Chico Scrap Metal, Inc. et al v. Robinson et al
Filing
54
ORDER granting 31 Motion to Dismiss signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 11/22/11: All of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. (Kaminski, H)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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CHICO SCRAP METAL, INC., a
California corporation; GEORGE
W. SCOTT, SR., individually and
as trustee of GEORGE W. SCOTT,
SR. REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUST
DATED SEPTEMBER 25, 1995,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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DEBBIE RAPHAEL, in her official )
capacity as Director of
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California Department of Toxic
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Substances Control; LEONARD
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ROBINSON, in his official
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capacity as former Acting
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Director of the California
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Department of Toxic Substances
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Control; RAYMOND LECLERC, in his )
official capacity as the
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Assistant Deputy Director of
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California Department of Toxic
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Substances; DIANE SHERIDAN, in
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her official capacity as an
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employee of California
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Department of Toxic Substances
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Control; NANCY LANCASTER, an
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individual; SAMUEL MARTINEZ, JR, )
an individual; VIVIAN MURAI, an )
individual; STEVEN BECKER, an
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individual; LEONA WINNER, an
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individual; MICHAEL RAMSEY, in
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his official capacity as
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District Attorney of Butte
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Case No. 2:11-CV-1201-JAM-CMK
ORDER GRANTING THE DISTRICT
ATTORNEY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED
COMPLAINT
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County; HAROLD THOMAS, an
individual; GEORGE BARBER, an
individual; and DOES 1-20,
inclusive,
Defendants.
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This matter comes before the court on Defendants Michael
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Ramsey in his official capacity, Harold Thomas in his individual
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capacity, and George Barber in his individual capacity’s
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(collectively ―Defendants‖) Motion to Dismiss First Amended
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Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(B)(1) and
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(6) (Doc. #31).1
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Scott, Sr., individually and as trustee of the George W. Scott, Sr.
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Revocable Inter Vivos Trust Dated September 25, 1995 (collectively
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―Plaintiffs‖) oppose the motion (―Opposition‖) (Doc. #47).
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Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiffs’ opposition (Doc. #50).
Plaintiffs Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., and George W.
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I.
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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action arises out of state enforcement of hazardous waste
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laws against Plaintiffs at four operating scrap metal facilities.
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Defendants, all associated with the Butte County District
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Attorney’s Office, initiated an investigation and then allegedly
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acted with the Department of Toxic Substances Control (―DTSC‖),
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members of which are also defendants in this action, to impose
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clean-up requirements on Plaintiffs’ four commercial properties.
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Plaintiffs bring three causes of action against Defendants in their
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First Amended Complaint (―FAC‖) (Doc. #17).
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(1) injunctive relief and (2) damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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They seek
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was originally
scheduled for September 21, 2011.
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Plaintiffs also seek (3) a declaration of the Defendants’ legal
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right to continue enforcing existing clean-up orders.
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Beginning in 2007, DTSC working with Defendants investigated
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Plaintiffs for various criminal violations related to the operation
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of Chico Scrap Metal.
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not intended to enforce California hazardous waste laws, but that
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the investigation was instead intended to produce revenue for DTSC
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and Defendants.
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investigation was not to protect the public health or enforce the
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law because the primary motivation was revenue generation through
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the levying of fines and enforcement costs against Plaintiffs.
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Plaintiffs allege that the investigation was
Plaintiffs also allege that the motivation for the
The investigation culminated in Plaintiffs’ agreement to
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several DTSC consent orders requiring compliance with a DTSC
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monitored environmental remediation program.
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filed criminal felony charges against Plaintiffs, leading to
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Plaintiffs’ pleas of nolo contendere in exchange for a plea
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agreement.
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referenced and incorporated the DTSC consent orders, requiring
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compliance with them as a term of Plaintiffs’ probation.
Further, Defendants
The plea agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants
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A.
Defendants’ 2007 Investigation
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In 2007, Defendants started investigating Plaintiffs’
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business.
The first sample taken from Plaintiffs’ property was
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acquired by Defendant Barber and tested by DTSC.
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that this sample, which was the basis for Defendants’
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investigation, was taken without a proper sampling plan and was
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tested improperly by DTSC.
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obtained through the reckless use of unsound testing methods in
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order to yield evidence of waste, which was subsequently
Plaintiffs allege
Plaintiffs claim that the sample was
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mischaracterized as hazardous.
Plaintiffs allege the following
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improprieties: (1) Defendants had no sampling plan; (2) Defendants
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did not apply the proper scrap metal industry exemptions to the
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sample; and (3) the testing performed on the samples was done
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incorrectly.
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B.
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In 2008, both DTSC and Defendants carried out enforcement
The DTSC Orders and Plaintiffs’ Criminal Conviction
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actions against Plaintiffs.
After DTSC imposed an ―Imminent
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Endangerment Order‖ shutting down one of Plaintiffs’ sites,
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Plaintiffs agreed to consent orders that permitted DTSC to
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investigate and monitor Plaintiffs’ businesses.
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required Plaintiffs to pay fees and costs to DTSC.
The orders also
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In October, 2008, Plaintiffs pleaded nolo contendere to a
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series of misdemeanors in state court pursuant to a plea agreement
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with Defendants.
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felonies to misdemeanors.
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investigation and cleanup costs incurred by DTSC up to that point.
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Further, Plaintiffs agreed to abide by the terms of the DTSC
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orders.
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suspended pending successful completion of Plaintiffs’ probation,
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but no term of imprisonment was imposed.
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incorporates the DTSC orders, DTSC was not a party to the plea
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agreement.
Defendants agreed to reduce all charges from
Plaintiffs agreed to pay $181,000 for
Finally, Plaintiffs were fined $700,000 with $500,000
While the plea agreement
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C.
Events Leading to the Present Litigation
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Plaintiffs allege that they began to question to necessity of
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DTSC and Defendants’ actions for a number of reasons.
First,
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Plaintiffs hired an independent expert in 2009 who was a former
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manager at the DTSC laboratory.
That expert allegedly identified
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various deficiencies in the testing system used by DTSC on samples
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taken from Plaintiffs’ properties.
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Plaintiffs allege that DTSC investigations at two out of four Chico
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Scrap Metal properties determined that no hazardous waste existed.
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Plaintiffs claim that DTSC was not willing to modify its orders,
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even though Plaintiffs’ consultants determined that any problems
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that did exist could be managed by existing procedures at the
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sites.
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Then, in 2010 and 2011,
DTSC subsequently reported to Defendants that Plaintiffs were
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no longer complying with the DTSC orders.
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with Plaintiffs’ cleanup efforts, the alleged reason for DTSC’s
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noncompliance report is that Plaintiffs objected to being double-
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billed by both DTSC and Defendants for the $181,000 in costs
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preceding the state court conviction.
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Rather than any concern
Plaintiffs filed the present lawsuit to challenge the DTSC
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consent orders and the actions taken by all defendants leading up
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to those orders.
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plea agreement.
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Plaintiffs do not plead claims arising from the
Defendants’ response to Plaintiffs’ allegations is emphatic:
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―This action arises out of the civil and criminal proceedings
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against Plaintiffs stemming from the finding of hazardous waste at
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all four of Plaintiffs’ scrap metal sites in Butte County.‖
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at 1.
MTD,
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II.
OPINION
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A.
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A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a
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Legal Standard
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of
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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the
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court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw
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all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
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Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
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Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,
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322 (1972).
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are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
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129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Scheuer v.
Assertions that are mere ―legal conclusions,‖ however,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
To survive a motion to dismiss, a
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plaintiff needs to plead ―enough facts to state a claim to relief
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that is plausible on its face.‖
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Dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim
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supportable by a cognizable legal theory.
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Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Balistreri v. Pacifica
Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
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claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the
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complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).
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―Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not
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appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not
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be saved by amendment.‖
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316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).
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B.
Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc.,
Discussion
1.
Jurisdiction
Defendants raise three jurisdictional doctrines in their
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motion: the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Younger abstention, and the
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exhaustion requirement established by Heck v. Humphrey.
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these doctrines applies to the claims before the Court, the Court
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must grant Defendants’ motion, or at least stay proceedings pending
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If any of
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resolution of the state court action.
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a)
Heck v. Humphrey
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the
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rule set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because
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Plaintiffs’ success in this suit will call into question the
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validity of their state law convictions.
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respond that success in this lawsuit does nothing to change the
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state law convictions, as the conduct at issue here is distinct
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from the state court criminal decisions.
MTD, at 5.
Plaintiffs
Opp., at 8.
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The Heck rule is simple: ―if finding in favor of a § 1983
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plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
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or sentence the complaint must be dismissed.‖
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L.A., 632 F.3d 607, 611 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at
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486-87).
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Szajer v. City of
Defendants offer two cases to support the argument that
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Plaintiffs’ lawsuit calls into question the validity of Plaintiffs’
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state court conviction.
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In Szajer, the plaintiffs were convicted of illegally possessing a
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particular weapon in state court based on nolo contendere pleas.
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Szajer, 632 F.3d at 609.
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convictions was found when the police executed a search warrant at
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the plaintiffs’ business and home.
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contest or question the legality of the searches during the course
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of the state proceedings.
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plaintiffs filed suit in federal court to recover damages for what
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they alleged were illegal searches.
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that declaring the search warrant invalid necessarily called into
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question the state court conviction because there was no evidence
First, they rely on Szajer.
MTD, at 9.
The only evidence supporting their
Id.
Id.
The plaintiffs did not
After entering their pleas, the
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Id. at 609-10.
The court held
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other than that recovered by the police during the execution of the
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search warrant to support the charge that they illegally possessed
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the weapon.
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plaintiffs did not provide ―any other basis for the discovery of
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the assault weapon found in their home, which formed the basis of
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the plea conviction.‖
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Id. at 612.
The Szajer court noted that the
Id.
Plaintiffs in this case respond to Szajer by contending that
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other evidence can provide a basis for their state court conviction
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independently of the DTSC orders and investigation.
Opp., at 10.
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This information includes admissions of Plaintiff Scott,
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observations made by Defendant Barber, and allegations of unsafe
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working methods used by Plaintiffs at one of their facilities.
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Defendants next rely upon Price v. Schwarzenegger, 344 F.
Id.
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App'x 375 (9th Cir. 2009).
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federal action alleging denial of due process at a parole hearing
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and in the imposition of a mandatory parole term.
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court dismissed the claim challenging the mandatory parole term on
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the grounds that the parole term was a statutorily required
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consequence of the guilty plea in the prior state court proceeding.
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Id. at 376.
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the plea agreement itself, the court held that Heck barred the
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federal court action.
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that the DTSC orders became a mandatory consequence of their plea
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agreement, and, therefore, like Price, Plaintiffs’ request to
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invalidate the DTSC Order is barred by Heck.
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In Price, the plaintiff brought a
Id. at 375.
The
Since the only way to avoid parole was to invalidate
Id.
Defendants rely on Price on the grounds
Reply, at 4.
Plaintiffs respond to Defendants’ arguments by claiming that
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successfully challenging the DTSC Orders in this federal action
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against Defendants will not change the status of their state court
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convictions.
Plaintiffs argue that the state court conviction is
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based on their nolo contendere pleas, not the legal validity of the
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DTSC orders. Plaintiffs cite two Ninth Circuit cases in support of
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their argument that a conviction based on a nolo contendere plea
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does not in any way depend on the validity of the evidence
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underlying the conviction.
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3836467, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2011) (citing Ove v. Gwinn, 264
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F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiffs’ argument fails for two
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reasons.
Lockett v. Ericson, — F.3d —, 2011 WL
First, in this case the DTSC orders are not evidence used
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to support the plea agreement, they are prospective requirements of
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the plea agreement and the state court terms of probation.
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permitting Defendants to challenge the DTSC orders in federal court
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would effectively invalidate the state court’s mandate that
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Plaintiffs abide by the terms of those orders.
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kind of action barred by Heck, and Lockett’s holding is
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inapplicable to the facts of the present case.
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Second,
This is exactly the
Defendants’ position is clearly supported by both Price and
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Szajer.
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guilty plea, the term of parole, was deemed inseparable from the
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plea agreement.
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terms of the DTSC orders are incorporated by reference in the plea
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agreement itself and are similarly inseparable.
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invalidating the parole term also invalidated the plea agreement,
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and that is the functional effect in this case as well.
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orders are clearly a mandatory term of Plaintiffs’ plea agreement.
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Heck, as explained by Szajer and Price, bars Plaintiffs’ federal
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claims against Defendants.
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In Price, the ―mandatory consequence‖ of the plaintiff’s
Price, 344 F. App’x. at 376.
In this case, the
In Price,
The DTSC
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss on
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these grounds.
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a)
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The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine & Younger
Abstention
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Having granted dismissal on the basis of Heck v. Humphrey, the
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Court need not reach Defendants’ motion insofar as it relies on the
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Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Younger abstention. The Court also
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declines to reach Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs failed to
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properly plead an equal protection claim.
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2.
Defendants’ Immunity
Defendants also seek dismissal claiming that they are immune
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from suit. The Court will address each of the three immunities
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raised by Defendants and finds, as an alternative ground for
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dismissal, that Defendants have qualified immunity in this action.
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a)
Absolute Immunity
Defendants argue that they are absolutely immune from suit
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because prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for actions taken as
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officers of the court.
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absolute immunity for Defendants’ actions because Plaintiffs’
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claims stem from two areas where absolute immunity is not
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applicable: 1) giving advice to police during an investigation, and
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2) making statements to the press.
Plaintiffs respond that there is no
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Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under Section
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1983 for their conduct in initiating a prosecution when the conduct
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is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
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process.
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citations omitted).
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to suits for damages, it does not bar suits for prospective
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injunctive relief.
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (internal
Absolute prosecutorial immunity only extends
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of
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the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736-37 (1980).2
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The Ninth Circuit explained when absolute prosecutorial
immunity is applicable:
[T]he actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely
immune merely because they are performed by a
prosecutor. Prosecutorial immunity depends on the
nature of the function performed, not the identity of
the actor who performed it. Prosecutors are entitled
to qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity,
when they perform administrative functions, or
investigative functions normally performed by a
detective or police officer.
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Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal
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citations omitted).
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prosecutors perform functions intimately associated with the
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judicial process, it does not apply when prosecutors perform the
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same function as police during the early stages of an
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investigation, or when prosecutors hold a defamatory press
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conference.
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259, 270 (1993)).
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Since absolute immunity only applies when
Id. at 637 (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
Defendants argue that once Defendant Barber collected a sample
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from Plaintiffs property and it tested positive for hazardous
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waste, probable cause existed and absolute immunity kicked in at
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that point.
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bright line rule for when absolute immunity applies.
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F.3d at 637 (―The analysis of whether prosecutorial acts constitute
Defendants are incorrect, however, because there is no
Genzler, 410
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Only defendants Barber and Thomas are sued for damages in
Plaintiffs’ first cause of action. FAC, at 41. Plaintiffs do,
however, indicate that Defendant Ramsey ―ratified‖ Defendants
Barber and Thomas’s conduct. FAC, at 42. Plaintiffs have not
clearly stated a claim against Mr. Ramsey, but even if they had, he
is immune from § 1983 liability because he is a state official and
not a ―person‖ for § 1983 purposes. Weiner v. San Diego County,
210 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a district
attorney is a state official when prosecuting a criminal violation
and is not subject to § 1983 liability).
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advocacy or police-type investigative work is complicated by the
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fact that the Supreme Court has resisted any attempt to draw a
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bright-line between the two.‖).
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of activity performed and its relation to the judicial process.
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Id. at 637-38.
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The analysis focuses on the type
In this case, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants do not enjoy
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absolute immunity for the advice that they provided to DTSC.
The
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allegation is that Defendant Barber assisted DTSC in investigating
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Plaintiffs’ assets and the best course of action to take in
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assessing DTSC penalties, as distinct from the subsequent criminal
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prosecution.
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however, is that they do not indicate how giving advice to DTSC is
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necessarily separate from the work Defendants did in preparing
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their own criminal prosecution of Plaintiffs.
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that establishing probable cause does not necessarily establish
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absolute prosecutorial immunity, in this case Defendants were
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engaging in their own prosecution.
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authority that suggests that sharing resources and recommendations
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with a state regulatory agency, DTSC, is grounds upon which
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absolute immunity can be denied or waived.
Opp., at 16.
The problem with Plaintiffs’ position,
While it is true
Plaintiffs do not cite
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The proper inquiry is instead whether or not Defendants’
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investigatory work ―is of the type normally done by police . . . or
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whether an investigation is bound up with the judicial
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process . . . .‖
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Defendants clearly explain that they were working with DTSC in an
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investigatory capacity to gather evidence prior to the December 2007
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to January 2008 period, when the decision to initiate criminal
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prosecution was finally made.
Genzler, 410 F.3d at 638.
MTD, at 1.
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In the present case,
Defendants agree that
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they spent over 40 hours planning the execution of a search warrant
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on Plaintiffs’ properties and conducting an asset search on
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Plaintiffs.
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the later decision to initiate a criminal prosecution.
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that the decision to prosecute either civilly or criminally was not
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made until after the execution of the search warrant (MTD, at 1),
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Defendants’ investigatory efforts were too attenuated from the
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judicial process to support absolute immunity.
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Id.
These actions give rise to Plaintiffs’ claims, not
Considering
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that Defendants engaged in
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police-like investigatory actions prior to initiating judicial
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proceedings.
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such actions.
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capacity for injunctive relief, and absolute immunity does not
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limit that claim.
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at 736-37.
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grounds is DENIED.
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Absolute prosecutorial immunity does not extend to
Defendant Ramsey has been sued only in his official
FAC, at 42; Supreme Court of Virginia, 446 U.S.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on these
b)
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Sovereign Immunity
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ second claim for relief
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against Defendant Ramsey in his official capacity is barred by the
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11th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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Prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their
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official capacity is not prohibited by the 11th Amendment.
23
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) (citing Ex parte Young, 209
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U.S. 123 (1908)).
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equivalent of requiring a payment made out of the state treasury is
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barred by the 11th Amendment, but prospective injunctive relief is
27
not.
28
Edelman
Retroactive equitable relief which is the
Id. at 668-69.
In this case, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement of the
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1
DTSC Orders prospectively, which will not require any payment from
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the state treasury.
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c)
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The 11th Amendment does not bar this claim.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants finally argue that they are immune from suit in
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this instance because of qualified immunity.
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that there was no rational basis for Defendants’ decision to
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investigate Plaintiffs’ property for hazardous substances, making
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qualified immunity inapplicable.
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Plaintiffs respond
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials
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sued in their individual capacity from monetary damages, unless
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their conduct violates ―clearly established‖ law that would be
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known to a reasonable public officer.
13
194, 199 (2001).
14
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
The Court must make a two-step inquiry in deciding the issue
15
of qualified immunity.
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must determine whether, under the facts alleged, taken in the light
17
most favorable to the plaintiff, a violation of a constitutional
18
right occurred.
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constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the
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violation.
21
Id.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200. First, the court
If so, the court must then ask whether the
Id.
Initially, the Supreme Court in Saucier held that these two
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inquiries must be decided in rigid order.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at
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200.
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of a constitutional right occurred before it could evaluate whether
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the right was clearly established.
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―there are cases in which it is plain that a constitutional right
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is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact
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there is such a right,‖ the Supreme Court recently relaxed the
That is, a district court had to resolve whether a violation
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Recognizing, however, that
1
order of analysis.
2
In Pearson, the Court held that the Saucier analysis may be
3
addressed in either order if the second step is clearly dispositive
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and can address the matter efficiently.
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Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237 (2009).
Id. at 241-42.
In this case, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs’
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allegations concern a clearly established constitutional right:
7
violation of the 14th Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.
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The Court is only left with deciding whether or not Plaintiffs
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adequately allege an actual violation of that right.
10
Plaintiffs claim that the DTSC investigation, assisted and
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encouraged by Defendants, had no rational basis.
12
Plaintiffs allege that DTSC neither produced evidence to support a
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rational basis for the investigation of Plaintiffs’ properties, nor
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did they show that other similarly situated scrap metal facilities
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were also investigated.
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class of one, were intentionally treated differently from other
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scrap yards.
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obtained by Defendant Barber from Plaintiffs’ property that tested
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positive for hazardous waste according to the DTSC provided the
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rational basis for the investigation.
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Defendants argue that merely pointing out that other scrap metal
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facilities were not investigated is insufficient to show an equal
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protection violation.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Opp., at 19.
Plaintiffs’ claim is that they, as a
Defendants respond that the sample
Id. at
MTD, at 15.
Further,
15-16.
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A valid class of one claim arises where an entity can show
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that it has been ―intentionally treated differently from others
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similarly situated and there is no rational basis for the
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difference in treatment.‖
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562, 564 (2000).
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
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Plaintiffs did not adequately plead that Defendants violated
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their right to equal protection, and the arguments in their briefs
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indicate that they may not be able to.
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example, focuses on DTSC’s actions because this suit does not
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challenge Plaintiffs’ criminal conviction, for which Defendants are
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responsible.
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properly test materials retrieved from Plaintiffs’ properties.
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Defendants merely ―assisted and encouraged‖ DTSC.
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Plaintiffs also argue, in an attempt to overcome the Heck bar
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discussed above, that Defendants based their investigation and
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prosecution on other evidence including Defendant Barber’s
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observations and Plaintiff Scott’s own admissions.
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testing did not provide a rational basis for Defendants’
14
investigation, then this other information did.
15
their equal protection claim in an attempt to win the Heck battle,
16
but as a result they lose the war.
Plaintiffs’ Opposition, for
It was, Plaintiffs allege, DTSC that failed to
Opp., at 19.
If the DTSC
Plaintiffs pleaded
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It is also meaningful that Plaintiffs do not allege that any
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other similarly situated scrap metal facility tested positive for
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hazardous waste.
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other scrap metal facilities are not subject to DTSC enforcement
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actions.
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facilities tested positive for hazardous waste and despite that,
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Defendants chose to only investigate Plaintiffs.
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plaintiffs must demonstrate that they were treated differently than
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someone who is prima facie identical in all relevant respects[,]‖
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but they have not done that.
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CV F 05–1184 LJO SMS, 2008 WL 2690431, at *9 (E.D. Cal. July 3,
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2008) (internal quotations omitted).
It is not enough for Plaintiffs to allege that
They must also allege that these other scrap metal
―To succeed,
Occhionero v. City of Fresno, No.
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1
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations indicate that
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there was a rational basis for Defendants’ investigation.
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Defendants are alleged to have relied on the DTSC testing and other
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independent evidence to support their investigation.
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Plaintiffs have not pleaded that any other similarly situated scrap
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metal facility was not investigated despite testing positive for
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hazardous waste.
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against Defendants in their individual capacities is also GRANTED
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on the alternative grounds that Defendants have qualified immunity
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Further,
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the claims
from suit.
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III. ORDER
For all the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that all
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of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants are dismissed with
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prejudice.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
November 22, 2011
____________________________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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