Balthrope v. Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services et al

Filing 61

ORDER signed by Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 2/21/12; The court concludes that no reasonable person could "perceive[] a significant risk that the [undersigned] will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits." Id. at 1178 (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, the undersigned does not recuse herself and this motion is denied. (Matson, R)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ARIEL BALTHROPE,

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Plaintiff,

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No. CIV S-10-3003 KJM-JFM

vs.
SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; et al.,

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Defendants.
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ORDER
/

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This matter comes before the court on plaintiff’s motion for the undersigned’s
recusal. (ECF 57.) Plaintiff did not notice this motion for hearing, nor is a hearing necessary.
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate . . . of the United

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States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be

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questioned.” Plaintiff contends the undersigned’s “judgment would be considered jeopardized”

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due to her prior position on the Sacramento City Council. In addition, plaintiff contends that the

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undersigned as a magistrate judge “has already made a biased ruling in the pertaining case of

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[her] father’s suit of similar interest.”

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“[I]n the absence of a legitimate reason to recuse [ ], ‘a judge should participate in

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cases assigned.’” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Maier v.

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Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1583 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, judges “are as bound to recuse
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[themselves] when the law and facts require as [they] are to hear cases when there is no

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reasonable factual basis for [their] recusal.” Id. “In analyzing [a] § 455(a) disqualification

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motion[], [the court] employ[s] an objective test: ‘whether a reasonable person with knowledge

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of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned.’”

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Clemens v. United States Dist. Court, 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Herrington

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v. Cnty of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation omitted)). Section

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455(a) analysis is fact driven. Id. “[S]peculation” and “prior rulings in . . . another proceeding”

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are generally insufficient for a § 455(a) recusal. See id. at 1178-79 (internal quotation omitted).

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Here, having carefully reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and the pending motion, the

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court concludes that no reasonable person could “perceive[] a significant risk that the

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[undersigned] will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits.” Id. at 1178 (internal

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quotation omitted). Accordingly, the undersigned does not recuse herself and this motion is

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denied.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 21, 2012.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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