Riggi et al v. City of Placerville et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., on 12/16/11 ORDERING that the District's 41 Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.(Kastilahn, A)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CHASE M. RIGGI, individually
and by and through his Guardian
ad Litem, JAMES M. RIGGI;
et al.,

No. 2:11-cv-00753-MCE-DAD

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Plaintiffs,
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v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

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CITY OF PLACERVILLE; et al.,
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Defendants.
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----oo0oo----

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Through this action, Plaintiffs Chase M. Riggi, Marty

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Hansen, Joan Beatrice, and the Estate of Linda Carol Clark

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(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seek to recover from Defendants,

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City of Placerville, Placerville Police Department, City of

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Placerville Policeman Nicolas Maurer, Placerville Police Chief

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George Nielsen, El Dorado County, El Dorado County Emergency

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Services District, El Dorado County Department of Mental Health,1

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and Marshall Medical Center (collectively “Defendants”) for

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El Dorado County, including the El Dorado County Department of
Mental Health, have since been dismissed from this action. (See
Stipulation and Order [ECF No. 36].)
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injuries sustained as a result of the shooting death of

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Ms. Clark.

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County Emergency Services District’s (“the District” or

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“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ fifth claim for

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violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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District’s Motion is DENIED.2

Presently before the Court is Defendant El Dorado

For the following reasons, the

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BACKGROUND3

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On March 27, 2010, Ms. Clark was involuntarily detained at

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the El Dorado County Mental Health Facility pursuant to

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California Welfare & Institutions Code § 5150 because she was

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deemed disabled and a danger to herself.

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Ms. Clark was taken to the Marshall Medical Center in

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Placerville, California, for medical evaluation and treatment.

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The next day, “at approximately 10:11 a.m., [Linda Clark], in her

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hospital gown, walked down a hallway of the Marshall Medical

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Center to the ambulance bay, found an unlocked, unattended

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ambulance with the keys in plain view, and drove said ambulance

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vehicle away.”

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report the ambulance stolen, after which City of Placerville

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police pursued and eventually stopped the vehicle.

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refused to surrender and was subsequently shot and killed.

(SAC ¶ 17.)

Later that evening,

Medical Center staff called 911 to

Ms. Clark

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the
Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal.
Local Rule 230(g).

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The following facts are derived from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint. (See Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. [“SAC”],, filed Aug. 25,
2011, [ECF No. 39].)
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The portions of the complaint pertinent to this motion
allege as follows:

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Employees of EL DORADO COUNTY EMERGENCY SERVICES
DISTRICT responsible for operation of the ambulance
LINDA CAROL CLARK drove from the hospital, were
negligent by virtue of the fact that they left keys for
the subject ambulance in open view and easily
accessible by unauthorized individuals, including, but
not limited to, the allegedly mentally disabled LINDA
CAROL CLARK.
. . .

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Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the violations
of LINDA CAROL CLARK’s constitutional rights complained
of herein and the resulting death of LINDA CAROL CLARK,
caused Plaintiffs’ resulting injuries and damages, and
were caused by the customs, policies, directives,
practices, acts and/or omissions of authorized policy
makers of Defendant[] . . . EL DORADO COUNTY EMERGENCY
SERVICES DISTRICT.
. . .

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The aforementioned acts and/or omissions of Defendants
violated LINDA CAROL CLARK’s civil rights and were the
direct and proximate result of policies procedures
practices/customs of Defendants, and each of them, as
alleged herein. Such policies, procedures, and
practices/customs include, but are not limited to, an
ongoing pattern of deliberate indifference to the need
for proper training and supervision of emergency
personnel including, but not limited to,
paramedic/emergency medical technicians including those
employees of Defendant EL DORADO COUNTY EMERGENCY
SERVICES DISTRICT responsible for the security and/or
lack thereof of the ambulance left unattended and with
keys in open view that decedent LINDA CAROL CLARK drove
from MERCY MEDICAL CENTER on March 29, 2010 that
proximately caused her death.
. . .

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As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned
policies, procedures, practices/customs of said
Defendants, and each of them, decedent and Plaintiffs
. . . individually and as successor in interest . . .
suffered injury and damages as alleged herein
including, but not limited to deprivation of the parent
child relationship.

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(SAC ¶¶ 33(f), 35, 59-62) (emphasis added).

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Plaintiffs assert a variety of claims against the various

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Defendants, only one of which, the fifth claim for violation of

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§ 1983, is subject to this motion.

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dismiss this claim.

The District now moves to

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STANDARD

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),4 all

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allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and

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construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

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Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.

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1996).

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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in

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order to ‘give the Defendant fair notice of what the [...] claim

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is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

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355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

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motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual allegations.

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However, “a Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his

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entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions,

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and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

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will not do.”

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A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion

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couched as a factual allegation.”

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662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

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555).

Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement

Bell Atl. Corp. v.

A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
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“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

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above the speculative level.”

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Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

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Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading must

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contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely

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creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of

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action.”)).

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2)...requires a ‘showing,’ rather
than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”

Twombly,

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550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

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Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is

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hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of

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providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but

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also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”

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Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202).

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must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that

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is plausible on its face.”

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have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to

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plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”

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However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it

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strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is

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improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’”

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Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

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Id. at 570.

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Id. (citing 5 Charles
A pleading

If the “Plaintiffs...

Id.

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A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then

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decide whether to grant leave to amend.

Leave to amend should be

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“freely given” where there is no “undue delay, bad faith or

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dilatory motive on the part of the movant,...undue prejudice to

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the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or]

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futility of the amendment....”

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(1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048,

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1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to be

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considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend).

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182

Not

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all of these factors merit equal weight.

Rather, “the

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consideration of prejudice to the opposing party...carries the

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greatest weight.”

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DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir.

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1987)).

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clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”

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Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056

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(9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (citing

Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is

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ANALYSIS

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The District contends that the court should dismiss

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Plaintiffs’ fifth claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they have

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failed to point to any specific policy, or lack of training that

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demonstrates a deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’

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constitutional interest in the parent-child relationship.

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Moreover, the District argues that Plaintiffs have “failed to

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demonstrate a close relationship between the [alleged]

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indifference to the need for proper training and supervision of

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Defendant’s employees and acts by police officers that ultimately

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deprived Plaintiffs of their claimed right of parent-child

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relations.”

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No. 41] at 2:20-23.)

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(Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, filed Sept. 2, 2011, [ECF

Plaintiffs counter that Defendants’ failure to train its
employees in appropriate safety precautions amounted to a

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deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to a

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parent-child relationship.

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that Defendants’ policies constituted an ongoing custom of

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failing to train its employees, resulting in a deliberate

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indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and that those

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policies were the moving force behind decedent’s ultimate death,

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and thus, the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional right.

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Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain

A municipality may only be liable where it individually

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causes a constitutional violation via “execution of a

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government’s policy or custom, whether by its lawmakers or by

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those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent them.

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Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978);

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Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984

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(9th Cir. 2002).

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to dismiss, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint must allege

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sufficient facts to permit the court to infer the plausibility of

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each of the following elements:

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In order to survive Defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion

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(1) an employee violated the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights;

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(2) the municipality has customs or policies that amount to

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deliberate indifference to those rights; (3) those customs or

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policies where the moving force behind the violation of the

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employee’s constitutional rights.

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290 F.3d 1175, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Gibson v. County of Washoe,

Complete inadequacy of training may amount to a policy

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giving rise to Monell liability; however, “adequately trained

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officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do says

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little about the training program or the legal basis for holding

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the [municipality] liable.”

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378, 379 (1989).

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training is only cognizable under Section 1983 “where that city’s

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failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the

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constitutional rights of its inhabitants.”

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“Plaintiff[s] can allege that through its omissions the

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municipality is responsible for a constitutional violation

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committed by one of its employees, even though the municipality’s

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policies were facially constitutional [and] the municipality did

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not direct the employees to take the unconstitutional action,” as

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long as the court may infer that those omissions amounted to a

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deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

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Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1193-94.

City of Canon v. Harris, 489 U.S.

It therefore follows that a claim of inadequate

Id. at 392.

In sum,

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There is no dispute that Plaintiffs have stated sufficient

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facts to plausibly establish the first element of their Section

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1983 claim: that an employee violated the Plaintiffs’

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constitutional rights.

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Specifically, Plaintiffs identified a particular constitutional

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right — right to the parent-child relationship — that the

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district plausibly deprived by leaving the ambulance unlocked,

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with the keys in plain view.

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(See Def.’s Mot. at 2:18-21.)

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With regard to the second element of Plaintiffs’ Section

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1983 claim against the District, the court finds Defendant’s

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contention that “[t]here are no facts to support Plaintiffs’

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allegation that Defendant was indifferent to the need for proper

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training and supervision” unavailing.

(Id. at 6:25-26.)

Given

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the allegations that Defendant’s employee left an ambulance

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unlocked, with the keys in plain view, at a hospital populated by

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persons who are mentally ill, persons who are medicated, and

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prisoners taken to the hospital for treatment, the court finds it

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“plausible” that Defendant had a policy or custom of failing to

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provide adequate training.

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Moreover, such a policy plausibly amounts to a deliberate

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indifference to the health and safety of the city’s inhabitants,

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and thus, the constitutional rights of those inhabitants.

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other words, based on the employee’s abject failure to prevent

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hospital patients from absconding with the ambulance, the court

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reasonably infers that Defendant’s employees were so lacking in

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safety training and accident prevention that it “amounted to a

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deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”

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See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3.

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In

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Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1193-94.

Given the early stage of the

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litigation, in which the facts5 are not fully developed, the

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court declines to hold that Plaintiffs’ cannot plausibly show

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that there was inadequate training amounting to a deliberate

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indifference.
The third element of Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claim —

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whether the failure to train was the “moving force” behind the

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constitutional violation — creates the most difficult issue

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presented by the present motion.

Indeed, Defendant’s contention

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that there is not a “close relationship between the indifference

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to the need for proper training ... and acts by police officers

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that ultimately deprived Plaintiffs of their claimed right of

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parent-child relations” is well-taken.

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For example, further discovery may reveal similar instances in
which Defendant failed to adequately safeguard against improper
use of its vehicles. Such similar instances would certainly
bolster Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants had a custom of, or
consciously failed to, adequately train its employees in proper
safety and accident prevention. Indeed, absconding with an
unattended ambulance is not an uncommon occurrence. See e.g.,
Mark Bellinger, Man Steals Ambulance from Murfreesboro Hospital,
(Jun. 20, 2011), available at http://www.newschannel5.com/story/
14942133/man-steals-ambulance-from-murfreesboro-hospital; Lauren
Garrison, Ambulance ‘driver’ just trying to go home: Vehicle
stolen in New Haven, stopped in Seymour, New Haven Register
(Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2010/08/31/
news/new_haven/doc4c7c79b309215015299729.txt. Conversely,
further discovery may reveal specific municipality policies
requiring training of employees in accident prevention. In that
case, Plaintiffs’ injury would be the sole result of the
employee’s individual negligence, and thus, the municipality
would not be liable. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387 (citing
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-695) (holding that “Respondeat Superior
or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983.”).
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(Def.’s Opp’n at 2:20-23.)

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to draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

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Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated

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sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss grounded in

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Defendant’s contention that there is not a sufficiently close

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relationship between the alleged indifference and the deprivation

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of Plaintiffs’ rights.

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Nevertheless, given the Court’s duty

“[F]or liability to attach in this circumstance the
identified deficiency in a city's training program must be

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closely related to the ultimate injury.”

City of Canton,

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489 U.S. at 931.

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between the municipal policy or custom and the claimed

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constitutional violation.

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force” requirement is akin to the tort law causation standard of

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proximate cause.

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1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008)

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from tort law, fairly describes a Plaintiffs’ causation burden

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with respect to a municipal liability claim under § 1983.”

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Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 342 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing

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Harper, 533 F.3d at 1026.)

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determine whether the constitutional deprivation was a

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foreseeable result of the alleged inadequate training.

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Arnold v. International Business Machines Corp., 637 F.2d 1350,

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1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (explaining that causation in the context of

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certain Section 1983 cases “closely resembles the standard

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‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.”)

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In other words, there must be a causal link

Id.

The “closely related” or “moving

See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d
“[P]roximate cause, although derived

Specifically, the court must

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Cf.

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In this case, at this stage of the litigation, the court

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cannot conclusively accept that Defendant’s policy or custom —

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or lack thereof — was not the moving force behind the

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deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to a parent-child

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relationship; that is, the death of Linda Carol Clark.

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Specifically, based on the facts alleged, the Court can

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reasonably infer that, had the district adequately trained its

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employees to protect ambulances from unwarranted entry,

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Plaintiffs would not have been able to access and abscond with

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the ambulance.

Thus, police intervention would have never been

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warranted.

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alleged,6 the ambulance was left unlocked, unattended, and with

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the keys in plain view, in an area occupied by persons that were

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either mentally ill, heavily medicated, or criminals present for

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treatment.

This notion is compounded by the fact that, as

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The Court acknowledges that a police shooting is not

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necessarily the specific manner, or the specific type, of harm

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that would naturally flow from Defendant’s conduct; that would

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most likely be a traffic accident injuring another driver or a

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pedestrian.

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circumstances of this case.

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mentally ill person or a prisoner being treated at the hospital

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would abduct an ambulance left unattended and completely

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accessible, thereby necessitating police intervention.

However, that analysis is mitigated by the
That is, it is foreseeable that a

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The Court notes that further factual development is warranted
in this regard as well. Specifically, the nature of the hospital
and its patrons is relevant to whether it was foreseeable that,
by leaving the ambulance unattended and easily accessible, a
person would steal the vehicle and, in turn, invoke police
intervention.
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It is also foreseeable that such police intervention would result

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in a conflict that commands the use of violent force.

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the foregoing, the Court declines to hold that, based on the

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facts alleged, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the alleged

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custom or policy is not sufficiently related to the underlying

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constitutional violation to meet the “moving force” standard for

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Section 1983 liability.

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Based on

The Court therefore finds that, at this stage of the

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litigation, absent a more fully developed factual predicate, and

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where the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

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the non-moving party, Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim

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against Defendant under Section 1983.

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motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is DENIED.

Therefore, Defendant’s

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons just stated, the District’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 41) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 16, 2011

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_____________________________
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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