Langston v. Reyes et al

Filing 7

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd on 08/02/11 denying 6 Motion to Proceed IFP. This action is dismissed without prejudice. (Plummer, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WALTER LANGSTON,

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Plaintiff,

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No. CIV S-11-1662 DAD P

vs.

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ARTHURO REYES et al.,

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Defendants.

ORDER

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Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42

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U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

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This proceeding was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule

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302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff has consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant

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to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. No. 4.)

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SCREENING REQUIREMENT

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The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

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against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

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claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

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U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

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A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

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(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

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indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

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490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

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pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

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Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

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Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

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plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

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defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

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(1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must

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contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain

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factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic,

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550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

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allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

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738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all

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doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

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The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

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Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

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actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
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Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

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(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

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meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

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omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

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complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

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actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

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defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

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constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

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(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

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allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

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sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
In the present case, plaintiff has named defense attorney Authuro Reyes and

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deputy district attorney Stephen Choe as the defendants. In his complaint plaintiff alleges that in

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2008, his criminal case was set for trial, and that he chose to represent himself. According to the

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allegations of the complaint, defendant Reyes was supposed to confer with the “pro per

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coordinator” about transferring the appropriate files to plaintiff, but defendant Reyes failed to do

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so in a timely manner. Plaintiff alleges that he felt as though he was being coerced into a plea

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deal without having received the appropriate case files and, ultimately, the California Court of

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Appeal agreed with him when it reversed his conviction. (Compl. & Attachs.)

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On remand to the Sacramento County Superior Court, plaintiff had a newly-

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appointed attorney. However, plaintiff alleges that defendant Reyes still refused to turn over the

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appropriate materials, and defendant Choe encouraged defendant Reyes’ improper conduct. In

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this regard, plaintiff contends that the defendants interfered with his efforts to put forth a defense

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and present an adequate argument during his suppression hearing. Plaintiff claims that the
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defendants have denied him access to the courts in violation of the First and Fourteenth

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Amendments. In terms of relief, plaintiff requests monetary damages. (Id.)

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DISCUSSION

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A civil rights action is the proper mechanism for a prisoner seeking to challenge

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the conditions of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991). In contrast,

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habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner seeking to challenge the fact

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or duration of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Here, plaintiff’s

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allegations and claims imply that the defendants’ conduct resulted in his criminal conviction and

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sentence. However, plaintiff has not indicated that his ultimate conviction has been overturned

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or otherwise invalidated.

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Under these circumstances, the court cannot allow plaintiff to proceed in this civil

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rights action. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“a state prisoner’s § 1983

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action is barred (absent prior invalidation) - no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable

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relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal

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prison proceedings) - if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of

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confinement or its duration.”) (emphasis in original); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (a

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state prisoner may not recover damages under § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional

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imprisonment, or for any other harm caused by “actions whose unlawfulness would render the

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imprisonment invalid,” unless he can prove that the conviction or other basis for confinement has

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been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

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authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a

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writ of habeas corpus). A writ of habeas corpus is plaintiff’s sole remedy by which to attack in

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federal court his state court criminal conviction and sentence, and that remedy may be pursued

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only after he has properly exhausted all of his constitutional claims by presenting them first to the

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California Supreme Court.

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CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 6) is denied; and

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2. This action is dismissed without prejudice.

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DATED: August 2, 2011.

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DAD:9
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