Newfarmer-Fletcher v. County of Sierra et al

Filing 36

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 10/22/2012 DENYING, as inappropriate, Defendants' 31 Motion for Attorney Fees. (Michel, G)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEAN NEWFARMER-FLETCHER, 12 2:11-CV-02054 JAM-CKD Plaintiff, 13 14 No. v. COUNTY OF SIERRA, et al., 15 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES Defendants. 16 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ County of 17 18 Sierra, Sierra County Department of Human Services/Social 19 Services Department, Carol Roberts, James Marks, Larry Allen, Van 20 Maddox, and Jodi Benson, (collectively “Defendants”), Motion for 21 Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Doc. #31). 22 Plaintiff Janis Starkey (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion (Doc. 23 #33).1 24 // 25 For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is denied. // 26 27 28 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was originally scheduled for October 3, 2012. 1 1 2 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND & FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS Plaintiff sued Defendants alleging civil rights violations 3 and state tort violations (Doc. #1). After Defendants filed a 4 Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #6), Plaintiff filed her First Amended 5 Complaint (Doc. #12). 6 Dismiss (Doc. #17), which the Court granted but allowed Plaintiff 7 leave to amend four of her claims (Doc. #22). 8 filed her Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #23), Defendants moved 9 once more to dismiss (Doc. #24). Defendants again filed their Motion to Once Plaintiff The Court issued an order on 10 July 9, 2012, dismissing all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims 11 (Doc. #29). 12 Plaintiff’s related state law claims for slander and invasion of 13 privacy because it declined to exercise jurisdiction over those 14 claims, and they were dismissed without prejudice. The Court, however, did not reach the merits on 15 16 II. OPINION 17 A. Legal Standard for Award Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 18 Normally, “a district court may in its discretion award 19 attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant [pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 20 § 1988] upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, 21 unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in 22 subjective bad faith.” 23 Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978). 24 bringing of cases with no foundation in law or facts at the 25 outset” can give rise to an award of fees to a prevailing 26 defendant under § 1988. 27 Superintendent of Sch., 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1986). Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Mitchell v. Office of L.A. Cnty. 28 2 “[T]he 1 A defendant seeking fees has the burden to “establish that 2 fees are attributable solely to the frivolous claims,” which “is 3 from a practical standpoint extremely difficult to carry.” 4 Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th 5 Cir. 2012) (quoting Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior Court, 631 6 F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2011)). 7 B. Discussion 8 Defendants contend that they are entitled to fees under 9 § 1988 because all the claims were dismissed and because the 10 claims were frivolous. 11 unwarranted because there was no bad faith as required under 28 12 U.S.C. § 1927. 13 not seeking attorney’s fees under § 1927, and therefore, bad 14 faith is not required. 15 Plaintiff argues that attorney’s fees are In Defendants’ reply, they clarify that they are For purposes of this present motion, Defendants have not met 16 their burden to show that the fees requested arise solely from 17 Plaintiff’s dismissed civil rights claim, and it is probably 18 impossible for them to do so. 19 Defendants moved for and achieved a dismissal with prejudice of 20 all claims except the slander and invasion of privacy claims, 21 which were dismissed without prejudice. 22 and invasion of privacy claims were dismissed in an earlier 23 order, but with leave to amend, which means the claims could have 24 been saved by amendment. Thus, it is unclear whether those 25 claims were meritorious. Additionally, Plaintiff’s civil rights 26 claim and state tort claims are intertwined because the state law 27 claims are based on the conduct that Plaintiff alleges was 28 retaliatory in her § 1983 claim. See Harris, 631 F.3d at 968. Moreover, the slander Therefore, a fee award would be 3 1 inappropriate. 2 fee award is not available for frivolous claims intertwined with 3 non-frivolous claims). 4 See Braunstein, 683 F.3d at 118 (holding that a Further, even if the claims could be separated, the 5 declaration submitted in support of the present motion makes no 6 distinction between the fees expended on the civil rights claims 7 and the fees expended on the slander and invasion of privacy 8 claims. 9 each motion is not enough to satisfy Defendants’ burden. Dividing the fees by the hours each attorney worked on See 10 Harris, 631 F.3d at 971. It is also impossible to adequately 11 distinguish the different claims from the statement of the 12 services rendered because in the statement, the hours expended 13 are not separated by claim. 14 Declaration of Kristina M. Hall, Doc #31. Statement, Exhibit A to the 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 III. ORDER For the foregoing reasons, a fee award under § 1988 is inappropriate. Defendants’ motion is therefore DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: October 22, 2012 ____________________________ JOHN A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4

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