Jacqueline Gaines et al v. County of Sacramento Child Protective Services et al

Filing 47

ORDER signed by Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr. on 5/8/2015 GRANTING 29 , 30 Motions for Summary Judgment; ORDERING that judgment be entered in favor of each defendant. CASE CLOSED. (Michel, G.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JACQUELINE GAINES and OLYMPIA
MORRIS1
Plaintiffs,

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ORDER GRANTING EACH DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

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No. 2:12-cv-01450-GEB-EFB

SACRAMENTO COUNTY CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES AGENCY,
an agency of the County of
Sacramento; ANN EDWARDS, in
her individual and
professional capacities;
SANDRA THOMPSON, in her
individual and professional
capacities; SHAUNTE DERRICK,
in her individual and
professional capacities; and
SANTRICE DAVIS, in her
individual and professional
capacities,

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Defendants.

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Each Defendant moves for summary judgment on each claim

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alleged against the movant.2 Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint

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the

23

intentional

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1

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26

following

claims

infliction

under
of

California

emotional

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distress,

and

negligence,
conspiracy.

The caption has been modified because Olympia Morris, referred to as
“O.M.” when this suit was filed, turned 18 on March 20, 2012. Therefore, the
use of her initials is no longer required under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 5.2. (See Compl. ¶ 4.)
2

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law:

Defendant Santrice Davis filed a separate summary judgment motion. (See
Mem. P.&A. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Davis Mot.”), ECF No. 30.) Since both motions
raise
similar
arguments,
they
are
considered
together.

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(Compl. ¶¶ 17, 28-37.) Plaintiffs allege the following claims

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: due process, equal protection, familial

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association, and conspiracy. (Id. ¶ 22.) The factual allegations

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underlying the claims are the following: Defendants wrongfully

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removed Plaintiff Olympia Morris (“Morris”) from the custody of

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her

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investigative reports, gave false testimony during Juvenile Court

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dependency

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Juvenile Court on visits Gaines and Morris should have with each

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other, and failed to ensure Morris’ well-being while she was in

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foster care. (See id. ¶¶ 4, 6-13.)

mother,

Plaintiff

proceedings,

Jacqueline

made

Gaines

unfounded

(“Gaines”),

falsified

recommendations

to

the

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Plaintiffs’ attorneys filed a Notice of Non-Opposition

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to the pending motions on March 24, 2015. (ECF No. 38.) However,

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on April 17, 2015, Gaines filed an unverified response to the

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motions in propia persona. (ECF No. 43.)3

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I.

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LEGAL STANDARD

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A party is entitled to summary judgment if
“the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” . . . The moving party has the burden
of establishing the absence of a genuine
dispute of material fact.

21

City of Pomona v. SQM North Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th

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Cir. 2014) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)) (citing Celotex Corp.

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v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “A fact is ‘material’ when

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. . . it could affect the outcome of the case.” Thrifty Oil Co.

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v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th

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Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

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19

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3

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Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a Motion to be Relieved as Counsel on March 26,
2015, which was denied on May 6, 2015.

2

1

242, 248 (1986)). “A[] [dispute] of material fact is “genuine”

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when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

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verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

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A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion
by . . . citing to particular parts of
materials in the record . . . or . . .
showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
cannot produce admissible evidence to support
the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).

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Local Rule 260(b) prescribes:

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Any party opposing a motion for summary
judgment . . . [must] reproduce the itemized
facts in the [moving party’s] Statement of
Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that
are undisputed and deny those that are
disputed, including with each denial a
citation to the particular portions of any
pleading,
affidavit,
deposition,
interrogatory answer, admission, or other
document relied upon in support of that
denial.

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If

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the

nonmovant

does

not

“specifically

.

.

.

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[controvert duly supported] facts identified in the [movant’s]

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statement of undisputed facts,” the nonmovant “is deemed to have

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admitted the validity of the facts contained in the [movant’s]

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statement.” Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 527 (2006).

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Because a district court has no independent duty “to

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scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact,”

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and may “rely on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable

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particularity

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. . . the district court . . . [is] under no obligation to

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undertake a cumbersome review of the record on the [nonmoving

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party’s] behalf. Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011,

the

evidence

that

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precludes

summary

judgment,”

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1017 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279

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(9th Cir. 1996)).

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II.

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Each

UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

motion

is

supported

18,

2008,

with

the

following

at

school,

uncontroverted facts.

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“On

November

while

[Morris]

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entered [Vice Principal and Counselor Michele Gorman’s] office,

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and told Gorman that she was afraid to go home out of concern

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over a bad progress report. [Morris] also informed Ms. Gorman

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that her mother had hit her before.” (Statement of Undisputed

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Material Facts Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J (“SUF”) No. 2, ECF No.

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29-3.) Specifically, Morris “told . . . Gorman that her mother .

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. . [had previously] hit her across the face . . . because of her

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cellphone bill.” (Id. No. 3.) Gorman, a “mandated child abuse

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reporter . . . . completed a suspected child abuse report” on

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November

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abuse, stating: “[Morris] is fearful that her mom will hit her

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again.” (Id. Nos. 4-6.) Gorman also “telephoned [CPS]” and “spoke

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with

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written on the child abuse report.” (Id. Nos. 7-8.) “Ms. Green

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indicated that they would not be able to get a CPS worker out to

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the school that afternoon, and suggested that Gorman call law

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enforcement.” (Id. No. 9.) That same day, Gorman “called the

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Sacramento City Police and made the same report of suspected

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child abuse.” (Id. No. 10.) “[F]ollowing . . . Gorman’s call

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. . . two police officers responded to [Morris’] school” and

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“escorted [her] to her home,” where they “spoke to both Gaines

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and [Morris.]” (Id. Nos. 11-13.) The officers left, and Morris

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Leslie

2008,

Green

which

at

CPS

detailed

and

told

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Morris’

her

account

exactly

of

what

alleged

she

had

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“slept at home that night.” (Id. No. 15.)

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On

with

Defendant

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interaction with the family to a CPS supervisor” on December 10,

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2008. (Id. Nos. 16-17; Dep. Sandra Thompson 19:20-20:4, Ex. C to

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Decl. Mark P. O’Dea (“O’Dea Decl.”), ECF No. 29-5.) Thompson

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stated in that report:

abuse

and

Gaines

Thompson

November

child

Morris

Sandra

4

2008

visit

2008,

conducted

18,

home

9,

3

9

a

December

allegations,

and

regarding

the

“reported

her

[Morris] disclosed that she was afraid and
that her mom hit her in the eye a few weeks
before. She disclosed that she had blurred
vision and was still experiencing some pain.
She was crying. Her mother was pointing her
finger in her face. [I] could not calm Ms.
Gaines down, nor was [I] able to establish a
safety plan with Ms. Gaines.

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(SUF No. 18.)

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“On

December

11,

2008

.

.

.

Thompson

interviewed

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[Morris] at her school. [Morris] indicated that she was fearful

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of returning home and she reported that her mother had been

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verbally and physically abusive toward her and she was afraid of

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going to sleep at night.” (Id. No. 20.) “Thompson made a decision

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not to detain [Morris at that time] because she did not have

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enough

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circumstances existed. She also did not believe that [Morris] was

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in imminent danger while she was at school.” (Id. No. 21.) That

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same day, “[Morris] reported to the school principal and vice

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principal/counselor

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“school staff [then] called the Sacramento Police Department for

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assistance, and Officer Christopher Shippen responded.” (Id. Nos.

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22-23.) Subsequently, Officer Shippen spoke to Morris at school,

information

.

.

that

.

and

she

did

did

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not

not

believe

want

to

that

go

exigent

home,”

and

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after which he transported her home, where he “made contact with

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. . . Gaines.” (Id. Nos. 25-26.) Shippen spoke with with Morris

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and

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interaction between [Plaintiffs] became very, very heated, with

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both participants raising their voice and yelling at each other.”

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(Id. No. 27.) As a result, Officer Shippen “became concerned” and

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“decided to intervene and formulate a plan to take [Morris] into

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protective custody and transport her to the children’s receiving

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home to ensure that both parties were separated and that the

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Gaines,

and

“at

one

point

during

the

conversation

the

situation would not deteriorate any further.” (Id. No. 28.)

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“[N]o one from CPS was present at the family residence

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during the time that Officer Shippen interacted with Gaines and

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[Morris] and [when he] made the decision to take [Morris] into

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protective custody.” (Id. No. 29.) Further, “[o]n December 11,

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2008, Officer Shippen did not contact CPS . . . in connection

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with his decision to take [Morris] into protective custody.” (Id.

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No. 30.)

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“On

December

16,

2008,

the

.

.

.

Juvenile

Court

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conducted a . . . hearing” at which Gaines was represented by

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counsel. (Id. No. 34.) “At the hearing, the [Juvenile Court]

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found that . . . [living] . . . in [Gaines’] home was contrary to

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[Morris’] welfare . . . [and ordered that Morris] be detained by

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the Department of Health and Human Services.” (Id. No. 35.) The

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Juvenile Court also scheduled a status hearing on January 8,

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2009, which was continued to January 29, 2009. (Id. Nos. 36-37.)

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In

connection

with

the

Juvenile

Court

proceedings,

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Defendant Shaunte Derrick interviewed Gaines on January 21, 2009,

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and

Morris

on

January

22,

2009.
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(Id.

Nos.

38-39.)

Derrick

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subsequently “prepared a summary of the interview[s] and entered

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[them] into the CPS [c]omputer system.” (Id. No. 38.)

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On or about January 27, 2009 [Derrick]
prepared [a report] for the [January 29,
2009] hearing . . . . In preparing the
[report], [Derrick] included, verbatim, her
summaries of her interviews with [Gaines and
Morris]. In particular, [Derrick] included
all of [Gaines’] statements denying and
disputing the allegations of abuse made by
[Morris].

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(Id. No. 40.)

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The January 29, 2009 status hearing was continued to

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April 30, 2009, at which time the Juvenile Court also scheduled a

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jurisdiction/disposition hearing. (Id. Nos. 41-44.) The Juvenile

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Court held jurisdiction/disposition hearings on multiple dates in

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June and July 2009, including on June 10, 2009 and June 11, 2009,

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at which time Defendant Thompson testified. (SUF Nos. 47-48.) On

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July 21, 2009, the Juvenile Court issued an order that Morris

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“should be adjudged a dependent child of the court.” (Id. No.

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87.)

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visitation with [Morris] consistent with [Morris’] wellbeing[,]”

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and that “[t]he Department of Health and Human Services shall

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determine the time, place and manner of visitation, including the

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frequency of visits, length of visits and whether the visits are

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supervised and who supervises them.” (Statement of Undisputed

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Material Facts Supp. Davis Mot. Summ. J. (“Davis SUF”) No. 3, ECF

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No. 32.)

The

order

specified

that

Gaines

“shall

have

regular

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“Defendant Davis was assigned as Plaintiffs’ family

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reunification social worker” in June 2009, while Gaines’ custody

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of Morris was being contested in Juvenile Court. (Id. No. 2.) “At

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the time . . . Davis was assigned to the case[,] visitation
7

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[between Gaines and Morris] was supervised . . . . [Davis] . . .

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met with [Plaintiffs] about once a month.” (Id. No. 4.)

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The supervised visits [between Plaintiffs]
changed to unsupervised in April of 2010
after a meeting . . . between Defendant
Davis, Plaintiffs and [Morris’] siblings and
her grandmother. They all met and had dinner
. . . during which time Defendant Davis
witnessed
an
interaction
between
the
Plaintiffs that she had never seen throughout
the case. Her understanding was that . . .
Plaintiff Gaines and [Morris], both wanted to
reunify.
During
this
meeting,
she
saw
affection between them . . . [that] she had
not seen before.

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5
6
7
8
9
10

(Id. No. 9.)

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Following

the

meeting,

“[i]n

April

2010,

Defendant

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Davis submitted a report to the [Juvenile] Court that Plaintiff

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Gaines

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indicated to the court that she was changing her recommendation

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from

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. . . [to reunite].” (Id. No. 10.) However, in May 2010 Davis

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“recommended the court grant restricted or supervised visitation

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again.” (Id. No. 11.)

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and

[Morris]

terminating

had

Family

expressed

a

Reunification

desire

to

to

reunify

allowing

and

Plaintiffs

Defendant Davis testified she recalls . . .
that the basis for requesting the court . . .
[restrict] visitation again [in May 2010] was
because she could not assess the quality of
the interaction between Plaintiffs. There was
no feedback from Plaintiff[s] Gaines or
[Morris on this issue]. [Further, Morris] had
been observed to increase opposition toward
participating in [county] services following
the change in visitation from supervised to
unsupervised. Plaintiff Gaines testified that
she disagreed with this change of visits.
[She] felt she had no control over Defendant
[Davis’] interactions with her daughter.
(Id. Nos. 11-12.)
While Morris was in foster care she “did not have any
8

1

complaints about her care . . . . She never felt unsafe.” (Id.

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No. 13; Dep. Olympia Morris 62:15-64:11, Ex. E to Decl. Carol

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Wieckowski Supp. Davis Mot. Summ J., ECF No. 31.) When Defendant

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Davis saw Morris “within the [foster] home and . . . at school or

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in other capacities such as visitation with Plaintiff Gaines,

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[Morris]

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residing with [her foster mother.]” (Davis SUF No. 13.) “[Morris]

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testified that she was having regular visits with a social worker

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[from CPS] the whole time she lived [with her foster mother.]”

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never

expressed

any

concerns

to

.

.

.

Davis

about

(Id. No. 8.)
[Morris] asserts that [in September of 2010,
after Davis was no longer her social worker]
she was sexually assaulted in the home of two
acquaintances,
‘Robert’
and
‘Anthony’.
[Morris] was at the home of ‘Robert and
Anthony’ without the permission of [her
foster mother]. The foster [mother] had
notified the police that she suspected that
[Morris] was at [Robert and Anthony’s house],
and the police responded . . . . However,
[Morris] hid from the police and [Robert]
persuaded them that [Morris] was not there.
(SUF Nos. 106-108; Dep. Olympia Morris 90:6-96:25, Ex. A to O’Dea
Decl.; Davis SUF No. 14)
“On March 10, 2011 the Juvenile Court ordered that the
dependency of [Morris] be terminated and that sole physical and
legal custody be awarded to [Gaines].” (SUF No. 109.)
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue the motions should be granted because
“[n]o Defendant . . . removed [Morris] from [Gaines’] house or
participated

in

[her]

removal,”

and

Defendants

“acted

appropriately, professionally, responsibly, and in good faith in
investigating [Gaines’ alleged abusive treatment of Morris] and
9

1

presenting . . . information to the [J]uvenile [C]ourt.” (Defs.’

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Mot. Summ J. (“Mot.”) 3:21-24, 47:13-15, ECF No. 29.) Further,

3

Defendants argue “there is no evidence that any . . . [Defendant]

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engaged in the falsification of reports or facts submitted to the

5

[Juvenile] [C]ourt [or] . . . [was] negligent in the selection or

6

supervision of [Morris’] foster care placement.” (Mot. 38:21-23,

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45:22-25.)

8

uncontroverted facts.

9

These

arguments

Plaintiff

Gaines

adequately

responds

motions

investigators

the

with

the

11

information that was helpful to Gaines’ case in the Juvenile

12

Court dependency proceedings, and that “[d]uring the [dependency

13

hearings] . . . [Defendants] lied under oath and hid evidence

14

from the court.” (Gaines’ Response 1-2.)
Plaintiffs

CPS

the

by

conclusory

However,

that

to

supported

10

15

assertions

are

“cannot

establish

“ignored”

a

disputed

16

question of material fact, and thereby avoid summary judgment, by

17

making . . . ‘bare assertion[s]’ that [are] devoid of ‘any legal

18

or factual support.’” Kitchens v. Pierce, 565 F. App'x 590, 591

19

(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting DeNieva v. Reyes, 966 F.2d 480, 486 (9th

20

Cir.

21

genuine [dispute] of material fact to defeat summary judgment.”

22

MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th

23

Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994); see generally

24

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

25

587

26

‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see

27

whether

28

56(e)’s Advisory Committee Note on the 1963 Amendments to the

1992)).

(1986)

Further,

(stating

there

is

a

“[m]ere

the

argument

“purpose

genuine

need

10

of

for

does

summary

not

establish

judgment

trial.’”)

is

(quoting

a

to

Rule

1

Rule).

2

existence of a genuine [dispute] for trial, a properly supported

3

summary judgment motion should be granted.” Nilsson, Robbins,

4

Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F.2d

5

1538, 1545 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding the district court properly

6

granted

7

defendants

8

showing of specific facts in their opposition.”)

“In

the

the

absence

plaintiff’s

against

9

whom

of

specific

summary
summary

IV.

10

For

the

foregoing

facts

judgment
judgment

.

.

.

motion
was

showing

where

entered

the

“the

made

no

CONCLUSION
reasons,

each

Defendant’s

summary

11

judgment motion is granted, and judgment shall be entered in each

12

Defendant’s favor.

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Dated:

May 8, 2015

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