Valdez v. Cate et al

Filing 83

ORDER signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 09/30/16 granting 60 Motion on the pleadings. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment and close this case. All pending motions are denied as moot. (Plummer, M)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RUBEN VALDEZ, 12 13 No. 2:12-cv-1352-CMK-P Plaintiff, vs. ORDER 14 MATTHEW CATE, et al., 15 Defendant. 16 17 / Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned 19 as the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 20 636(c). Pending before the court is defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 60), 21 plaintiff opposition (Doc. 66), and defendants’ reply brief (Doc. 67). 22 I. Background 23 This action proceeds on plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 42). Plaintiff is 24 challenging the procedures used for validating him as a gang member. He alleges his due process 25 rights were violated during the gang validation process, and in the decision to place and/or retain 26 plaintiff in administrative segregation based on that gang validation. 1 1 II. Motion to Dismiss 2 Defendants bring this motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 3 12(c) on the grounds that this action is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or 4 alternatively, that plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim. 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are 6 closed – but within such time as not to delay the trial – a party may move for judgment on the 7 pleadings.” Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings are the functional equivalent of a 8 motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Dworkin v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 9 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, in considering either a motion to dismiss or motion for 10 judgment on the pleadings, the court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint 11 as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The court must also construe the 12 alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 13 236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett 14 v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also 15 be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 16 However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be 17 accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are 18 held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 19 519, 520 (1972). 20 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, the court generally may not consider 21 materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th 22 Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The court may, however, 23 consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose 24 authenticity no party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is 25 not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to 26 the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) 2 1 documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 2 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994). 3 Defendants contend this action should be dismissed on the basis of collateral 4 estoppel. Defendants argue that plaintiff raised this same issues with the state court in a habeas 5 petition, which has been denied, and plaintiff is therefore precluded from raising the issue in a 6 subsequent action. Plaintiff counters that the state habeas was a summary denial, thus does not 7 have preclusive effects. 8 9 Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, an action may be barred where an earlier action involved the same claim and parties, and reached a final judgment on the 10 merits. See Nordhorn v. Ladish Co, Inc., 9 F.3d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1993). A decision in a 11 prior habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 can have preclusive effect in a subsequent 12 civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. 13 1992) (federal habeas); Sperl v. Deukmejian, 642 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1981) (state habeas). 14 Thus, a subsequent § 1983 action is barred if the identical claim was raised in a prior § 2254 15 case. See id. Similarly, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, any issue 16 necessarily and finally decided in an earlier action may not be relitigated in a later case involving 17 a party to the prior action. See Allan v. McCury, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); see also Hawkins, 984 18 F.2d at 325. 19 The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the very issue raised in this case in Gonzales 20 v. California Department of Corrections, 739 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2014). In Gonzales, the Ninth 21 Circuit specifically found that “reasoned denials of California habeas petitions, as in this case, do 22 have claim-preclusive effect.” Id. at 1231 (emphasis in original). To the extent plaintiff 23 contends the state habeas opinion issued in his case was a summary denial, he misunderstands 24 the difference between a reasoned denial and a summary denial. While it may be the case that 25 the superior court did not issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing in 26 response to plaintiff’s petition, where the state court did in Gonzales, the decision by the state 3 1 court still addressed the merits of his petition in a reasoned decision. Thus, it constitutes a 2 decision on the merits, and has preclusive effects. To the extent plaintiff argues he did not 3 receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims raised in his state habeas petition, the 4 undersigned is not persuaded. Based on the information plaintiff provided the state court, it was 5 determined on the face of the petition that plaintiff could not state a claim. That determination 6 would not have been altered if the state court had ordered the government to show cause or 7 required a response from the government. Thus, the state habeas opinion issued in this case does 8 have preclusive effects. 9 “Under California’s doctrine of claim preclusion, ‘all claims based on the same 10 cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at 11 a later date.” Id. at 1232 (quoting Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 123 Cal.Rptr. 2d 432, 51 12 P.3d 297, 302 (Cal. 2002)). “A ‘“cause of action” is comprised of a “primary right” of the 13 plaintiff, a corresponding “primary duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant 14 constituting a breach of that duty.’” Id. at 1232-33 (quoting Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666, 15 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 881 P.2d 1083, 1090 (1994)). “‘[I]f two actions involve the same injury to 16 the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if 17 in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief 18 and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.’” Id. at 1233 (quoting Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 19 Cal.App.3d 1170, 197 Cal.Rptr. 612, 614 (1983)). “‘If the same primary right is involved in two 20 actions, judgment in the first bars consideration not only of all matters actually raised in the first 21 suit but also all matters which could have been raised.’” Id. (quoting Eichman, 147 Cal.Rptr. at 22 614). “‘[U]nder the primary rights theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered. When 23 two actions involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm, they generally 24 involve the same primary right.’” Id. (quoting Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal.4th 25 788, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 806, 230 P.3d 342, 348 (2010)). 26 /// 4 1 As in Gonzales, the primary right at issue in both this case and the state habeas 2 action was plaintiff’s due process right in remaining free from administrative segregation. The 3 harm plaintiff suffered was the gang validation and indeterminate administrate segregation based 4 on allegedly insufficient or unreliable evidence. Both cases involve the same actions taken by 5 the same officials at the same time. Thus, they arise under the same primary right. 6 The state habeas court evaluated plaintiff’s claims, discussed the items used to 7 validate plaintiff’s gang membership, and found1 no due process violation. (Opp., Doc. 60-2, at 8 6-7). The court concluded under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) and In re Johnson, 176 9 Cal.App.4th 290 (Cal. App. 2009), “a determination of a matter such as gang affiliation does not 10 involve any atypical or significant hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 11 prison life.” (Opp., Doc. 60-2, at 7). The state habeas court further determined that even if not 12 barred, 13 petitioner would not be entitled to relief from his gang validation, because clearly there was ‘some evidence’ to support the gang validation. As described above, four independent sources evidenced petitioner’s membership in the gang. Petitioner does not attach any reasonably available documentary evidence to show that any of these four items should not have been considered. He disputes their accuracy, but only by his own assertions; as such, he does not demonstrate that any of the four items should be precluded from being considered as ‘some evidence’ of gang membership.” (Opp., Doc. 60-2, at 8). 14 15 16 17 18 19 Based on this issued raised in petitioner’s state habeas petition, and the findings 20 by the state habeas court, the undersigned finds collateral estoppel is applicable, and defendant’s 21 motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted accordingly. 22 23 24 25 26 1 Defendants request the court take judicial notice of the Sacramento County Superior Court opinion of July 27, 2011. The court may take judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of matters of public record. See U.S. v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 530 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, this court may take judicial notice of state court records, see Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, 336 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1964), as well as its own records, see Chandler v. U.S., 378 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1967). The request is therefore granted. 5 1 Even if collateral estoppel did not apply, the court finds defendants’ argument that 2 the complaint fails to state a claim persuasive. Due process claims related to gang validation are 3 “subject to the ‘some evidence’ standard of Superintendent v. Hill, [472 U.S. 445,455 (198)] . . . 4 not the heightened standard of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 5 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003). Under Wolff, due process requires prison officials to provide 6 the inmate with: (1) a written statement at least 24 hours before the disciplinary hearing that 7 includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the inmate, and an explanation for the 8 disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary evidence and call witnesses, 9 unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security; and (3) legal assistance where 10 the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-70. Due process 11 is satisfied where these minimum requirements have been met. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 12 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994). Under Hill, however, due process only requires there to be “some 13 evidence” in the record as a whole which supports the decision. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. The 14 “some evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and is satisfied where “there is any 15 evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached.” Id. at 455-56. 16 Here, plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the defendants used four items to 17 validate him as a member of the Northern Structure (NS) gang: plaintiff’s tattoos and body 18 markings, two confidential memorandum in which two NS rosters identified plaintiff as a 19 member, and a confidential memorandum in which plaintiff was identified as being in possession 20 of gang notes. He objects to the use of these items as they are unreliable, conclusory, hearsay, 21 and did not meet the validation requirements. Plaintiff further alleges in his complaint that he 22 was interviewed in response to these items during the validation process, was provided notice 23 and an opportunity to be heard. He also states he was personally interviewed and allowed to rebut 24 each source item. While plaintiff contests the sufficiency of the evidence, he does not contest 25 that he was in fact interviewed and allowed to present his rebuttal to the evidence. Therefore, it 26 is clear from the allegations in the complaint that if Wolff standards are used, plaintiff received 6 1 the process he was due, notice and an opportunity to be heard. 2 As for the source items themselves, they clearly have some indicia of reliability 3 and could support the conclusion reached. While plaintiff objects to the reliability of the items 4 used, none of his arguments are persuasive.2 Plaintiff avers on information and belief that 5 defendant Villasenor failed to verify the information he used to validate plaintiff’s membership 6 in NS. However, as clearly set forth in the complaint, defendant Villasenor certified based on his 7 experience and training, the source items show plaintiff’s membership therein. Plaintiff merely 8 speculates that the information is unreliable. Such speculation is simply insufficient. See Iqbal, 9 556 U.S. at 678-79. 10 III. Conclusion 11 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that collateral estoppel is applicable 12 to bar plaintiff from proceeding on his challenge to his gang membership validation and the 13 motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted. Alternatively, the undersigned finds 14 plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for denial of due process as there is some evidence to 15 support the defendants’ determination as to plaintiff’s membership in the Northern Structure 16 gang. 17 Based on those findings, the remaining motions pending before the court are 18 rendered moot. Specifically, plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. 69) is moot as no additional 19 discovery will occur in this matter. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint 20 (Doc. 73) is moot, as the proposed amendments will not save the complaint based on the above 21 discussion. Similarly, as no amendment will be allowed, plaintiff’s motion for additional time to 22 23 24 25 26 2 To the extent plaintiff claims the prison officials violated the settlement agreement in Castillo (apparently a case out of the Northern District), plaintiff has not adequately plead such a claim in his complaint. He fails to allege sufficient facts to indicate he is subject to that settlement agreement, was a party to that action or otherwise included in the alleged settlement, or that the defendants have in fact violated the same. Defendants content that the procedural protections provided in the settlement agreement plaintiff has attached to his opposition are already included in Title 15, section 3378 at the time of Plaintiff’s validation. 7 1 file a reply (Doc. 76) is unnecessary. 2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleading (Doc. 60) is granted; 4 2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this case; 3. All pending motions are denied as moot. 5 6 and 7 8 9 10 DATED: September 30, 2016 ______________________________________ CRAIG M. KELLISON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 8

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