Conservation Congress v. United States Forest Service et al

Filing 53

ORDER signed by Judge Lawrence K. Karlton on 6/19/2012 ORDERING 43 Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. (Waggoner, D)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CONSERVATION CONGRESS and KLAMATH FOREST ALLIANCE, NO. CIV. S-11-2605 LKK/EFB 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. O R D E R 14 15 UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, 16 Defendant, 17 and 18 19 SIERRA PACIFIC INDUSTRIES, Proposed Defendant Intervenor. 20 / 21 22 Plaintiff Conservation Congress brings this action against 23 Defendants United States Forest Service and United States Fish and 24 Wildlife Service (collectively, “Federal Defendants”), concerning 25 Federal Defendants’ approval of a timber sale, known as the Mudflow 26 Vegetation Management Project, and its effect upon the habitat of the northern spotted owl. Plaintiff’s action arises under the 1 Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), the National Environmental Policy 2 Act 3 Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), and the Equal Access to Justice 4 Act (“EAJA”). 5 (“NEPA”), Pending the before Administrative the injunction, court 6 preliminary 7 Federal 9 Industries (“SPI”) oppose. is Plaintiff’s claims under the ESA. 8 Defendants 10 Opp’n, ECF No. 47. 11 brought and Procedure Act Plaintiff’s specifically (“APA”), motion in the for relation a to Pl’s Amend. Mot., ECF No. 44. Defendant-Intervenor Sierra Pacific Fed. Defs’ Opp’n, ECF No. 46; Def. SPI For the reasons provided below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied. 12 13 14 I. BACKGROUND A. Statutory Background The Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) requires that the 15 Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce promulgate regulations 16 listing “endangered” by 17 extinction and to designate critical habitat for such species. 16 18 U.S.C. § 1533; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 157-58, 117 S.Ct. 19 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). 20 areas which have “physical or biological features (I) essential to 21 the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special 22 management considerations or protection.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). plant and animal species that are Critical habitat consists of those 23 24 Section 9 of the ESA establishes a blanket prohibition on the 25 “taking” of any member of a listed endangered species. 26 § 1538(a)(1)(B); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Allen, 476 2 16 U.S.C. 1 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 2007). To “take” is defined as “to 2 harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 3 collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 4 § 1532(19); Oregon Natural Resources Council, 476 F.3d at 1033 n.1. 16 U.S.C. 5 6 Section 7 of the ESA allows statutorily-defined “applicants,” 7 including Federal agencies, to carve out limited exceptions to 8 Section 9's blanket prohibition under certain circumstances. 9 U.S.C. § 1536(a)-(c), (o). 16 Under Section 7, each federal agency 10 must “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by 11 such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of 12 any endangered species or threatened species or result in the 13 destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species 14 which is determined by the Secretary . . . to be critical.” 15 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The applicable regulations define an “action” 16 to include “actions directly or indirectly causing modifications 17 to the land, water, or air.” 16 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 18 In addition to the ESA’s substantive obligations to conserve 19 and not jeopardize protected species, Section 7(a)(2) imposes a 20 procedural obligation on federal agencies. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home 21 Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 667, 127 S.Ct. 22 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007); New Mexico ex rel. Richardson v. 23 Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 700 (10th Cir. 2009). 24 agency’s decision whether to take a discretionary action that may 25 jeopardize endangered or threatened species is strictly governed 26 by ESA-mandated inter-agency consultation procedures.” 3 “An Forest 1 Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 2006). The 2 procedural obligation ensures that the agency proposing the action, 3 in this case the United States Forest Service (“USFS”), consults 4 with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) to 5 determine the effects of its action on endangered species and their 6 critical habitat.1 7 1138 (11th Cir. 2008). See Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 8 To meet its procedural obligation, the agency action must 9 first determine whether its proposed discretionary action may 10 affect a listed species or a critical habitat. 11 402.14(a). 12 critical species or habitats, formal consultation is ordinarily 13 mandated. 14 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 15 754, 16 consultation is excused only where (1) an agency determines that 17 its action is unlikely to adversely affect the protected species 18 or habitat, and (2) the relevant Service (FWS or NMFS) concurs with 19 that determination. 20 Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054, n.8 (9th Cir. 1994)). 21 //// 22 //// 763 50 C.F.R. § If an agency determines that an action “may affect” Natural Resources Defense Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d (9th Cir. 1985); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a)). Formal Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b); Pacific 23 1 24 25 26 The FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service administer the ESA. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b). The “FWS has jurisdiction over freshwater and terrestrial species while the National Marine Fisheries Service is responsible for anadromous and marine species.” Johanns, 450 F.3d at 457 n.1 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b)). 4 1 If it appears from informal consultation2 that a protected 2 species may be present in the area of a federal agency’s “major 3 construction activity,” then the agency must prepare a “biological 4 assessment.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(b). The purpose of the biological 5 assessment is to “evaluate the potential effects of the action on 6 listed and proposed species and designated and proposed critical 7 habitat and determine whether any such species or habitat are 8 likely to be adversely affected by the action and is used in 9 determining whether 10 necessary.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(a). 11 not required if, as a result of informal consultation, the “Federal 12 agency determines with the written concurrence of the Director [of 13 the Fish and Wildlife Service], that the proposed action is not 14 likely to adversely affect any listed species or critical habitat.” 15 Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 661 F.3d 1147, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 16 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(b)). formal consultation or a conference is Again, formal consultation is 17 To determine a project’s effects, agencies are required to 18 understand the existing conditions of the species or critical 19 habitat at issue, before they consider the effects of a proposed 20 action on those conditions. 21 Section 7 consultation purposes is defined as follows: The “environmental baseline” for The environmental baseline includes the past and present impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action 22 23 24 2 25 26 Informal consultation merely means “all discussions, correspondence, etc., between the Service and the Federal agency,” designed to assist the action agency (USFS) in determining whether formal consultation will be necessary. 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a). 5 1 area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the action area that have already undergone formal or early section 7 consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are contemporaneous with the consultation in process. 2 3 4 5 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (definition of “environmental baseline” is 6 included within the definition of “effects of the action”). 7 Section 7 consultation purposes, the “effects” of a proposed action 8 include not only “direct” effects, but also “indirect effects,” 9 which is defined to include any effects caused or induced by the 10 action that are “reasonably certain to occur.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 11 Additionally, in meeting the Section 7 consultation requirements, 12 agencies must utilize the best scientific and commercial data 13 available and agencies that fail to consult properly run the risk 14 that 15 1536(a)(2); see also, e.g., Pacific Rivers Council v. Robertson, 16 854 F. Supp. 713, 724 (D. Or. 1993) (holding that procedural 17 violations of the ESA, such as not initiating Section 7(a)(2) 18 consultation when required, mandate that the underlying action be 19 enjoined), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Pacific Rivers 20 Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994). 21 B. Factual Background their activities will be enjoined. See 16 For U.S.C. § 22 The northern spotted owl has been listed as a threatened 23 species by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”). See Shasta- 24 Trinity National Forest, Biological Assessment Mudflow Vegetation 25 Management 26 (“Biological Assessment”). Project, MAR002558-2580, at 8 (Feb. 15, 2008) Critical habitat for the northern 6 1 spotted owl was proposed within the Federal Register on May 6, 2 1991, and a Final Rule was published on January 15, 1992. Id. 3 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 20816-21016; 57 Fed. Reg. 1796-1838). On 4 September 12, 2008, a Final Revised Critical Habitat Rule for the 5 northern spotted owl became effective. 6 Service, Second Letter of Concurrence, FWS AR 001317-1331, at 1-2 7 (Feb. 10, 2012) (“2nd LOC”) (citing 73 Fed. Reg. 47326-47522). 8 Mudflow Project area contains 888 acres within the 2008 Critical 9 Habitat 10 designation subunit C-70 Critical Habitat subunit C-72. and See Fish & Wildlife 3,392 acres within The the Id. at 2. 11 The area encompassing the Mudflow Project has been surveyed 12 for northern spotted owls “annually to protocol” starting in 2004 13 through 2007. 14 Biological Assessment for the Mudflow Project, which was based on 15 the 1992 Final Critical Habitat Rule, the nearest known owl nests 16 (ST-211 and ST-213) are located approximately .6 miles to the east 17 and 1 mile to the west, respectively. 18 mile radius owl home ranges are within the project assessment area. 19 Id. 20 most years at both nest sites. Id. Owls in ST-211 were last known 21 to nest in 1992. 22 of this nest core in 2006. 23 breed in 1992 and a single male was last heard in 1994. 24 2005, a single male northern spotted owl was heard approximately 25 1 mile to the northeast of the nest core on Forest Service land 26 during surveys conducted by a private landowner, but the owl was Biological Assessment, at 9. Id. According to the Portions of both 1.3 Starting in 1992, annual historical checks have occurred in Id. A single male was located in the vicinity Id. Owls in ST-213 were last known to 7 Id. In 1 not relocated by Forest Service personnel on subsequent surveys. 2 Id. 3 1.3 miles of the Mudflow Project. 4 There are no known owl locations on private ownership within The proposed area for Id. the Mudflow Project encompasses 5 approximately 10,430 acres of Forest Service land and 3,400 acres 6 of private land. 7 suitable nesting/roosting habitat and 5,125 acres of foraging 8 habitat. 9 the known nest cores of ST-213 and ST-211. Id. Id. The project area contains 510 acres of There are no activities proposed within 1/4 mile of Id. at 10. Protocol 10 surveys conducted during 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 in all areas 11 of potential nesting, roosting, or foraging habitat in the Mudflow 12 Project did not detect any additional owls. Id. 13 According to the Biological Assessment, the Mudflow Project 14 will “degrade” 1,719 acres of foraging habitat for the northern 15 spotted owl overall, 215 acres of which are within the owl’s “home 16 range” (1.3 mile radius) and 18 acres of which are within the owl’s 17 “territory” (.7 mile radius). 18 as a reduction in some habitat components, but the habitat would 19 still function at the current habitat level. 20 Biological Assessment indicates that none of the Mudflow Project 21 area will be “downgraded” or “removed.” 22 term of art which “indicates that there is a temporary reduction 23 (approximately 30 years) in nesting/roosting or foraging habitat.” 24 Id. 25 would 26 habitat.” Id. at 11. “Degraded” is defined Id. T Id. h e “Downgraded” is a “Removed” is a term of art which “indicates that the habitat not longer Id. function The as nesting/roosting Biological 8 Assessment or foraging” concludes with a 1 determination that the proposed Mudflow Project “[m]ay affect, but 2 is not likely to adversely affect” the northern spotted owl. 3 at 15. 4 Id. The FWS issued an initial letter of concurrence with the 5 Biological Assessment for the Mudlfow Project on April 28, 2008. 6 See 2nd LOC, at 1. 7 account both the 2008 Final Revised Critical Habitat Rule for the 8 Northern Spotted Owl and the 2011 Revised Recovery Plan for the 9 Northern Spotted Owl (“Recovery Plan”), the FWS issued a second On February 10, 2012, in order to take into 10 letter of concurrence. Id. at 1-2. 11 C. Plaintiff’s Complaint 12 Plaintiff Conservation Congress filed its original complaint 13 on October 3, 2011, and its first supplemental complaint on March 14 22, 2012. 15 No. 40. 16 inter alia, the following assertions: Pl’s Compl., ECF No. 1; Pl’s First Suppl. Compl., ECF In its first supplemental complaint, Plaintiff makes, 17 The 2011 Recovery Plan for the northern spotted owl notes that 18 “past habitat loss, current habitat loss and competition from 19 Barred Owls” were “the most pressing threats to [northern] spotted 20 owl persistence,” and that active management projects should 21 explicitly evaluate the short-term impacts to the Northern Spotted 22 Owl 23 benefits of such projects. and its prey while considering the long-term ecological Id. (citing 76 Fed. Reg. 38575). 24 According to Plaintiff, the most recent scientific evidence 25 analyzing northern spotted owl population and demographic trends 26 indicate that, despite over 20 years of legal protection under the 9 1 ESA, the species’ population is declining by 3%-4% each year. 2 Id. at 13-14. 3 The Mudflow Project is only one of many projects that involve 4 tree cutting on lands managed by the Shasta-Trinity National Forest 5 that are designated as critical habitat for the northern spotted 6 owl. 7 projects that also involve tree cutting in northern spotted owl 8 habitat including the Algoma, Pilgrim, Moosehead and East McCloud 9 projects. 10 Id. at 15. USFS has analyzed and/or approved several Id. FWS has conducted no surveys for northern spotted owl’s in the 11 Mudflow Project area since 2007. Id. Seventeen percent of the 12 existing foraging habitat within the home range of a spotted owl 13 pair, designated as ST-211, will be degraded in the Mudflow 14 Project. Id. Despite this level of degradation, in its Biological 15 Assessment, USFS did not evaluate the spatial relationship of its 16 proposed logging to the existing habitat features of this area, 17 even though spatial patterns of logging units vis-a-vis existing 18 habitat, are considered by experts to be important to the survival 19 of Owls post-logging. Id. 20 Based on the 2008 critical habitat rule, the Mudflow Project 21 area contains 888 acres of designated critical habitat in unit “C- 22 70" and 3,392 acres in unit “C-72,” for a total of 4,280 acres of 23 critical habitat. Pl’s Reply, ECF No. 49, at 3.3 The Project will 24 3 25 26 Initially, Plaintiff alleged calculations for the Mudflow Project’s effects on northern spotted owl critical habitat using the 1992 critical habitat rule. Following briefing by the parties in support of the instant motion, Plaintiff offers recalculations 10 1 encompass 19% of the total critical habitat in unit C-70 and 11% 2 of the total critical habitat in unit C-72. 3 that USFS and FWS propose to treat are comprised of 408 acres of 4 foraging habitat, 128 acres of dispersal habitat, and 8 acres of 5 non-capable habitat. 6 acres 7 sanitation, and 46 acres of shaded fuelbreak. 8 alleges that these treatments “appear to be targeted at all the 9 foraging habitat, the highest quality remaining habitat[] included 10 of natural in the Project.” Id. stand Id. The 544 acres USFS’s proposed treatments include 340 thinning, 22 acres of thinning Id. with Plaintiff Id. at 3-4. 11 Plaintiff asserts that, in its Second Letter of Concurrence, 12 FWS fails to consider: the 2011 Revised Recovery Plan for the 13 Northern Spotted Owl; or FWS’s Biological Opinion on USFS’s Algoma 14 Project. 15 asserts that FWS conducted no surveys in the Mudflow Project area 16 since 2007, even though FWS revised its survey protocol in 2011 to 17 better detect both Barred Owls (a competitor species to the 18 Northern Spotted Owl) and northern spotted owls. Pl’s Am. Compl., ECF No. 40, at 20. Plaintiff further Id. 19 Plaintiff brings two claims under the ESA alleging: (1) 20 inadequate biological assessment on the part of USFS, in violation 21 of 16 U.S.C. § 1536 and 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(a); and (2) arbitrary 22 concurrence letters on the part of FWS, in violation of 16 U.S.C. 23 § 1536(a)(2) and 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). 24 On April 5, 2012, Federal Defendants filed an answer to 25 26 Id. at 22-25. based on the 2008 critical habitat rule. 11 1 Plaintiff’s supplemental complaint, see Fed. Defs’ Answer, ECF No. 2 41, as did Defendant-Intervenor Sierra Pacific Industries, see Def- 3 Intervenor’s Answer, ECF No. 42. 4 D. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction 5 6 On April 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed the pending motion for a preliminary injunction. Pl’s Amend. Mot., ECF No. 44. 7 On April 30, 2012, Federal Defendants and Defendant-Intervenor 8 Sierra Pacific Industries filed oppositions to Plaintiff’s motion 9 for a preliminary injunction. 10 See Fed. Defs’ Opp’n, ECF No. 46, Def-Int’s Opp’n, ECF No. 47. 11 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION UNDER THE 12 ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 provides authority to issue preliminary 13 14 injunctions. 15 remedy." 16 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (internal citation 17 omitted). 18 preliminary injunction, it traditionally balances "the competing 19 claims of injury, . . . the effect on each party of the granting 20 or 21 consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction," 22 and plaintiff's likelihood of success. 23 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 24 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 25 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982)). 26 preliminary injunction is an "extraordinary Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, When a court considers whether to grant a motion for a withholding Under A the of the requested traditional relief, approach, 12 . . . the public Id. at 20, 24 (quoting a plaintiff seeking a 1 preliminary injunction must demonstrate that he is “likely to 2 succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm 3 in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities 4 tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public 5 interest.” 6 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 7 Alternatively, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ [rather 8 than a likeliness of success on the merits] and a hardship balance 9 that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an 10 injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are 11 also met.” 12 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011). 13 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 Alliance For The Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d By enacting the ESA, Congress altered the normal standards for 14 injunctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. 15 Circuit has consistently held that “[t]he traditional preliminary 16 injunction analysis does not apply to injunctions issued pursuant 17 to the ESA.” Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. NMFS, 422 F.3d 782, 793 (9th 18 Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court explained that in enacting the ESA 19 “Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly 20 clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording 21 endangered species the highest of priorities.” Tenn. Valley Auth. 22 v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978). 23 “Accordingly, courts may not use equity's scales to strike a 24 different 25 (internal quotation omitted). “ T h e 26 violations of the ESA consultation requirements is an injunction balance.” Nat'l Wildlife 13 Fed'n, 422 The Ninth F.3d at 794 appropriate remedy for 1 pending compliance with the ESA.” 2 Environmental Protection Agency, 413 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 3 2005) (upholding an injunction prohibiting the EPA from authorizing 4 the use of certain pesticides within proscribed distances of 5 salmon-bearing waters until it had fulfilled its consultation 6 obligations under § 7(a)(2) of the ESA). 7 Wash. Toxics Coalition v. III. ANALYSIS 8 Plaintiff asserts a procedural violation of the ESA due to 9 Federal Defendants’ failure to engage in the formal consultation 10 11 required by Section 7(a)(2). The Tenth Circuit has indicated that, to challenge the 12 agency’s failure to undertake formal consultation, a plaintiff may 13 utilize 14 1540(g)(1)(A). Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 15 601 F.3d 1096, 1106 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010). 16 “any person may commence a civil suit . . . to enjoin any person, 17 including 18 instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation 19 of any provision of [the ESA] or regulation issued under the 20 authority [of the ESA]; . . . .” 21 However, to challenge discretionary final agency actions of the FWS 22 and other federal agencies under the ESA, plaintiffs must utilize 23 the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 24 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 174-75, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 25 281 (1997). 26 the the ESA’s citizen-suit United States provision, and any 16 U.S.C. § Under this provision, other governmental 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A). See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); Plaintiff and Federal Defendants dispute whether Plaintiff’s 14 1 claims against the USFS and the FWS arise under the ESA citizen 2 suit provision or the APA. Because the APA governs judicial review 3 of agency action challenged through the ESA citizen-suit provision, 4 see 5 U.S.C. § 706; Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 5 760 F.2d 976, 981–82 (9th Cir. 1985); Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 6 601 F.3d at 1106 n.3 (citing Coal. for Sustainable Res., Inc. V. 7 U.S. Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001)), the APA 8 will provide the standard of review for both of Plaintiff’s 9 relevant claims, regardless of the statutory authority under which 10 the claims arise. At this stage in the proceedings, the court 11 therefore declines to analyze whether Plaintiffs claims against the 12 USFS and FWS arise under the ESA Section 11(g) citizen suit 13 provision or the APA.4 14 4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 The court must note, however, the ESA Section 11(g) citizensuit requirement that 60-day written notice be provided to the appropriate Secretary and to any alleged violator intended to be a defendant in the lawsuit. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A), (B), and (C). A proper 60-day notice of intent must sufficiently alert the recipient of the actual alleged violation, so that the recipient may attempt to abate the violation. Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515, 521 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit considers this requirement jurisdictional. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the administrative record indicates that a 60-day notice of intent to sue, from Plaintiff Conservation Congress was received by Sharon Heywood, the Forest Supervisor for the Shasta-Trinity National Forest of the USFS, on July 13, 2011--over 60 days before Plaintiff’s filing of its original complaint in this action. See Letter from Denise Boggs, Conservation Congress, Sixty-Day Notice of Intent to Sue (Jul. 13, 2011). The letter was also addressed to Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, for the U.S. Department of the Interior. Id. at 1. In addition to being filed in a timely manner, the letter is explicitly identified as a 60-day notice of intent to sue under ESA Section 11(g), see id. at 1; it clearly provides notice of the violation upon which Plaintiff sued, see, e.g., id. at 2 (“the USFS and USFWS have contravened the 15 1 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 2 i. Standard of Review 3 Under the APA, a court may disturb an agency's final action 4 only if that final action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 5 discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 6 706(2)(A). This standard is “highly deferential, presuming agency 7 action to be valid and affirming the agency action if a reasonable 8 basis exists for its decision.” 9 California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court not “substitute Independent Acceptance Co. v. 10 must 11 concerning the proposed action. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park 12 v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). 13 Rather, a court must determine whether the decision was “based on 14 a consideration of relevant factors” and whether “the agency has 15 taken a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of its 16 proposed 17 Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998). 18 agency must state a rational connection between the facts found and 19 the decision made. 20 Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004). action.” its 5 U.S.C. § Blue judgment Mountains for that of Biodiversity the agency” Project v. That is, the Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and The standard 21 22 23 24 25 26 requirements of the ESA by . . . failing to initiate formal consultation with the USFWS”); and it appears to have been served upon the relevant Secretary (the Secretary of the Interior) as well as the alleged ESA violator (the USFS). This letter was therefore sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of notice under 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(i). To the extent that Plaintiff asserts an ESA claim against the USFS, brought pursuant to the ESA citizen suit provision of 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A), this court has jurisdiction to hear that claim. 16 1 does not shield the agency from a “thorough, probing, in-depth 2 review.” 3 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 4 U.S. at 415, 91 S.Ct. 814). Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F.Supp. 1473, 1476 5 In reviewing environmental actions, in particular, the Ninth 6 Circuit has explicitly provided that the “highest deference is owed 7 to the Forest Service's technical analyses and judgments within its 8 area of expertise.” League Of Wilderness Defenders Blue Mountains 9 Biodiversity Project v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010) 10 (citing Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir. 2008), 11 overruled on other grounds by American Trucking Ass’ns Inc. v. City 12 of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009)). 13 Circuit 14 deference 15 regulations, including forest plans, and that, under the APA, the 16 court's 17 conflicting expert opinions or to consider whether the agency 18 employed the best methods, but instead, when an agency's particular 19 technical expertise is involved, to guard the agency's discretion. 20 See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089, 1097, 21 1099 (9th Cir. 2003); Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. 22 Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 1985); Marsh v. Or. Natural 23 Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376-77, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 24 (1980). has further relative role in provided to The Ninth that agencies are entitled to their interpretation of their own reviewing agency actions is not to weigh 25 ii. Analysis 26 Underlying the test for injunctive relief is the requirement 17 1 that Plaintiff demonstrate at least some probability of success on 2 the merits. See Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686 3 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Benda v. Grand Lodge of 4 International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 584 5 F.2d 308, 315 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 937, 99 6 S.Ct. 2065, 60 L.Ed.2d 667 (1979)). 7 below, the court determines that Plaintiff has not established a 8 probability of success on the merits of its claims. 9 the court denies Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. For the reasons explained Accordingly, 10 Plaintiff claims that the USFS and the FWS were arbitrary and 11 capricious in their determination that the Mudflow Project was not 12 likely to adversely affect the Northern Spotted Owl and that formal 13 consultation, therefore, should have been required. A plaintiff’s 14 burden in establishing a procedural violation of the ESA is to show 15 that the circumstances triggering the procedural requirement exist 16 (i.e., 17 determining that the Mudflow Project is not likely to adversely 18 affect the Northern Spotted Owl), and that the required procedures 19 have not been followed (i.e., the USFS and the FWS did not engage 20 in formal consultation). See Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 765 21 (9th Cir. 1985). 22 not engage in formal consultation. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has not 23 met its burden of establishing that the agencies were arbitrary and 24 capricious in determining that Mudflow Project is not likely to 25 adversely affect the Northern Spotted Owl. 26 //// that the agencies were arbitrary and capricious in It is uncontested that the USFS and the FWS did 18 1 a. Short-Term Impacts of the Mudflow Project on the 2 Northern Spotted Owl and its Prey 3 Plaintiff argues that the USFS’s biological assessment and the 4 FWS’s second letter of concurrence failed to consider the short- 5 term impacts to the Northern Spotted Owl and its prey in reaching 6 their 7 ecological benefits. conclusions that the Mudflow Project offers long-term Pl’s Am. Mot., ECF No. 44, at 23-24. 8 It appears to the court, however, that the USFS considered the 9 short-term impacts to the species when it determined that “[n]o 10 activities are proposed within 1/4 mile of” the “nearest known owl 11 nests (ST-11 and ST-213),” which are located .6 miles to the east 12 of the Mudflow Project and 1 mile to the west, respectively, and 13 when the USFS further provided that “[s]hould an owl nest be 14 located in the project area, a limited operating period . . . will 15 be required to avoid direct effects to spotted owls during the 16 breeding season.” 17 seems to have explicitly taken into account short-term impacts on 18 the prey of the Northern Spotted Owl when analyzing the effects of 19 the Mudflow Project on the Northern Spotted Owl’s foraging habitat. 20 See Biological Assessment, at 11-14. Biological Assessment, at 9-10. The USFS also 21 Furthermore, the FWS clearly considered the short-term effects 22 of the Mudflow Project on both the Northern Spotted Owl and its 23 prey when it determined that: 24 25 26 1) limited detections in both historical activity centers [ST-211 and ST-213] since 1992 indicate a low likelihood of occupancy by NSO [Northern Spotted Owls] within the project area, 2) treatments are not proposed within nesting/roosting 19 1 2 3 4 habitat or high-quality foraging habitat, within the NSO core areas, 3) treatments proposed for 171 acres of foraging habitat within the two home ranges have been designed to retain the function of foraging habitat and, 4) a seasonal restriction will be placed on project activities during the breeding season. 5 2nd LOC, at 9. 6 Northern Spotted Owls to the Mudflow Project area, the effects of 7 the Mudflow Project upon the any nesting/roosting habitat or high- 8 quality foraging habitat of the Owls, and the impacts that the 9 Mudflow Project might have upon the Owls’ breeding season, the FWS 10 appears to have overtly considered the short-term effects that the 11 Project would have upon the species. Indeed, in determining the proximity of any 12 Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Federal Defendants took 13 into account the short-term impacts of the Mudflow Project on both 14 the Northern Spotted Owl and its prey. 15 to establish that Federal Defendants’ conclusions were arbitrary 16 and capricious in this regard. 17 18 b. Plaintiff therefore fails Characterization of the Forest Areas Plaintiff further asserts that the Federal Defendants 19 incorrectly characterized the Mudflow Project area as 65 to 85 year 20 old “second growth” forests, and thus, not high quality Northern 21 Spotted Owl habitat, when the habitat actually includes old growth 22 trees hundreds of years old. Pl’s Am. Mot., ECF No. 44, at 24-25. 23 24 25 Plaintiff cites the declaration of Monica Bond, a “wildlife biologist with expertise in wildlife 26 20 biology, ecology, and Bond Decl., ECF No. 43, Att. 2.5 1 behavior.” 2 “was dumbfounded when [she] saw the large size of the trees 3 proposed for logging within Northern Spotted Owl Critical Habitat.” 4 Id. at 6, ¶ 14. 5 the trees, Bond submits a series of photographs of a person 6 standing beside marked tree trunks. Bond Photos, ECF No. 43, Atts. 7 3-5, 7, 9-11. 8 Boggs, 9 Congress,” who asserts that many of the trees marked for cutting “the Bond asserts that she In support of her testimony regarding the size of Plaintiff also cites the declaration of Denise Executive Director and a member of Conservation 10 “are large, old trees.” Boggs Decl., ECF No. 43, Att. 12, at 2, 11 ¶ 4. 12 up to 43 inches in diameter at breast height. . . . 13 are not 60-80 year old ‘second growth’ forest,” but instead “are Boggs further states, “We measured trees marked for cutting These trees 14 5 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 A court may consider evidence outside the administrative record for the limited purposes of reviewing a plaintiff’s ESA claim. Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 497 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 366 (2011). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are brought under the ESA’s citizen suit provision, the court considers the Boggs and Bond declarations and attachments. When reviewing a claim under the APA standard of review, however, an agency action must typically be judged on the rationale and record that led to the decision. See, e.g., Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1994). However, a court is “not straightjacketed to the original record in trying to make sense of complex technical testimony,” but may consider evidence not included in the administrative record to “clarif[y] a dispute that . . . was less than clear from the original record.” Bunker Hill Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 572 F.2d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir. 1977). Here, Plaintiff’s submitted evidence is clearly meant to support its assertion that the Federal Defendants’ findings are belied by “simple observation.” See Pl’s Am. Mot., ECF No. 44, at 25. To the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are brought pursuant to the APA, the court considers the Boggs and Bond declaration and attachments to ascertain whether the Federal Defendants considered the evident size of the Mudflow Project area trees when making its habitat determination. 21 1 old growth trees hundreds of years old.” Id. 2 Plaintiff’s submitted evidence does not establish that the 3 Federal Defendants made an arbitrary and capricious assessment of 4 habitat quality. 5 submitted photographs appear to be large as compared to the person 6 in the photograph and therefore also appear to be old, that 7 agreement does not call into question the complex and technical 8 analyses and judgments of the USFS and the FWS in their assessment 9 of the characteristics of the habitat affected by the Mudflow Even if the court agrees that the trees in the 10 Project. The court declines to disturb the Forest Service’s 11 discretion in making technical analyses and judgments of the 12 Mudflow Project habitat–-a subject clearly within the agency’s area 13 of expertise. 14 Biodiversity Project v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 15 2010).6 See League Of Wilderness Defenders Blue Mountains 16 Thus, the court finds that the Plaintiff fails to establish 17 that the Federal Defendants’ assessment of habitat quality was 18 arbitrary and capricious. c. 19 Threat of Barred Owls 20 Plaintiff argues that the USFS’s biological assessment fails 21 to discuss the Mudflow Project’s potential to facilitate the 22 invasion of Barred Owls, and FWS’s Second Letter of Concurrence 23 inappropriately minimizes the threat of Barred Owls and fails to 24 25 26 6 While the photos are opaque, the affidavit says that certain trees were measured. Although troubling, the deference the court owes the agency’s technical evaluation disposes of the issue. 22 1 use the best available science. 2 26. 3 Although Plaintiff bases Pl’s Am. Mot., ECF No. 44, at 25- its argument, in part, on the 4 assertion that “FWS has conducted no surveys for Spotted Owl[]s in 5 the Mudflow Project area since 2007,” Pl’s Am. Mot., ECF No. 44, 6 at 26, the FWS 2nd Letter of Concurrence, in fact, indicates that 7 “[t]he Mudflow [P]roject area has been surveyed annually for NSOs 8 from 2004 to 2011,” FWS 2nd LOC, at 6. 9 Furthermore, the FWS’s 2nd Letter of Concurrence explicitly 10 discusses the threat of Barred Owls to Northern Spotted Owls in 11 relation to the Mudflow Project and references the FWS’s analysis 12 of recovery planning for the Northern Spotted Owl, which is based 13 upon the 2011 Revised Recovery Plan for the Northern Spotted Owl. 14 See FWS 2nd LOC, at 7, 12. 15 Recovery Plan for the Northern Spotted Owl represents the “best 16 available science.” 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 All parties agree that the 2011 Revised The FWS 2nd Letter of Concurrence states: Barred owls are recognized as a significant threat to the recovery of the NSO (USFWS 2011). Although barred owls have not been detected in the project area, given the local presence of barred owls and their current rate of spread, it is likely that barred owls could move into the project area in the foreseeable future. Results of a recent study . . . suggest that in environments where the two species compete directly for resources, maintaining larger amounts of older forest (nesting/roosting) may help NSOs to persist, at least in the short term. Our evaluation of the Mudflow Project therefore focused on whether proposed treatments could potentially act to exacerbate competitive interactions between the two species by reducing the availability of high-quality habitat (see Recovery Planning for NSO section . . . ). As described below, the treatments prescribed by the Mudflow project are not proposed for 23 1 nesting/roosting and other high-quality habitat, and therefore, it is unlikely that the Mudflow project will exacerbate competitive interactions between the two species. In addition, because survey results suggest that neither barred owls nor territorial NSO currently occupy the treatment areas, the direct influence of barred owls was not a factor in determining the effects of this project on NSO. 2 3 4 5 6 FWS 2nd LOC, at 7 (italics included). 7 to establish that the FWS arbitrarily and capriciously minimized 8 the threat of Barred Owls in its analysis. 9 the FWS explicitly references its “Recovery Planning for NSO 10 section,” which relies upon the 2011 Revised Recovery Plan for the 11 Northern Spotted Owl, the FWS analysis appears to be using the 12 “best available science.” Plaintiff’s arguments fail Additionally, because 13 Although the USFS’s Biological Assessment does not explicitly 14 discuss any potential invasion of Barred Owls--a threat which was 15 identified in the 2011 Revised Recovery Plan for the Northern 16 Spotted Owl--the USFS’s Biological Assessment was published in 17 2008, years before the 2011 Revised Recovery Plan for the Northern 18 Spotted Owl was issued, and an updated memorandum to the Biological 19 Assessment was made in May 3, 2011, over a month before the 2011 20 Revised 21 Vegetation 22 MAR002420 (May 3, 2011); 2011 Revised Recovery Plan for the 23 Northern Spotted Owl, FWS AR 002765. Absent evidence that the USFS 24 was aware of the potential threat of Barred Owl invasion due to the 25 Mudflow Project at the time that its Biological Assessments were 26 conducted, yet failed to take that evidence into account, the court Recovery Plan Management was See Memorandum: Mudflow Biological Assessment Update, released. Project 24 1 cannot 2 scientific data available to it at the time. 3 the court that the fact that the FWS’s 2nd Letter of Concurrence 4 later discussed the Barred Owl threat in some detail in concurring 5 with 6 Assessment’s failure to consider the Barred Owl threat before the 7 release of the 2011 Revised Recovery Plan. 8 9 determine the USFS’s that the Biological USFS failed Assessment to consider the best It also appears to cures the Biological Furthermore, the contents of a Biological Assessment are discretionary. The applicable regulations state that “[t]he 10 contents of a biological assessment are at the discretion of the 11 [action] agency and will depend on the nature of the Federal 12 action.” 13 F. Supp. 581, 594 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing Bays’ Legal Fund v. 14 Browner, 828 F. Supp. 102, 110 (D. Mass. 1993) (“there are no 15 strict requirements for what the biological assessment should 16 include; its contents are discretionary within the agency preparing 17 it.”)).7 18 USFS was aware of any potential invasion of Barred Owls due to the 19 Mudflow Project in 2008, the court cannot find that the USFS abused 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(f). See also Strahan v. Linnon, 967 As explained above, without evidence indicating that the 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 7 The regulation does list certain criteria that the agency may consider. These include: (1) the results of an on-site inspection of the area affected by the action to determine if listed or proposed species are present or occur seasonally; (2) the views of recognized experts on the species at issue; (3) a review of the literature and other information; (4) an analysis of the effects of the action on the species and habitat, including consideration of cumulative effects, and the results of any related studies; and (5) an analysis of alternative actions considered by the Federal agency for the proposed action. 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(f). 25 1 its discretion in failing to address that threat in its Biological 2 Assessment. 3 Plaintiff therefore fails to demonstrate that the USFS and FWS 4 were arbitrary and capricious in their consideration, or failure 5 to explicitly consider (in the case of the USFS), any threats of 6 invasion by Barred Owls due to the Mudflow Project. 7 d. Effects of “Landing” Construction 8 Plaintiff argues that the FWS failed to address the adverse 9 modification and destruction of critical habitat that will likely 10 result from “landing” construction. 11 26-27. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Pl’s Am. Mot., ECF No. 44, at In discussing the Mudflow Project’s landing construction, the FWS’s 2nd Letter of Concurrence states that: Within the project area there are approximately 73 existing landings that would be reused, along with an estimated 55 new landings proposed for construction. All existing and proposed landings are located within existing treatment units and are often directly adjacent to roads. Landing size will vary between 0.25 and 0.5 acres depending on unit volume. Existing landings and openings will be used when available, and Forest biologists will work with the Sale Administrator to encourage placing landings outside of high quality foraging habitat, where possible. A conservatively high estimate of 10 acres of foraging habitat would be affected due to landing construction. Landings are not proposed within nesting/roosting habitat, Riparian Reserves, or NSO core areas. Due to their small size and placement outside of high-quality habitat, the effects of landing construction are considered negligible in the scope of the Project. FWS 2nd LOC, at 6. 25 Plaintiff has produced no evidence to indicate that, contrary 26 to the FWS’s assessment, the proposed landings will adversely 26 1 affect critical habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl. 2 argues 3 destruction of Owl habitat,” and “[a]t a minimum it must be 4 considered adverse modification,” but cites no evidence in support 5 of those assertions. that “[l]anding construction results in the Plaintiff complete See Pl’s Am. Mot., ECF No. 44, at 27. 6 7 The Ninth Circuit has provided that “an adverse modification 8 occurs only when there is a direct or indirect alteration that 9 appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat,” and that 10 “[a]n area of a species’ critical habitat can be destroyed without 11 appreciably diminishing the value of a critical habitat for the 12 species’ survival or recovery.” 13 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 620 F.3d 936, 948 (9th Cir. 2010) 14 (internal 15 Plaintiff’s assertion that “[l]anding construction results in 16 complete destruction of Owl habitat” is credited, according to the 17 Ninth Circuit, that destruction may not necessarily “appreciably 18 diminish[] the value of the critical habitat,” and thus, that 19 destruction does not necessarily rise to the level of an adverse 20 modification. Plaintiff’s argument, that the landing construction 21 itself requires the FWS to conclude that an adverse modification 22 will necessarily occur, therefore fails. quotations omitted) Butte Environmental Council v. (emphasis omitted). Even if 23 Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show that the FWS abused its 24 discretion in determining that adverse affects on Northern Spotted 25 Owls are unlikely to occur. 26 //// 27 1 e. Cumulative Effects of Past Logging and USFS Projects 2 Plaintiff argues that the USFS and the FWS failed to analyze 3 the cumulative effects of past logging and USFS projects on the 4 Northern Spotted Owl when evaluating the Mudflow Project. Pl’s Am. 5 Mot., ECF No. 44, at 27-30. 6 Although agencies are required to evaluate the cumulative 7 effects on a listed species or critical habitat during formal 8 consultation, see 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3)-(4), no such requirement 9 binds the action or the consulting agency during informal 10 consultation, cf. 50 C.F.R. § 402.13. 11 the Biological Assessment, the USFS could have, but was not 12 required to include a consideration of cumulative effects. 13 C.F.R. § 402.12(f)(4). 14 of 15 unwilling to find that the USFS abused its discretion in failing 16 to consider a factor which it was not required to consider in the 17 first instance. a Biological Furthermore, in completing 50 Because, as explained above, the contents Assessment are discretionary, the court is 18 It is particularly difficult for the court to find that the 19 USFS and the FWS abused their discretion in failing to consider 20 cumulative effects where, as here, Plaintiff’s argument hangs upon 21 its conflation of the technical and colloquial meanings of the word 22 “degrade.” 23 USFS and the FWS, “degradations” will occur to the critical 24 habitat, and that “a large amount of degradation from repetitive 25 timber sale projects, even if designed to benefit the Owl over the 26 long-term, simply must have some short-term impacts to the Owl and In essence, Plaintiff argues that, according to the 28 1 are likely impeding its recovery.” Pl’s Am. Mot., ECF No. 44, at 2 29. 3 argument loses its force in a regulatory world in which words are 4 not given their plain meanings. Although Plaintiff’s argument appears facially valid, the 5 According to the Biological Assessment, “degraded” is defined 6 as “a reduction in some habitat components,” without a loss of 7 “function at the current habitat level.” 8 at 11. The FWS’s Second Letter of Concurrence stretches the common 9 understanding of the word “degrade” further by providing that: 10 Biological Assessment, The term degraded signifies when treatments influence the quality of habitat by the removal or reduction of habitat elements but not to the degree where existing habitat function is changed . . . . this category includes activities that may be neutral or beneficial to habitat function even though habitat elements are being reduced. 11 12 13 14 FWS 2nd LOC, at 7 (emphasis included). 15 “degrade” that could mean “beneficial to habitat function,” and 16 absent further proof to the contrary, the court is unable to agree 17 with Plaintiff that a series of “degradations” will necessarily 18 have an adverse effect upon the Northern Spotted Owl critical 19 habitat. 20 In light of a definition of Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the FWS and the 21 USFS arbitrarily and capriciously 22 Northern Spotted Owl critical habitat will be “degraded” by the 23 Mudflow Project, such “degradation” does not rise to the level of 24 an “adverse modification.” 25 //// 26 //// 29 determined that, although 1 f. Analyzing the Mudflow Project’s Effects Upon the 2 Recovery of the Northern Spotted Owl 3 Finally, Plaintiff argues that FWS and USFS improperly failed 4 to analyze the Mudflow Project’s effects upon the recovery, as 5 opposed to the mere survival, of the Northern Spotted Owl. 6 Am. Mot., ECF No. 44, at 30-31. 7 is Plaintiff’s unsupported assumption that “it appears clear that 8 ‘degrading’ a species[’s] critical habitat may well set back its 9 recovery.” Id. at 31. However, as the court previously discussed, 10 in light of the peculiar way that the agencies employ the term 11 “degrade,” it is not at all clear to the court that “degrading” a 12 species’ critical habitat would necessary adversely affect the 13 recovery of the species. 14 position, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the FWS and the USFS 15 abused their discretion in this regard.8 Pl’s Underlying Plaintiff’s argument Without evidence to support Plaintiff’s 16 Because Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence demonstrating 17 that the Federal Defendants abused their discretion in determining 18 that the Mudflow Project is not likely to adversely affect the 19 Northern Spotted Owl, Plaintiff has not established a probability 20 8 21 22 23 24 25 26 Moreover, the FWS’s Second Letter of Concurrence explicitly states that it is based, in part, on the 2011 Revised Recovery Plan. See FWS 2nd LOC, at 2. The 2011 Revised Recovery Plan for the Northern Spotted Owl, in turn, explains that “[r]ecovery plans describe reasonable actions and criteria that are considered necessary to recover listed species.” U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 2011 Revised Recovery Plan for the Northern Spotted Owl, FWS AR 002766 (June 28, 2011). If the FWS’s Second Letter of Concurrence, in fact, adheres to the recommendations and analyses of the 2011 Revised Recovery Plan, it stands to reason that the FWS’s Second Letter of Concurrence takes into account the recovery, as opposed to the mere survival, needs of the species. 30 1 of succeeding on the 2 Defendants violated the ESA consultation requirements. 3 therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 4 Plaintiff’s request that the court waive the bond requirement is 5 moot. 6 7 8 9 10 merits of its claim that the Federal The court IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 43, is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: June 19, 2012. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 31

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