Aoki et al v. Gilbert et al

Filing 291

ORDER signed by District Judge Troy L. Nunley on 12/11/2017 DENYING 282 Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration. (Washington, S)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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THOMAS T. AOKI, and AOKI
DIABETES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, a
California non-profit corporation,

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Plaintiffs,

No. 2:11-cv-02797-TLN-CKD

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR
RECONSIDERATION

v.

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GREGORY FORD GILBERT, et al.,
Defendants.

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This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Request for Reconsideration (ECF No.

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282) of this Court’s Order (ECF No. 279) striking Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgement

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as untimely. Plaintiffs oppose the application. (ECF No. 284.) Having reviewed the arguments

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raised by both parties, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ Request for Reconsideration. (ECF

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No. 282.)

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“The general rule regarding the power of a district court to rescind an interlocutory order

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is as follows: As long as a district court has jurisdiction over the case, then it possesses the

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inherent procedural power to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause seen

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by it to be sufficient.” City of Los Angeles, Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d

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882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). This power “is derived from the
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common law, not from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 886.
While “a district court may reconsider and reverse a previous interlocutory decision for

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any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in

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or clarification of controlling law,” it “should generally leave a previous decision undisturbed

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absent a showing of clear error or manifest injustice.” Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., 127

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F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1102 (S.D. Cal. 2000); see also Frye v. Warden, San Quentin State Prison, 200

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F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1038 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“But as a general rule, previous orders should stand in

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the absence of extraordinary circumstances, such as where the initial decision was clearly

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erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration marks

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omitted). The burden is on the party challenging a court’s earlier ruling or order to demonstrate

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reconsideration is appropriate. See U.S. ex rel. Oliver v. The Parsons Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d

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1260, 1277 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
Defendants seek reconsideration of this Court’s order striking their motions for summary

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judgment as untimely. (ECF No. 282 at 2.) Defendants propound three reasons for

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reconsideration. First, Defendants contend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) (“Rule 56(b)”)

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governs the timing of summary judgment motions and permits summary judgment motions to be

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filed within 30 days of the close of discovery. (ECF No. 282 at 3–4.) Second, Defendants

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contend they reasonably understood the Court’s discovery deadline extensions to similarly apply

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to the dispositive motion deadline. (ECF No. 282 at 3.) Finally, Defendants contend that in light

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of Rule 56(b) it would be “patently unfair” not to allow Defendants to file a motion for summary

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judgment when discovery was not completed by the dispositive hearing deadline. (ECF No. 282

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at 4.)

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Defendant asserts the deadline for motions for summary judgment is set by statute as 30

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days past the close of discovery. This is plainly not the case. Rule 56(b) merely provides a

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deadline when one is not set by the Court. In fact, Rule 56(b) builds into its construct “unless . . .

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the court orders otherwise,” explicitly informing practitioners that the Court has the ultimate

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power to order a different deadline. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). As Defendants’ argument

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precedes a legally incorrect concept, the Court must reject this argument.
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Second, Defendant argues the local rules as well as the Court’s pretrial scheduling order

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“should be read as providing a reference point upon which parties seeking relief . . . can rely,

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rather than a barrier to accessing the valuable tool of summary judgment for parties to utilize an

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extension of the discovery cut-off deadline.” (ECF No. 282 at 4.) The Court is perplexed by

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Defendants’ argument. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 requires the Court set deadlines in

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each and every case. Fed. R. Civ. P 16(b). Certainly, “[a] scheduling order is not a frivolous

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piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril.”

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Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff and

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Defendant seemingly understood the significance of the scheduling order when they filed two

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separate motions for discovery extensions. To say now that the scheduling order should have no

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affect or should be a “reference point” rather than a Court ordered deadline is in contrast to

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Defendants’ earlier actions seeking leave of the Court for changes to deadlines. The fact that

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Defendants overlooked the need to request an extension on dispositive motions does not render

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the whole scheduling order and its purpose obsolete or provide good cause for this Court to allow

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Defendants to arbitrarily alter the deadlines as they see fit.

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Third, Defendants assert they reasonably understood the extensions of discovery deadlines

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granted by this Court to include extensions for the dispositive motion hearing deadline.

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Defendants argue it is understandable that Counsel would take the plural “deadlines” to include

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the summary judgement deadline. However, Defendants acknowledge the two orders signed by

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this Court extending discovery deadlines referred to “discovery deadlines.” In fact, each order

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included the term discovery as a descriptor to the deadlines being extended. Furthermore,

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discovery and summary judgment motions are separated out in the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure, thus, indicating their distinct nature. The fact that discovery may dictate, absent a

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court ordering otherwise, the timing for summary judgment motions does mean summary

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judgments motions are included in the term discovery. This argument is equally unavailing.

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Perhaps the only portion of Defendants request that the Court agrees with is his belief in

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fairness dictating the outcome of this order. Indeed, fairness was at the forefront of the Court’s

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decision to strike Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Fairness clearly requires
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preventing a party from gaining an advantage by failing to adhere to the scheduling order.

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Similarly, fairness requires not penalizing a party who adhered to the scheduling order by now

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setting new deadlines retroactively, which the party would have had no way of knowing was a

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deadline when the date came and went. Defendants seem to forget that Plaintiffs were equally

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unable to file a motion for summary judgment after the hearing deadline for dispositive motions,

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yet Defendants seem to feel they are uniquely situated to feel the “patent unfairness” associated

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with the Court’s order to strike. This is simply untrue.

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For the above stated reasons, the Court finds Defendants’ arguments for reconsideration

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unavailing and thus declines to reconsider the Court’s Order to Strike the Motions for Summary

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Judgment (ECF No. 279). Defendants Ex Parte Request for Reconsideration (ECF No. 282) is

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hereby DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 11, 2017

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Troy L. Nunley
United States District Judge

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