasonable inferences

21

supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.”

22

Walls,

23

inferences “supported by the evidence,” it is the non-moving

24

party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate as a basis for

25

such inferences.

26

898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987).

653

F.3d

at

966.

Because

the

court

only

considers

See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d
The opposing party “must do more than
7

1

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

2

material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not

3

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

4

there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”

5

586-87 (citations omitted).

6
7

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

III. ANALYSIS
A. Failure to Exercise Reasonable Care

8

Defendants contend that, due to the undisputed evidence of

9

Defendant Grewal’s maintenance of his tractor, Plaintiff is unable

10

to prove that Defendant Grewal failed to exercise reasonable care.

11

As

12

explanation for her negligence claim,” Defendants point to a number

13

of interrogatory responses in which Plaintiff asserted that:

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

proof

that

Plaintiff

is

“unable

to

provide

any

factual

The responding party is unable to admit or deny
this request as this case is in the early stages
of discovery. . . .
[T]he lawsuit is based upon a preliminary traffic
collision report indicating that a truck, owned and
operated by defendants, lost the drive line and/or
drive shaft to the truck, which collided with
plaintiff’s vehicle. Although it is believed and,
therefore, alleged that drive lines and/or drive
shafts that have been properly maintained do not
separate from the vehicle without some type of
negligence, it is still too early to answer this
admission without a reasonable opportunity to
perform discovery regarding the cause as to why the
drive line and/or drive shaft separated from the
truck.
Borger Decl., ECF No. 41, Ex. B, at 2-10.
The collision report at issue lists the “primary collision

25

factor” or “cause” as “[o]ther than driver.”

26

No. 41, Ex. E, at 2, 6.
8

Borger Decl., ECF

1
2
3

Defendants

contend

that

plaintiff's

disguised absolute liability claim.

claim

is

really

a

The court cannot agree.

Plaintiff relies on res ipsa loquitur to prove negligence.

4

Under California law, “certain kinds of accidents are so likely to

5

have been caused by the defendant's negligence that one may fairly

6

say ‘the thing speaks for itself,’” or, in Latin, “res ipsa

7

loquitur.”

8

825, 843 P.2d 624, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 (Cal. 1993).

Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist., 4 Cal.4th 820,

9

For this presumption to arise where the plaintiff presents

10

circumstantial evidence of negligence, three conditions must be

11

satisfied: (1) the accident must be of the kind that ordinarily

12

does not occur absent someone's negligence; (2) the cause or

13

instrumentality must have been within the defendant's exclusive

14

control; and (3) the accident must not have been due to the

15

plaintiff's voluntary action or contribution. Id.; see also Ybarra

16

v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 489, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1945). When

17

these conditions are met, the trier of fact may assume the

18

existence of the presumed fact unless the defendant introduces

19

evidence to the contrary.

20

Brown, 4 Cal.4th at 826.

The existence of the three conditions upon which res ipsa

21

loquitur is predicated is usually a question of fact.

22

v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 826-27, 291 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1955). “[W]here

23

the evidence is conflicting or subject to different inferences, it

24

is for the jury, under proper instructions, to determine whether

25

each of the conditions necessary to bring into play the rule of res

26

ipsa loquitur is present.” Roddiscraft v. Skelton Logging Co., 212
9

See Seneris

1

Cal.App.2d 784, 794, 28 Cal.Rptr. 277, 282-83 (Cal.Ct.App. 1963)

2

(citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by McFarland v.

3

Booker, 250 Cal.App.2d 402, 58 Cal.Rptr. 417, 422-23 (Cal.Ct.App.

4

1967).

5

In support of Plaintiff’s argument that res ipsa loquitur

6

applies to the facts presented in her case, Plaintiff refers to the

7

declaration of Lawrence Huey (“Huey”). See Huey Decl., ECF No. 72.

8

Huey attests that he is an “expert in vehicle maintenance and

9

repair,” that “[f]or 35 years, [he] was the owner and chief

10

mechanic of [his] own shop, in which [he] personally maintained and

11

repaired both commercial and non-commercial vehicles,” and that he

12

also “had experience working for Caltrans for approximately two

13

years

14

trucks.”

working

on

heavy

equipment,

including

commercial-size

Id. at 1.5

15
5

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Defendants object to Huey’s testimony, arguing that Huey “is
not qualified to provide to provide opinions on the maintenance of
the truck or the reasons why the drive shaft or yoke may have
detached from the truck.” Defs’ Reply, ECF No. 79, at 4.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, “[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”
Fed.R.Evid. 702. See also United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000,
1007 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Rule 702] consists of three distinct but
related requirements: (1) the subject matter at issue must be
beyond the common knowledge of the average layman; (2) the witness
must have sufficient expertise; and (3) the state of the pertinent
art or scientific knowledge permits the assertion of a reasonable
opinion”); Sterner v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 467 F.Supp.2d
1017, 1033 (S.D.Cal. 2006) (“There are three basic requirements
that must be met before expert testimony can be admitted. First,
10

1
2

Huey further attests that:
(1) Semi-tractor drive shafts do not spontaneously
come off without warning to the operator.

3
4
5
6
7

(2) Warnings, such as vibrations, would be
detectible to the operator.
Once the operator
could eliminate tire issues by visual inspection,
they would know something more serious is wrong.
(3) The potential of a critical failure resulting
in the drive shaft coming off would almost always
be preventable through adherence to reasonable
preventative maintenance and inspection procedures.

8
9
10
11

(4) There is almost always either a triggering
event, such as an impact, which would put the
operator on notice of potential problems, or else
there would be easily-detectable symptoms of a
driveline problem or notice of a serious mechanical
problem.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

the evidence must be useful to a finder of fact. Second, the
expert witness must be qualified to provide this testimony. Third,
the proposed evidence must be reliable or trustworthy” (citations
omitted)).
“The party offering the expert bears the burden of
establishing that Rule 702 is satisfied.” United States v. Real
Property in Santa Paula, Cal. , 763 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1188, n.77
(C.D.Cal. 2011) (internal citations omitted). This showing must
be by a preponderance of the evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 n.10, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125
L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). “In
determining whether expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702,
the district court must keep in mind Rule 702's broad parameters
of reliability, relevancy, and assistance to the trier of fact.”
Sementilli v. Trinidad Corp., 155 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jinro Am. Inc. v.
Secure Invests., Inc., 266 F.3d 993, 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Rule
702 is applied consistent with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal
Rules and their general approach of relaxing the traditional
barriers to opinion testimony” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The court is satisfied that, given Huey’s considerable
experience as a mechanic for commercial vehicles, and specifically
commercial-sized trucks, Huey’s declaration meets the requirements
of Rule 702. The court therefore considers Huey’s declaration in
deciding the instant motion.
11

1

(5) Such symptoms would
vibrations and/or noise.

include

noticeable

2
3
4

(6) A reasonable commercial operator would
immediately get his vehicle off the road to be
inspected by an appropriate mechanic if such a
triggering event occurred or symptoms were
detected.

5
6

(7) Reasonable, appropriate periodic maintenance to
the driveline, yokes, and fastening parts would
prevent critical failures.

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

(8) Maintenance of commercial vehicles, such as
semi-tractors is dependent on highly detailed
inspections, open and thorough communication
between the operator and his mechanics and
maintenance professionals, and relatively strict
adherence to schedules and standard practices.
(9) Because commercial vehicles are typically
driven many times as many miles per year as noncommercial vehicles, delaying maintenance of
critical parts or systems for even a short period
of time will have a multiplied impact on
potentially dangerous equipment problems and safety
on the road.
(10) Additionally, because of the size of the
vehicles and danger to other drivers on the
highway,
safety
concerns
with
respect
to
maintenance and repair must be even more focused.

17
18
19
20
21
22

(11) By comparison, a problem that a private car
owner might reasonably wait a day or two to address
cannot reasonably be neglected by a commercial
operator for any length of time.
(12) In my review of the documentation provided by
the defendant, there is no indication from the
invoices of September 2008 or October 2008 that a
full, systemic inspection, (such as indicated by
the record of August 5, 2008,) of the driveline
occurred.

23

25

(13) In particular, my review of the documentation
provided by defendant reveals no inspection of the
interaxle or its components or servicing of the
interaxle or components.

26

(14) Between the August 5, 2008, inspection and the

24

12

1
2

October 24, 2008, accident, there were 80 days of
no documented inspection or service on the
interaxle or components.

3

. . . .

4

(17) The interaxle, u-joints, and slip yokes are
replaced on an as-needed basis, and are not changed
out as a part of scheduled maintenance.

5
6
7

Id. at 1-3.
The

court

finds

that

Plaintiff

has

met

her

burden

of

8

establishing the existence of genuine issues for trial as related

9

to whether Defendant Grewal failed to exercise reasonable care.

10

Huey’s attestations provide evidence that a dispute exists as to

11

whether the accident was of the kind that ordinarily does not occur

12

absent someone's negligence.

13

credited, the first condition for establishing the presumption of

14

res ipsa loquitur is met.

15

of the second condition for res ipsa loquitur (that “the cause or

16

instrumentality must have been within the defendant's exclusive

17

control”).

18

evidence in favor of the Plaintiff, the court determines that the

19

third condition for res ipsa loquitur (that “the accident must not

20

have been due to the plaintiff's voluntary action or contribution”)

21

may be met by the traffic collision report, which indicates that

22

the “primary collision factor” or “cause” of the accident was

23

“[o]ther than driver.”

That is, if Huey’s attestations are

Neither party disputes the satisfaction

Drawing all reasonable inferences supported by the

24

Thus, Plaintiff has provided specific evidence demonstrating

25

that the res ipsa loquitur presumption should apply to this case

26

when proving whether Defendant Grewal acted with reasonable care.
13

1

The court therefore denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

2

as to the issue of whether Defendant Grewal acted with reasonable

3

care.

4

B. Negligent Entrustment

5

Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks evidence to establish

6

that

Defendant

New

Star

Transportation

Inc.

(“New

7

Star”)

negligently entrusted the vehicle to Defendant Grewal.

8

The tort of negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle is

9

premised on a vehicle owner or permitter’s wrongful entrustment of

10

a motor vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose

11

incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have

12

been known to the owner.

13

703, 708-09, 252 Cal.Rptr. 613 (Cal.Ct.App. 1989).

14

Osborn v. Hertz Corp., 205 Cal.App.3d

In support of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

15

Plaintiff’s

16

Plaintiff’s interrogatory responses as to New Star’s liability, in

17

which Plaintiff indicated that her case is based on the traffic

18

collision report.

19

Decl., ECF No. 41, Ex. B, at 5-10.

20

Defendant Grewal was not an employee of New Star, but was, instead,

21

an independent contractor.

22

21.

23

negligent

entrustment

claim,

Defendants

See Defs’ Mem., ECF No. 39, at 3-4; Borger
Defendants further assert that

Pl’s Resp., ECF No. 77, at 6, ¶¶ 20,

In response, Plaintiff provide to the following deposition

24

testimony of Defendant Grewal, taken on March 16, 2012:

25

Q. Who do you currently work for right now?
A. Right now I work at same company. New Star.
. . . .

26

note

14

1

Q. Okay. At the time of the accident we’re here
for, October of 2008, did you work for New Star?
A. Yes.
. . . .
Q. Okay. Do you work for New Star full time?
A. Yes, full time. I am an owner operator; that
truck was mine.
Q. But you work for New Star?
A. Yes, I working for New Star.
. . . .
Q. Thank you. You are an employee of New Star?
A. Yes.

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Masuda Decl., ECF No. 73, at 20-21.

9

Defendant Grewal’s “lack of maintenance, temporary lack of a valid

10

license, and lack of records of maintenance are all evidence that

11

defendant New Star knew or should have known that defendant Singh

12

should

13

interstate/international commerce.”

not

have

been

Plaintiff further argues that

entrusted

with

loads

in

Pl’s Mot., ECF No. 76, at 7.

14

Plaintiff has provided specific evidence in the form of

15

Defendant Grewal’s deposition testimony as to the question of

16

whether Defendant Grewal was an employee of New Star or an

17

independent contractor.

18

to have, in fact, entrusted Grewal with driving the truck may be

19

resolved by the type of employment relationship between the two

20

defendants.

21

Plaintiff’s claim for negligent entrustment, there is a genuine

22

dispute of material fact as to Grewal’s relationship to New Star.

23

The

Furthermore,

court

the

The extent to which New Star can be said

therefore

undisputed

finds

fact

that,

that

in

regards

Grewal,

as

to

a

24

professional truck driver, had temporarily lacked a valid license

25

could be probative to a jury as to whether New Star was negligent

26

in entrusting Grewal with the burdens and responsibilities of his
15

1

employ.

2

Because Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated the existence

3

of genuine issues for trial as to her negligent entrustment claim

4

against Defendant New Star, the court denies Defendants’ motion for

5

summary judgment in this regard as well.

6

IV. CONCLUSION

7

Accordingly, the court ORDERS as follows:

8

•

9
10
11

Defendants’ motion for sanctions, ECF No. 68, is
DENIED.

•

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 38,
is DENIED in its entirety.

12

IT IS SO ORDERED.

13

DATED:

September 20, 2012.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
16