Jones v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

Filing 73

ORDER signed by Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. on 7/29/2013 DENYING plaintiff's 62 Motion for New Trial / Reconsideration. (Marciel, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL R. JONES,

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Plaintiff,

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No. 2:11-cv-02799-MCE-CMK

v.

ORDER

OFFICE OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,
Defendant.

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Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brought this civil action pursuant to

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5 U.S.C.§ 522a(g)(1) to remedy alleged violations of the Privacy Act of 1974. On

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October 26, 2012, the assigned magistrate judge issued his Findings and

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Recommendations (“F&R”) and recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint in its

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entirety but granting Plaintiff leave to amend on the “catch-all damages” claim only.

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(ECF No. 44.) On February 26, 2013, this Court adopted the F&R in full, dismissed the

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complaint, and allowed Plaintiff to file an amended pleading stating a viable “catch-all

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damages” claim within thirty days. (ECF No. 56.) In response, Plaintiff filed a document

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on March 25, 2013, indicating that he would not be filing an amended complaint and,

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instead, stands on the original complaint, which the Court had dismissed with leave to

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amend as to the “catch-all damages” claim. (ECF No. 58.)

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Given Plaintiff’s March 25, 2013, response, the Court dismissed the remaining

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“catch-all damages” claim without leave to amend on May 13, 2013, and entered

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judgment for Defendant. (ECF Nos. 59-60.) Presently before the Court is a Motion for a

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“New” Trial, filed by Plaintiff on May 24, 2013.1 (ECF No. 62.) In his Motion, Plaintiff

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contends that the Judgment and Order dismissing this case with prejudice, issued by the

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Court on May 13, 2013, “should be set aside because they are prejudice, not based on

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fact(s), and are clearly erroneous.” (ECF No. 62 at 2.)

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A district court may reconsider its ruling under either Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure2 59(e) or 60(b). See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc.,

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5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir.1993). A motion for reconsideration is treated as a Rule

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59(e) motion if filed within twenty-eight days of entry of judgment, but as a Rule 60(b)

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motion if filed more than twenty-eight days after judgment. See Am. Ironworks &

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Erectors Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898–99 (9th Cir.2001) (applying

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Rule 59(e)’s previous ten day filing deadline). Here, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration

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within the twenty-eight day period prescribed by Rule 59(e). Accordingly, the Court will

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treat Plaintiff’s motion as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment.

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Generally, a court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion: “(1) if such motion is necessary

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to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion

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is necessary to present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) if such

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motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by

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an intervening change in controlling law.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101,

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1111 (9th Cir. 2011). However, relief under Rule 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy

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which should be used sparingly.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111

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(9th Cir.2011).

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Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter
submitted on the briefing. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).
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All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless
noted otherwise.

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A Rule 59(e) motion “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or

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present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon

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Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008).

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After careful consideration of the arguments raised in Plaintiff’s instant motion, the

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Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to provide any grounds upon which the Court could

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reconsider its order. Plaintiff alleges no newly discovered evidence, no intervening

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changes in controlling law, and points to no specific errors of law or fact on which the

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judgment rests. Instead, Plaintiff vaguely asserts, among other things, that he was

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subjected to an “effort, between the respective Judges and the Defendants’ [sic] to

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unjustly dismiss . . . without allowing plaintiff a legitimate trial, without being able to

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conduct discovery, and without due process.” (ECF No. 62 at 3.) According to Plaintiff,

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the Court “has not provided any valid argument, evidence, or facts to support its Order or

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Judgment,” and “has ignored every bit of factual evidence Plaintiff has presented in this

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case.” (ECF No. 62 at 4-5.) Thus, it appears that Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the Court’s

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ruling in general and attempts to relitigate his claims by bringing the instant motion to

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reconsider. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s mandate that Rule 59(e) “should be used

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sparingly,” see Allstate Ins. Co., 634 F.3d at 1111, Plaintiff’s general assertions of

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injustice are grossly insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief. Accordingly,

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Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 62) is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 29, 2013

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