Doe v. Sacramento Dept. of Health and Human Services

Filing 26

ORDER granting in part and denying in part defendants' 20 Motion to Dismiss, signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 3/9/12. All claims against Defendant Ann Edwards in her official capacity are dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff's Eig hth Amendment claim is dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff's state law tort claims are dismissed without leave to amend. Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Equal Protection claim is denied. Defendants must file an answer to the Amended Complaint within 20 days of this order. (Kastilahn, A)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11
12

JOHN DOE, a minor, by his
Guardian Ad Litem, KATHRYN
CLARK,

13
14
15
16
17

Plaintiff,
v.
SACRAMENTO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES-CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES OF
SACRAMENTO COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.

18
19

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 2:11-CV-01767 JAM-JFM
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants County of

20

Sacramento and Ann Edwards’ (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to

21

Dismiss For Failure to State A Claim (Doc. #20).

Plaintiff John

22

Doe (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion (Doc. #23).

Defendants filed

23

a reply (Doc. #24).

24

I.

25

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action originated when Plaintiff filed a complaint with

26

this Court on July 5, 2011 (Doc. #1).

27

amended complaint (the “Amended Complaint”) (Doc. #13) on August

28

26, 2011, which Defendants now seek to partially dismiss.
1

Plaintiff then filed an

The

1

Amended Complaint names Sacramento Department of Health and Human

2

Services-Child Protective Services of Sacramento County and Ann

3

Edwards, the director of that department, as defendants.

4

Amended Complaint also asserts claims against multiple Doe

5

defendants.

6

The

The allegations in the Amended Complaint concern injuries

7

allegedly sustained by Plaintiff when he was in the care of Non-

8

relative Extended Family Members (“NREFMs”).

9

declared a dependent child of Sacramento County Juvenile Court in

Plaintiff was

10

January, 2009.

11

before he was placed with NREFMs Fernando Ramirez and Lace Robinson

12

(“Ramirez/Robinson”).

13

apartment, not a single family home.

14

Plaintiff was placed with two different caregivers

The placement with the NREFMs was in an

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to ensure that his

15

placement with the NREFMs was safe because Defendants apply lower

16

safety standards for apartment placements and placements with

17

NRFEMs.

18

that the Ramirez/Robinson home met federal and state health and

19

safety standards.

20

conduct proper background checks on Robinson and Ramirez.

21

Plaintiff alleges that there was no effort to ensure that the water

22

temperature in the Ramirez/Robinson home was regulated to avoid

23

burns to young children.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants did not properly ensure

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants failed to

24

In early July, 2009, Plaintiff alleges that he sustained

25

second degree burns to 12% of his body when he was left unattended

26

in the bathtub.

27

buttocks, posterior trunk, and lower abdominal wall.

28

hospitalized after the incident.

The burns were allegedly to his groin, scrotum,
Plaintiff was

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers
2

1

from permanent physical and psychological injuries as a result of

2

the incident.

3

Plaintiff alleges that he would not have been injured if

4

Defendants had ensured that the water temperature was properly

5

regulated prior to placing Plaintiff in the home.

6

Plaintiff alleges that the injuries would not have been sustained

7

if Defendants had properly investigated the NREFMs’s backgrounds.

8
9

Further,

Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Plaintiff’s Amended

10

Complaint also references several state laws that were allegedly

11

violated by Defendants.

12

Plaintiff’s federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and

13

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28

14

U.S.C. § 1367.

This Court has jurisdiction over

15
16
17
18
19

II.
A.

OPINION

Legal Standard
1.

Motion to Dismiss

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a

20

claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of

21

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

22

court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw

23

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

24

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

25

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,

26

322 (1972).

27

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

28

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

In considering a motion to dismiss, the

Scheuer v.

Assertions that are mere “legal conclusions,” however,

3

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

1

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

2

plaintiff needs to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief

3

that is plausible on its face.”

4

Dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim

5

supportable by a cognizable legal theory.

6

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

7

To survive a motion to dismiss, a

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Balistreri v. Pacifica

Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

8

claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the

9

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).

10

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not

11

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not

12

be saved by amendment.”

13

316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

14

B.

15
16

Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc.,

Discussion
1.

Defendant Ann Edwards

Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against Defendant Ann

17

Edwards (“Defendant Edwards”) because she is sued only in her

18

official capacity as the director of a county agency, and as such,

19

the suit is in actuality against the County of Sacramento, the

20

governmental entity that employs her.

21

that Defendant Edwards is sued in her official capacity, but argues

22

that the suit should proceed against her on a Monell theory of

23

liability.

24

Plaintiff does not dispute

When officials of a public entity are sued in their official

25

capacity, it is not a suit against the official, but rather a suit

26

against the entity itself.

27

(1985).

28

or county when constitutional deprivations occur as a result of a

Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–72

Monell liability attaches to a municipality such as a city

4

1

governmental custom or formal policy.

Monell v. Dep't of Soc.

2

Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).

3

In this case, Defendant Edwards is sued in her official

4

capacity, which amounts to a suit against the County of Sacramento

5

under Brandon.

6

theory of liability should proceed is not without merit, but it is

7

inapplicable to the present situation.

8

Monell theory to proceed against Defendant Edwards is the same as

9

permitting it to proceed against the County.

Plaintiff’s argument that discovery under a Monell

Allowing discovery on a

Therefore, Defendant

10

Edwards’ inclusion in this lawsuit is duplicative of the County’s

11

insofar as her liability is predicated upon a Monell theory of

12

liability.

13

indicate that Defendant Edwards is liable on any other theory of

14

liability under § 1983 or otherwise, and she is therefore dismissed

15

from this action.

16

futile and, therefore, the dismissal is with prejudice.

17

2.

18
19

The Amended Complaint contains no allegations that

It is clear that further amendment would be

Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment Substantive Due Process
Claim

Plaintiff generally claims that as a dependent child of the

20

County of Sacramento, he may assert a claim under the 14th

21

Amendment for his alleged injuries.

22

dismiss his 14th Amendment substantive due process claim in their

23

motion, and accordingly, this claim is not dismissed and will

24

proceed.

25
26

3.

Defendants do not seek to

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim

The Amended Complaint seeks damages for the imposition of

27

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment

28

to the U.S. Constitution.

Defendants argue that this claim is
5

1

inadequately pled because the Eighth Amendment only applies post-

2

conviction.

3

given the allegations in the Amended Complaint.

4

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is dismissed with prejudice.

5
6

Plaintiff agrees that this claim is not appropriate

4.

Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

Defendants move to dismiss any state law tort claims in the

7

Amended Complaint on the grounds that state law presentment

8

prerequisites were not met pursuant to the California Government

9

Tort Claims Act.

Plaintiff responds that state law cannot place

10

presentment requirements upon a federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of

11

action.

12

Plaintiff does not respond to the substance of Defendants’

13

argument, but instead argues that insofar as his claims are based

14

on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they cannot be burdened by additional state

15

law requirements.

16

admission that the Amended Complaint does not contain separate or

17

distinct tort claims under state law, and no such claims were

18

intended.

19

on liability arising from a state law cause of action is dismissed

20

with prejudice and Plaintiff is barred from any recovery under

21

California law.

22
23

The Court interprets Plaintiff’s argument as an

Accordingly, any state law tort claim predicated solely

5.

Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff’s final claim is for denial of the equal protection

24

guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

25

Plaintiff argues that he is a member of three suspect classes:

26

(1) a dependent child of a governmental entity, (2) a dependent

27

child placed with NREFMs, and (3) a dependent child placed in an

28

apartment.

Plaintiff further argues that he was denied the equal
6

1

protection of the laws in comparison with non-dependent children.

2

Plaintiff also argues that Defendants denied him equal protection

3

of the laws as a dependent child placed with NREFMs as compared to

4

dependent children not placed with NREFMs.

5

asserts that he was denied equal protection by Defendants when

6

compared to dependent children placed in single family homes rather

7

than apartments.

8

grounds that Plaintiff makes no allegation in the Amended Complaint

9

that he was treated differently because he was a member of a

10
11

Finally, Plaintiff

Defendants seek to dismiss this claim on the

suspect class.
The “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

12

commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its

13

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is

14

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should

15

be treated alike.”

16

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (internal citations omitted).

17

state action is valid under the Equal Protection Clause so long as

18

it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

19

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr, Inc.
Generally,

Id.

When a suspect class is implicated by state action, however, a

20

higher level of scrutiny is used to determine if the Equal

21

Protection Clause is violated.

22

plaintiff “must show that the defendant acted with an intent or

23

purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership

24

in a protected class.”

25

Elementary Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 1748793, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18,

26

2009).

27

separate elements: (1) that the defendants treated plaintiff

28

differently from others similarly situated; (2) this unequal

Id.

To state such a claim, a

T.A. ex rel. Amador v. McSwain Union

A plaintiff may satisfy this showing by alleging four

7

1

treatment was based on an impermissible classification; (3) the

2

defendants acted with discriminatory intent in applying this

3

classification; and (4) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of

4

the discriminatory classification.

5

Id.

The Amended Complaint clearly alleges that Plaintiff, as both

6

a dependent child placed with NREFMs and as a dependent child

7

placed in an apartment, was treated differently from those

8

dependent children who were respectively placed with related family

9

members and those placed in single family homes.

The Amended

10

Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff suffered injury.

11

can then proceed only if (1) Plaintiff alleges that he was a member

12

of a suspect classification and Defendants intentionally treated

13

him unequally on that basis, or in the absence of a suspect

14

classification (2) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants treated

15

Plaintiff differently from others similarly situated without a

16

rational basis founded in a legitimate state interest.

17
18

(a)

The claim

Suspect Classification

A suspect classification is one that is “more likely than

19

others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative

20

rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.”

21

Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.14 (1982).

22

historical matter, often been subject to discrimination; they may

23

exhibit immutable characteristics that identify them as a member of

24

a particular group; or they may be a politically powerless

25

minority.

26

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-314,

27

96 S. Ct. 2562, 2566-2567, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976)).

28

Plyler v.

Such classes have, as a

Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (citing

In this case, the Amended Complaint is devoid of allegations
8

1

to support a finding that Plaintiff is a member of a suspect

2

classification.

3

received certain treatment based on his placement with NREFMs and

4

in an apartment, there is simply no basis upon which the Court can

5

find that it was due to his membership in a suspect class.

6

Further, there are no grounds in the Amended Complaint upon which

7

the Court can find that dependent children placed with NREFMs or in

8

apartment buildings constitute a suspect class.

9

Plaintiff has not stated an equal protection claim based on

10

Accordingly,

membership in a suspect class.

11
12

While it is clearly alleged that Plaintiff

(b)

Plaintiffs Claim and Rational Basis Review

Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because

13

it was the NREFMs who were treated differently based on state

14

classification, not Plaintiff.

15

treated him differently based on his placement with NREFMs and in

16

an apartment.

17

Plaintiff responds that Defendants

The Court finds that Plaintiff clearly alleges that he was

18

placed in an unsafe home because Defendants do not ensure the same

19

level of safety for those placed with NREFMs or in apartments as

20

they do for those placed in single family homes or with close

21

relatives, pursuant to their customary practices or policies.

22

Amended Compl., at 5.

23

to determine whether or not the alleged practices of Defendants

24

actually pass a rational basis review.

25

to dismiss stage, the Court is required to accept the allegations

26

as true.

27

deny the allegations or even proffer a legitimate state interest

28

for a two-class safety policy for dependent children, if they

At this stage it is not proper for the Court

First of all, at the motion

Secondly, Defendants have not yet had the opportunity to

9

1

indeed adhere to one.

2

the County arbitrarily and without basis provides lower levels of

3

safety to individuals in Plaintiff’s position, such state action

4

would be prohibited by the 14th Amendment.

5

450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (state action that creates a

6

classification must, at the minimum, be rationally related to a

7

legitimate state interest.).

8
9

If Plaintiff, however, is able to prove that

Schweiker v. Wilson,

The Court’s holding is supported by the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Fajardo v. Cnty. of L.A.

179 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1999).

10

In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that the Plaintiffs had

11

stated a claim pursuant to the equal protection clause by alleging

12

that a sheriff gave priority to non-domestic violence 911 calls

13

over domestic violence related calls.

14

by state-action was not related to a suspect class, but the Fajardo

15

court ruled that if there was no rational basis upon which the

16

distinction between the classes was made by the sheriff, it was

17

constitutionally impermissible.

18

classification is directly analogous to the classification alleged

19

in this case.

20
21

The classification created

Id. at 701.

The Fajardo 911 call

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim.

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

III. ORDER
After careful review of all of the documents filed in support
of and in opposition to this motion, the Court rules as follows:
1.

All claims against Defendant Ann Edwards in her official

capacity are dismissed without leave to amend;
2.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is dismissed without
10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

leave to amend;
3.

Plaintiff’s state law tort claims are dismissed without

leave to amend; and
4.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Equal

Protection claim is denied.
Defendants must file an answer to the Amended Complaint within 20
days of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 9, 2012

____________________________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
11