Johnson v. Shaffer et al

Filing 22

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 1/10/2013 ORDERING 20 that Luis Renteria's motion to be joined in this action is DENIED. (Reader, L)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAM JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

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No. 2:12-cv-1059 KJM AC P

vs.
JENNIFER SHAFFER, et. al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
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Plaintiff, a state prisoner housed at San Quentin State Prison and proceeding with

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retained counsel, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court is non-party Luis

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Renteria’s November 19, 2012 motion to be joined in this case. Neither plaintiff nor defendants

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have responded to this motion. On review of the motion and good cause appearing therefor,

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THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

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RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff initiated this action on April 20, 2012 and is proceeding on a first

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amended complaint filed November 15, 2012. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief

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against various State defendants for their allegedly unconstitutional bias in implementing a

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system of fabricated evidence to support their decisions to deny parole. Plaintiff accuses
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officials of the State of California, including the Governor, the Secretary of the California

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Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and various officials of the Board of

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Parole Hearings (“BPH”) for ordering a psychological evaluation by the Forensic Assessment

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Division (“FAD”) for every inmate who has been sentenced to an indeterminate period of

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imprisonment (“Lifer”) and who is facing a parole hearing. Plaintiff asserts that the FAD

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reports, which are purportedly used to assist the Board in determining an inmate’s future

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propensity for violence, are based on tools that are inaccurate measures of an inmate’s risk of

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future violence and on factors with no statistical correlation to risk. Plaintiff claims that the BPH

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implemented psychological evaluations by the FAD with the purpose of limiting parole

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availability to Lifer inmates.

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Plaintiff is serving a sentence of 25 years to life following a 1991 conviction for

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first degree murder, robbery and assault. He claims that, in preparation for his April 2010 parole

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hearing, he was required to undergo a psychological evaluation by an FAD evaluator, Dr.

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Richard Hayward. Plaintiff contends that the FAD report prepared by Dr. Hayward was replete

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with findings unsupported by any evidence and made a projection of plaintiff’s future risk of

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violence that was contradictory to other findings made by the same psychologist in the same

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report. In total, plaintiff claims that the FAD report contained nine substantial errors. This

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report was relied on by the BPH in finding plaintiff unsuitable for parole at the April 2010 parole

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hearing. Plaintiff also claims that the BPH failed to abide by its own rules that require it to order

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a new FAD report if the initial FAD report is found to contain errors; that the BPH failed to

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allow the psychologist who prepared the FAD report to appear as witnesses at the parole board

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hearing; and that the BPH refused to consider objections to the FAD report. Plaintiff’s next

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parole consideration hearing is scheduled for April 21, 2013. Plaintiff now seeks, inter alia,

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expungement of this report from his prison file and declaratory relief that the regulations

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governing the FAD and its psychological evaluations are void and unenforceable.

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DISCUSSION
Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the joinder of plaintiffs

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in one action if: (1) the plaintiffs assert any right to relief arising out of the same transaction,

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occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and (2) there are common questions of law

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or fact. Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997).

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The permissive joinder rule “is to be construed liberally in order to promote trial

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convenience and to expedite the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple

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lawsuits.” League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 914, 917 (9th

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Cir. 1997). The purpose of Rule 20(a) is to address the “broadest possible scope of action

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consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly

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encouraged.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966).

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For there to be transactional relatedness under Rule 20(a)(1)(A), the claims must

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arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A). There is no bright-line definition of “transaction,” “occurrence,” or “series.”

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Instead, courts assess the facts of each case individually to determine whether joinder is sensible

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in light of the underlying policies of permissive party joinder. Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350.

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Although there might be different occurrences, where the claims involve enough related

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operative facts, joinder in a single case may be appropriate.

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The second part of the joinder test requires commonality. Commonality under

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Rule 20(a)(1)(B) is not a particularly stringent test. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 11 C Music, 202

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F.R.D. 229, 231 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (“the common question test[ ] is usually easy to satisfy”).

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The Rule requires only a single common question, not multiple common questions. Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 20 (“any question of law or fact common to ...”). The common question may be one of fact or

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of law and need not be the most important or predominant issue in the litigation. See Mosley v.

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Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1974) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) does not establish

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a quantitative or qualitative test for commonality).
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Here, non-party Luis Renteria, presently housed at California State Prison – Los

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Angeles, seeks to be joined in this action on the ground that he, like plaintiff, was found

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unsuitable for parole based on the BPH’s reliance on an erroneous FAD report. In anticipation

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of his March 22, 2010 parole consideration hearing, Renteria was required to undergo a FAD

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psychological evaluation. According to Renteria, the report that issued from this evaluation

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contained false information and evaluations based upon this false information. In response,

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Renteria hired an independent private psychologist to issue a second report for the hearing. The

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FAD report and the private psychologist report were in conflict with each other related to

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completed findings. Regardless, the BPH relied on the FAD report. Renteria then claims that,

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although he filed objections to the FAD report, the BPH did not order a new FAD report in

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violation of its own regulations. Lastly, he claims that the FAD psychologist was not made

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available for cross-examination during the parole consideration hearing. Renteria was given a

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five-year denial of parole.

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On review, the court finds that Renteria’s allegations lack the requisite similarity

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in transaction or occurrence to justify joinder. Although Johnson and Renteria both allege

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systemic unconstitutional practices by the BPH and FAD, each inmate’s cause of action under §

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1983 arises from application of the defendants’ practices to deprive him individually of his

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rights. Each inmate’s right to relief will therefore turn on matters of proof involving his own

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forensic psychological assessment and parole hearing(s). Litigation of the merits of the claims

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will necessarily involve evidence related to each inmate’s family and social history, criminal

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history, behavior while incarcerated, et cetera. In short, each claim will require its own review

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of entirely separate events in addition to consideration of the policies and procedures at issue.

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Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Renteria has met Rule 20’s requirements

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for joinder, the court will deny this request in light of the inevitable procedural hurdles that will

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arise due to the fact that plaintiff is proceeding with counsel and Renteria would be a pro per

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plaintiff. If Renteria is allowed to proceed in this action with plaintiff, then under Rules 7, 8, and
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11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, each plaintiff must sign every filing made in this case

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on behalf of the group. The failure of any plaintiff to sign a particular pleading could be

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prejudicial to him and possibly subject his claims to dismissal. The court is aware that the

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routine practices of prison life often prohibit or delay communications between prisoners. The

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potential problems that this situation could cause are obvious, including delays in filing, the

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potential for multiple filings, and disagreements on litigation tactics. The court is not inclined to

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accept multiple filings from different plaintiffs in the same case, or to delay filing deadlines until

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both plaintiffs, located at different institutions, can sign a single pleading.

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This court concludes that the interests of justice are not served by joinder of

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Renteria in this action. Rule 20 is designed to promote judicial economy, and reduce

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inconvenience, delay, and added expense. Here, efficiency will not be promoted by allowing

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one plaintiff to proceed with counsel and a second plaintiff, housed at a different institution, to

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proceed in pro per. Avoidance of possible prejudice to the individual plaintiff, delay reduction,

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and avoidance of confusion call for these claims to proceed separately.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Luis Renteria’s November 19,

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2012 motion to be joined is denied.

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DATED: January 10, 2013.

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`
ALLISON CLAIRE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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