Todd v. Curtis, et. al.

Filing 3

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan on 05/29/12 RECOMMENDING that the 2 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis be granted, that the 1 Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend and this be case closed. Objections to these F&Rs due within 14 days; 2 Motion and 1 Complaint referred to Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. (Benson, A.)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9

DEREK TODD,
Plaintiff,

10
11

No. CIV 12-1323 MCE EFB PS

vs.

13

RICHARD CURTIS, Placer County
Superior Court Judge; PLACER COUNTY
SUPERIOR COURT,

14

Defendants.

12

/

15
16

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This case, in which plaintiff is proceeding in propria persona, was referred to the

17

undersigned under Local Rule 302(c)(21), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff seeks

18

leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff’s declaration makes

19

the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). See Dckt. No. 2. Accordingly, the

20

undersigned recommends that the request to proceed in forma pauperis be granted. 28 U.S.C.

21

§ 1915(a).

22

Determining plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis does not complete the required

23

inquiry. Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the court is directed to dismiss the case at any time if it

24

determines the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to

25

state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune

26

defendant.
1

1

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

2

520-21 (1972), a complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if

3

it fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

4

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41

5

(1957)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of

6

his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

7

a cause of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to

8

relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are

9

true.” Id. (citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of cognizable

10

legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories.

11

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

12

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations

13

of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740

14

(1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in

15

the plaintiff’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). A pro se plaintiff must

16

satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule

17

8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

18

pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the

19

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007)

20

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).

21

Additionally, a federal court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and may adjudicate only

22

those cases authorized by the Constitution and by Congress. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

23

Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The basic federal jurisdiction statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 &

24

1332, confer “federal question” and “diversity” jurisdiction, respectively. Federal question

25

jurisdiction requires that the complaint (1) arise under a federal law or the U. S. Constitution, (2)

26

allege a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III, § 2 of the U. S. Constitution, or
2

1

(3) be authorized by a federal statute that both regulates a specific subject matter and confers

2

federal jurisdiction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). To invoke the court’s diversity

3

jurisdiction, a plaintiff must specifically allege the diverse citizenship of all parties, and that the

4

matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Bautista v. Pan American World

5

Airlines, Inc., 828 F.2d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 1987). A case presumably lies outside the jurisdiction

6

of the federal courts unless demonstrated otherwise. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-78. Lack of

7

subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by either party or by the court. Attorneys

8

Trust v. Videotape Computer Products, Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1996).

9

Plaintiff’s complaint against Judge Richard Curtis and the Placer County Superior Court

10

are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dckt. No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Curtis granted

11

a domestic violence restraining order against plaintiff without holding a hearing, in violation of

12

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, plaintiff’s presumption of innocence,

13

plaintiff and his child’s Eighth Amendment rights, and California law. Id. at 1, 10. All of the

14

issues plaintiff presents surround the constitutionality of the domestic violence restraining order

15

that Judge Curtis allegedly issued. Id. at 2.

16

However, judges are absolutely immune from suit for judicial actions taken by them in

17

the course of their official duties in connection with a case, unless those actions are taken in the

18

complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Plaintiff makes

19

no factual allegations that Judge Curtis acted outside the scope of his judicial capacity or lacked

20

jurisdiction. In fact, all of his claims are based on the issuance of a domestic violence restraining

21

order by Judge Curtis. Therefore, Judge Curtis is immune from liability in this § 1983 action.

22

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (finding that judicial immunity is applicable to § 1983

23

actions).

24

Additionally, although § 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of

25

civil liberties, it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a state

26

for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66
3

1

(1989). The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity. Id.

2

A municipal court is an arm of the state and is protected from lawsuit by the Eleventh

3

Amendment. Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, plaintiff’s

4

claims against Placer County Superior Court must be dismissed without leave to amend.

5

Simmons v. Sacramento County Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff cannot

6

state a claim against Sacramento County Superior Court because it is an arm of the state and thus

7

barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Franceschi, 57 F.3d at 831 (claim against South Orange

8

County Municipal Court barred by Eleventh Amendment because it is “arm of the state”).

9

Moreover, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court does not have

10

subject-matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state court. Exxon Mobil

11

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005); see also Dist. of Columbia

12

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.

13

413, 415 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars jurisdiction in federal district court if the

14

exact claims raised in a state court case are raised in the subsequent federal case, or if the

15

constitutional claims presented to the district court are “inextricably intertwined” with the state

16

court's denial of relief. Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting

17

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16). Rooker-Feldman thus bars federal adjudication of any suit

18

whether a plaintiff alleges an injury based on a state court judgment or directly appeals a state

19

court’s decision. Id. at 900 n.4. The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction either to

20

conduct a direct review of a state court judgment or to scrutinize the state court’s application of

21

various rules and procedures pertaining to the state case. Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F. Supp. 1381,

22

1411-12 (D. Idaho 1996), aff’d, 129 F.3d 127 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d

23

287, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction over section 1983 claim

24

seeking, inter alia, implicit reversal of state trial court action). “That the federal district court

25

action alleges the state court’s action was unconstitutional does not change the rule.” Feldman,

26

460 U.S. at 486. In sum, “a state court’s application of its rules and procedures is unreviewable
4

1

by a federal district court. The federal district court only has jurisdiction to hear general

2

challenges to state rules or claims that are based on the investigation of a new case arising upon

3

new facts.” Samuel, 980 F. Supp. at 1412-13. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff’s complaint

4

challenges the entry of a state court judgment, that claim must be dismissed.

5

Further, even if the Rooker-Feldman does not deprive this court of jurisdiction because

6

the action was filed before the state court judgment was rendered, principles of comity and

7

abstention would likely require dismissal. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 292. Younger v.

8

Harris held that federal courts should not enjoin pending state proceedings except under

9

extraordinary circumstances. 401 U.S. 37, 49, 53 (1971). Thus, federal courts should refrain

10

from exercising jurisdiction in actions for injunctive, declaratory, or monetary relief that would

11

interfere with pending state judicial proceedings. Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 (9th

12

Cir. 2004) (en banc) (indicating that abstention is required even when damages are sought, when

13

the federal court damages award “would frustrate the state's interest in administering its judicial

14

system, cast a negative light on the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles, and

15

put the federal court in the position of prematurely or unnecessarily deciding a question of

16

federal constitutional law.”). In the Ninth Circuit, Younger abstention prevents a court from

17

exercising jurisdiction when three criteria are met: 1) there are ongoing state judicial

18

proceedings; 2) an important state interest is involved; and 3) there is an adequate opportunity to

19

raise the federal question at issue in the state proceedings. H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203

20

F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000). “Whether it is labeled ‘comity,’ ‘federalism,’ or some other term,

21

the policy objective behind Younger abstention is to avoid unnecessary conflict between state

22

and federal governments.” United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 707 (9th Cir. 2001); see also

23

Wiener v. County of San Diego, 23 F.3d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The critical question is not

24

whether the state proceedings are still ‘ongoing’ but whether the state proceedings were

25

underway before initiation of the federal proceedings.”); Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467

26

U.S. 229, 238 (1984) (Younger abstention is required if the state proceedings were initiated
5

1

“before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in federal court.”); Huffman

2

v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607–611, 95 (1975) (state court proceedings are “pending” even

3

after a judgment has been rendered if the time for appeal has not expired); Pennzoil Co., 481

4

U.S. at 15 (state court proceedings are presumed adequate to raise the federal claim “in the

5

absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.”); see also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337

6

(1977) (“[Federal plaintiffs] need be accorded only an opportunity to fairly pursue their

7

constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceedings . . . their failure to avail themselves of

8

such opportunities does not mean that the state procedures were inadequate.”).

9

Therefore, the court will recommend this action be dismissed without leave to amend.

10

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987) (While the court ordinarily would permit a

11

pro se plaintiff to amend, leave to amend should not be granted where it appears amendment

12

would be futile).

13

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

14

1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis be granted;

15

2. The complaint be dismissed without leave to amend; and

16

3. The Clerk be directed to close this case.

17

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

18

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

19

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

20

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

21

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

22

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

23

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

24

DATED: May 29, 2012.

25
26
6