Newfarmer-Fletcher v. County of Sierra et al

Filing 36

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 10/22/2012 DENYING, as inappropriate, Defendants' 31 Motion for Attorney Fees. (Michel, G)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JEAN NEWFARMER-FLETCHER,

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2:11-CV-02054 JAM-CKD

Plaintiff,

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No.

v.
COUNTY OF SIERRA, et al.,

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ County of

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Sierra, Sierra County Department of Human Services/Social

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Services Department, Carol Roberts, James Marks, Larry Allen, Van

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Maddox, and Jodi Benson, (collectively “Defendants”), Motion for

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Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Doc. #31).

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Plaintiff Janis Starkey (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion (Doc.

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#33).1

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For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is denied.

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
originally scheduled for October 3, 2012.
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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND & FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff sued Defendants alleging civil rights violations

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and state tort violations (Doc. #1).

After Defendants filed a

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Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #6), Plaintiff filed her First Amended

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Complaint (Doc. #12).

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Dismiss (Doc. #17), which the Court granted but allowed Plaintiff

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leave to amend four of her claims (Doc. #22).

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filed her Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #23), Defendants moved

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once more to dismiss (Doc. #24).

Defendants again filed their Motion to

Once Plaintiff

The Court issued an order on

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July 9, 2012, dismissing all of Plaintiff’s remaining claims

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(Doc. #29).

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Plaintiff’s related state law claims for slander and invasion of

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privacy because it declined to exercise jurisdiction over those

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claims, and they were dismissed without prejudice.

The Court, however, did not reach the merits on

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II. OPINION

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A.

Legal Standard for Award Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988

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Normally, “a district court may in its discretion award

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attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant [pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1988] upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous,

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unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in

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subjective bad faith.”

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Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).

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bringing of cases with no foundation in law or facts at the

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outset” can give rise to an award of fees to a prevailing

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defendant under § 1988.

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Superintendent of Sch., 805 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1986).

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal

Mitchell v. Office of L.A. Cnty.

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“[T]he

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A defendant seeking fees has the burden to “establish that

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fees are attributable solely to the frivolous claims,” which “is

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from a practical standpoint extremely difficult to carry.”

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Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1189 (9th

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Cir. 2012) (quoting Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior Court, 631

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F.3d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 2011)).

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B.

Discussion

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Defendants contend that they are entitled to fees under

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§ 1988 because all the claims were dismissed and because the

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claims were frivolous.

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unwarranted because there was no bad faith as required under 28

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U.S.C. § 1927.

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not seeking attorney’s fees under § 1927, and therefore, bad

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faith is not required.

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Plaintiff argues that attorney’s fees are

In Defendants’ reply, they clarify that they are

For purposes of this present motion, Defendants have not met

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their burden to show that the fees requested arise solely from

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Plaintiff’s dismissed civil rights claim, and it is probably

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impossible for them to do so.

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Defendants moved for and achieved a dismissal with prejudice of

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all claims except the slander and invasion of privacy claims,

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which were dismissed without prejudice.

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and invasion of privacy claims were dismissed in an earlier

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order, but with leave to amend, which means the claims could have

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been saved by amendment.

Thus, it is unclear whether those

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claims were meritorious.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s civil rights

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claim and state tort claims are intertwined because the state law

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claims are based on the conduct that Plaintiff alleges was

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retaliatory in her § 1983 claim.

See Harris, 631 F.3d at 968.

Moreover, the slander

Therefore, a fee award would be
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inappropriate.

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fee award is not available for frivolous claims intertwined with

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non-frivolous claims).

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See Braunstein, 683 F.3d at 118 (holding that a

Further, even if the claims could be separated, the

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declaration submitted in support of the present motion makes no

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distinction between the fees expended on the civil rights claims

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and the fees expended on the slander and invasion of privacy

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claims.

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each motion is not enough to satisfy Defendants’ burden.

Dividing the fees by the hours each attorney worked on
See

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Harris, 631 F.3d at 971.

It is also impossible to adequately

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distinguish the different claims from the statement of the

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services rendered because in the statement, the hours expended

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are not separated by claim.

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Declaration of Kristina M. Hall, Doc #31.

Statement, Exhibit A to the

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III. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, a fee award under § 1988 is
inappropriate.

Defendants’ motion is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 22, 2012

____________________________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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