Brafman v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

Filing 39

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER signed by Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. on 6/19/2013 ORDERING 30 Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Court Order, and Judgment is DENIED. (Reader, L)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ROBERTA BRAFMAN, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 15 No. 2:11-cv-001627-MCE-GGH v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. 16 17 On April 23, 2012, the Court dismissed this action with prejudice due to Plaintiff 18 19 Roberta Brafman’s (“Plaintiff”) repeated failure to oppose a motion to dismiss filed by 20 Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (“Defendant” or “Nationwide”). (ECF 21 No. 28.) Presently before the Court is a Motion to Vacate Judgment pursuant to Federal 22 Rule of Civil Procedure1 60(b), filed by Plaintiff on April 1, 2013. (ECF Nos. 30 & 32.) 23 For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.2 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 1 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless noted otherwise. 2 28 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g). 1 1 BACKGROUND 2 3 On May 12, 2011, Plaintiff initiated a state court action against Nationwide based 4 on the denial of benefits allegedly due under an insurance policy (“Policy”) issued by 5 Nationwide. (ECF No. 1-1 Ex. A.) Plaintiff’s original complaint contained claims for 6 fraudulent inducement, fraudulent and deceitful claims practices, breach of the implied 7 covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief. (Id.) On June 15, 2011, 8 Nationwide removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) 9 On June 22, 2011, Nationwide filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 10 (“First Motion to Dismiss”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 11 which relief may be granted. (ECF Nos. 6 & 7.) On November 2, 2011, the Court 12 granted Nationwide’s First Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. (ECF No. 17.) The 13 Court held that a one-year limitations period, which applied to Plaintiff’s claims brought 14 under the Policy, had run by the time Plaintiff filed her Complaint. (Id. at 7-9, 11-12.3) 15 The Court further held that the claims for fraudulent inducement were not on the Policy, 16 but had not been pled with the requisite particularity under Rule 9(b). (Id. at 10-11.) 17 On November 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), 18 which included claims for fraudulent inducement, fraudulent and deceitful claims 19 practices and declaratory relief. (ECF No. 18.) On December 6, 2011, Nationwide filed 20 a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC (“Second Motion to Dismiss”), which was set for 21 hearing on January 12, 2012. (ECF Nos. 19 & 20.) Nationwide again argued that 22 Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable limitations period, and that the two fraud- 23 based claims failed to allege any actionable representations and failed to state facts with 24 particularity under Rule 9. (ECF No. 20.) 25 26 Plaintiff’s opposition to Nationwide’s Second Motion to Dismiss was due on January 6, 2012. 27 3 28 All page references in this Order are to the Court’s ECF pagination, and not to the pagination assigned by the parties. 2 1 After Plaintiff had failed to file either an opposition or a statement of non-opposition as 2 required under Local Rules, the Court issued a minute order vacating the January 12, 3 2012, hearing date and ordering Plaintiff to show cause as to why this case should not 4 be dismissed with prejudice. (ECF No. 23.) On January 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed a 5 Response to the Order to Show Cause. (ECF No. 24.) In her Response, Plaintiff 6 explained that her attorney Robert F. Koehler, Jr. (“Mr. Koehler”) had developed health 7 problems after Christmas of 2011 which “affected counsel’s focus on office matters 8 including attention to this action.” (ECF No. 24 at 2.) Plaintiff’s Response also stated 9 that Mr. Koehler’s “maladies became progressively worse,” and that he “was unaware” of 10 the serious nature of his illness. (Id.) Mr. Koehler’s medical records were attached to 11 the Response. (Id.) 12 On January 31, 2012, the Court issued an Order finding Plaintiff’s Response to 13 the Order to Show Cause to be insufficient. (ECF No. 25.) However, after concluding 14 that Plaintiff should not be penalized for her counsel’s failures, the Court reset the 15 hearing on Nationwide’s Second Motion to Dismiss for February 23, 2012, thus providing 16 Plaintiff with additional time to file an opposition to Defendant’s motion. (Id.) The Court 17 explicitly warned Plaintiff and her counsel that further failure to file an opposition or a 18 statement of non-opposition to Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss, as required by 19 Eastern District of California Local Rules, will result in dismissal of this action with 20 prejudice without further notice to the parties. (Id.) On February 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed a 21 request seeking continuance of the hearing date on Defendant’s Second Motion to 22 Dismiss to April 23, 2012. (ECF No. 26.) In support of the continuance request, 23 Mr. Koehler filed a declaration again referencing the health problems he had been 24 experiencing since December of 2011. (Id.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s request and 25 continued the hearing to May 3, 2012. (ECF No. 27.) 26 Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss prior 27 to the April 19, 2012 filing deadline. 28 /// 3 1 On April 20, 2012, the Court issued an Order dismissing the instant action with prejudice 2 pursuant to Rule 41(b) and denying Nationwide’s Second Motion to Dismiss as moot. 3 (ECF No. 28.) Subsequently, the Court entered judgment for Defendant. (ECF No. 29.) 4 On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Vacate Court Order Entered 5 April 20, 2012 and Judgment Entered April 23, 2012, and Request for New Hearing Date 6 on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 30 & 32.) Mr. Koehler continues 7 representing Plaintiff in this action. Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate again cites her counsel’s 8 medical problems as the basis for the requested relief. More specifically, Plaintiff asserts 9 that, starting in 2011 and during 2012, Mr. Koehler was affected by a rare and potentially 10 lethal medical condition called Wegener’s granulomatosis (“Wegener’s disease”), which 11 is a rare disorder defined by inflammation of the blood vessels, kidneys, the upper and 12 lower respiratory tract and eyes. (ECF No. 30-1 at 5; Declaration of Kenneth B. 13 Wiesner, M.D.4 (“Wiesner Decl.”), ¶¶ 4 & 9, ECF No. 30-4.) As alleged, Mr. Koehler was 14 diagnosed with Wegener’s disease on February 27, 2012. (ECF No. 30-1 at 7.) 15 Subsequently, Mr. Koehler was also diagnosed with arthritis and limb pain, hypertension, 16 stress reaction, depression, unspecified inflammatory polyarthropathy, iridocyclitis, 17 glaucoma, numbness, and neuralgia. (Id.) 18 According to Plaintiff, the disease caused Mr. Koehler’s failure to respond to 19 Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss and rendered Mr. Koehler incapable of practicing 20 law during 2012. (Id. at 4, 8.) Koehler allegedly did not realize the seriousness of his 21 medical problems until recently and believed that he could continue meeting his clients’ 22 demands. (Id. at 5.) To compensate for his medical disability, Mr. Koehler engaged a 23 full-time law clerk in 2012 and “closely monitored his practice, giving close supervision 24 and direction to his law clerk.” (Id. at 8.) 25 26 27 28 4 Defendant has filed objections to the admissibility of Exhibit A to the Declaration of Kenneth B. Weisner, M.D., arguing that the Exhibit contains inadmissible hearsay evidence. (ECF No. 33-1.) The Court need not engage in a lengthy discussion of whether this particular piece of evidence is admissible because, as fully explained below, Plaintiff is not entitled to Relief under Rule 60(b) even if the Court finds that every piece of evidence presented by Plaintiff in support of her Motion to Vacate Judgment is admissible. 4 1 However, Mr. Koehler “felt that his law clerk was unqualified” to prepare a motion to 2 vacate judgment entered in the present case. (Id. at 8-9.) In December 2012, 3 Mr. Koehler engaged services of another law clerk who Mr. Koehler believed to be 4 qualified to prepare the instant motion. (Id. at 9.) However, “this engagement failed with 5 essentially no usable work performed.” (Id.) In late January of 2013, Mr. Koehler finally 6 obtained assistance of a qualified law clerk who prepared a “working draft” of the instant 7 motion. (Id.) Unfortunately, the law clerk was injured in a ski accident at the end of 8 February of 2013, which further delayed the filing of Plaintiff’s motion to vacate. (Id.) 9 Important for the purposes of the instant Motion, Plaintiff knew about her 10 counsel’s medical problems throughout 2012, and Mr. Koehler “promptly” informed 11 Plaintiff about the dismissal of her case with prejudice in April 2012 because of 12 Mr. Koehler’s failure to file an opposition to Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss. (See 13 id. at 5; Declaration of Roberta Brafman (“Brafman Decl.”) ¶¶ 3-5, ECF No. 30-2.) 14 However, according to Plaintiff and her counsel, neither of them realized the seriousness 15 of Mr. Koehler’s medical condition, and Plaintiff believed Koehler’s promises to take care 16 of this case. (ECF No. 30-1 at 5-6; Brafman Decl. ¶ 3-5; Declaration of Robert Koehler 17 (“Koehler Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 30-3.) 18 19 STANDARD 20 21 Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek reconsideration of a final judgment or any order 22 where such a party can demonstrate: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 23 neglect; . . . [or] (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “Motions 24 for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) are addressed to the sound discretion of 25 the district court.” Casey v. Albertson's Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir.2004). 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 5 1 In determining whether a party is entitled to relief on the basis of “excusable 2 neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1), courts apply “a four-factor equitable test examining: (1) the 3 danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential 4 impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant 5 acted in good faith.” Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 6 2010) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 7 (1993)). 8 9 Rule 60(b)(6) is the “catch-all” clause “intended to encompass errors or actions beyond the petitioner's control.” Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 n. 8, 10 1170 n. 11 (9th Cir.2002). Courts therefore use Rule 60(b)(6) relief “sparingly as an 11 equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice” and grant relief “only where extraordinary 12 circumstances prevent . . . a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an 13 erroneous judgment.” United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 14 1049 (9th Cir.1993). Accordingly, to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a party must show 15 that she suffered an injury as a result of the judgment from which she seeks relief and 16 that circumstances beyond her control prevented her from taking timely action to protect 17 her interests. Id.; see also Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir.2008). 18 A motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable 19 time, and a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) should be brought no more than a year 20 after the entry of the judgment or order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). 21 22 ANALYSIS 23 24 In her Motion to Vacate Judgment, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief 25 under both Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(6). (ECF No. 30-1 at 9.) The Court will 26 address each of Plaintiff’s arguments below. 27 /// 28 /// 6 1 A. Rule 60(b)(1) 2 3 Plaintiff first argues that her failure to file an opposition to Defendant’s Second 4 Motion to Dismiss constitutes “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1). Before turning to 5 the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Judgment, the Court must consider the 6 timeliness of Plaintiff’s Motion under Rule 60(c). As noted above, a Rule 60(b)(1) motion 7 should be filed within a “reasonable time,” and in no case may be filed more than a year 8 after the judgment or order was entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). “A Rule 60(b)(1) motion 9 filed within the one-year limitation, however, may still be barred under the reasonable- 10 time limitation, depending on relevant circumstances.” Woodfin Suite Hotels, LLC v. City 11 of Emeryville, No. C 07-1719 SBA, 2008 WL 724105, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2008); 12 see also Hidais v. Porter, No. C09–0512 THE, 2010 WL 760561, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 13 2010) (“[A] court may deny a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, even if it was filed within the one-year 14 period, if the moving party ‘was guilty of laches or unreasonable delay.’”); Nastrom v. JP 15 Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 1:11–cv–01998–SAB, 2013 WL 245734, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 16 Jan. 22, 2013) (concluding that a plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion was untimely under the 17 circumstances when it was filed 42 days after the Court denied plaintiff’s ex parte 18 application to file an opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss and 12 days after the 19 Court granted the motion to dismiss); McPhatter v. Ryan, No. cv-11-8147-PCT- 20 RCB(JFM), 2013 WL 428280, at *3-6 (D. Ariz. Feb. 4, 2013) (denying a Rule (60)(b)(1) 21 motion as unreasonably late under the circumstances when the motion was filed more 22 than four months after entry of the judgment). 23 “What constitutes ‘reasonable time’ depends upon the facts of each case, taking 24 into consideration the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the 25 litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.” 26 Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981). The Court concludes that all of 27 these factors weigh in favor of denying Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(1) Motion. 28 /// 7 1 First, the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint twice, with the original 2 dismissal being on the merits due to Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) 3 and the subsequent dismissal due to Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b). 4 (See ECF Nos. 17 & 28.) The time for appealing the Court’s judgment has long passed. 5 Accordingly, the Court must give “strong weight” to the interest of finality of its judgment. 6 See Ashford, 657 F.2d at 1055. 7 Second, in support of her Motion to Vacate Judgment, Plaintiff offers the same 8 explanation—her counsel’s medical problems—as she did more than a year ago in 9 response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. As Plaintiff and her counsel assert in 10 support of the instant Motion, Mr. Koehler started experiencing serious medical problems 11 in late 2011. (See Koehler Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff first used her counsel’s illness as an 12 excuse for her failure to comply with the Court-imposed deadlines in January of 2012, 13 when she informed the Court that she had missed the filing deadline for opposing 14 Defendants’ Second Motion to Dismiss because of Mr. Koehler’s medical problems. 15 (See ECF No. 24.) The Court was sympathetic and allowed Plaintiff to file an opposition 16 to Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 25.) Subsequently, Plaintiff sought 17 continuance of the hearing from February 23, 2012, to April 23, 2012, again citing her 18 counsel’s health problems. (ECF No. 26.) The Court again agreed to the continuance 19 and set the hearing for May 3, 2012. (ECF No. 27.) As alleged in Plaintiff’s moving 20 papers, Mr. Koehler was diagnosed with Wegener’s disease on February 27, 2011, 21 which is nearly two months before Plaintiff’s opposition was due to Defendant’s Second 22 Motion to Dismiss and more than thirteen months before Plaintiff filed her instant Motion 23 to Vacate Judgment. (See ECF No. 30-1 at 7.) 24 Thus, the facts giving rise to Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) Motion were in existence more 25 than a year ago and were relied on by Plaintiff and her counsel to obtain the Court’s 26 relief for Plaintiff’s repeated failures to meet the Court-imposed deadlines. 27 /// 28 /// 8 1 However, neither Mr. Koehler nor Plaintiff took any action to seek further continuance or 2 any other appropriate relief before Plaintiff’s opposition was due to Defendant’s Second 3 Motion to Dismiss and have not filed the instant motion until almost a year after the 4 dismissal of this action with prejudice. 5 For her part, Plaintiff contends that the delay in seeking relief from judgment is not 6 unreasonable because neither she nor her counsel recognized, until recently, the 7 seriousness of Mr. Koehler’s medical condition. (ECF No. 30-1 at 15.) However, the 8 record demonstrates that Mr. Koehler was aware that a motion for relief from judgment in 9 this action should be filed, made several attempts to complete the motion in the second 10 half of 2012, and even hired a full-time law clerk to assist him in meeting Plaintiff’s and 11 other clients’ demands. (ECF No. 30-1 at 8; Koehler Decl. ¶ 5.) Further, according to 12 Plaintiff’s moving papers, Mr. Koehler “closely monitored his practice [in 2012], giving 13 close supervision and direction to his law clerk” and “continued to meet the legal 14 obligations of his clients.” (ECF No. 30-1 at 8.) Mr. Koehler also was able to recognize 15 that his law clerk was not competent to draft the instant motion to vacate. (Koehler Decl. 16 ¶ 5.) These facts amply demonstrate that Mr. Koehler could and did understand the 17 nature of work required in this case and also realized that neither he nor his law clerk 18 could perform the required work. The Court fails to see why, while being fully aware that 19 he needed assistance of a competent attorney in representing Plaintiff, Mr. Koehler 20 waited for almost a year to either obtain such assistance or advise Plaintiff that she 21 needed a different attorney. Therefore, Mr. Koehler’s nearly year-long delay in bringing 22 the instant Motion to Vacate Judgment was not reasonable under the circumstances. 23 Because, as a general rule, “parties are bound by the actions of their lawyers, and 24 alleged attorney malpractice does not usually provide a basis to set aside a judgment 25 pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1),” see Casey v. Albertson's Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 26 2004), Mr. Koehler’s unreasonable delay in seeking relief under Rule 60(b) is imputed to 27 Plaintiff. See also Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co., 507 U.S. at 396 (“[C]lients must be held 28 accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys.”). 9 1 Further, aside from being charged with her counsel’s negligence, Plaintiff herself 2 knew of Mr. Koehler’s repeated failures to comply with this Court’s orders since this case 3 was dismissed with prejudice in April of 2012. Plaintiff admits being “promptly advised” 4 that the Court had dismissed her action against Defendant due to Mr. Koehler’s “failure 5 to file a response or seek other relief from the Court.” (See Brafman Decl. ¶ 3.) She 6 also admits waiting throughout 2012 and into 2013 for her attorney to file a motion 7 seeking relief from the dismissal entered in April of 2012. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 7.) Moreover, 8 Plaintiff admits that she not only was aware of her counsel’s persisting medical problems 9 but also knew that Mr. Koehler “was more ill than he gave himself credit, misleading 10 himself into thinking he was more capable of working than he actually was.” (Id. ¶ 5.) 11 Despite this knowledge and dispute the lack of any activity in her case for almost a year, 12 Plaintiff had waited idly and made no effort to seek relief from judgment earlier or to find 13 a new attorney to represent her. Accordingly, the Court finds that, under the 14 circumstances of this case, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that her delay in seeking relief 15 under Rule 60(b)(1) was reasonable. 16 Finally, the Court finds that vacating judgment entered in this case will be 17 prejudicial to Defendant. As noted above, the Court previously granted Defendant’s First 18 Motion to Dismiss finding that Plaintiff’s claims on the Policy were barred under the 19 applicable statute of limitations, and that the remaining claims were insufficiently pled. 20 (See ECF No. 17.) In light of the circumstances of this case, equity requires that Plaintiff 21 demonstrates how the filing of her opposition to Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss 22 would have affected the ultimate outcome of this litigation. Plaintiff has failed to show 23 that she can present any meaningful opposition to Defendant’s Second Motion to 24 Dismiss if the Court vacates judgment entered against Plaintiff. In the absence of such 25 showing, vacating the judgment would simply delay a final resolution of the matter and 26 thus would be prejudicial to Defendant. 27 /// 28 /// 10 1 In sum, after considering the relevant factors under the totality of circumstances 2 standard, the Court finds that neither Plaintiff nor her attorney acted reasonably in 3 waiting for almost a year to move for relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Because Plaintiff has 4 not brought her Motion to Vacate Judgment within a reasonable time as required under 5 Rule 60(c), the Court denies her Motion as untimely. 6 7 B. Rule 60(b)(6) 8 9 As noted above, Rule 60(b)(6) motions must be brought within a reasonable time. 10 See Fed R. Civ. P. § 60(c). For all the reasons set forth above, including Plaintiff’s 11 admitted knowledge of the judgment dismissing this case with prejudice and knowledge 12 of her attorney’s serious medical problems, it was unreasonable for her to wait for almost 13 a year to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 14 Additionally, to be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6), Plaintiff must demonstrate 15 that extraordinary circumstances beyond her control prevented her from taking timely 16 action to protect her interests. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d at 1049. Plaintiff 17 argues that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is appropriate because Mr. Koehler had “virtually 18 abandoned” her. (ECF No. 30-1 at 14.) The Supreme Court has recently explained: 19 “[A] client cannot be charged with the acts or omissions of an attorney who has 20 abandoned him. Nor can a client be faulted for failing to act on his own behalf when he 21 lacks reason to believe his attorneys of record, in fact, are not representing him.” 22 Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 924 (2012). However, contrary to Plaintiff’s 23 contention, the facts demonstrate that she was never abandoned by Mr. Koehler. 24 Plaintiff’s moving papers and accompanying declarations show that Mr. Koehler 25 promptly advised Plaintiff of the dismissal of this action with prejudice due to his failure to 26 file an opposition to Defendant’s Second Motion to Dismiss, regularly met with Plaintiff 27 throughout 2012, and kept her informed about his efforts to vacate judgment entered 28 against Plaintiff in this case. (See Brafman Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 6, 7.) 11 1 The record also demonstrates that Plaintiff has been fully aware of her counsel’s failure 2 to provide competent representation and has made an informed decision to wait for 3 Mr. Koehler’s health to improve instead of seeking assistance of a competent attorney. 4 In fact, Mr. Koehler continues representing Plaintiff in this litigation. These facts do not 5 support the finding of abandonment or, as Plaintiff claims, “virtual abandonment” by her 6 counsel. 7 In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show any extraordinary 8 circumstances beyond her control that would warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). As 9 amply demonstrated by the record, Plaintiff chose to wait idly for almost a year to take 10 action even though she was fully aware of the dismissal of this case with prejudice in 11 April of 2012 and even though Mr. Koehler’s failures were blatantly obvious. 12 Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(6) Motion. 13 14 CONCLUSION 15 16 17 18 19 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Court Order Entered April 20, 2012 and Judgment Entered April 23, 2012, (ECF No. 30) is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: June 19, 2013 20 21 22 ___________________________________________ MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 23 24 25 26 27 28 12

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