Boardman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Filing 14

MEMORANDUM and ORDER signed by Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. on 12/6/2012 ORDERING that Defendant's 7 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint is accordingly DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b) (1) and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Because the Court does not believe that the defects of Plaintiff's Complaint can be remedied though amendment, leave to amend is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the file. CASE CLOSED. (Zignago, K.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ELIZABETH BOARDMAN,
No. 2:12-cv-00639-MCE-GGH

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Plaintiff,

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v.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Douglas H.
Shulman,

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Defendant.

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----oo0oo----

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Through this action, Plaintiff Elizabeth Boardman seeks a

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permanent injunction preventing Defendant Internal Revenue

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Service (“IRS”) from using its tax collection procedures to

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infringe on her religious rights.

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Defendant’s policies run afoul of the First Amendment’s Free

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Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993

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(“RFRA”).

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///

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///
1

Plaintiff alleges that

1

Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

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Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).1

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Additionally, Defendant moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s

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complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule

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12(b)(6).

7

No. 1.)

8

2012.

9

motion (ECF No. 11), and Defendant filed a timely reply (ECF No.

Plaintiff filed her complaint on March 13, 2012.

(ECF

Defendant’s motion to dismiss was filed on July 29,
(ECF No. 6.)

10

12).

11

Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant’s

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motions are

GRANTED.2

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BACKGROUND3

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As a lifelong Quaker and peace activist, Plaintiff “refuses

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voluntarily to pay the percentage of her federal income taxes

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that is directed towards war.”

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Plaintiff takes the position that “paying for war is repugnant to

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her religion and to her conscience.”

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practice of antiwar tax retention, often called ‘war tax

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resistance,’ is an established [Quaker] practice.”

(ECF No. 1 at 1.)

(Id. ¶ 35.)

In fact,

“The religious

(Id. ¶ 16.)

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1

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All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
2

Because oral argument would not be of material assistance,
the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.
Cal. R. 230(g).
3

The factual assertions in this section are based on the
allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint unless otherwise specified.
(ECF No. 1.)
2

1

Quakers, like Plaintiff, suffer spiritual pain from war and

2

adhere to a commandment against killing.

3

Plaintiff has held numerous leadership positions within Quaker

4

organizations, and she has written several books and articles

5

about Quaker customs and teachings.

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also been involved in several forms of antiwar activism.

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¶¶ 7-8.)

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participating in marches and traveling to Iraq.

(Id. ¶¶ 9, 29.)

(Id. ¶ 6.)

Plaintiff has
(Id.

These include writing letters, holding vigils,
(Id.)

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When filing her federal tax returns for the 2007 and 2008

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tax years, Plaintiff fully completed the returns with accurate

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information but remitted only about half of her federal income

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tax liability.

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tax returns, Plaintiff explained that “her conscience and

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religious beliefs would not allow her to pay the full amount

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due.”

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evidence that the withheld funds were on deposit with a financial

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institution and maintained that she would pay the funds if they

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were allocated toward peaceful purposes.

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correspondence between Plaintiff and Defendant resulted in

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Defendant stating that Plaintiff’s justification was frivolous

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and not supported by law.

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argument was deemed “frivolous,” the Tax Relief and Health Care

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Act of 2006 (“TRHCA”) allowed Defendant to deny any additional

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administrative or judicial review.

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Plaintiff’s demand for a Tax Court determination was

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unsuccessful.

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///

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///

(ECF No. 11 at 1.)

(ECF No. 1 at 1-2.)

In a letter attached to the

Plaintiff’s letter also offered

(Id. at 2.)

(Id. ¶¶ 33, 36.)

(Id. ¶¶ 39, 40.)

3

Further

Once Plaintiff’s

(Id. ¶ 30.)

As a result,

1

Plaintiff also claims that Defendant misrepresented various

2

aspects of the tax collection process and misconstrued

3

Plaintiff’s statements.

4

that Defendant’s threats of imminent seizure compelled Plaintiff

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to pay her outstanding liability for the 2008 tax year.

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(Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff further alleges

(Id.)

Plaintiff claims that Defendant “employs punitive procedures

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and/or policies against persons who fail or refuse to make full

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payment of taxes on grounds of religion or conscience.”

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2.)

(Id. at

Defendant’s practices, according to Plaintiff, are

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discriminatory and seek to suppress conduct undertaken for

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religious reasons.

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alleges that Defendant intentionally frustrated her religious

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beliefs by depriving her of rights and procedures that would have

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been available had she not asserted a religious motive for

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withholding a portion of her taxes.

(ECF No. 11 at 17.)

In fact, Plaintiff

(ECF No. 1 at 2.)

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Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s

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regulations and methods violate the First Amendment’s Free

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Exercise Clause and the RFRA.

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offense to the word “frivolous” being used to describe a

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taxpayer’s reliance on moral or religious grounds as a

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justification for refusing to pay their taxes.

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Plaintiff claims that she does not challenge the tax system or

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“seek to restrain assessment or collection of tax,” she does

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request a permanent injunction forcing Defendant to promulgate

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new procedures for collecting taxes.

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doing so, Plaintiff “seeks to enforce the intent of Congress,

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which is to protect and preserve an established religious

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practice.”

(Id. at 3.)

(ECF No. 11 at 3.)
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Plaintiff also takes

(Id.)

Although

(Id. ¶¶ 4, 34, 54.)

In

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Plaintiff implicitly acknowledges that Defendant correctly

2

calculated her taxes owed and any penalty due, and she does not

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request monetary damages.

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Defendant’s motion is now before the Court for adjudication.

(Id. ¶ 55.)

As indicated above,

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MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 12(B)(1)

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STANDARD

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In moving to dismiss for lack of subject matter

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jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(1), the plaintiff bears the

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burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction.

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Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377

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(1994).

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the plaintiff proves otherwise.

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Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.

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1989).

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complaint, when considered in its entirety, fails to allege facts

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sufficient to establish jurisdiction.

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High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,

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541 U.S. 1009 (2004).

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pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the district court is not restricted

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to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence.”

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McCarthy v. U.S., 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988).

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challenging jurisdiction may either make a “facial attack” on the

26

allegations of jurisdiction contained in the complaint or can

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instead take issue with subject matter jurisdiction on a factual

28

basis (“factual attack”).

The court presumes that jurisdiction is lacking until
Stock W., Inc., v. Confederated

Furthermore, courts should grant the motion if the

Savage v. Glendale Union

“When considering a motion to dismiss

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The party

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Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel. & Elect. Corp., 594 F.2d

2

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan

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Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

4

If the motion constitutes a facial attack, the Court must

5

consider the factual allegations of the complaint to be true.

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Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1981);

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Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.

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attack, however, “no presumptive truthfulness attaches to

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plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material

If the motion constitutes a factual

10

facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for

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itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.”

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at 733 (quoting Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).

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Thornhill, 594 F.2d

If the Court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

14

then decide whether to grant leave to amend.

Generally, leave to

15

amend should be denied only if it is clear that the deficiencies

16

of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment.

17

Cutter Labs, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980).

Broughton v.

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ANALYSIS

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The Anti-Injunction Act (“the Act”) establishes that “no

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suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection

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of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,

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whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax

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was assessed.”

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26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).

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“The Court has interpreted the principal purpose of [the Act] to

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be the protection of the Government’s need to assess and collect

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taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of pre-

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enforcement judicial interference.”

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416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974).

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impacting tax collection, even if the complaint alleges

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constitutional violations.

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616 U.S. 752, 759 (1974).

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Act when the complaint seeks injunctive relief.

Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon,

As such, the Act applies to all cases

Alexander v. Ams. United Inc.,
Furthermore, courts have relied on the
Uptergrove v.

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United States, 2009 WL 2244185, *2 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2009).

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Courts tend to broadly and strictly enforce the Act.

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Maxfield v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 433, 434 (9th Cir. 1984).

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If the Act applies to a particular lawsuit, the court lacks

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jurisdiction to entertain the claim or grant relief.

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Science Church v. IRS, 525 F. Supp 399, 404 (N.D. Cal. 1981).

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However, the Act “sets forth [a two-prong exception] which, if

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present, will support the granting of equitable relief.”

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of Scientology of California v. United States, 920 F.2d 1481,

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1484 (9th cir. 1990).

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the collection of any tax if [the plaintiff establishes that]

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(1) it is ‘clear that under no circumstances could the government

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ultimately prevail’ and (2) ‘equity jurisdiction’ otherwise

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exists, i.e., the taxpayer shows that he would otherwise suffer

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irreparable injury.”

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///

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Life

Church

“[A]n injunction may be obtained against

Id. at 1485 (internal citations omitted).

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1

A.

Whether the Act Applies

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3

Plaintiff claims that the Act is not applicable in this case

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because she “does not seek to restrain assessment or collection

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of any tax.”

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she “does not contend herein that the amount of any determination

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of tax or penalty by [Defendant] was improper and she does not

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seek any monetary damages.”

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asks for “efficient and transparent collection of taxes” and

(ECF No. 1 at 4.)

Moreover, Plaintiff states that

(Id. at 19.)

Instead, Plaintiff

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asserts that her “requested restraints on abuse are extraneous to

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tax assessment and collection protected by the [Act].”

12

No. 11 at 13-14.)

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candidly admits that she does not seek a refund of taxes paid,”

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she “seeks an injunction requiring the government to reorganize

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the method it has chosen to assess and collect taxes.”

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No. 7 at 10.)

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requested relief would hinder Defendant’s “ability to avoid

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engaging in legally frivolous and ultimately meritless arguments

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advanced by taxpayers regardless of their religious or moral

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beliefs.”

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(ECF

Defendant asserts that although “Plaintiff

(ECF

Thus, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s

(Id. at 11.)

In a similar case involving a plaintiff disputing the

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constitutionality of particular tax code statutes, the court held

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that “[a]lthough [plaintiff’s] complaint does not specifically

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seek an injunction restraining the assessment or collection of

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tax, the relief he seeks . . . would ‘necessarily preclude the

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Act’s collection of’ the challenged tax and therefore falls

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within the Act’s scope.”

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(9th Cir. 2007).

Hansen v. Dep’t of Treasury, 528, 601

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Here, while Plaintiff claims she does not wish to interfere with

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tax assessment and collection, she requests that Defendant

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implement new procedures and policies for collecting taxes.

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Contrary to Plaintiff’s stated purpose, her complaint is actually

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a thinly-veiled attempt to force extensive and burdensome changes

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to Defendant’s already complex taxation system.

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granting relief to Plaintiff would certainly impede the

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collection of taxes.

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As such,

The Court has no doubt that ruling in Plaintiff’s favor

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would negatively impact Defendant’s established methods of

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assessing taxes.

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adopt procedures catering to the religious or moral views of

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every taxpayer would significantly burden tax collection.

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Indeed, the costs of administering the tax system may become

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prohibitively expensive, threatening the system’s integrity, if

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Defendant allocated tax revenue based on the individualized

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beliefs of each taxpayer.

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that Plaintiff’s suit challenges statutory framework pertaining

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to tax assessment and collection, and, if Plaintiff is

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successful, she would “impermissibly restrain and hamper

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[Defendant’s] ability to assess and collect taxes.”

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at 11.)

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the case at hand.

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jurisdiction unless Plaintiff demonstrates that she satisfies

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both prongs of the exception.

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It is also clear that compelling Defendant to

Thus, the Court agrees with Defendant

(ECF No. 7

As a result, the Court finds that the Act does apply to
Because the Act applies, the Court lacks

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1

B.

Whether Plaintiff Satisfies the Act’s Exception

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3

A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating both that “the

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Government could not ultimately prevail” and that he will suffer

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an irreparable injury with no legal remedy.

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Scientology of California, 920 F.2d at 1485.

Church of

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8

1.

Could the Government Ultimately Prevail

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This first prong is satisfied “[o]nly if it is then

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manifest, under the most liberal view of the law and the facts,

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that the government cannot prove its claim.”

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440 F.2d 1186, 1187 (9th Cir. 1971).

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provide an argument regarding the first prong, Defendant contends

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that “Plaintiff cannot establish that under no circumstance could

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[Defendant] ultimately prevail on the merits of the action.”

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(ECF No. 7 at 11.)

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Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim by stating that “[n]eutral laws

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of general application (such as the federal tax laws in question)

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do not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause of the First

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Amendment, even when they somehow burden religious practices.”

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(Id. at 18.)

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regarding whether existing tax administration framework violated

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Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

25

Thrower v. Miller,

Although Plaintiff fails to

Specifically, Defendant responds to

Thus, Defendant argues that it could indeed prevail

(Id. at 11.)

“[T]he necessities of revenue collection under enactments of

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general applicability raise governmental interests sufficiently

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compelling to outweigh the free exercise rights of those who find

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the tax objectionable on bona fide religious grounds.”
10

1

Franklet v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (N.D. Cal.

2

1984).

3

justified by the ‘broad public interest in maintaining a sound

4

tax system,’ free of ‘myriad exceptions flowing from a wide

5

variety of religious beliefs.’”

6

Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989) (internal citations

7

omitted).

8

unmistakably clear that the constitutional nature of a taxpayer’s

9

claim, as distinct from its probability of success, is of no

10
11

“[E]ven a substantial burden [on free exercise] would be

Hernandez v. Comm’r Internal

Furthermore, previous Supreme Court decisions “make it

consequence under the [Act].”

Alexander, 416 U.S. at 759.

While Plaintiff’s pleadings are somewhat unclear, Plaintiff

12

apparently claims that the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006

13

(“TRHCA”), which curtails the administrative appeals process for

14

certain taxpayer claims, violates her free exercise rights.

15

However, Plaintiff is unable to adequately demonstrate how the

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TRHCA is discriminatory or thwarting her religious practices.

17

Moreover, the Court agrees with Defendant that the TRHCA advances

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the compelling government interest in efficiently collecting

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taxes by permitting the expedient disposal of meritless

20

arguments.

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burdening religious freedom because the TRHCA only disregards

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arguments that have no legal basis.

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to establish that Defendant could not possibly prevail in regard

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to Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim.

The TRHCA is also the least restrictive means of

As a result, Plaintiff fails

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Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant has violated the

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Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), legislation

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reaffirming the right to practice religion without government

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interference.
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1

In countering Plaintiff’s argument, Defendant states that neutral

2

laws substantially burdening religion in order to further a

3

compelling government interest do not contravene the RFRA.

4

No. 7 at 20-21.)

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“cannot show that [Defendant] would not prevail under RFRA.”

6

(Id. at 20.)

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government’s compelling interest in collecting taxes outweighs

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the burden imposed on an individual’s religious freedom.

9

Comm’r Internal Revenue, 48 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 1995).

10

Additionally, “[i]n the context of [the TRHCA], the Government’s

11

compelling interest in maintaining a sound and administratively

12

workable tax system justifies the alleged restriction on free

13

expression.”

14

(9thCir. 1987).

15

(ECF

Therefore, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff

Even after Congress enacted the RFRA, the

Droz v.

Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 1400, 1403

Once again, although Plaintiff’s pleadings are convoluted,

16

Plaintiff appears to allege that the TRHCA violates the RFRA.

17

discussed above, the TRHCA uses the least restrictive means

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possible to further a compelling Government interest.

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a neutral law, equally impacting all religions and beliefs.

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result, Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendant cannot

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possibly prevail in regard to Plaintiff’s RFRA claim.

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Defendant could succeed on the merits, Plaintiff is unable to

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fulfill the first prong of the Act’s judicial exception.

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As

It is also
As a

Because

2.

1

Jurisdiction Premised on Equity

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3

“[T]he taxpayer must demonstrate that [he] is entitled to

4

equitable relief.”

Church of Scientology of California, 920 F.2d

5

at 1485.

6

remedy at law and that the denial of injunctive relief would

7

cause him immediate, irreparable harm.”

8

196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987).

9

alternative remedy” because “[n]one of the requested relief is

This entails establishing that “he has no adequate

Jensen v. IRS, 835 F.2d

Plaintiff claims that she “has no

10

available in any forum other than this one.”

11

11-12.)

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adequate remedy at law.”

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Defendant, Plaintiff can provide her outstanding tax balance, and

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she “may then file an administrative claim for refund of taxes

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she believes she should not be required to pay, and then sue for

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a refund in a district court or the Court of Federal Claims.”

17

(Id.)

18

(ECF No. 11 at

Defendant disagrees and contends that “Plaintiff has an
(ECF No. 7 at 24.)

According to

“A taxpayer cannot render an available review procedure an

19

inadequate remedy at law by voluntarily forgoing it.”

Alexander,

20

416 U.S. at 762 n.13.

21

to pay the assessed taxes and file a refund suit.

22

admits that she chose not to pursue all available administrative

23

remedies.

24

claim that no satisfactory remedy exists simply because she would

25

prefer to create her own remedy.

26

insufficient support for her allegations that she can obtain the

27

requested relief only through the present action.

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///

Here, Plaintiff concedes that she declined

(ECF No. 1 at 15.)

Plaintiff also

Plaintiff is not permitted to then

13

Additionally, Plaintiff offers

1

The Court finds that Plaintiff has “an adequate remedy at law in

2

an action for a refund.”

3

920 F.2d at 1488.

4

choose any remedy that they desire would significantly hinder the

5

tax system.

6

Church of Scientology of California,

Furthermore, allowing taxpayers to pick and

The plaintiffs in United States v. American Friends Service

7

Committee also claimed that they had “no alternative legal remedy

8

available.”

9

suit provided the plaintiffs with ample opportunity to litigate

419 U.S. 7, 11 (1974).

(Id.)

The court held that a refund

10

their liability.

Similarly, Plaintiff in the present case

11

cannot ignore the existing and adequate remedy of paying the tax

12

liability and then suing for a refund.

13

the remitting of [Plaintiff] to a refund action may frustrate

14

[her] chosen method of bearing witness to [her] religious

15

convictions, a chosen method which [she] insist[s] is

16

constitutionally protected, the bar of the [Act] is not removed.”

17

(Id.)

18

“equity jurisdiction” does not exist, and Plaintiff is unable to

19

satisfy the second prong of the Act’s judicial exception.

Moreover, “[e]ven though

Because Plaintiff has a satisfactory remedy available,

20

As discussed above, the Act applies to the instant

21

action, and Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that she qualifies for

22

an exception to the Act.4

23

Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) is GRANTED.

24

///

25

///

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to

26
4

27
28

Plaintiff put forth several additional arguments as to why
the Act should not bar the Court’s jurisdiction over this case.
After examining Plaintiff’s theories, the Court finds them
unpersuasive.
14

1

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 12(B)(6)

2
STANDARD

3
4
5

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

6

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

7

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

8

nonmoving party.

9

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996).

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,
Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and

10

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

11

to relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what

12

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

13

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007) (internal

14

citations and quotations omitted).

15

by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed

16

factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

17

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than

18

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

19

elements of a cause of action will not do.”

20

citations and quotations omitted).

21

Bell

Though “a complaint attacked

Id. at 555 (internal

A plaintiff’s factual allegations must be enough to raise a

22

right to relief above the speculative level.

23

5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216,

24

pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“The pleading must contain something

25

more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a

26

suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)).

27
28

Id. (citing

Moreover, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a ‘showing,’ rather
than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief.
15

1

Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to

2

see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing

3

not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also

4

‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”

5

n.3 (internal citations omitted).

6

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

7

face.”

8

677-79 (2009).

9

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,

A pleading must contain “only

Id. at 570; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
If the “plaintiffs .

10

complaint must be dismissed.”

11

. . have not nudged their

556 U.S. at 680.

12

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal,

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then

13

decide whether to grant leave to amend.

14

court to freely grant leave to amend when there is no “undue

15

delay, bad faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant,

16

. . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . .

17

the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment. . . .”

18

Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

19

generally denied when it is clear the deficiencies of the

20

complaint cannot be cured by amendment.

21

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992);

22

Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A

23

complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it

24

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

25

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”)

26

(internal citations omitted).

27

///

28

///
16

Rule 15(a) empowers the

Foman v.

However, leave to amend is

DeSoto v. Yellow Freight
Balistieri v.

ANALYSIS

1
2
3

“Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound

4

tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in conflict

5

with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting the

6

tax.”

7

Plaintiff’s pleadings are confusing and, at times, contradictory,

8

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s tax policies and practices

9

violate the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA.

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).

Although

(ECF No. 1 at 3.)

10

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s use of the word

11

“frivolous” evidences Defendant’s hostility toward Plaintiff’s

12

religious views.5

13

Plaintiff fails to state a claim “because the overwhelming weight

14

of authority has held that the government’s interest in

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maintaining a uniform, mandatory system of taxation is

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compelling, and sufficient to defeat any claim of a substantial

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burden on Free Exercise under either the First Amendment or

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RFRA.”

(ECF No. 11 at 15.)

Defendant contends that

(ECF No. 7 at 24.)

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“The Free Exercise Clause . . . does not afford an

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individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s

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internal procedures.”

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///

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///

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///

Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 693 (1986).

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5

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There appears to be some confusion over Defendant’s use of
the word “frivolous.” Plaintiff mistakenly believes that
Defendant utilizes “frivolous” as a means of discouraging
religion. The Court finds that Defendant uses “frivolous” in its
legal context, referring to an argument lacking a legal or
factual basis. (ECF No. 12 at 7.)
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Thus, “[t]he fact that some persons may object, on religious

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grounds, to some of the things that the government does is not a

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basis upon which they can claim a constitutional right not to pay

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a part of a tax.”

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Cir. 1969).

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were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments

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were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.”

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Lee, 455 U.S. at 260.

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clear that a federal taxpayer has no standing to maintain a

Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586, 588 (9th

“The tax system could not function if denominations

Moreover, “[t]he Supreme Court has made it

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purely religious objection to federal expenditures.”

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Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1532 (9th Cir. 1985),

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cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).

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is willing to voluntarily remit her outstanding tax liability

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only upon assurance that the funds will be used for purposes she

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deems acceptable, she essentially objects to Defendant’s method

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of allocating tax dollars.

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grounds on which she will pay the tax and how the government can

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use the revenue.

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religious convictions as the basis for withholding tax payments.

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As a result, the Court agrees with Defendant that “the

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overwhelming weight of authority” clearly demonstrates that

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Plaintiff fails to state a claim.6

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Grove v.

Because Plaintiff claims she

Her position also prescribes both the

Furthermore, Plaintiff repeatedly cites her

In an analogous case decided after Congress enacted the

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RFRA, a plaintiff sought a court order preventing the IRS from

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allocating his tax dollars to war-related programs.

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6

Although the Court has duly considered Plaintiff’s various
arguments opposing the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
these arguments are insufficient to warrant further discussion.
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1

Kennedy v. Rubin, 1995 WL 552148, *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 07, 1995).

2

Additionally, the plaintiff wanted his payments distributed to

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programs that he did not consider “religiously objectionable.”

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Id.

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Rule 12(b)(6), the court found that “a plaintiff cannot state a

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claim based upon a religious objection to paying taxes.”

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*3.

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elevate form over substance” when he endeavors to distinguish his

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lawsuit from past cases on the ground that “he is not opposed to

In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to

Id. at

The court also noted that the plaintiff simply “attempts to

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paying his federal taxes, but rather, seeks Only to divert his

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taxes away from military programs.”

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Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions attach “equally whether

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the taxpayer refuses to pay taxes or simply attempts to control

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the use of any taxes tendered to the Government.”

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Id.

The court held that

Likewise, Plaintiff in the present case seeks to prevent

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Defendant from using her tax dollars for war-related programs.

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Plaintiff claims that she will pay the full extent of her tax

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liability only if the money is allocated to peaceful purposes.

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Plaintiff predicates her lawsuit on Defendant allegedly

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suppressing religion.

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demonstrates that Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases estop

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Plaintiff from bringing her lawsuit, a religious objection to the

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country’s tax system, even if she does not dispute her overall

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tax liability.

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procedures violate her Constitutional and statutory religious

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rights, but “nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Congress

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from levying a tax upon all persons, regardless of religion, for

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support of the general government.”

However, Kennedy v. Rubin plainly

Moreover, Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s tax

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Autenrieth, 418 F.2d at 588.

1

Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim, and Defendant’s

2

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.

3
CONCLUSION

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6

As a matter of law, and for the reasons set forth above,

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED.

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Plaintiff’s Complaint is accordingly dismissed for lack of

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subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and,

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alternatively, for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

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Because the Court does not believe that the defects of

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Plaintiff’s Complaint can be remedied though amendment, leave to

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amend is DENIED.

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file.

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The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 6, 2012

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_____________________________
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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