Gooden v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc., et al.,

Filing 109

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 12/11/2013 DENYING in its entirety 80 Motion for Class Certification. (Michel, G)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SHEILA GOODEN, an individual;
and MICHELLE HALL, an
individual,

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Plaintiffs,

No.

2:11-cv-02595-JAM-DAD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

v.
SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC., a
Virginia corporation,

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Defendant.
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This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Sheila

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Gooden and Michelle Hall’s (“named Plaintiffs”) Motion for Class

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Certification (Doc. #83-1) pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal

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Rules of Civil Procedure.

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(“Defendant”) opposes the motion (Doc. #91), and Plaintiffs

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replied (Doc. #105-2).

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November 15, 2013.

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with respect to certain of the proposed classes and took the

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Motion under submission as to certain other proposed classes.

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The Court, in this Order, reaffirms its decision stated at the

Defendant SunTrust Mortgage, Inc.

A hearing on this Motion was held on

At the hearing, the Court denied this Motion

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November 15, 2013 hearing and, for the reasons set forth below,

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denies Plaintiffs’ motion in its entirety.

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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action originated when named Plaintiff Gooden filed her

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complaint in this Court on September 30, 2011.

Gooden alleges

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that she obtained a mortgage from Defendant in June 2005 to

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refinance the existing debt on her property.

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property is located at 632 S. Murdock, Willows, California 95988.

Plaintiff Gooden’s

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According to Plaintiff, the terms of the mortgage agreement

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required Plaintiff Gooden to purchase hazard and flood insurance

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coverage in an amount at least equal to the replacement value of

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the improvements on the property or the principal balance of the

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mortgage, whichever was less.

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maintained coverage on the property between $130,130 and $161,960

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at all times.

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Plaintiff alleges that she

Plaintiff Gooden alleges that in October 2010, after six

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years of carrying the same amount of insurance, Defendant

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determined without explanation that her existing insurance

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coverage was inadequate.

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Defendant force placed additional flood and hazard insurance on

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her property and sent her a mortgage bill that contained line

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item charges for the premiums of the additional coverage.

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Defendant contends that the line item charges did not include a

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force placed hazard policy.

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Gooden alleges that in March 2011,

On June 19, 2013, Plaintiff Gooden was granted leave to

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amend the complaint (Doc. #62).

The First Amended Complaint

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(“FAC”) expanded the class on whose behalf the second and third
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causes of action are being brought and added named Plaintiff Hall

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to the litigation (Doc. #63).

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The FAC alleges that in August 2008 Hall refinanced her

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mortgage on her property at 3229 Glennon Place, Bronx, New York

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10465 with Defendant.

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hazard insurance on Plaintiff Hall despite the fact that she

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already had adequate insurance.

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these claims and admitted that the hazard policy discussed in the

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FAC was not actually force placed.

Plaintiffs allege Defendant force placed

However, Hall has reconsidered

Hall does further allege that

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Defendant force placed unnecessary flood insurance policies on

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her home.

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This Court granted Defendant’s most recent Motion to Dismiss

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(Doc. #88), rejecting Plaintiffs’ theory that the loan documents

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set a contractual maximum on the amount of hazard insurance that

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could be required of the borrowers.

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discretionary language in the documents controlled.

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further found that the fourth cause of action alleging violation

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of Cal. Civ. Code § 2955.5 would be dismissed insofar as it

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alleged a violation based on force placing coverage exceeding the

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outstanding loan balance, rather than replacement value.

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The Court found that the
The Court

The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal causes

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of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the related state law

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claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

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II.

OPINION

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A.

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Defendant has asked the Court to judicially notice two

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documents.

Judicial Notice

The first is a “Brief for the United States as Amicus
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Curiae Supporting Appellees,” submitted by the United States

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Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban

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Affairs in a case pending in the Eleventh Circuit.

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#97) at 1, Exh. A.

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2006-2012,” issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal

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Reserve System.

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request.

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RJN (Doc.

The second is a “Consumer Compliance Handbook

Id., Exh. B.

Plaintiffs have not opposed the

The Court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject
to reasonable dispute because it is either generally known within

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the Court’s jurisdiction, or can be accurately and readily

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determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably

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questioned.

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Fed. R. Evid. 201.

“As the brief is not a ‘fact,’ legal or adjudicative, but

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only legal argument, Fed. R. Evid. 201 is not a bar.”

Natural

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Res. Def. Council v. Sw. Marine, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1237-

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43 (S.D. Cal. 1999) aff'd, 236 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2000).

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Court takes notice of the amicus brief as persuasive argument.

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The government handbook is a government publication providing

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guidance on consumer compliance and flood insurance regulation.

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The Court also takes notice of the handbook.

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Ctr. of S. California v. City of Los Angeles, CV 12-0551 FMO

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PJWX, 2013 WL 5424291, at *13 (C.D. Cal. 2013).

The

See Indep. Living

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B.

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Plaintiffs seek to certify the following classes:

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Proposed Classes

1.

Nationwide Hazard Insurance Class (1st Cause of
Action)

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All persons who have or had loans with Defendant secured by
residential property in the United States who were force placed
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for hazard insurance in excess of the lesser of (1) the

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replacement cost of the property or (2) the greater of the unpaid

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principal balance at the time of force placement and 80% of the

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replacement cost of the property on or after September 30, 2010.

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///
2.

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Nationwide Flood Insurance Class (2nd Cause of
Action)

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All persons who have or had loans with Defendant, secured by
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residential property in the United States, who were force placed
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for flood insurance in excess of the amount required under the
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Flood Disaster Protection Act, on or after June 19, 2012.
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3.
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Breach of Contract Hazard Classes (3rd Cause of
Action)

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This class is broken into two sub-classes revolving around
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hazard insurance forced placed in excess of what was required by
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Plaintiffs’ contracts.

This class was limited by this Court’s

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ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #88).

Reply (Doc.

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#105-2) at p. 2.
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a. California Breach of Contract Sub-Class
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All persons who have or had loans with Defendant, secured by
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residential property in the state of California, who were force
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placed for hazard insurance in excess of the replacement cost of
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the property on or after September 30, 2007.
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b. New York Breach of Contract Sub-Class
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All persons who have or had loans with Defendant, secured by
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residential property in the state of New York, who were force
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placed for hazard insurance in excess of the replacement cost of
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the property on or after June 13, 2007.
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4.

California Hazard Class (4th & 5th Causes of
Action)

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All persons who have or had loans with Defendant, secured by

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residential property in the State of California, who were force

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placed for hazard insurance in an amount greater than the

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replacement cost of the property on or after September 30, 2007.
5.

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California Flood Class (6th Cause of Action)

All persons who have or had loans with Defendant, secured by
residential property in the State of California who were force

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placed for flood insurance in excess of the amount required under

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the Flood Disaster Protection Act on or after September 30, 2007.

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C.

Legal Standard

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According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), a

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plaintiff hoping to certify a class must demonstrate that

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“(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

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impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to

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the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative

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parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

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(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect

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the interests of the class.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

The plaintiff must also meet one of the requirements listed

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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b).

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request the certification of hybrid classes under both Rule

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23(b)(2) and (b)(3), the Court finds the monetary relief sought

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predominates over the injunctive relief being sought rather than

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being incidental to it, and therefore it is most appropriate to

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certify, if at all, under Rule 23(b)(3).

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F.R.D. 242, 247 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
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Although Plaintiffs

In re Paxil Litig., 218

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––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2560-61 (2011).

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only 23(b) requirement at issue in this litigation is: “that the

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questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over

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any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class

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action is superior to other available methods for fairly and

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efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”

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23(b(3).

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Therefore, the

Fed. R. Civ. P.

Certification is proper “only if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of

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Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”

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(internal citations omitted).

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to satisfy Rule 23 is the primary focus of a class certification

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analysis, but that analysis may overlap with the legal and

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factual issues underlying the plaintiff’s claims insofar as the

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practical resolution of those claims relate to the prerequisites

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of Rule 23.

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D.

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Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2551

The ability of the proposed class

Id.

Rule 23 Requirements
1.

Numerosity

Numerosity is satisfied if “the class is so numerous that

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joinder of all members is impracticable.”

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23(a)(1).

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challenged by Defendant and the Court finds it to be clearly met.

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Fed. R. Civ. P.

Plaintiffs’ satisfaction of this requirement is not

2.

Commonality

Commonality is required pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2).

In the

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past, a plaintiff satisfied this element by showing at a minimum

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the “existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual

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predicates” or “a common core of salient facts coupled with

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disparate legal remedies within the class.”
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Hanlon v. Chrysler

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Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Supreme Court clarified what Rule 23(a)(2) requires.

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matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common

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‘questions'—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a

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classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the

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resolution of the litigation.”

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omitted) (emphasis in the original).

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question that meets these criteria satisfies rule 23(a)(2).

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at 2556.

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In Dukes, the
“What

Id. at 2551 (internal quotations
Even a single common
Id.

In addition to the threshold requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), a

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plaintiff seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3) must satisfy

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two additional commonality conditions: (1) “[c]ommon questions

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must ‘predominate over any questions affecting only individual

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members,’ and [(2)] class resolution must be ‘superior to other

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available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

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controversy.’”

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§ 23(b)(3)).

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Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

Under Rule 23(b)(3), plaintiffs seeking to represent a class

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must show that a class action is superior to other methods of

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adjudication considering “the likely difficulties in managing a

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class action.”

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requirement includes consideration of the potential difficulties

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in notifying class members of the suit, calculation of individual

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damages, and distribution of damages.”

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v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1304–305 (9th Cir. 1990).

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

The “manageability

Six (6) Mexican Workers

Since Rule 23(b)(3) is basically a heightened commonality
inquiry, the two analyses are typically made together.

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3.

Typicality

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the claims or defenses of the

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class representative “be typical of the claims or defenses of the

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class.”

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possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class

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members.”

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typicality requirement is satisfied only when “each class

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member’s claim arises from the same course of events, and each

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class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the

“A class representative must be part of the class and

Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2550 (citation omitted).

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defendant’s liability.”

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The

1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011).

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4.

Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d

Adequacy

Rule 23(a)(4) has two requirements: (1) that the named

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plaintiffs and their counsel do not have conflicts of interest

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with the proposed class; and (2) that the named plaintiffs and

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their counsel can prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of

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the class.

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not relevant unless they bear on the existence of conflicts among

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class members or plaintiffs’ ability to vigorously prosecute

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their case.

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Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

5.

Challenges to adequacy are

Id.
Ascertainability

In addition, implicit in Rule 23 is the requirement that the

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classes must be clearly ascertainable.

Quezada v. Loan Ctr. of

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California, Inc., No. 2:08-CIV-00177-WBS-KJM, 2009 WL 5113506, at

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*2 (E.D. Cal. 2009).

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objective, and presently ascertainable.’

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definition specifies “a distinct group of plaintiffs whose

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members [can] be identified with particularity.”’”

“A class definition must be ‘precise,

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‘An adequate class

Id. (internal

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citations omitted).

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D.

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Analysis
1.

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Ascertaining Replacement Value

Defendant’s main argument in the Opposition is that each

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cause of action brought on behalf of the classes requires a

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determination of the replacement value of each of the class

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members’ homes, a calculation that Defendant contends is

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“inherently individualized” and cannot be determined on a class-

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wide basis.

Defendant contends that this results in deficiencies

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in the ascertainability of the classes, and the commonality,

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predominance, and superiority requirements.

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Again, implicit in Rule 23 is the requirement that the

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classes must be clearly ascertainable.

Quezada, 2009 WL 5113506,

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at *2.

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Circuit is that the need for individualized damages calculations

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alone cannot defeat class certification (Yokoyama v. Midland

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Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010)), the

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Supreme Court in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1432-

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33 (2013), found that a plaintiff seeking certification must

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present an adequate model for determining damages on a classwide

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basis in order to meet the predominance requirement.

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be exact but it must present a model that establishes consistency

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between the plaintiff’s damages case with its liability case.

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Id.

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would also be pertinent to a merits determination.

In addition, although the general rule in the Ninth

It need not

This determination must be made even if the court’s analysis
Id.

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Plaintiffs contend the classes are ascertainable by, in

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relevant part, analyzing the replacement cost value of the class

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members’ properties at the time an insurance policy was force
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placed.

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simply use the value that Defendant uses in its own systems for

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determining replacement value.

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not actually calculate replacement cost on its own, but rather

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uses proxies, including a borrower’s “last known voluntary

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coverage amount.”

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contend it does not matter what proxy Defendant uses.

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argue: “Because [Defendant] tracks the data of the amount it uses

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as the proxy, a comparison between the proxy for replacement cost

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can be made in order to determine the maximum amount of insurance

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[Defendant] can force place.”

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of Defendant’s proxies are appropriate for determining whether

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Defendant has force placed insurance in excess of the contractual

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or statutory maximums because it is the same way that Defendant

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tracks its “portfolio of over 800,000 loans to ensure they have

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adequate insurance.”

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MCC at p. 13.

Plaintiffs argue that the Court could

They admit that Defendant does

Id. at p. 14; Reply at pp. 3-4.

MCC at p. 14.

Plaintiffs
They

They argue the use

Reply at p. 4.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ plan to use Defendant’s

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own proxy for replacement value is inappropriate.

It relies on a

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report from its own expert, Richard Baum.

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former Chief Deputy Insurance Commissioner for the California

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Department of Insurance (“CDI”), opines on whether the CDI has

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established a consistent definition for the term “replacement

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cost” and whether that definition requires individualized

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consideration of each dwelling.

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Exh. A at p.1.

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number, but rather one that requires consideration of ever

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changing variables and which “does not lend itself to the simple

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application of previously fixed numbers.”

In the report, Baum, a

Barilovits Decl. (Doc. #92) ¶ 2,

Baum states that replacement cost is not a static

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Id. at p. 3.

He goes

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on to state:

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The Department historically has resisted allowing an
insurer to use previously fixed numbers such as
homeowner’s outstanding loan balance or last selected
coverage amount as a surrogate for replacement
coverage. While such fixed numbers may be equivalent
to replacement cost under some circumstances, under
other circumstances they will not be. . . . There are
simply too many variables that can render the
borrower’s last known voluntary coverage amount an
inaccurate reflection of replacement cost.

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Id.

In addition, Defendant points to regulations recently

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promulgated by the CDI laying out the many factors that should be
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examined in determining replacement value.

See Cal. Code Regs.

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Tit. 10 § 2188.65.
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Plaintiffs’ proffered plan to determine replacement value
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based on Defendant’s proxies raises an issue of first impression.
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The viability of Plaintiffs’ claims hinges on whether or not
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Defendant force placed policies on putative class members in
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excess of replacement value, in violation of contractual language
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and specific statutory law.

Plaintiffs’ plan relies on educated

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guesses as to the replacement value of each home at issue.
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Simply because Defendant uses these proxies to determine the
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amount of insurance it will require of its borrowers as part of
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its own business model does not change the fact that these
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proxies are essentially estimates that do not take into
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consideration the many individual factors that might affect a
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particular home’s replacement value.

Therefore, the Court is

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being asked to ascertain membership in each of these classes,
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determine Defendant’s liability, and calculate the amount of
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damages incurred all based on a shorthand calculation of the
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value of borrowers’ homes.
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Without a more accurate and reliable class wide solution to

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calculating replacement value, ascertaining the classes and

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ultimately determining Defendant’s liability would require the

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Court to examine the individual replacement value of each class

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member’s home to determine if they suffered an actual injury from

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the force placement of policies.

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makes certification of this claim inappropriate.

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Healthcare Corp., 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 629 (Ct. App. 2012).

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other words, because replacement value cannot be determined on a

Such an individualized inquiry
Tien v. Tenet
In

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class wide basis, the claims are not capable of proof at trial

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through evidence common to the class.

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predominate, negating the commonality and superiority

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requirements.

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Accordingly, the Court denies certification of each of the

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classes proposed by Plaintiffs as each would require calculation

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of replacement value.

Individual issues would

See Rule 23; Comcast Corp., 133 S.Ct. at 1432-33.

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Although the Court finds Plaintiffs’ entire motion for class

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certification is fatally flawed on the issue of replacement value

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determination, the Court details below the other grounds upon

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which it finds certification improper.

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2.

TILA Classes

Plaintiffs seek to certify two nationwide classes, one for

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hazard and one for flood insurance, based on their TILA claims in

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the first and second causes of action.

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classes consist of Defendant’s customers, who are asserting

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claims that raise substantially similar issues of law and fact.

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MCC at pp. 16-17.

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whether Defendant violated TILA by failing to make timely

They contend the two

The two claims require determination of

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disclosure of all finance charges, other charges, and third party

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charges imposed in connection with a mortgage loan or line of

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credit.

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Defendant utilized “the same or substantially similar disclosure

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materials and procedures for its customers, irrespective of

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location.”

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See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637, 1637a.

Plaintiffs contend that

The motion was filed before the Court’s ruling on the most

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recent motion to dismiss.

The motion relies on the closing

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instructions to set the maximum amount required of the borrowers.

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However, the Court found that the closing instructions do not

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place a maximum on the amount of hazard insurance that could be

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required, but rather the discretionary clauses in the mortgage

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agreements put it in the sound discretion of Defendant.

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Court further found “[r]elevant state laws and the implied

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covenants included in such agreements place limits on that

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discretion.”

17

Bank N.A., C 12-04026 WHA, 2013 WL 269133, at *8 (N.D. Cal.

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2013).

19

the discretionary clause in Gooden’s Deed of Trust relied on in

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making that ruling extends to various forms of insurance,

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including both hazard and flood insurance.

22

#83-4) Exh. 37, ¶ 5; Gooden Depo. 16:11-18:15.

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discretionary language is found in Hall’s mortgage.

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¶ 5.

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The

MTD (Doc. #88) at p. 8; see Lane v. Wells Fargo

Although that motion dealt with solely hazard insurance,

Buescher Decl. (Doc.
Similar
Id. Exh. 12,

In addition, both agreements contain provisions that provide

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the laws of the jurisdiction in which the property was located

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would apply.

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argues that TILA does not set any kind of maximum amount of flood

Id. ¶ 16; Buescher Decl. Exh. 37, ¶ 16.

14

Defendant

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or hazard insurance that lenders may require.

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therefore contends that the respective state laws governing

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implied contractual covenants, the calculation of replacement

4

value, and limitations on the amount of hazard and flood

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insurance that can be required would control loans in those

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states.

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underlying basis for these claims arises based on the

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circumstances of the individual transactions and the unique

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effect of the individual states’ rules pertaining to them.

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11

Opp. at p. 16.

It

Furthermore, while TILA is a federal statute, the

See

Lane v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 2013 WL 269133, at *14-15.
The Ninth Circuit has held that “the law on predominance

12

requires the district court to consider variations in state law

13

when a class action involves multiple jurisdictions.”

14

AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 728 (9th Cir. 2007).

15

“In a multi-state action, variations in state law may swamp any

16

common issues and defeat predominance.”

17

Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996).

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whether a plaintiff has met its burden, the district court must

19

consider how variations in state law affect predominance and

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superiority and whether plaintiff has presented “a suitable and

21

realistic plan” for addressing them.

22

Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189 (opinion amended on

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denial of reh'g, 273 F.3d 1266) (9th Cir. 2001); see also Lane v.

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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., C 12-04026 WHA, 2013 WL 3187410 (N.D.

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Cal. 2013).

26

Lozano v.

Castano v. Am. Tobacco
Therefore, in determining

Id.; Zinser v. Accufix

In its Motion for Class Certification, Plaintiffs argue that

27

variations in state law are “nonexistent among the classes in

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this case.”

MCC at p. 18.

Defendant points to various examples
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1

of how state laws vary regarding maximums on insurance, the

2

appropriate calculations for replacement value, and the operation

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of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

4

p. 18.

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argument is a single sentence in a footnote contending that

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Defendant’s argument would preclude any national TILA classes.

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Reply at p. 7 n.1.

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Opp. at

In their Reply, Plaintiffs’ only response to this

Because it is unclear how the variations in state law would

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be dealt with, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not met their

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burden to establish the commonality and predominance requirements

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of Rule 23 (a)(1) and (b)(3) for the Nationwide Classes for Flood

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and Hazard Insurance.

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classes is hereby denied on this alternate ground.

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15

3.

Accordingly, certification for the TILA

Typicality and Adequacy: Hazard Insurance Claims

Defendant argues that the named Plaintiffs, Gooden and Hall,

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are neither typical nor adequate.

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there is not sufficient evidence that the named Plaintiffs were

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subjected to force placed hazard insurance, thus undermining Rule

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23 requirements.

20

Opp. at pp. 22-25.

It argues

In her deposition and in the First Amended Complaint, Gooden

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relies on a billing statement, sent to her by Defendant in

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April/May 2011, for her claim that hazard insurance was

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improperly force placed on her property.

24

Barilovits Decl. (Doc. #94-1) Exh. C (Gooden Depo.), 100-123.

25

the statement there are three line items entitled “Hazard

26

Insurance,” “Flood Insurance” and “Addl. Hazard Ins.”

27

Decl. (Doc. #83-4) Exh. 35; MCC at p. 21.

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that the “Addl. Hazard Ins.” line item references a force placed
16

FAC ¶¶ 22-25;
On

Buescher

Plaintiffs contend

1

hazard policy.

2

all category and is actually indicating a charge for additional

3

flood insurance.

4

hazard insurance was ever force placed on Gooden.

5

Defendant contends that the line item is a catch-

It argues there is no basis to believe that

In the Reply, Plaintiffs rely on the deposition testimony of

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Terri Curbeira, an Insurance Manager for Defendant.

Reply at p.

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9.

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the billing statement and testified that the “Addl. Haz. Ins.”

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indicated a force placed hazard insurance policy.

In her deposition, Curbeira was asked about the line items on

Curbeira Depo.

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63:24-66:25.

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stating that she misread the statement and misspoke in her

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deposition.

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declaration that the line item in question actually references a

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force placed or “gap” flood insurance policy.

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that this change in statement should be rejected because Curbeira

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should have gone through the errata process rather than waiting

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seven months and submitting a declaration.

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argue Curbeira’s claim of mistake is not credible.

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However, Curbeira submitted a later declaration

Barilovits Decl. Exh. G ¶¶ 5-14.

She states in her

Plaintiffs contend

In addition, they

Plaintiffs have not provided any other evidence that Gooden

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was ever subjected to improper force placement of hazard

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insurance outside of the line item that Defendant contends

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actually references flood insurance, nor do they explicitly

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restate their contention that Gooden in fact was force placed

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with such insurance.

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As to named Plaintiff Hall, Defendant claims no hazard

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policy was ever force placed on her property.

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Class Certification, Plaintiffs merely mention a bill sent by

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Defendant to Hall charging her for “Addl. Hazard Ins.,” similar
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In the Motion for

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to Gooden’s claim.

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Defendant points out that Hall testified that her claim regarding

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a force placed hazard insurance policy, as stated in ¶ 27 of the

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FAC, was mistaken.

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12:1.

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policy force placed on her home was for flood insurance.

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134:7-19.

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Reply at pp. 8-10.

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MCC at p. 21.

However, in addition,

Barilovits Decl. Exh. B (“Hall Depo.”) 11:6-

She further testified in her deposition that the only
Id.

In the Reply, Plaintiffs fail to address the issue.

The Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient

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evidence that either named Plaintiff was force placed for hazard

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insurance.

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hazard insurance classes they seek to certify in this motion,

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and, without viable hazard insurance claims of their own, the

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named Plaintiffs would clearly be inadequate to represent the

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putative classes regarding such claims.

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denies on this alternate ground Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the

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following classes for claims involving force placed hazard

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insurance: the Nationwide Hazard Insurance Class (1st Cause of

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Action - TILA claim); the California and New York breach of

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contract subclasses (3rd Cause of Action – Breach of Contract

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Claim); and the California Hazard Class (4th Cause of Action –

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Cal. Civil Code § 2955.5 claim; 5th Cause of Action – Cal. Bus. &

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Prof. Code § 17200 claim).

Therefore, Plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of the

Accordingly, the Court

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III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above and at the November 15,

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2013 hearing,

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certification.

Plaintiffs’ proposed classes are inappropriate for
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for class
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1
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3
4

certification is DENIED in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 11, 2013

____________________________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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