Newfarmer-Fletcher v. County of Sierra et al

Filing 29

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 7/9/12 ORDERING the Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants' Motion to Dismiss: (1) All causes of action against the Sierra County Department of Human Services/Social Services; and (2) Plaintiff's first cause of action for due process violations. The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE: (1) The second cause of action for slander; and (2) The third cause of action for invasion of privacy. (Matson, R)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

JEAN NEWFARMER-FLETCHER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
COUNTY OF SIERRA, a California
)
Municipality, SIERRA COUNTY
)
DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES/SOCIAL
)
SERVICES DEPARTMENT, a
)
government agency organized and )
existing pursuant to the law and )
policy of the COUNTY OF SIERRA, )
CAROL ROBERTS, Director of the
)
DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, JAMES
)
MARKS, LARRY ALLEN, VAN MADDOX, )
JODI BENSON, CAROL IMAN, and
)
DOES 1-50,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No. 2:11-CV-02054 JAM-CKD
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTON TO DISMISS

Before the Court is Defendants’ County of Sierra, Sierra

23

County Department of Human Services/Social Services Department,

24

Carol Roberts (“Roberts”), James Marks (“Marks”), Larry Allen

25

(“Allen”), Van Maddox (“Maddox”), and Jodi Benson (“Benson”),

26

(collectively “Defendants”), Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #24) the

27

Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #23) filed by Plaintiff Jean

28

Newfarmer-Fletcher (“Plaintiff”).
1

Plaintiff opposes the motion

1

(Doc. #25).1

2
3

I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND & FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

4

Plaintiff filed her Complaint (Doc. #1) on August 1, 2011.

5

After Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #6), Plaintiff

6

filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. #12).

7

again filed their Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #17).

8

the Motion to Dismiss, but allowed Plaintiff leave to amend four of

9

her claims (Doc. #22).

Defendants

The Court granted

Plaintiff now alleges three causes of

10

action in her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Doc. #23): (1) Due

11

Process Violations (as against Roberts and Does 1-50); (2) Slander

12

(against all Defendants); and (3) Invasion of Privacy (against

13

Roberts, Marks, and Does 1-50).

14

Plaintiff is a social worker employed by Sierra County.

In

15

approximately May 2010, Plaintiff alleges that she participated in

16

the initiation of a child dependency proceeding previously handled

17

by Benson, another social worker at Sierra County Health and Human

18

Services.

19

case was inaccurate and contained unspecified false information.

20

Plaintiff alleges she reported her findings to her direct

21

supervisor, Marks.

22

inappropriate personal relationship with Benson and as a result of

23

this relationship, Plaintiff alleges that she was targeted by

24

Benson and Marks.

25

Roberts, the Director of Health and Human Services in Sierra County

26

and Curtis, an unknown party not named in this lawsuit.

Plaintiff believed that Benson’s prior handling of the

Plaintiff alleges that Marks was in an

Plaintiff alleges she was also harassed by

27
1

28

This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled
for June 6, 2012.
2

1

Plaintiff’s allegations stem from two key events:

2

(1) In approximately June 2010, Plaintiff alleges that she received

3

telephone calls from her clients who asked why Defendant Carol

4

Iman, a union representative for California United Homecare Workers

5

Union, was visiting them to obtain negative information about her.

6

Plaintiff further alleges that Marks and Benson also approached her

7

clients to illicit information to utilize against her.

8

avers that Defendants told County Counsel and the Board of

9

Supervisors that Plaintiff had multiple complaints from her clients

10

and was incompetent in her job; and (2) On or about April 8, 2011,

11

Plaintiff alleges that she was forced to submit to an alcohol test

12

at the direction of Roberts without a reasonable suspicion

13

providing a basis for the test.

14

occurred at the Sheriff’s Department in a room with clear glass

15

windows, visible to the public, and not in private.

16

alleges that Roberts discussed the fact that Plaintiff underwent

17

the alcohol test in the presence of other co-workers and that this

18

information was released to the editor of the local newspaper, the

19

Mountain Messenger. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants

20

refused to provide her with copies of the test results so that she

21

could contest the legitimacy of the alcohol test through grievance

22

procedures.

Plaintiff

Plaintiff alleges that the test

Plaintiff

23
24
25
26
27
28

II.
A.

OPINION

Legal Standard
1.

Motion to Dismiss

A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of
3

1

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the

2

court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw

3

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

4

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

5

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,

6

322 (1972).

7

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

8

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

9

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Scheuer v.

Assertions that are mere “legal conclusions,” however,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

To survive a motion to dismiss, a

10

plaintiff needs to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief

11

that is plausible on its face.”

12

Dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim

13

supportable by a cognizable legal theory.

14

Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

15

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Balistreri v. Pacifica

Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

16

claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the

17

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).

18

“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not

19

appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not

20

be saved by amendment.”

21

316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

22
23

2.

Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc.,

Section 1983

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are brought under 42

24

U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”).

25

action against state actors for the deprivation of

26
27
28

To prevail in a Section 1983 civil

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, a plaintiff must show that
(1) acts by the defendants (2) under color of state
law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges
or immunities and (4) caused him damage. Section
1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,
4

1
2
3
4

but merely provides a method for vindicating federal
rights elsewhere conferred. Accordingly, the
conduct complained of must have deprived the
plaintiff of some right, privilege or immunity
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.

5

Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir.

6

2005) (internal citations omitted).

7
8

B.

Claims for Relief
1.

9
10

Sierra County Department of Human Services/Social
Services

Defendants argue that the Department of Human Services/Social

11

Services (“DHSSS”) should be dismissed with prejudice because under

12

Section 1983 Plaintiff may not pursue claims against municipal

13

departments.

14

this Court dismissed all claims against the County of Sierra with

15

prejudice, DHSSS should also be dismissed because it would be

16

redundant to suing the County itself.

17

any authority, that DHSSS is a proper defendant because the Court

18

only dismissed the claims against the County of Sierra, not DHSS.

19

Municipal departments of a public entity, such as DHSSS, are

In the alternative, Defendants argue that because

Plaintiff replies, without

20

not subject to suit under Section 1983.

21

Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995-96 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

22

party for Plaintiff’s claims is the County of Sierra, which the

23

Court already dismissed with prejudice.

24

GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss DHSSS.

25

2.

Vance v. Cnty. Of Santa
The correct

Accordingly, the Court

Due Process Violations

26

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead any facts

27

regarding the procedural due process claim against Marks or Benson.

28

Plaintiff concedes that they can be dismissed from this claim.
5

1

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Marks

2

and Benson from the Due Process Claim WITH PREJUDICE.

3

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to

4

support a violation of her due process rights by Roberts.

In the

5

alternative, Defendants argue that Roberts is entitled to qualified

6

immunity.

7

procedural due process.

8

she has a property interest in not having her body arbitrarily

9

subjected to alcohol testing; she had no notice of the testing; and

10

Roberts refused to provide a copy of the results after the alcohol

11

testing was done with the intent to interfere with her ability to

12

utilize the grievance procedure.

Plaintiff counters that she pleads the elements of
Without citing authority, she argues that

13

As discussed in the Court’s previous Order, Plaintiff must

14

allege (1) she possesses a liberty or property interest, Bd. of

15

Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); (2) she was

16

deprived of that interest by government action; Gilbert v. Homar,

17

520 U.S. 924 (1997); and (3) the deprivation occurred without

18

adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.

19

held that Plaintiff can maintain this cause of action only if she

20

can plead the elements of the due process violation and allege how

21

she was denied due process despite voluntarily foregoing the

22

grievance process.

23

Id.

The Court

Plaintiff fails to point to any facts in the SAC or proffer

24

any argument to suggest that she was deprived of constitutionally-

25

protected property.

26

suggest that as a result of the test, Plaintiff lost her job or was

27

subject to any type of discipline that would be a constitutionally-

28

protected property interest.

Plaintiff does not plead any facts that

Her argument that she has a property
6

1

interest in not having her body arbitrarily subjected to alcohol

2

testing lacks any authority.

3

that she was deprived of constitutionally-protected property and

4

thus fails to plead the elements of her due process violation

5

claim.

6

In sum, Plaintiff has not alleged

Furthermore, Plaintiff still does not allege how she was

7

denied due process despite voluntarily foregoing the grievance

8

process.

9

procedural safeguards in place and available to her.

Plaintiff does not dispute that there were adequate
Moreover, the

10

policies of the County of Sierra clearly reflect that Plaintiff had

11

many options available to her to pursue her grievance claim – none

12

of which required documentary evidence.2

13

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Cause of Action WITH

14

PREJUDICE.

15

due process claim, it need not reach whether Roberts is entitled to

16

qualified immunity.

17

3.

18

Accordingly, the Court

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff does not have a

Jurisdiction

“The district court[] may decline to exercise supplemental

19

jurisdiction . . . if [it] has dismissed all claims over which it

20

has original jurisdiction.”

21

pendent jurisdiction to hear state claims is within the discretion

22

of the federal district court.”

23

Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1992).

24

to remand, the court should consider “the values of judicial

25

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”

28 U.S.C. § 1367.

“The exercise of

Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac.
When determining whether

Carnegie-Mellon Univ.

26
2

27
28

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in
Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #24)
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2). Accordingly, the
Court takes notice of the provided excerpts of the official Sierra
County Employee Handbook.
7

1
2

v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims

3

with prejudice, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

4

over the remaining state law claims. Accordingly, these claims are

5

dismissed and may be re-filed in state court if Plaintiff so

6

chooses.

7
8
9

III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above,

10

The Court GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss:

11

(1)

12
13
14

All causes of action against the Sierra County Department

of Human Services/Social Services; and
(2)

Plaintiff’s first cause of action for due process

violations.

15

The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE:

16

(1)

The second cause of action for slander; and

17

(2)

The third cause of action for invasion of privacy.

18

IT IS SO ORDERED.

19

Dated:

July 9, 2012

____________________________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8