Rainwater v. Scully et al

Filing 6

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 8/22/2012, GRANTING plaintiff's 2 application to proceed IFP; and the complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim and the clerk is directed to close the case.CASE CLOSED. (Yin, K)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOHN ALLEN RAINWATER,
Plaintiff,

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vs.
JAN SCULLY, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
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No. 2:11-cv-2929 EFB P

Plaintiff, a civil detainee, proceeds pro se with this civil action. This proceeding was

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referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and is before the

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undersigned pursuant to plaintiff’s consent. See E.D. Cal. Local Rules, Appx. A, at (k)(4).

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Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff

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has submitted the affidavit required by § 1915(a) showing that he is unable to prepay fees and

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costs or give security therefor. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be

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granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Determining plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis does not

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complete the required inquiry. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court is directed to

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dismiss the case at any time if it determines the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is

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frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

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relief against an immune defendant.
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Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

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520-21 (1972), a complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if

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it fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41

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(1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of

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his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

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a cause of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

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relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are

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true.” Id. (citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of cognizable

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legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories.

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Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

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In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations

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of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740

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(1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in

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the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). A pro se plaintiff must

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satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule

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8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the

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grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007)

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(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).

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Plaintiff alleges that defendant prosecutors Jan Scully and Donna Gissing used plaintiff’s

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“private mental health information” during proceedings to have plaintiff civilly committed as a

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sexually violent predator to the custody of the California Department of Mental Health, and that

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they also used this private information in a news article and a news release. Plaintiff purports to

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bring a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff fails to state a

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cognizable claim and leave to amend appears to be futile.
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In order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation of a

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federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person

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acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v.

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Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized a limited right to

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informational privacy protected by the federal Constitution’s Due Process Clause. Seaton v.

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Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 537-39 (9th Cir. 2010). In the context of California’s civil commitment

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procedure for sexually violent predators, however, any constitutional right to privacy of medical

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information is not protected. Id. at 539 (reasoning that such information is not protected because

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the disclosure is limited to the parties and the court and remains confidential for all other

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purposes, there is a substantial need for access to the information to protect the public, and there

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is an express statutory mandate to protect the public from persons whose mental illness causes

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them to be sexually violent predators). Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim based on

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defendants’ alleged use of his private mental health information in his civil commitment

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proceedings, and further amendment could not cure the deficiency in this claim.

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Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated his right to privacy by issuing a “news

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release” and a “case of interest” announcement containing plaintiff’s private mental health

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information. However, the court may disregard these allegations, as they are contradicted by the

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complaint’s attached exhibits. See Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267 (9th Cir.

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1987); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1998). Plaintiff

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attaches to the complaint the referenced news articles, neither of which includes plaintiff’s

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private mental health information. See Dckt. No. 1. Rather, the articles note plaintiff’s “history

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of sexual offenses” and the fact that plaintiff has been deemed a sexually violent predator. See

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id. These disclosures do not amount to a constitutional violation. See Seaton, 610 F.3d at 539

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(noting that criminal convictions are already matters of public record and that privacy is already

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lost by laws requiring registration on publicly available lists); id. at 540-41 (explaining that
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sexually violent predator evaluations are for the benefit of the public and cannot be treated “as

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constitutionally secret”). Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim based on

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defendants’ alleged use of his private mental health information in a news release and case of

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interest announcement, and further amendment would not cure the deficiencies in this claim.

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Plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable and must be dismissed without leave to amend.

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Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under Ninth Circuit case law, district

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courts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are

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not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.”).

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dckt. No. 2) is granted;
and
2. The complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim and the Clerk is directed to

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close this case.

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DATED: August 22, 2012.

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