Randolph v. FEDEX-Federal Express Corporation

Filing 86

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. on 1/27/2015 GRANTING defendant FedEx's 78 Motion for Summary Judgment. This action shall be CLOSED and Judgment entered in favor of defendant. (Marciel, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SHAWN L. RANDOLPH,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:11-CV-0028-GEB-DAD

v.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FEDEX-FEDERAL EXPRESS
CORPORATION,
Defendant.

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FedEx

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seeks

summary

judgment

on

the

sole

claim

in

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Plaintiff‟s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), in which Plaintiff

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alleges she was terminated because of a disability, in violation

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of public policy. (ECF No. 72.)
I. LEGAL STANDARD

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A

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seeking

demonstrating

summary

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(1986). “A fact is „material‟ when . . .

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outcome of the case.” Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat‟l Trust

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&

Ass‟n,

322

F.3d

v.

1039,

Catrett,

1046
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(9th

a

genuine

initial

material

Corp.

of

the

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Celotex

absence

bears

burden

fact.

the

judgment

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Sav.

of

party

477

U.S.

issue

of

317,

323

it could affect the

Cir.

2003)

(quoting

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An

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issue of material fact is “genuine” when “the evidence is such

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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

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party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

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If

the

movant

satisfies

its

“initial

burden,”

“the

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nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise

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provided in Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. (“Rule”) 56, „specific facts

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showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.‟” T.W. Elec.

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Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass‟n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

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(9th Cir. 1987) (quoting former Rule 56(e)). Summary judgment

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“evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

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nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in

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favor of that party.” Sec. & Exch. Comm‟n v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207,

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1215 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified

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Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001)).

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Further, Local Rule 260(b) prescribes:

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Any party opposing a motion for summary
judgment . . . [must] reproduce the itemized
facts in the [moving party‟s] Statement of
Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that
are undisputed and deny those that are
disputed, including with each denial a
citation to the particular portions of any
pleading,
affidavit,
deposition,
interrogatory answer, admission, or other
document relied upon in support of that
denial.

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If

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the

nonmovant

does

not

“specifically

.

.

.

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[controvert duly supported] facts identified in the [movant‟s]

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statement of undisputed facts,” the nonmovant “is deemed to have

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admitted the validity of the facts contained in the [movant‟s]

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statement.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 527 (2006).

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Because a district court has no independent duty “to
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scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact,”

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and may “rely on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable

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particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment,”...

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the district court . . . [is] under no obligation to undertake a

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cumbersome

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behalf. Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th

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Cir. 2010) (quoting Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.

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1996)).

review

of

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the

record

on

the

[nonmoving

party‟s]

II. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

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FedEx

“is

an

express

transportation

and

delivery

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company based in Memphis, Tennessee.” (Pl.‟s Resp. Def.‟s SUF

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(“SUF”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 82.) “Plaintiff‟s employment with FedEx

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began on July 27, 1997” and her last position was Operations

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Manager at the FedEx station in Stockton, California. (Id. ¶¶ 9,

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15-16.) “As an Operations Manager, Plaintiff‟s duties included

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supervising

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representatives and the sorting of packages that arrive from the

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airport . . . to be placed on courier trucks for delivery to

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customers.” (Id. ¶ 14.)

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couriers,

handlers,

and

customer

service

While working as an Operations Manager, “Plaintiff was

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diagnosed

with

agoraphobia,

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anxiety,

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requested medical leave. (SUF ¶¶ 17, 22.) FedEx‟s medical leave

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policy “provides that the maximum allowable leave of absence is

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30 months . . . unless the employee is determined to be totally

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disabled from all occupations by the long term disability plan

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administrator.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff received a combination of

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medical absence pay, short term disability benefits and long term

depression,

night

claustrophobia,

terrors,

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paranoia,

panic
and

attacks,
PTSD”

and

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disability benefits from FedEx for the thirty months, from August

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2010 through February 2013. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19, 21.) “During this

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medical leave of absence, Plaintiff was unable to perform the

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essential duties of her Operations manager job . . . . with or

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without an accommodation.” (SUF ¶¶ 23, 25.) As a result, she “was

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not able to return to work.” (SUF ¶ 44.) However, “FedEx‟s Long

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Term Disability Plan Administrator determined effective December

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1,

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occupations.” (Id. ¶ 39.) FedEx sent Plaintiff a letter dated

2012

that

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Plaintiff

2013

was

not

her

of

the

disabled

from

termination

of

all

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February

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employment.” (Id. ¶ 42.) “Plaintiff is currently still suffering”

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from her disability and “is currently unable to perform any job

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at FedEx.” (Id. ¶¶ 54-55.)

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“notifying

totally

her

III. DISCUSSION

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FedEx argues “Plaintiff admits that, during her medical

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leave of absence from August 2010 to February 11, 2013, she was

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unable to perform the essential duties of her Operations Manager

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job with or without an accommodation” and therefore public policy

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did “not prohibit[] [FedEx] from” terminating her employment.

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(Mem. P&A ISO Def.‟s Mot. Summ. J. (“Mot.”) 11:17-22, ECF No. 78-

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2.)

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Plaintiff does not dispute that she lacks the ability

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to perform the essential duties of an Operations Manager and

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instead argues there is an issue of “material fact [regarding]...

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whether

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2013.” (Pl.‟s Mem. P&A Opp‟n Def.‟s Mot. Summ. J. 4:23-24, ECF

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No. 81.) However, she cites to no specific facts showing she

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qualified for total disability in February 2013.

Plaintiff

qualified

for

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total

disability

in

February

1

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Under California common law. . . there can be
no right to terminate [an employee] for an
unlawful reason or a purpose that contravenes
“fundamental public policy.” Nevertheless,
“[t]his public policy exception to the atwill employment rule must be based on
policies carefully tethered to fundamental
policies
that
are
delineated
in
constitutional or statutory provisions.”

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Dep‟t of Fair Emp‟t and Hous. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 642

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F.3d 728, 748-49 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Silo v. CHW Med. Found.,

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27 Cal. 4th 1097 (2002)). Plaintiff alleges in her

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California

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“has

a

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov.

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Code § 12940. (SAC ¶¶ 27, 29, ECF No. 71.)

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in

the

Green v. State, 42 Cal. 4th 254, 262 (2007).

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delineated

[B]y its terms, section 12940 makes it clear
that drawing distinctions on the basis of
physical
or
mental
disability
is
not
forbidden discrimination in itself. Rather,
drawing these distinctions is prohibited only
if the adverse employment action occurs
because of a disability and the disability
would
not
prevent
the
employee
from
performing the essential duties of the job,
at least not with reasonable accommodation.
Therefore, in order to establish that a
defendant employer has discriminated on the
basis of disability in violation of FEHA, the
plaintiff employee bears the burden of
proving he or she was able to do the job,
with or without reasonable accommodation.

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is

disability

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which

against

discrimination

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employment,”

policy

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in

„fundamental‟

SAC that

It is uncontroverted that during her medical leave of
absence, “Plaintiff was unable to perform the essential duties of
her Operations Manager job” and there “was no accommodation that
would have enabled Plaintiff to perform the essential duties of
her

Operations

Manager

job.”

(SUF

¶¶

23-24.)

Further,

it

is

uncontroverted that “Plaintiff is currently still suffering” from

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her

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FedEx,” and that “FedEx. . . determined . . .

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totally disabled from all occupations.” (SUF ¶¶ 54-55, 39.) Since

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the

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disabled from all occupations, FedEx‟s summary judgment motion is

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granted.

disability,

undisputed

“is

facts

currently

evince

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that

to

perform

Plaintiff

any

job

at

Plaintiff was not

was

not

totally

IV. CONCLUSION

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unable

For

the

above

stated

reasons,

FedEx‟s

motion

for

summary judgment is GRANTED, judgment shall be entered in favor

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of Defendant and this action shall be closed.

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Dated:

January 27, 2015

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