Huffman et al v. Target Corporation

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER signed by Judge Morrison C. England, Jr on 5/20/11 ORDERING that Plaintiffs' MOTION TO REMAND 8 is GRANTED. This Case should be remanded to the originating State Court, the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Sacrmamento, for final adjudication. CASE CLOSED. (cc: Sacramento County Superior Court) (Mena-Sanchez, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GERALD HUFFMAN, THERESA
HUFFMAN, individually, and
on behalf of the general
public,

No. 2:11-cv-00488-MCE-EFB

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Plaintiffs,
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v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

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TARGET CORPORATION, a
corporation, aka TARGET INC.,
a corporation,

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Defendants.
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----oo0oo---Plaintiffs Gerald and Theresa Huffman (“Plaintiffs”)

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initiated this action in Sacramento County Superior Court on

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January 14, 2011, and Defendant Target Corporation (“Defendant”)

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removed the case to this Court on February 18, 2011.

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before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (“Motion”).

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the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED.1

Presently
For

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,
the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.
Cal. Local Rule 230(g).
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BACKGROUND

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Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in state court, alleging

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causes of action arising out of Defendant’s violation of

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California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

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(“RFDCPA”), California Civil Code §§ 1788-1788.32, and Unfair

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Competition Law (“UCL”), Business and Professions Code § 17200,

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et seq.

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unlawful debt collection practices by, among other things,

Plaintiffs generally allege that Defendant engaged in

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contacting Plaintiffs by telephone on numerous occasions, even

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after being advised that Plaintiffs were represented by counsel.

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According to Plaintiffs, Defendant’s actions constitute

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violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

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(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., and thus also constitute

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violations of the RFDCPA.

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turn establish violations of the UCL.

These alleged RFDCPA violations in

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More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that prior to November

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2010, they incurred financial obligations owing to Defendant and

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qualifying as “debt” and “consumer debt” under California Civil

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Code § 1788.2(d), (f).

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obligations were incurred for “personal, family or household

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purposes,” they also constitute “debt(s)” under 15 U.S.C.

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¶ 1692a(5).

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Complaint, ¶ 16.

Id., ¶ 17.

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Because these

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Plaintiffs became delinquent on their payments and, on

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approximately November 21, 2010, Defendant called one of the

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Plaintiff’s2 cell phones to demand payment.

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Plaintiff provided the caller with the name of the attorney

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Plaintiffs had retained to assist them with their financial

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difficulties.

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from Defendant constituted a “communication” under 15 U.S.C.

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§ 1692a(2), a “debt collection” under California Civil Code

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§ 1788.2(b), and an “initial communication” under 15 U.S.C.

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§ 1692g(a).

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Id., ¶ 19.

Id., ¶¶ 18-19.

That

According to Plaintiffs, this call

Id., ¶ 20.

Despite having been provided with the name of Plaintiffs’

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counsel, Defendant informed Plaintiffs it would continue to call

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Plaintiffs directly, and, over approximately the next month,

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proceeded to do so.

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2010, Defendant’s employee contacted Mr. Huffman demanding

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information from him and informing him that “Target does not call

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lawyers.”

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additional calls, including three calls on January 2, 2011, and

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two calls the following day.

Id., ¶ 25.

Id., ¶¶ 21-22.

For example, on December 28,

Defendant then continued to make

Id., ¶ 28.

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Plaintiffs notified their counsel of the calls, and one of

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the attorney’s staff members attempted to provide verbal notice

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to Defendant that counsel had been retained.

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Defendant indicated to that staff member that it was aware

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Plaintiffs were represented and that it already had counsel’s

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contact information.

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Id., ¶ 30.

Id.

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It is unclear from Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which Plaintiff
was reached during this call.
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Plaintiffs thus complain as follows:

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These calls made by Defendant despite Defendant’s
knowledge of Plaintiff’s retention of an attorney in
addition to having that attorney’s name, address and
communication information is a direct violation of 15
U.S.C. 1692c(a)(2). Id., ¶ 23.

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Because these acts violated certain provisions of 15
U.S.C. 1692c(a)(2), the acts are also a violation of
Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. Id., ¶ 24.

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The natural consequence of this and every other call
made once Defendant was aware Plaintiff was represented
by counsel can only be interpreted as having the
natural consequence of harassing, oppressing or abusing
Plaintiff, and thus in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d,
et seq. Id., ¶ 26.

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Because these acts violated certain provisions of 15
U.S.C. 1692d, the acts are also a violation of Cal.
Civ. Code § 1788.17. Id., ¶ 27.

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Again, these calls equate to violations of Cal. Civ.
Code § 1788.17, as they violate certain provisions of
15 U.S.C. 1692, et seq. Id., ¶ 29.

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Defendant’s continued and relentless collection efforts
upon Plaintiff has caused Plaintiff worry, confusion,
and distress concerning their right to be free from
these calls when represented by an attorney. Id.,
¶ 32.

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According to Plaintiffs, Defendant’s above conduct resulted

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in “numerous and multiple violations” of the RFDCPA and the UCL.

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Id., ¶¶ 34, 37.

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claims, Plaintiffs nonetheless allege that jurisdiction over

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their action “arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C.

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§ 1692k(d), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for supplemental state law

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claims” and that “[v]enue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1391.”

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Despite specifically bringing only state law

Id., ¶¶ 4, 6.

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Defendant thus removed the action to this Court reasoning

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that: 1)”[t]he Complaint states that jurisdiction arises under

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Federal law”; 2) “Federal law is a necessary element of the

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Plaintiffs’ claim for damages pursuant to the Fair Debt

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Collection Practices Act”; and 3) Plaintiffs’ “claim for damages

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cannot be supported by an alternative and independent theory

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under state law.”

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subsequently filed the instant Motion seeking to remand this

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action to state court because, contrary to Defendant’s

Notice of Removal, Id., ¶ 3.

Plaintiffs

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assertions, Plaintiffs’ claims are supported by an “alternative

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and independent” state law theory and thus federal question

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jurisdiction is lacking.

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Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (“Memorandum”), p. 10-11.

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

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STANDARD

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A defendant may remove any civil action from state court to

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federal district court if the district court has original

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jurisdiction over the matter.

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district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in

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two instances: (1) where there is complete diversity between the

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parties, or (2) where a federal question is presented in an

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action arising under the Constitution, federal law, or treaty.

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28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.

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28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Generally,

The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal

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jurisdiction.

Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389,

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1393 (9th Cir. 1988).

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statute strictly against removal.

Furthermore, courts construe the removal

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Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations

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omitted).

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the first instance, remand must be granted.

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Therefore, if it appears before final judgment that a district

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court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be

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remanded to state court.

If there is any doubt as to the right of removal in
See id. at 566.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

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The district court determines whether removal is proper by

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first determining whether a federal question exists on the face

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of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.

Caterpillar, Inc. v.

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Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

If a complaint alleges only

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state-law claims and lacks a federal question on its face, then

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the federal court must grant the motion to remand.

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§ 1447(c); Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.

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rare exceptions when a well–pleaded state-law cause of action

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will be deemed to arise under federal law and support removal.

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They are “(1) where federal law completely preempts state law,

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(2) where the claim is necessarily federal in character, or

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(3) where the right to relief depends on the resolution of a

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substantial, disputed federal question.”

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L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d

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1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).

See 28 U.S.C.

Nonetheless, there are

ARCO Envtl. Remediation

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ANALYSIS

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The parties’ only relevant jurisdictional dispute in this

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case goes to whether, under the final exception just mentioned,

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Plaintiffs’ state law claims “depend[] on the resolution of a

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substantial, disputed federal question.”
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Id.

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“[W]here, as here, state law creates the cause of action, and no

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federal law completely preempts it, federal jurisdiction may

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still lie if ‘it appears that some substantial, disputed question

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of federal law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded

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state claims[.]”

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345 (1996) (emphasis in original) (quotations and citations

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omitted).

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independent theories-one of which is a state law theory and one

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of which is a federal law theory-federal question jurisdiction

Rains v. Criterion Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 339,

“When a claim can be supported by alternative and

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does not attach because federal law is not a necessary element of

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the claim.”

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disagree as to whether Defendant’s alleged violations of the

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FDCPA are “necessary elements” of Plaintiffs’ state law claims or

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whether those state law claims can be supported by alternative

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and independent state law grounds.3

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Id. at 346.

Plaintiffs and Defendant fundamentally

According to Defendant, Plaintiffs’ state law claims

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necessarily turn on violations of federal law because Plaintiffs

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only specifically reference California Civil Code § 1788.17 as

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the basis for their RFDCPA claim.

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by reference provisions of the FDCPA and makes violations of

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federal law a violation of state law as well.

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argues that Plaintiffs’ multiple references to Defendant’s

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violations of federal law are dispositive of the parties’

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jurisdictional dispute.

Section 1788.17 incorporates

Defendant thus

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This issue is only discussed below in the context of
Plaintiffs’ RFDCPA claim because Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is a
derivative cause of action; if federal law is necessary to the
RFDCPA claim it is also necessary to the UCL claim and vice
versa.
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In addition, Defendant cites to Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional

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statement, where Plaintiffs assert that jurisdiction and venue

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arise under federal law, as further support for a finding that

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federal jurisdiction exists.

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jurisdictional statements, and because Plaintiffs only make

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specific references to federal law and the state provision

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incorporating that law into the RFDCPA, Defendant argues that

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Plaintiffs’ state law claims necessarily turn on the

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interpretation of federal law.

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Accordingly, based on Plaintiffs’

For their part, Plaintiffs argue that their assertions of

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jurisdiction should be ignored, and stricken if necessary,

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because they are improper.

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their reference to federal law and to Section 1788.17, Plaintiffs

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have alleged sufficient facts to state claims for direct

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violations of the RFDCPA.

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alleged facts indicating the frequency of the calls made was

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unreasonable directly under the RFDCPA without reference to

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federal law.

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by showing that the nature of Defendant’s collection calls were

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made to annoy Plaintiff pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.11(d)

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or (e) that the frequency of calls was unreasonable.”).

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According to Plaintiffs, because they can successfully prove a

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RFDCPA violation (and thus a UCL violation) strictly under state

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law, their claims are supported by an “alternative and

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independent theory” distinct from their federal law theories.

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Plaintiffs also argue that, despite

For example, Plaintiffs claim they

See Memorandum, 10:19-21 (“Plaintiff could prevail

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First and foremost, Plaintiffs’ assertions of jurisdiction

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do not render such jurisdiction proper.

See Rains, 80 F.3d at

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343.

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specific statutory sections in their Complaint so long as the

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basis for their claims remains clear.

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1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Notice pleading requires the

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plaintiff to set forth in his complaint claims for relief, not

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causes of action, statutes or legal theories.”) (emphasis in

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original); see also Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data

In addition, Plaintiffs are not required to cite to

Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d

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Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir. 1990) (determining complaint

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put defendant on notice of plaintiff’s unfair competition law

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claim even though no explicit “unfair competition” claim was

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listed when plaintiff referred to unfair competition in its

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jurisdictional statement, other claims and its prayer for relief

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and when plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to give rise to such

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a claim).

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federal law without reference to similar state statutes, nor

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their jurisdictional statements, affect the Court’s jurisdiction.

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Therefore, neither Plaintiffs’ multiple citations to

Moreover, Plaintiffs specifically allege that, even after

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notifying Defendant they were represented by counsel, Plaintiffs

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continued to receive multiple calls, in some cases repeatedly

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within the same day.

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claim under the RFDCPA, California Civil Code § 1788.11(d)-(e),

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without reference to federal law.

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Companies, L.L.C., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1167-69 (N.D. Cal.

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2002); Simmons v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2010 WL 2635220,

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*6 (S.D. Cal.).

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These allegations are sufficient to state a

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Joseph v. J.J. Mac Intyre

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Accordingly, because Plaintiffs, by citing to Civil Code Sections

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1788-1788.32, make clear in their Complaint that they are

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proceeding under multiple provisions of the RFDCPA, and because

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Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support independent

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violations of state law absent their simultaneous reliance on

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federal law, federal jurisdiction does not provide a “necessary”

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element of Plaintiffs’ claims, and this Court lacks jurisdiction

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over Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

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CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing, the Court finds this case should be

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remanded to the originating state court, the Superior Court of

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the State of California in and for the County of Sacramento, for

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final adjudication.

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accordingly GRANTED.

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Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8) is
The Clerk is ordered to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 20, 2011

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_____________________________
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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