Knight et al v. City of Sacramento et al

Filing 20

ORDER signed by Judge John A. Mendez on 5/9/2014 DENYING 15 Defendants' Motion to Sever. (Reader, L)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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VONTRE KNIGHT, et al.,

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2:12-CV-0346 JAM-KJN

Plaintiffs,

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No.

v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO SEVER

CITY OF SACRAMENTO POLICE
DEPT., DOG HANDLERS AARON
THOMPSON, GARY DAHL, JOHN
AZEVEDO,

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Defendants.
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This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ City of

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Sacramento, Aaron Thompson, John Azevedo, and Gary Dahl’s

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(collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Sever (Doc. #15), pursuant

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to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).

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Plaintiffs VonTre Night, Robert Price, Ricky Lee Sims, Tommy

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Martinez, Todd Jamison, Jerry Tolliver, Shylow Thurman, Kevin

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Stern, and Jason Blevins (collectively “Plaintiffs”) oppose the

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motion (Doc. #16).

Defendants filed a reply (Doc. #17).

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This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without
oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was
scheduled for May 7, 2014.
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I.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are nine individuals who were bitten by K-9 units

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in Defendant City of Sacramento’s police force.

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Complaint (“SAC”) ¶¶ 11-23.

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on a separate occasion.

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Bandit, who is handled by Defendant Dahl.

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Plaintiffs were bitten by K-9 Blitz, who is handled by Defendant

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Azevedo.

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unidentified K-9 unit handled by Defendant Thompson.

SAC ¶¶ 19-22.

Second Amended

Each individual Plaintiff was bitten

Two Plaintiffs were bitten by K-9
SAC ¶¶ 12-14.

Four

One Plaintiff was bitten by an
SAC ¶ 23.

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Two Plaintiffs were bitten by K-9 units handled by officers who

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are unidentified in the complaint.

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SAC ¶¶ 16, 18.

On February 9, 2012, the Court issued an order (Doc. #2)

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severing Defendants from a previous action (Dobrowski, et al. v.

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Sacramento City Police Department, et al. – 2:11-cv-01390-JAM-

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KJN) and creating the current action.

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March 7, 2012, Plaintiffs filed the SAC (Doc. #4) against

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Defendants.

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(1) “Violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S. 1983 by Dog

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Handlers;” (2) “Violation of Civil Rights under 42 USC 1983:

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Fourth Amendment violations by Defendant Handlers;”

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(3) “Violation of Civil Rights: Deliberate Indifference by Dog

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Handlers;” (4) “Violation of Bane Act, California Civil Code 52:

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Threats and Violence by Dog Handlers;” (5) “Intentional/Negligent

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Infliction of Emotional Distress by Dog Handlers;” (6) “Assault

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and Battery by Dog Handlers;” (7) “Negligence by Dog Handlers;”

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(8) “Negligent Training;” (9) “Negligent Supervision;” and

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(10) “Deliberate Indifference.”

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the face of the SAC, it appears that the first through seventh

Pursuant to that order, on

The SAC includes the following causes of action:

Although not entirely clear from

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causes of action are brought against the individual dog handlers

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(Defendants Thompson, Azevedo, and Dahl), whereas that the eighth

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through tenth causes of action are brought against Defendant City

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of Sacramento.

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not expressly cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it can reasonably be read as

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a Monell claim against Defendant City of Sacramento.

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Moreover, although the Tenth Cause of Action does

The Court’s status/scheduling Order was filed on November 2,

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2012. (Doc.#8) For reasons unclear to the Court, Defendants

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waited until April 2, 2014 to file the instant motion. The final

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pretrial conference is currently set for May 29, 2014 and the

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trial is set for June 30, 2014.

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II.

OPINION

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A.

Legal Standard

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Rule 21 of the FRCP provides that a court “may . . . sever

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any claim against a party.”

The Ninth Circuit has noted that “a

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district court’s decision regarding severance may be set aside

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only for abuse of discretion.”

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1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Davis

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v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1556 (9th Cir.

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1992).

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whether the parties were properly joined under Rule 20.

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v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997).

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Court finds that the parties were properly joined, the Court may

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still grant the motion to sever upon a finding that (1) a joint

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trial would result in substantial prejudice to the moving party,

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or (2) a joint trial would result in substantial jury confusion.

Davis v. Mason Cnty., 927 F.2d

On a Rule 21 motion, the Court must first consider

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Coughlin

Even if the

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B.

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Defendants argue that the Court should sever each individual

Discussion

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Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants, creating nine separate

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lawsuits.

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improperly joined under Rule 20.

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argue that failure to sever the individual Plaintiffs would

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create “severe and undue prejudice” to Defendants.

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Finally, Defendants argue that severance will prevent “confusion

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to a jury who would be hearing different factual scenarios they

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would need to separate and align with particular Plaintiffs and

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Defendants.”

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argue that “it is not the use of a K-9 that ties these plaintiffs

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together,” but rather “it is the city policy” that justifies the

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joinder.

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Defendants’ primary argument is that Plaintiffs were

Reply at 2.

Mot. at 2.

Defendants also

Mot. at 2.

In a five-page opposition, Plaintiffs

Opp. at 4.
1.

Rule 20(a) – Permissive Joinder

Rule 20(a) of the FRCP governs “Permissive Joinder of

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Parties.”

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action as plaintiffs if: (A) they assert any right to relief

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. . . with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,

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occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any

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question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in

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the action.”

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action if both of these requirements are satisfied.

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Rule 20(a)(1) provides that “persons may join in one

Accordingly, plaintiffs are properly joined in an

In the case at bar, Plaintiffs’ Tenth Cause of Action

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asserts a § 1983 Monell claim against Defendant City of

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Sacramento for deliberate indifference, on behalf of all

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Plaintiffs.

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both prongs of Rule 20(a)(1).

SAC ¶¶ 51-54.

The Tenth Cause of Action satisfies
First, each Plaintiff’s right to
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relief under the Monell claim arises out of the same “series of

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transactions or occurrences” – namely, the City’s alleged failure

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to address the pattern of misconduct by K-9 handlers.

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the first prong of Rule 20(a)(1) does not require that all claims

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in the complaint arise from the same series of transactions or

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occurrences; rather it only requires that any claim for relief,

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common to all Plaintiffs, arises from the same series of

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transactions and occurrences.

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will arise in the action – namely, whether the City’s acts or

Notably,

Second, a common question of fact

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omissions in training K-9 handlers constituted deliberate

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indifference.

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Defendants’ Motion to Sever fails to acknowledge that the

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City of Sacramento is a “common defendant” among all nine

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Plaintiffs.

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plaintiff’s claim does not “arise[] from a unique and separate

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transaction or occurrence against a separate and unique

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defendant.”

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argument that Plaintiffs were improperly joined under Rule 20(a)

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has no merit.

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joinder of Plaintiffs in a single action was not improper.

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Accordingly, contrary to Defendants’ argument, each

Mot. at 1 (emphasis added).

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Therefore, Defendants’

Both prongs of Rule 20(a)(1) are satisfied and the

Prejudice to Individual Defendants

Defendants argue that “severe and undue prejudice” would

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result from a joint trial.

Mot. at 2.

In a nearly identical

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case, the Ninth Circuit directly addressed and rejected this

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argument.

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1991), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. City & Cnty. of San

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Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1556 (9th Cir. 1992).

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several plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action against a county, its

Davis v. Mason Cnty., 927 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir.

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In Davis,

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sheriff, and several deputies.

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claim arose from a separate traffic stop by a separate officer –

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and each stop culminated in the arrest and beating of that

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individual plaintiff.

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the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

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the defendants’ motion to sever each plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

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into a separate trial.

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argued that prejudice would result from a joint trial because

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“evidence of the series of incidents of excessive force involving

Id. at 1479.

Id. at 1479.

Id. at 1480.

Each plaintiff’s

The Ninth Circuit held that

In part, defendants had

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different police officers [would be] admissible against the

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County and the Sheriff’s Department,” despite the fact that that

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evidence “would have been inadmissible against individual

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defendants not involved in the particular episode.”

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The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument:

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Id. at 1479.

“Yet, while severing the defendants would have surely
eliminated this prejudice, severing the plaintiffs
would not have solved the problem. Even if each
plaintiff had a separate trial, evidence of a pattern
of misconduct would still have been admitted because
each plaintiff . . . presented a claim against at least
one defendant and against the County. Since defendants
requested severance of the plaintiffs’ claims, the
court below did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
the motion.” Id. at 1479-80 (emphasis in original).

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The case at bar presents the same situation.

Even if the Court

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were to grant Defendants’ motion to sever each Plaintiff’s claim

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into a separate trial, the same evidence of each individual

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incident would be admissible, at each trial, to show a pattern of

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misconduct by Defendant City.

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before the Court is to sever Plaintiffs, not Defendants.

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Accordingly, the Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to sever

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would not result in any prejudice to individual Defendants.

Just as in Davis, the motion

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3.

Juror Confusion/Judicial Economy

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Defendants argue that a joint trial would result in

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“confusion to the jury” and “would in no way promote judicial

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economy.”

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jury confusion, but do note that “severance and litigating

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separately would be an extreme waste of court time.”

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3.

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Mot. at 2.

Plaintiffs do not address the issue of

Opp. at 2-

Evaluation of these factors is soundly within the Court’s
discretion.

Davis, 927 F.2d at 1479.

Proper jury instructions

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would substantially mitigate any potential juror confusion.

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Moreover, the interest of judicial economy cuts strongly in favor

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of holding a joint trial: holding nine separate trials would not

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only be substantially burdensome on the Court’s calendar, but

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would also likely result in the repeated presentation of

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identical evidence against Defendant City at each trial.

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Accordingly, the factors of juror confusion and judicial economy

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do not support Defendants’ motion.

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Finally, Defendants failed to explain why they waited over

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two years (and approximately two months before the trial date) to

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file this motion. Such a last minute request for relief that

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would cause significant disruption to the Court’s calendar is

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neither encouraged nor, as in this case, likely to be granted.
III.

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ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES

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Defendants’ Motion to Sever:

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:

May 9, 2014

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