Johnson v. Shaffer et al

Filing 90

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Allison Claire on 11/09/15 granting 86 Motion for Attorney Fees. Defendants shall remit payment to plaintiff's counsel in the amount of $119,796.05, not later than 30 days after the filing date of this order, subject to interest thereafter as provided in 28 USC 1961. (Plummer, M)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAM JOHNSON, on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS

v.

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No. 2:12-cv-01059 KJM AC P

JENNIFER SHAFFER, et al.,
Defendants.

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This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion

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for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. See ECF No. 86. Having considered the briefing in support of the

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motion, any responses received from class members, relevant legal authority, and the record in

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this case, the Court finds good cause to GRANT the motion.
The Amended Stipulated Settlement in this matter, ECF No. 83, provides that Defendants

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would not oppose Plaintiffs’ motion for fees and costs as long as the requested total award did not

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exceed $120,000.1 Plaintiffs’ motion seeks an award of $119,796.05. Pursuant to Federal Rule

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of Civil Procedure 23(h), class members were informed about the fee request in the Class Notice,

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and a full copy of the Stipulated Settlement was made available to all class members in the prison

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This matter is decided on the papers, without oral argument, because the motion remains
unopposed. See Amended Stipulated Settlement, ECF No. 83 at 6:22-7.
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libraries. Class members were afforded an opportunity to comment on or object to the Stipulated

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Settlement or the award of fees.

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After review of all briefing and evidence presented, this Court finds that the requested

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award of $119,796.05 is fair and reasonable. Plaintiffs’ action sought to compel the Board of

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Parole Hearings to reform its forensic assessment protocol. The settlement achieves just that:

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Among other things, Defendants have agreed to provide additional training for commissioners on

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recidivism and how to interpret risk assessments; to provide more timely assessment reports; to

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establish a formal appeal process through which members of the plaintiff class may correct errors

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in psychological reports before they are considered by commissioners in determining parole

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suitability; and to insert clarifying language into the reports that explains the tests and risk ratings

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used. See Amended Stipulated Settlement, ECF No. 83 at 3-5.

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To reach this result, Plaintiffs spent roughly four years investigating and litigating this

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matter. Plaintiffs conducted extensive discovery, which involved numerous depositions of Board

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officials and Board psychologists as well as production of training materials, reports, and other

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documents. Defendants vigorously contested the claims; as a result, Plaintiffs had to expend

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significant time and resources in opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, motion for summary

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judgment, and motion for judgment on the pleadings; in litigating class certification; and in

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addressing numerous other matters including discovery disputes.

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The fee request reasonably reflects the time and labor required to litigate this matter, and

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was calculated pursuant to the lodestar method: Plaintiffs’ counsel kept contemporaneous time

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records detailing the hours worked on the case and the nature of each task completed. Wattley

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Decl., ¶ 8. Although counsel represented Plaintiffs without charge, counsel exercised the same

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billing judgment applied to privately billed clients. Wattley Decl., ¶ 8. Gonzalez v. City of

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Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Ultimately, a ‘reasonable’ number of hours

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equals ‘[t]he number of hours . . . [which] could reasonably have been billed to a private client.”)

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(citations omitted, alterations in original).

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The lodestar method of calculating fees is strongly presumed to be reasonable. Oviatt v.
Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992) (“There is a strong presumption that the lodestar
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figure is reasonable, and adjustments are to be adopted only in exceptional cases.”); Morales v.

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City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996). In the present case, application of the

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lodestar method requires multiplying 501.9 hours by $212.50/hour, resulting in $106,653.75 in

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attorneys’ fees.

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Plaintiffs’ requested award also fairly reflects the novelty and difficulty of the questions

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presented, the skill required in litigating this complex case, and the fact that Plaintiffs’ counsel

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litigated this matter on a contingency basis and expended significant time and resources doing so.

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This court finds that the total request for $119,796.05 in attorneys’ fees ($106,653.75) and

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costs ($9500.00 expert witness fee, and $3642.30 expenses) is fair, adequate and reasonable.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for

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Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, ECF No. 86, is GRANTED. Defendants shall remit payment to

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Plaintiffs’ counsel in the amount of $119,796.05, not later than 30 days after the filing date of this

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Order, subject to interest thereafter as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

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SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 9, 2015

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