Anselmo et al v. Mull et al

Filing 132

ORDER signed by Senior Judge William B. Shubb on 7/30/2013 DENYING 120 , 121 Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. (Kirksey Smith, K)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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REVERGE ANSELMO and SEVEN
HILLS LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY,
LLC,

NO. CIV. 2:12-1422 WBS EFB

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Plaintiffs,

ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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v.
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RUSS MULL, LESLIE MORGAN, a
Shasta County AssessorRecorder, COUNTY OF SHASTA,
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE
COUNTY OF SHASTA, LES BAUGH
and GLEN HAWES,

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Defendants.
/

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COUNTY OF SHASTA, AND COUNTY
OF SHASTA, for the People of
the State of California,

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Cross-Complainant,
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v.
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REVERGE ANSELMO; SEVEN HILLS
LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY LLC;
NANCY HALEY; MATTHEW RABE;
MATTHEW KELLEY; ANDREW JENSEN;
and DOES 1 THRU 50,

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Cross-Defendants.
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REVERGE ANSELMO; SEVEN HILLS
LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY LLC;

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Counter-Claimants,
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v.
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COUNTY OF SHASTA, and COUNTY
OF SHASTA, for the People of
the State of California,

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Counter-Defendants.
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/

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COUNTY OF SHASTA, and COUNTY
OF SHASTA, for the People of
the State of California,

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Counter-Claimants,

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v.
REVERGE ANSELMO; SEVEN HILLS
LAND AND CATTLE COMPANY LLC;

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Counter-Defendants.
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/

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Plaintiffs Reverge Anselmo and Seven Hills Land and
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Cattle Company (“Seven Hills”) have brought this suit against
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defendants Ross Mull, Leslie Morgan, Les Baugh, Glen Hawes,
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County of Shasta (“Shasta County”), and the Board of Supervisors
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of the County of Shasta (“Board”) related to defendants’ actions
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surrounding the issuance of a Williamson Act contract and
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enforcement of a grading ordinance.

Plaintiffs allege violations

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of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seek injunctive relief through a writ of
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mandate.

(Notice of Removal Ex. B (“TAC”) (Docket No. 1-2).)

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Presently before the court are plaintiffs’ motions for partial
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summary judgment.

(Docket Nos. 120, 121.)1

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The legal bases for plaintiffs’ motions are unclear.

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In one motion, plaintiffs request that the court find that the

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defendant owed Seven Hills a “duty to approve a Williamson Act

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contract” and breached that duty or, alternatively, that Board’s

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vote on December 16, 2008 “constituted approval of execution of

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such a Contract as of that date.”

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J. Re: Williamson Act (“Williamson Act MSJ”) at 6:12-22 (Docket

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No. 121-2).)2

(Pls.’ Mot. for Partial Summ.

Seven Hills contends that, should the court find

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that defendants owed it a duty to grant a Williamson Act

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contract, “the question of whether the failure to comply with

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this duty by the County and its officers amounts to a violation

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of 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983 will still remain for the jury and Court to

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resolve.”

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(Id. at 6:15-17.)
In the other motion, plaintiffs “seek[] to eliminate a

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In its March 18, 2013 Order, the court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a variety of state law
cross-claims and counter-claims. (Docket No. 117.) The claims
for violation of § 1983 and injunctive relief in the Third
Amended Complaint (“TAC”) are the only remaining claims in this
case.
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“The Williamson Act is a legislative effort to preserve
agricultural and open space land and discourage premature urban
development.” County of Humboldt v. McKee, 165 Cal. App. 4th
1476, 1487 (1st Dist. 2008) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 51220).
“It authorizes local governments to establish ‘agricultural
preserve[s],’ which consist of lands devoted to agricultural and
compatible uses.” Id. (alteration in original) (citing Cal.
Gov’t Code § 51230). “Upon establishment of such preserves, the
locality may offer to owners of included agricultural land the
opportunity to enter into annually renewable contracts that
restrict the land to open space use for at least [ten] years.”
Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 28 Cal. 3d 840, 851 (1981)
(citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 51240, 51242, 51244). “In return, the
landowner is guaranteed a relatively stable tax base, founded on
the value of the land for open space use only and unaffected by
its development potential.” Id.
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defense likely to be asserted by the County and individual

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defendants that their actions or inactions were not violative of

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the constitutional rights of plaintiffs.”

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of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Re: Grading Ordinance (“Ordinance

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MSJ”) at 2:5-7 (Docket No. 128).)

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request partial summary judgment barring defendants from

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asserting, as a defense to a § 1983 claim, that plaintiffs

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violated a grading ordinance when conducting work on plaintiffs’

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property.

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(Pls.’ Reply in Supp.

Specifically, plaintiffs

(Ordinance MSJ at 1:25-2:4 (Docket No. 120-1).)
With regard to the Williamson Act MSJ, plaintiffs’

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briefs sometimes imply that Seven Hills’ Fourteenth Amendment due

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process rights were infringed when it was deprived of a

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constitutionally protected property interest.

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MSJ at 7:18-21, 10:1-4.)

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contend that the motion is based on deprivation of a Fourteenth

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Amendment right to equal protection.

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28; Pls.’ Reply in Supp. of Williamson Act MSJ at 6:5-6, 12:5-7).

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Likewise with regard to the Ordinance MSJ, the court cannot

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determine what constitutional right plaintiffs allege was

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infringed by defendants’ actions regarding the grading ordinance.

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Without a clear statement of the constitutional right at issue,

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the court cannot even begin to analyze whether defendants’

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hypothetical defense to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim fails as a

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matter of law.

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(Williamson Act

At other points plaintiffs appear to

(See id. at 10:6-8, 14:19-

The Third Amended Complaint’s (“TAC”) § 1983 claim

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alleges both due process an equal protection violations, (Third

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Am. Compl. (“TAC”) ¶¶ 60.0(1) & (4)).

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not cite a single §1983 case by a federal court to guide this
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Yet, plaintiffs’ briefs do

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court’s analysis.3

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asserting an independent claim for a writ of mandate under

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sections 1085 and the William Act statute–-if such a claim is

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even cognizable in federal courts, see Hill v. County of

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Sacramento, 466 F. App’x 577, 579 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[Section]

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1085 authorizes only state courts to issue writs of mandate.”)--

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or whether they are simply seeking prospective injunctive relief

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under § 1983.

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second claim is entitled “Writ of Mandate and Injunction to

Plaintiffs fail to explain whether they are

The TAC fails to clarify the issue, as plaintiffs’

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Prohibit Future Violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and to Enforce Other

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Statutory Requirements.”

(Docket No. 1-2.)

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“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive

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rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal

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rights elsewhere conferred.’”

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271 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443

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U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).

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to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly

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infringed.”

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motions under the standard set forth in Anderson v. Liberty

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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

“The first step in any such claim is

Id. (citations omitted).

Evaluating plaintiffs’

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The majority of the cases cited by plaintiff are state
law cases involving writs of mandate issued under California Code
of Civil Procedure section 1085. See, e.g., Schram Const. Inc.
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 187 Cal. App. 4th 1040, 1051
(1st Dist. 2010); SN Sands Corp. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 167 Cal. App. 4th 185, 191 (1st Dist. 2008). Section
1085 provides that “[a] writ of mandate may be issued by any
court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to
compel the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins . . . or to compel the admission of a party to the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is
entitled.” Cal. Code Civ. Procedure § 1085.
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477 U.S. 317 (1986), because plaintiffs have failed to identify a

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specific constitutional right forming the bases of the § 1983

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claims upon which they seek partial summary judgment, their

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motions for partial summary judgment must accordingly be denied.4

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Without a clear explanation of the constitutional

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rights at the base of plaintiffs’ motions, the court would simply

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be speculating as to the specific issues to be resolved, which

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would likely lead to later argument that the court misunderstood

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plaintiffs’ motions.

Furthermore, the dispositive motion

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deadline is still six weeks away.

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court granted plaintiffs the relief they seek, plaintiffs might

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then file another motion seeking summary judgment on the

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remaining issues in their § 1983 claims.

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plaintiffs’ specific arguments regarding the Williamson Act

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statutory scheme and the statute of limitations for a grading

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ordinance violation at this time would not “be conducive to the

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conservation of judicial resources and of benefit to the

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parties.”

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(Docket No. 117.)

Even if the

Thus, addressing

Bruschini, 911 F. Supp. at 106.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motions for

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partial summary judgment be, and the same hereby are, DENIED.

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DATED:

July 30, 2013

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Because plaintiffs’ motions fail to identify the
specific constitutional right at issue, the court makes no
finding regarding the merits of plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.
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