Valdez v. Cate et al

Filing 95

FINDINGS and RECOMMENDATIONS signed by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison on 08/29/18 RECOMMENDING that defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings 60 be granted. Motion 60 referred to Judge John A. Mendez. Objections due within 14 days. (Plummer, M)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RUBEN VALDEZ,

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No. 2:12-cv-1352-JAM-CMK-P

Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

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MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

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Defendant.

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Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to

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42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the undersigned following remand by the Ninth Circuit

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Court of Appeals for proper consideration of defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings

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(Doc. 60).

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I. BACKGROUND
This action proceeds on plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 42). Plaintiff is

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challenging the procedures used for validating him as a gang member. He alleges his due process

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rights were violated during the gang validation process, and in the decision to place and/or retain

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plaintiff in administrative segregation based on that gang validation.
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II. STANDARD FOR MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Defendants bring this motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on the grounds that this action is barred by the doctrine of

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collateral estoppel, or alternatively, that plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim.

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are

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closed – but within such time as not to delay the trial – a party may move for judgment on the

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pleadings.” Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings are the functional equivalent of a

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motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Dworkin v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 867 F.2d 1188,

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1192 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, in considering either a motion to dismiss or motion for

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judgment on the pleadings, the court must accept all allegations of material fact in the complaint

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as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). The court must also construe the

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alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

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236 (1974); see also Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976); Barnett

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v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). All ambiguities or doubts must also

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be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

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However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be

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accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). In addition, pro se pleadings are

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held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

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519, 520 (1972).

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In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, the court generally may not consider

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materials outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th

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Cir. 1998); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The court may, however,

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consider: (1) documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose

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authenticity no party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is

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not in question, and upon which the complaint necessarily relies, but which are not attached to

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the complaint, see Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3)
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documents and materials of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13

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F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1994).

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III. DISCUSSION

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Defendants contend this action should be dismissed on the basis of collateral

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estoppel. Defendants argue that plaintiff raised this same issues with the state court in a habeas

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petition, which has been denied, and plaintiff is therefore precluded from raising the issue in a

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subsequent action. Plaintiff counters that the state habeas was a summary denial, thus does not

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have preclusive effects.

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Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, an action may be barred

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where an earlier action involved the same claim and parties, and reached a final judgment on the

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merits. See Nordhorn v. Ladish Co, Inc., 9 F.3d 1402, 1404 (9th Cir. 1993). A decision in a

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prior habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 can have preclusive effect in a subsequent

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civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir.

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1992) (federal habeas); Sperl v. Deukmejian, 642 F.2d 1154, 1155 (9th Cir. 1981) (state habeas).

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Thus, a subsequent § 1983 action is barred if the identical claim was raised in a prior § 2254

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case. See id. Similarly, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, any issue

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necessarily and finally decided in an earlier action may not be relitigated in a later case involving

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a party to the prior action. See Allan v. McCury, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); see also Hawkins, 984

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F.2d at 325.

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The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the very issue raised in this case in Gonzales

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v. California Department of Corrections, 739 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2014). In Gonzales, the Ninth

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Circuit specifically found that “reasoned denials of California habeas petitions, as in this case, do

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have claim-preclusive effect.” Id. at 1231 (emphasis in original). To the extent plaintiff

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contends the state habeas opinion issued in his case was a summary denial, he misunderstands

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the difference between a reasoned denial and a summary denial. While it may be the case that
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the superior court did not issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing in

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response to plaintiff’s petition, where the state court did in Gonzales, the decision by the state

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court still addressed the merits of his petition in a reasoned decision. Thus, it constitutes a

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decision on the merits, and has preclusive effects. To the extent plaintiff argues he did not

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receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims raised in his state habeas petition, the

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undersigned is not persuaded. Based on the information plaintiff provided the state court, it was

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determined on the face of the petition that plaintiff could not state a claim. That determination

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would not have been altered if the state court had ordered the government to show cause or

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required a response from the government. Thus, the state habeas opinion issued in this case does

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have preclusive effects.
“Under California’s doctrine of claim preclusion, ‘all claims based on the same

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cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at

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a later date.” Id. at 1232 (quoting Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 123 Cal.Rptr. 2d 432, 51

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P.3d 297, 302 (Cal. 2002)). “A ‘“cause of action” is comprised of a “primary right” of the

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plaintiff, a corresponding “primary duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant

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constituting a breach of that duty.’” Id. at 1232-33 (quoting Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666,

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34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 881 P.2d 1083, 1090 (1994)). “‘[I]f two actions involve the same injury to

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the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if

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in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief

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and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.’” Id. at 1233 (quoting Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147

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Cal.App.3d 1170, 197 Cal.Rptr. 612, 614 (1983)). “‘If the same primary right is involved in two

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actions, judgment in the first bars consideration not only of all matters actually raised in the first

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suit but also all matters which could have been raised.’” Id. (quoting Eichman, 147 Cal.Rptr. at

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614). “‘[U]nder the primary rights theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered. When

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two actions involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm, they generally

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involve the same primary right.’” Id. (quoting Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 48 Cal.4th
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788, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 806, 230 P.3d 342, 348 (2010)).

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As in Gonzales, the primary right at issue in both this case and the state habeas

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action was plaintiff’s due process right in remaining free from administrative segregation. The

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harm plaintiff suffered was the gang validation and indeterminate administrate segregation based

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on allegedly insufficient or unreliable evidence. Both cases involve the same actions taken by

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the same officials at the same time. Thus, they arise under the same primary right.

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The state habeas court evaluated plaintiff’s claims, discussed the items used to

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validate plaintiff’s gang membership, and found1 no due process violation. (Opp., Doc. 60-2, at

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6-7). The court concluded under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) and In re Johnson, 176

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Cal.App.4th 290 (Cal. App. 2009), “a determination of a matter such as gang affiliation does not

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involve any atypical or significant hardship on an inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

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prison life.” (Opp., Doc. 60-2, at 7). The state habeas court further determined that even if not

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barred,

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petitioner would not be entitled to relief from his gang validation,
because clearly there was ‘some evidence’ to support the gang
validation. As described above, four independent sources
evidenced petitioner’s membership in the gang. Petitioner does not
attach any reasonably available documentary evidence to show that
any of these four items should not have been considered. He
disputes their accuracy, but only by his own assertions; as such, he
does not demonstrate that any of the four items should be
precluded from being considered as ‘some evidence’ of gang
membership.”

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(Opp., Doc. 60-2, at 8).
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Defendants request the court take judicial notice of the Sacramento County
Superior Court opinion of July 27, 2011. The court may take judicial notice pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 201 of matters of public record. See U.S. v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 530 F.3d
883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, this court may take judicial notice of state court records, see
Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, 336 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1964), as well as its own
records, see Chandler v. U.S., 378 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1967). The request is therefore
granted.
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Based on this issued raised in petitioner’s state habeas petition, and the findings
by the state habeas court, the undersigned finds collateral estoppel is applicable.

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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that defendants’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 60) be granted.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

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Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days

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after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of

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objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal.

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See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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DATED: August 29, 2018
______________________________________
CRAIG M. KELLISON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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