Langley v. Central Credit Control

Filing 24

ORDER signed by Judge Morrison C. England, Jr on 4/20/12 ORDERING plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint 18 is GRANTED. Plaintiff is directed to file her amended complaint not later than five (5) days following the date this Memorandum and Order is electronically filed. (Becknal, R)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBIN LANGLEY, 12 13 No. 2:10-cv-03060-MCE-KJN Plaintiff, v. ORDER 14 SENTRY CREDIT, INC., 15 Defendant. 16 ----oo0oo---- 17 18 This action proceeds against Defendant Sentry Credit, Inc. 19 (“Defendant”), on Plaintiff Robert Langley’s (“Plaintiff”) First 20 Amended Complaint, which alleges violations of the Federal Fair 21 Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., and the 22 Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil 23 Code § 1788, et seq. 24 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 18).1 25 following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s For the 26 27 28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g). 1 BACKGROUND 1 2 3 Plaintiff originally initiated this action as an unfair debt 4 collection practices case that was based on Defendant’s 5 purportedly harassing telephone calls to Plaintiff. 6 2011, this Court issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order (“PTSO”) 7 setting July 6, 2012, as the deadline for completion of non- 8 expert discovery, September 6, 2012, as the deadline for expert 9 disclosure, December 6, 2012, as Defendant’s dispositive motion On July 28, 10 filing cut-off, and May 6, 2013, as the date for trial. 11 PTSO, the Court also specified that “[n]o joinder of parties or 12 amendments to pleadings is permitted without leave of court, good 13 cause having been shown.” 14 In the PTSO, 1:24-25. Plaintiff subsequently served Defendant with discovery 15 requests, including a request for the production of any 16 recordings of Defendant’s phone calls to Plaintiff. 17 served its responses to those requests on October 26, 2011. 18 Plaintiff thereafter served follow-up requests for production to 19 Defendant to learn whether Defendant had employed any pre- 20 recorded messages informing Plaintiff the calls to her might be 21 recorded. 22 Defendant’s subsequent responses, which confirmed that Defendant 23 had failed to warn Plaintiff her telephone calls were being 24 recorded or to obtain her consent to do so. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// Defendant On approximately December 22, 2011, Plaintiff received 2 1 At that point, Plaintiff sought and retained experienced 2 class counsel who associated in the matter on January 20, 2012. 3 Shortly thereafter, on January 31, 2012, Plaintiff filed her 4 instant Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint, by 5 which she seeks to add four class-based causes of action arising 6 out of Defendant’s allegedly illegal recording of class members’ 7 confidential telephone conversations without their consent. 8 of Plaintiff’s proposed causes of action are alleged on behalf of 9 a California class pursuant to California Penal Code § 632, which Two 10 prohibits the recording of confidential telephone calls without 11 all parties’ consent, and the right to privacy included in 12 California Constitution, Article I, Section I. 13 proposed claims is alleged, as an alternative to the California 14 class claims, on behalf of a nationwide class under Washington 15 Revised Code § 9.73.060, and the final proposed cause of action 16 is alleged on behalf of both classes under a negligence per se 17 theory. 18 permitted leave to add these class claims. One of her other Plaintiff’s Motion is now GRANTED, and she will be 19 STANDARD 20 21 22 Typically, leave to amend should be “freely give[n]...when 23 justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(2). 24 district court has filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to 25 Rule 16, as this Court did here on July 28, 2011, however, the 26 standards set forth by Rule 16 control. 27 Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 28 PTSO, 1:24-25. 3 Once a Johnson v. Mammoth 1 “Unlike Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses 2 on the bad faith of the party seeking to interpose an amendment 3 and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s ‘good 4 cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party 5 seeking the amendment.” 6 this standard, the Ninth Circuit has stated that: 7 Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. In explaining [a] district court may modify the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.’ Moreover, carelessness is not compatible with a finding of diligence and offers no reason for granting of relief. Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end. 8 9 10 11 12 13 Id. (citations omitted). To demonstrate diligence under Rule 14 16's “good cause” standard, courts have required movants to show 15 that: 1) they were diligent in assisting the Court in creating a 16 workable Rule 16 order; 2) despite their diligent efforts to 17 comply, their noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred 18 because of the development of matters that could not have been 19 reasonably foreseen or anticipated; and 3) they were diligent in 20 seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent 21 that they could not comply with the order. 22 Inc., 186 F.R.D. 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (internal citations 23 omitted). 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 4 Jackson v. Laureate, ANALYSIS 1 2 3 According to Plaintiff, good cause exists to justify further 4 amendment of her First Amended Complaint here because she did not 5 know and could not have known prior to conducting discovery that 6 her calls with Defendant were recorded. 7 that in prosecuting her originally filed action, she diligently 8 pursued discovery, which, on December 19, 2011, resulted in 9 confirmation that Defendant had, without notice to her and Plaintiff thus contends 10 without her consent, recorded her phone calls. 11 thereafter promptly hired class counsel and filed her instant 12 Motion. 13 class-based discovery and that she intends to file her motion for 14 class certification prior to May 23, 2012. 15 that amendment of her FAC will not require modification of the 16 deadlines set by the Court in the PTSO. 17 Plaintiff Plaintiff further argues that she is already preparing Plaintiff thus avers Defendant disagrees, of course, arguing Plaintiff has been 18 dilatory in seeking amendment and that any amendment will be 19 futile. 20 unjustifiably delayed bringing her instant Motion because she 21 waited three months after receiving the recordings from Defendant 22 and one year after filing this action to seek leave to amend. 23 In addition, Defendant argues amendment will be futile in any 24 event because this case is substantially similar to another 25 pending class action filed in the Southern District of 26 California, Allen v. Sentry Credit, Inc., 3:11-cv-02317-IEG-BLM. 27 /// 28 /// More specifically, Defendant believes Plaintiff 5 1 The Allen case also asserts violations of California Penal Code 2 section 632 and California Constitution, Article I, Section 1, as 3 well as a negligence cause of action. 4 Defendant, it will be prejudiced if Plaintiff is permitted to 5 amend because it will be required to file a Motion to Strike or a 6 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s class claims as duplicative of 7 those raised in Allen. 8 to engage in extensive additional discovery and dispositive 9 motion preparation, which would consequently require Defendant to 10 11 Finally, according to Defendant will also purportedly be forced later seek to modify the PTSO. Plaintiff’s arguments are well-taken. The record before the 12 Court indicates that Plaintiff timely pursued discovery related 13 to her existing fair debt collection claims and promptly sought 14 leave to add her class claims only one month after she had 15 obtained Defendant’s responses indicating those causes of action 16 might be viable. 17 Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff should have sought amendment 18 upon receipt of the recordings themselves, rather than upon 19 receipt of Defendant’s responses indicating it did not utilize 20 pre-recorded messages, the Court would still find the interests 21 of justice served by permitting amendment are outweighed by the 22 marginal delay between Defendant’s October production of that 23 evidence and Plaintiff’s filing of her current Motion in January, 24 particularly in light of Plaintiff’s interim need to locate and 25 retain class counsel. 26 with Plaintiff’s decision to expeditiously pursue confirmation as 27 to the legitimacy of her class claims prior to calling upon the 28 resources of this Court in seeking leave to amend. Moreover, even if the Court were to accept In any event, the Court finds no fault 6 1 Accordingly, especially given the fact that dispositive motions 2 are not set to be heard until the end of this year and trial is 3 not set to begin until next year, the Court finds Plaintiff was 4 diligent in seeking leave to amend here. 5 The Court likewise rejects Defendant’s contention that 6 Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied because her class claims are 7 duplicative of those pending in the Allen case. 8 argument is really a substantive challenge to the proposed 9 amended pleading that, while potentially appropriate in response 10 to the Second Amended Complaint, once filed, is not proper in the 11 context of whether Plaintiff should, as an initial matter, be 12 permitted leave to amend. 13 Court no class has been certified in that litigation. 14 Accordingly, while the Allen plaintiff may be pursuing putative 15 class claims, it is entirely speculative to presume those claims 16 will ever actually be litigated on behalf of the named class. 17 Moreover, Defendant’s “substantial similarity” argument is based 18 on Plaintiff’s California-based claims, but wholly ignores the 19 fact that Plaintiff in this case seeks to add additional class 20 claims, one of which arises under Washington law, on behalf of a 21 nationwide class as well. 22 find at this preliminary juncture that any amendment would be so 23 futile as to justify denying Plaintiff’s Motion. 24 First, this In addition, Plaintiff has advised the Accordingly, this Court declines to Finally, Defendant’s theory that it will be prejudiced by 25 amendment is likewise rejected. There is still ample time prior 26 to the dispositive motion deadline and the current trial date in 27 which the parties can litigate this case. 28 /// 7 1 Discovery does not close for several months, and there is no 2 indication at this time that any dates in the PTSO will at any 3 point need to be modified. 4 characterize the potential for additional motion practice or 5 discovery as “prejudicial” fails as well because Defendant has 6 not described anything beyond what is part and parcel of any 7 litigation. 8 contrary, Plaintiff’s Motion is now GRANTED. In addition, Defendant’s attempt to Accordingly, no persuasive arguments to the 9 CONCLUSION 10 11 12 For the reasons just stated, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 13 Amend the Complaint (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED. 14 directed to file her amended complaint not later than five (5) 15 days following the date this Memorandum and Order is 16 electronically filed. 17 18 Plaintiff is IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: April 20, 2012 19 20 21 _____________________________ MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?