Hoover v. Doyle et al
Filing
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ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 11/21/2011 ORDERING that petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is SUMMARILY DISMISSED; the court DECLINES TO ISSUE a COA; and the clerk is to enter judgment and close this case. CASE CLOSED. (Yin, K)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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CROSSAN D. HOOVER, Jr.,
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Petitioner,
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No. CIV S-11-2064-CMK-P
vs.
ORDER
ROBERT DOYLE, et al.,
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Respondents.
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/
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Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this petition for a writ of
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habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the denial of parole. Petitioner has
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consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and no other party has
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been served or appeared in the action.
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On September 2, 2011, the court directed petitioner to show cause in writing why
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his petition should not be summarily dismissed. In response, petitioner argues that contrary to
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the court’s determination, he did not receive proper procedural due process.
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The court set forth the following in the September 2, 2011, order to show cause:
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[T]he United States Supreme Court recently observed:
Whatever liberty interest exists [in parole] is, of course, a state
interest. There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be
conditionally released [on parole] before the expiration of a valid
sentence, and the States are under no duty to offer parole to their
prisoners. Id. at 7. When, however, a State creates a liberty
interest, the Due Process Clause requires fair procedures for its
vindication – and federal courts will review the application of
those constitutionally required procedures. . . .
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Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 859, 862 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)) (emphasis in original).
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The Court held:
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. . . In the context of parole, we have held that the
procedures required are minimal. In Greenholtz, we found that a
prisoner subject to a parole statute similar to California’s received
adequate process when he was allowed an opportunity to be heard
and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was
denied. 442 U.S. at 16. “The Constitution,” we held, “does not
require more.” Ibid. Cooke and Clay received at least this amount
of process: They were allowed to speak at their parole hearings and
to contest the evidence against them, were afforded access to their
records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole
was denied. (citations omitted).
That should have been the beginning and the end of the
federal habeas courts’ inquiry into whether Cook and Clay received
due
process. . . .
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Id.
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The Court added that “[n]o opinion of ours supports converting
California’s ‘some evidence’ rule into a substantive federal requirement”
and “. . . it is no federal concern . . . whether California’s ‘some evidence’
rule of judicial review (a procedure beyond what the Constitution
demands) was correctly applied” because “a ‘mere error of state law’ is not
a denial of due process.” Id. at 862-63 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 121, n.21 (1982)). Thus, in cases challenging the denial of parole, the
only issue subject to federal habeas review is whether the inmate received
the procedural due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be
heard. There is no other clearly established federal constitutional right in
the context of parole.
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Here, to the extent petitioner claims that the decision to deny
parole was not based on “some evidence” or otherwise failed to satisfy
substantive due process, the claim is foreclosed as a matter of law because
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there is no clearly established federal constitutional substantive due
process right in parole. To the extent petitioner claims that he was not
provided the minimal procedural due process protections of notice and an
opportunity to be heard, the petition must be denied because it is clear on
the face of the petition and documents attached thereto that petitioner was
provided the minimum procedural protections guaranteed by the federal
constitution.
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Petitioner argues that based on recent California law, so called “Marshy’s Law,”
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he did not receive the procedural due process he was entitled. This argument, however, is based
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on California law, which in a federal habeas action is not the standard. Rather, a writ of habeas
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corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of a transgression of federal law
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binding on the state courts. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985);
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Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is not available for alleged error in
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the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v.
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Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir.
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1986).
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However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the
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Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so
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infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.”
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Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th
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Cir. 1980)); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). In order to raise such a
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claim in a federal habeas corpus petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete
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miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Crisafi v. Oliver, 396
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F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968); Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1960).
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As set forth above, a federal habeas court is only to determine whether a prisoner
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challenging a denial of parole decision has received the minimal amount of procedural due
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process of an opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. No
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further inquiry is to be conducted. Petitioner’s statement that this court should inquire whether
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additional state law protections were granted goes beyond the scope of federal habeas review.
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Petitioner received the minimum procedural protections guaranteed by the federal
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constitution. Accordingly, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus shall be summarily dismissed.
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Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the
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court has considered whether to issue a certificate of appealability. Before petitioner can appeal
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this decision, a certificate of appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P.
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22(b). Where the petition is denied on the merits, a certificate of appealability may issue under
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28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
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constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The court must either issue a certificate of
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appealability indicating which issues satisfy the required showing or must state the reasons why
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such a certificate should not issue. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Where the petition is dismissed
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on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability “should issue if the prisoner can show: (1)
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‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
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procedural ruling’; and (2) ‘that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
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states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.’” Morris v. Woodford, 229 F.3d 775,
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780 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000)).
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For the reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations, the court finds
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that issuance of a certificate of appealability is not warranted in this case.
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
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Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is summarily dismissed;
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The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability; and
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3.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case.
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DATED: November 21, 2011
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CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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