Anselmo et al v. Mull et al

Filing 117

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 3/15/2013 ORDERING that the first and second crossclaims brought by Shasta County in its First Amended Cross-Complaint, (Docket No. 1 -1), all counterclaims filed by plaintiffs on 11/14/2012, (Docket No. 99 ), and all counterclaims filed by Shasta County on 12/5/2012, (Docket No. 102 ), be, and the same hereby are, REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Shasta. Since the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims forming the basis of Shasta County's 104 motion for a preliminary injunction that motion is DENIED without prejudice as moot. (Zignago, K.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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NO. CIV. 2:12-1422 WBS EFB

REVERGE ANSELMO and SEVEN
HILLS LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY,
LLC,
Plaintiffs,

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ORDER

v.
RUSS MULL, LESLIE MORGAN, a
Shasta County AssessorRecorder, COUNTY OF SHASTA,
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE
COUNTY OF SHASTA, LES BAUGH
and GLEN HAWES,

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Defendants.
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COUNTY OF SHASTA, AND COUNTY
OF SHASTA, for the People of
the State of California,

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Cross-Complainant,

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v.
REVERGE ANSELMO; SEVEN HILLS
LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY LLC;
NANCY HALEY; MATTHEW RABE;
MATTHEW KELLEY; ANDREW JENSEN;
and ROES 1 THRU 50,

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Cross-Defendants.

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REVERGE ANSELMO; SEVEN HILLS
LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY LLC;

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Counter-Claimants,

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v.
COUNTY OF SHASTA, and COUNTY
OF SHASTA, for the People of
the State of California,
Counter-Defendants.

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/
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COUNTY OF SHASTA, and COUNTY
OF SHASTA, for the People of
the State of California,

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Counter-Claimants,
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v.
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REVERGE ANSELMO; SEVEN HILLS
LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY LLC;

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Counter-Defendants.
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This action was removed from Shasta County Superior

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Court on May 25, 2012 and included, in plaintiffs’ Third Amended

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Complaint (“TAC”), claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on

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defendants’ allegedly wrongful interference with plaintiffs’ use

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of their land.

(Notice of Removal, Ex. B (Docket No. 1-2).)1

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The removed action also included Shasta County’s First
Amended Cross-Complaint (“FACC”), which brought crossclaims
against plaintiffs alleging public nuisance and violation of
California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business
and Professions Code §§ 17200, for a set of structures on
plaintiffs’ property. (Notice of Removal, Ex. A (Docket No. 11).)
The FACC also brought third-party claims seeking
contribution and indemnity from employees of the Army Corps of
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On November 14, 2012, plaintiffs filed counterclaims

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against Shasta County seeking declaratory relief regarding the

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restaurant, winery, and land’s compliance with various Shasta

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County Codes and use permits, Shasta County’s failure to provide

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administrative hearings on permit applications under county and

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state law, and plaintiffs’ compliance with their Williamson Act

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Contract.

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another set of counterclaims against plaintiffs on December 5,

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2012, alleging public nuisance and violations of California’s

(Docket No. 99-1.)

In response, Shasta County filed

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Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business and

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Professions Code §§ 17200, for new buildings under construction.

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(Docket No. 102.)

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Courts have discretion to consider sua sponte whether

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to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law

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claims.

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(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

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district court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

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when state claims “substantially predominate[] over the claim or

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claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.”

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28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).

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See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1003 n.3
Section 1367(c)(2) authorizes a

Where “the state issues substantially predominate,
whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or

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Engineers on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, and the United States
removed the action from state court by certifying that the
employees were acting within the scope and course of their
employment under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679. (Docket
Nos. 1 & 3.) The United States was substituted in place of the
Army Corps employees, (Docket No. 4), but the claims against the
United States were dismissed with prejudice on September 24,
2012, (Docket Nos. 58 & 95.)
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of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims

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may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to

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state tribunals.”

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715, 726 (1966).

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substantial predomination ‘where a state claim constitutes the

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real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an

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appendage–-only where permitting litigation of all claims in the

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district court can accurately be described as allowing a federal

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tail to wag what is in substance a state dog.’”

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
“Generally, a district court will find

De Asencio v.

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Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting

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Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir.

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1995)).

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“[T]he issue of whether pendent jurisdiction has been

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properly assumed is one which remains open throughout the

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litigation.”

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state claim constitutes the real body of a case . . . the state

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claim may fairly be dismissed.”

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deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best

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serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and

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comity which underlie the pendant jurisdiction doctrine.’”

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of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172-73

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(1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

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Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)).

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discretion to remand to state court a removed case involving

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pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining

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jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate.”

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Mellon, 484 U.S. at 357.

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Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727.

Id.

“Once it appears that a

“‘District courts [should]

City

“A district court has

Carnegie-

Here, the court has jurisdiction over this action under
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§ 1331 based on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims and has been exercising

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supplement jurisdiction over the state law claims.

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apparent, however, that the increasing number and complexity of

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state law claims are substantially predominating this case,

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calling upon the court to construe various local and state

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ordinances and procedures related to plaintiffs’ property use.

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The scope of the litigation has expanded considerably from the

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determination of whether defendants’ actions constituted

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deprivations of the plaintiffs’ First, Fifth, and Fourteenth

It has become

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Amendment rights under § 1983.

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judgment2 on a variety of state law matters that are beyond the

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scope of plaintiffs’ original allegations and continue to bring

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claims based on actions occurring after late 2008–-the

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approximate date of the final factual allegation in the TAC.

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Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, now lurking behind the expanding state

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law issues, are merely the “federal tail [that] wag[s] what is in

The parties now seek declaratory

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The court does not exercise federal question
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ counterclaims seeking
declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201. (Docket No. 99-1.) In passing the Declaratory
Judgment Act, “Congress enlarged the range of remedies available
in federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction.” Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “It is well settled that
Declaratory Judgment Act does not itself confer federal subject
matter jurisdiction, but merely provides an additional remedy in
cases where jurisdiction is otherwise established.” Staacke v.
U.S. Sec’y of Labor, 841 F.2d 278, 280 (1988).
Here, the claims upon which plaintiffs seek declaratory
relief do not give rise to federal question jurisdiction, nor do
the parties contend that this case involves diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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substance a state dog.”3

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Coast, Inc. v. Snohomish Cnt’y, 33 F. Supp. 2d 924, 925 (W.D.

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Wash. 1999).

De Asencio, 342 F.3d at 309; accord W.

Remanding the parties’ state law claims will serve the

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principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

The

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court is spending an increasing amount of its scarce judicial

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resources on plaintiffs’ state law claims, even as those claims

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have an increasingly tenuous relationship with plaintiffs’ § 1983

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claims over which the court is vested original jurisdiction.

As

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plaintiffs have persuasively argued, this court is now inundated

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with purely state and local law issues that state courts

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routinely and competently handle.
Other than dismissing contribution and indemnity claims

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related to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim, the court has yet to issue

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any dispositive orders regarding the parties’ state law claims

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and has denied a preliminary injunction as to those claims.

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(Docket No. 96.)

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with § 2679(d)(2)’s aim of “‘foreclos[ing] needless shuttling of

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a case from one court to another.’”

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225, 242 (2007) (quoting Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515

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U.S. 417, 433 n.10 (1995)).

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1983 claims that formed the basis for the Westfall Act

The court’s decision also does not conflict

Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S.

By retaining jurisdiction over the §

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To the extent the parties’ state law claims share a
common nucleus of operative fact with Shasta County’s dismissed
third-party claims for indemnity and contribution which implicate
the Westfall Act, the court finds that the state law claims also
predominate over those third-party claims. See Osborn, 549 U.S.
at 245 (“Even if only state-law claims remained after resolution
of the federal question [of whether defendant has Westfall Act
immunity], the District Court would have discretion, consistent
with Article III, to retain jurisdiction.”)
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certification of Army Corps employees for indemnity and

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contribution, should any further disputes over Westfall Act

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certification arise, the dispute will be handled in this court.
Accordingly, while the court continues to exercise

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original jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims in the

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TAC, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

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over the parties’ state law claims.

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remand those claims to Shasta County Superior Court.4

The court, therefore, will

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the first and second

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crossclaims brought by Shasta County in its First Amended Cross-

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Complaint, (Docket No. 1-1), all counterclaims filed by

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plaintiffs on November 14, 2012, (Docket No. 99), and all

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counterclaims filed by Shasta County on December 5, 2012, (Docket

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No. 102), be, and the same hereby are, REMANDED to the Superior

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Court of the State of California in and for the County of

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Shasta.5

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DATED:

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March 15, 2013
_________________________________________
WILLIAM B. SHUBB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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The court recognizes that plaintiffs’ counterclaims
filed on November 14, 2012, (Docket No. 99), and Shasta County’s
counterclaims filed on December 5, 2012, (Docket No. 102), were
filed subsequent to the removal of the action. The court
nonetheless finds it appropriate to remand claims. See
Contemporary Servs. Corp. v. Hartman, Civ. No. 08-02967 AHM
(JWJx), 2008 WL 3049891, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2008)
(remanding state law counterclaims brought subsequent to removal
when declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2)).
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Since the court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the claims forming the basis of Shasta County’s
motion for a preliminary injunction, (Docket No. 104), that
motion is denied without prejudice as moot.
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