Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Association v. California Department of Education
Filing
349
ORDER signed by District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller on 3/5/2018 ORDERING the parties to jointly file a status statement 7 days prior to the status conference and DENYING 346 Motion to Stay Discovery as MOOT. (Fabillaran, J)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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MORGAN HILL CONCERNED
PARENTS ASSOC., CONCERNED
PARENTS ASSOC.,
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ORDER
Plaintiffs,
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No. 2:11-cv-3471 KJM AC
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION,
Defendant.
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After carefully considering the parties’ responses to the court’s order to show
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cause, the court STAYS this action until April 20, 2018, resolving the order to show cause, ECF
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No. 339, and CDE’s pending ex parte application for a stay, ECF No. 346.
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I.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Association and Concerned Parents
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Association (“plaintiffs”) allege defendant California Department of Education (“CDE”) is
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violating its obligations under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Section
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act to ensure that all children with disabilities in California receive a
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“free appropriate public education,” otherwise known as a FAPE. First Am. Compl., ECF No. 6,
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at 1-2. Plaintiffs allege that CDE is failing to adequately monitor, investigate or enforce the
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provision of FAPE in local school districts. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive
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relief requiring CDE to adopt and implement “a statewide monitoring, investigative and
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enforcement model that verifiably measures and ensures the provision of FAPE . . . .” Id. at 4.
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CDE is currently implementing a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) concerning its
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IDEA monitoring obligations under the supervision of the United States District Court for the
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Northern District of California. See ECF No. 2330 in Emma C. v. Torlakson, Case No. 3:96-cv-
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4179 (VC). On November 21, 2017, this court issued an order to show cause why this action
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should not be stayed pending completion of the remedial proceedings in Emma C. v. Torlakson,
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Case No. 3:96-cv-4179 (VC) or, in the alternative, why this action should not be transferred to the
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United States District Court for the Northern District of California for possible relation to
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Emma C. OSC, ECF No. 339.
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CDE filed a response on December 12, 2017. CDE Resp., ECF No. 343. That
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day, plaintiffs also filed a response. Pls.’ Resp., ECF No. 344. Although the parties disagree as
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to whether a stay is warranted, both agree transfer to the Northern District is inappropriate at this
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juncture. CDE Resp. at 4-8; Pls.’ Resp. at 15-17. On February 8, 2018, CDE filed an ex parte
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application to stay discovery pending resolution of the order to show cause, ECF No. 346, which
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plaintiffs oppose, ECF No. 347.
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As explained below, the court issues a temporary targeted stay pending a
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March 26, 2018 hearing in Emma C. The stay, which resolves the pending order to show cause
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and CDE’s ex parte application, will continue until April 20, 2018, at which time the court will
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hold a further status conference.
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I.
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LEGAL STANDARD
“A district court has inherent power to control the disposition of the causes on its
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docket in a manner to promote economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
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litigants.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). “A trial court may, with
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propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a stay
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of an action before it, pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.”
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Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1111 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Levya v. Certified
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Grocers of California, Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1979)); Levya, 593 F.2d at 863-64 (“This
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rule . . . does not require that the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the
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action before the court.”).
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In determining whether a stay is warranted, the court must weigh the competing
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interests resulting from granting or declining a motion to stay. Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110
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(citations omitted). The competing interests include: (1) the possible damage that may result
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from granting a stay, (2) the hardship or inequity a party may suffer in being required to go
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forward, and (3) the orderly course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or
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complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law expected to result from a stay. Id. (citations
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omitted). “[I]f there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to
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some one else,” the moving party “must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being
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required to go forward.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (verbatim quote). Furthermore, “a stay should
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not be granted unless it appears likely the other proceedings will be concluded within a
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reasonable time in relation to the urgency of the claims presented to the court.” Leyva, 593 F.2d
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at 864; see Dependable Highway Exp., Inc. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir.
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2007) (“Generally, stays should not be indefinite in nature.”). “The proponent of a stay bears the
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burden of establishing its need.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997) (citing Landis,
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299 U.S. at 255).
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III.
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DISCUSSION
A.
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Possible Damage
Plaintiffs contend they face considerable damage should a stay issue because they
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will be unable to pursue critical discovery and will be unjustifiably delayed in seeking relief for
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their “urgent [claims], implicating . . . the statutory rights of children with disabilities to a
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meaningful education.” Pls.’ Resp. at 6, 13. Moreover, plaintiffs doubt the value of a stay,
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noting, (1) Emma C. concerns only K-8 students with disabilities at Ravenswood City School
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District (“Ravenswood”) while the instant action concerns all children with disabilities in the
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State of California, and (2) Emma C. implicates only CDE’s monitoring obligations while
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plaintiffs here allege CDE is not fulfilling its monitoring, investigation and enforcement
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obligations. Id. at 5-6.
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B.
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Hardship or Inequity in Going Forward
CDE argues a stay “is warranted because the final resolution in Emma C. . . . may
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be instructive or directive on the statewide system as a whole.” CDE Resp. at 2. CDE further
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suggests a stay may ultimately help focus the parties’ discovery plans. See id. at 3. Furthermore,
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CDE’s compliance with its monitoring obligations under the Emma C. consent decree does
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implicate to some degree CDE’s “statewide system” for monitoring. See Emma v. Eastin,
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673 F. App’x 637, 640 (9th Cir. 2016). In fact, the Emma C. court has rejected CDE’s prior
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attempts to limit “the scope of the Court’s examination . . . to the district-level system,” and has
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“affirmed the Monitor’s determination that he needed to review the state-level system in order to
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evaluate its application in Ravenswood.” Emma C. v. Eastin, No. 96-CV-04179-TEH, 2015 WL
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5029283, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Emma v. Eastin, 673 F. App’x 637 (9th
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Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). As the Ninth Circuit noted, “the State itself appears to have chosen
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to turn its state-level obligation under the Consent Decree to monitor Ravenswood into an
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obligation to monitor school districts statewide—by choosing to present the court with only a
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uniform statewide monitoring approach.” Emma, 673 F. App’x at 640.
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Moreover, because the certified class in Emma C. includes all past, present and
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future students with disabilities at Ravenswood, plaintiffs in the instant action necessarily seek to
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further the interests of Emma C. class members. See ECF No. 2330 at 4 in Emma C. v.
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Torlakson, Case No. 3:96-cv-4179 (VC) (noting certified class consists of “all past, present, and
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future children with disabilities who reside in the Ravenswood District”); see also Pls.’ Resp. at
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10 (explaining plaintiffs “seek[] relief on behalf of all children with disabilities in the State of
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California who are being denied FAPE . . .”). Accordingly, CDE’s compliance with obligations
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imposed in this action pertaining to elementary school students, if any, will implicate CDE’s
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Emma C. monitoring requirements at Ravenswood, and vice versa. To the extent any remedial
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monitoring plan that this court might issue were to conflict with Emma C.’s consent decree,
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CDE’s fulfillment of its monitoring obligations at Ravenswood would comply with its monitoring
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obligations in this action, or its Emma C. monitoring obligations, but not both.
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3.
Orderly Course of Justice
Plaintiffs acknowledge that “both cases call for remedial monitoring plans” and
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say they “anticipate drawing on the considerable expertise and knowledge of the Emma C. Court
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Monitor,” though they contend the actions “only incidentally intersect.” See Pls.’ Resp. at 17. It
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appears to this court that the relationship between the instant action and Emma C. is more than
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incidental, and that the remedial proceedings in Emma C. will inform the proceedings here.
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Furthermore, clarity on the intersection between these two cases may be forthcoming, as the
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Emma C. court will consider the parties’ newly proposed processes for the court’s evaluation of
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state compliance on March 26, 2018. See ECF No. 2350 at 1 in Emma C. v. Torlakson, Case
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No. 3:96-c0v-4179 (VC). A limited stay here pending the outcome of the Emma C. status
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conference is warranted.
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The court is cognizant of the differences between these cases and plaintiffs’
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concerns that a stay would sweep too broadly and cause more harm than it would avoid. Thus,
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after careful consideration, the court determines a temporary targeted stay is appropriate: The
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court STAYS discovery related to CDE’s monitoring obligations at K-8 schools until April 20,
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2018. On April 20, 2018, the court will hold a status conference. The parties are ORDERED to
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jointly file a status statement seven days prior to the status conference. The statement should
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indicate whether and how the March 26, 2018 hearing in Emma C. informs this action. In light of
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this order, CDE’s ex parte motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the order to show
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cause, ECF No. 346, is DENIED as MOOT.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 5, 2018.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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